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Hargovind Johari v. Zila Panchayat, Morena And Others

Madhya Pradesh High Court
Jan 30, 1996
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Structured Summary of the Court Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner is a Member of the Zila Panchayat, District Morena. Some members requisitioned a meeting to express no confidence; the meeting was scheduled for 9th December 1995 at 1:30 AM. The presiding officer reported that quorum was not available and adjourned the meeting (the opinion records different adjourned dates in places: one passage indicates adjournment to 20th December 1995 and a later operative passage refers to adjournment to 12th December 1995). Annexure P/1 is the communication of that adjournment and is challenged in this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The petitioner contends that, because the requisite members were not present, the no-confidence motion should be deemed to have failed and the meeting could not be simply adjourned. The State opposes the challenge and relies on a Division Bench decision (Shankerlal v. