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Shrinath Buliyan Refinery v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax

Madhya Pradesh High Court
Mar 18, 2002
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Legal Opinion Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The present application (I.A. No. 796 of 2002) was filed to recall an impugned order dated July 11, 2001, which had dismissed I.T.A. No. 24 of 2001 in limine. I.T.A. No. 24 of 2001 was an appeal under Section 260A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (reported as Srinath Bullion Refinery v. CIT [2001] 251 ITR 540 (MP)). On July 9, 2001, when the appeal came up in motion hearing before a Division Bench, no counsel appeared for the applicant. The court perused the record and by the July 11 order dismissed the appeal in limine.

The applicant sought recall under Order 41, rule 19 of the Civil Procedure Code on the ground that the appellant's counsel, Shri Jagat Kumar Jain, had to leave for Maheshwar on July 6, 2001 to attend an ailing near relative and could not return to Indore in time for the July 9 hearing. An affidavit of the counsel was filed in support of this cause. The application invoked Section 260A(7) of the Income-tax Act to contend that the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code apply to appeals under Section 260A.

The Registry was directed, upon allowance of the application, to restore I.T.A. No. 24 of 2001 to the file and list it for admission before the appropriate Bench. The opinion contains a brief note "Also to current assessment year."

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether an application under Order 41, rule 19 of the Civil Procedure Code is maintainable in respect of an appeal under Section 260A of the Income-tax Act by virtue of Section 260A(7).
  2. Whether an impugned order dismissing an appeal in limine by a reasoned (speaking) order can be treated as an order passed in default of the appellant's appearance and therefore be recalled under Order 41, rule 19 on showing sufficient cause for non-appearance.
  3. What is the scope of the court's inquiry when a party applies to recall an order alleged to have been passed in default of their appearance (i.e., the sufficiency of the cause shown).

Arguments of the Parties

Applicant's (Appellant's) Arguments

  • The application under Order 41, rule 19 is maintainable for appeals under Section 260A because Section 260A(7) applies the Civil Procedure Code provisions to such appeals.
  • The impugned order was passed in the absence of the appellant or the appellant's counsel (i.e., in default), and therefore the appellant has the right to apply for recall by showing sufficient cause for non-appearance.
  • The affiant-counsel's affidavit explains that due to an unavoidable circumstance (attending an ailing relative in Maheshwar) he was unable to return to Indore for the hearing on July 9, 2001, which constitutes sufficient cause within the meaning of Order 41, rule 19.

Respondent's Contentions

  • The impugned order was a reasoned (speaking) order dismissing the appeal on merits, and therefore, it could not be recalled. (The opinion records this contention and describes it as not sustainable.)

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Srinath Bullion Refinery v. CIT, I.T.A. No. 24 of 2001 ([2001] 251 ITR 540 (MP)) The impugned order dated July 11, 2001 (dismissing I.T.A. No. 24 of 2001 in limine) — the order sought to be recalled. The court recalled the impugned July 11, 2001 order and restored I.T.A. No. 24 of 2001 to the file for hearing on admission.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in identifiable steps, based on the statutory text and the factual record before it:

  1. Applicability of Civil Procedure Code: The court accepted the submission that Section 260A(7) of the Income-tax Act makes the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code applicable to appeals under Section 260A; therefore, recourse to Order 41, rule 19 is permissible in respect of such appeals.
  2. Test for maintainability of an application under Order 41, rule 19: The court held that the primary enquiry is whether the impugned order was passed in default of the appellant's appearance (i.e., in the absence of the appellant or his counsel). If so, the order is subject to being set aside upon a showing of sufficient cause for non-appearance.
  3. Effect of a reasoned/speaking dismissal: The court rejected the contention that a dismissal by a reasoned (speaking) order removes the right to seek recall. It held that merely because an appeal was dismissed by a reasoned order does not take away the appellant's statutory right to apply for restoration when the impugned order was passed in default. The court cited the newly added Explanation to Rule 17(1) of Order 41 as supporting the proposition that dismissal under that provision shall not be construed as dismissal on the merits.
  4. Principle of statutory rights and defaults: The court emphasized the settled principle that a right conferred by the Legislature on a litigant cannot be taken away by court orders or made dependent on the nature of the order. Thus, if a party suffers an order in their absence, the provisions of Order 9 and Order 41, rule 19 apply to remedy orders passed in default.
  5. Scope of inquiry on recall: In proceedings under Order 41, rule 19 the court's scope of inquiry is limited to whether a good or sufficient cause has been shown to empower the court to recall the impugned order.
  6. Evaluation of the cause shown: The court found the affidavit of the appellant's counsel credible and accepted that unavoidable circumstances had compelled the counsel to leave Indore for Maheshwar and prevented appearance on July 9, 2001. The court therefore concluded that sufficient cause had been shown within the meaning of Order 41, rule 19.
  7. Limitation on grounds allowed: The court expressly recorded that it did not entertain or allow the application on any grounds under Order 47, Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code; the recall was granted only by recourse to Order 41, rule 19.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The application under Order 41, rule 19 is allowed; the impugned order dated July 11, 2001 (dismissing I.T.A. No. 24 of 2001) is recalled and I.T.A. No. 24 of 2001 is restored to the file for hearing on admission.

Immediate consequences and practical implications:

  • The Registry was directed to list I.T.A. No. 24 of 2001 for admission before the appropriate Bench hearing such appeals.
  • The decision was in favour of the appellant (the application for recall succeeded on the ground of sufficient cause for non-appearance of counsel).
  • The court clarified that the recall was effected solely under the statutory remedy provided by Order 41, rule 19 and by operation of Section 260A(7); the court did not grant relief under Order 47, Rule 1.
  • The opinion does not state that a new precedent was laid down; it articulates and applies established principles regarding recall of orders passed in default and the right to invoke Order 41, rule 19 even where a dismissal is by a reasoned order.

This summary is based exclusively on the content of the provided opinion and does not add or infer information beyond the text.

Show all summary ...

Maintainability of application under Order 41 rule 19 of Civil Procedure Code--Non-appearance of counsel of assessee Catch Note:

Due to non-appearance of counsel of appellant appeal under section 260A was dismissed--Appellant filed application for recalling order of High Court, under Order 41, rule 19 as there was sufficient cause for non-apperance of counsel of appellant--Respondent contended that order was passed on merits, therefore, same could not be recalled--Not sustainable--Once it is found that impugned order was passed in absence of appellant or/and his counsel, then it becomes an order having been passed in default of assessee's appearance, thereby entitling appellant for its setting aside by showing sufficient cause for his non-appearance--Therefore, merely because appeal was dismissed by a reasoned order that would not take away right of appellant to apply, for its restoration--Hence, on sufficient cause having been shown by appellant order passed under section 260A is recalled.

Ratio:

Once it is found that impugned order was passed in absence of appellant or/and his counsel, then it becomes an order having been passed in default of assessee's appearance, thereby entitling the appellant for its setting aside by showing sufficient cause for his non-appearance, therefore, merely because appeal was dismissed by a reasoned order that would not take away right of appellant to apply for its restoration--Hence, on sufficient cause having been shown by appellant order passed under section 260A is recalled.

Held:

The cause shown in the application (I. A. No. 796 of 2002) made under Order 41, rule 19 of the Civil Procedure Code does constitutes a sufficient cause within the meaning of Order 41, rule 19, which prevented counsel from appearance, when the appeal was called on for hearing. Indeed there is no reason to disbelieve the affidavit filed by counsel deposing that due to some unavoidable circumstance, he was forced to leave Indore.

The application under Order 41, rule 19, ibid is maintainable by virtue of section 260A(7) and notwithstanding the dismissal of the appeal in limine by a reasoned order. Merely because appeal was dismissed by a reasoned order that would not take away right of appellant to apply for its restoration. In order to decide whether an application under Order 41, rule 19, ibid is maintainable or not, what has to be seen is whether impugned order was passed in default of the appellant's appearance. Once it is found that the impugned order was passed in absence of appellant or/and his counsel, then it becomes an order having been passed in default of his appearance, thereby entitling the appellant for its setting aside by showing sufficient cause for his non-appearance.

Under these circumstances, even if the suit or appeal is dismissed by the court on the merits, nevertheless, the plaintiff or the appellant as the case may be shall have a right to invoke the provisions of Order 9, or/and Order 41, rule 19, treating the impugned order to be an order passed in default. It being a settled principle of law that a right conferred on a litigant by the legislature cannot be taken away by the orders of the court, nor such right can be made dependent upon the nature of the order passed. Once the party to a suit/appeal suffers any order in their absence from the court, the provisions of Orders 9 and 41, rule 19, are attracted to get rid of the orders passed in their default. In such proceedings, the scope of inquiry is whether a good or sufficient cause is made out so as to empower the court to recall the order impugned.

Court has recalled the order impugned only by recourse to the provisions contained in Order 41, rule 19, ibid.

Application:

Also to current assessment year.

Decision:

In favour of appellant.

Income Tax Act 1961 s.260A Civil Procedure Code 1908 Order 41 Civil Procedure Code 1908 r.19 JUDGMENT A.M. Sapre, J.

1. By this application made essentially under Order 41, rule 19, read with Order 47, Rule 1, of the Civil Procedure Code, the applicant seeks for recalling of the order dated July 11, 2001, passed by this court in I. T. A. No. 24 of 2001 (Srinath Bullion Refinery v. CIT [2001] 251 ITR 540). The facts which led to the filing of this application lie in a narrow compass. They need mention in brief.

2. The applicant was the appellant of I. T. A. No. 24 of 2001 (see [2001] 251 ITR 540 (MP)) out of which this application arises. The said I. T. A. No. 24 of 2001 which was an appeal under Section 260A of the Income-tax Act, 1961, came up for hearing on the question of admission before a Division Bench of this court on July 9, 2001, in motion hearing. None appeared for the applicant when the case was called on for hearing. This court perused the record of the case, i.e., I. T. A. No. 24 of 2001 (see [2001] 251 ITR 540 (MP)), and by an impugned order dated July 11, 2001, dismissed the appeal in limine. It is this dismissal which has given rise to the filing of this application.

3. In substance, the application for recalling of the impugned order is founded on the allegations that counsel for the appellant, Shri Jagat Kumar Jain, had to leave for Maheswar on July 6, 2001, all of a sudden to attend his near relative who was ailing. It is alleged that Mr. Jain could not come back to Indore on July 9, 2001, and had to remain at Maheshwar to attend his ailing relative. An affidavit of Mr. Jain is also filed in support of the cause pleaded in the application. It is on this cause, a prayer is made to recall the impugned order as according to applicant, the cause pleaded does constitute a sufficient cause as contemplated under Order 41, rule 19 of the Civil Procedure Code.

4. Heard Shri S. C. Bagadia, learned senior counsel, with Shri D. K. Chhabra, learned counsel, for the applicant.

5. The submission of learned counsel for the applicant was that by virtue of Section 260A(7) of the Income-tax Act, the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code relating to appeals filed in the High Court are made applicable to appeals filed under Section 260A ibid and it is for this reason the application under Order 41, rule 19 of the Civil Procedure Code, is maintainable. Learned counsel urged that since the impugned order was passed in default of the appellant's appearance, the appellant will always be at liberty to apply for its recalling by making an application under Order 41, rule 19 of the Civil Procedure Code notwithstanding the dismissal of appeal on the merits (i.e., by a speaking order). In other words, the submission was that even though the impugned order is a speaking one dismissing an appeal on the merits, yet the same has to be treated as a dismissal in default attracting the provisions of Order 41, rule 19 of the Civil Procedure Code.

6. Having heard learned counsel for the appellant and having perused the record of the case, we are inclined to allow this application and recall the impugned order, thereby restoring I. T. A. No. 24 of 2001 (see [2001] 251 ITR 540 (MP)), to its file for hearing on admission.

7. In our considered opinion, the cause shown in the application (I. A. No. 796 of 2002) made under Order 41, rule 19 of the Civil Procedure Code does constitutes a sufficient cause within the meaning of Order 41, rule 19, which prevented counsel from appearing on July 9, 2001, when the appeal was called on for hearing. Indeed there is no reason to disbelieve the affidavit filed by counsel deposing that due to some unavoidable circumstance, he was forced to leave Indore.

8. We are also inclined to accept the submission of learned counsel for the applicant when he urged that the application under Order 41, rule 19, ibid is maintainable by virtue of Section 260A(7) and notwithstanding the dismissal of the appeal in limine by a reasoned order. In our opinion, merely because the appeal was dismissed by a reasoned order that would not take away the right of the appellant to apply for its restoration. In order to decide whether an application under Order 41, rule 19, ibid is maintainable or not what has to be seen is whether the impugned order was passed in default of the appellant's appearance. Once it is found that the impugned order was passed in the absence of the appellant or/and his counsel, then it becomes an order having been passed in default of his appearance, thereby entitling the appellant for its setting aside by showing sufficient cause for his non-appearance. This court cannot non-suit the appellant simply on the ground that the impugned order being a speaking one, the remedy of the appellant is in appeal. In other words, the scheme of Order 9 which has its application to suits and that of Order 41, Rule 17 and Rule 19, which has its application to appeals do indicate that courts do not possess the power to dismiss the suit or appeal as the case may be on the merits if the plaintiff or the appellant does not appear when the case is called on for hearing. This legal position is made luculent by the newly added Explanation to Rule 17(1) of Order 41 of the Civil Procedure Code, which clearly lays down that the order of dismissal of an appeal passed under Sub-rule (1) shall not be construed to have been passed on the merits. Under these circumstances, even if the suit or appeal is dismissed by the court on the merits, nevertheless, the plaintiff or the appellant as the case may be shall have a right to invoke the provisions of Order 9 or/and Order 41, rule 19, treating the impugned order to be an order passed in default. It being a settled principle of law that a right conferred on a litigant by the Legislature cannot be taken away by the orders of the court, nor such right can be made dependent upon the nature of the order passed. Once the party to a suit/appeal suffers any order in their absence from the court, the provisions of Orders 9 and 41, rule 19, are attracted to get rid of the orders passed in their default. In such proceedings, the scope of inquiry is whether a good or sufficient cause is made out so as to empower the court to recall the order impugned.

9. We may make it clear that we have neither entertained nor allowed the application made by the applicant on any of the grounds taken by the applicant under Order 47, Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code. We have recalled the order impugned only by recourse to the provisions contained in Order 41, rule 19, ibid.

10. Accordingly and in view of the aforesaid discussion, the application is allowed. Impugned order dated July 11, 2001, passed in I. T. A. No. 24 of 2001 (see [2001] 251 ITR 540 (MP)), is hereby recalled. As a consequence, I. T. A. No. 24 of 2001 (see [2001] 251 ITR 540 (MP)), is restored to its file. The Registry is directed to list the appeal, i.e., I. T. A. No. 24 of 2001 (see [2001] 251 ITR 540 (MP)), for admission before the appropriate Bench hearing such appeals.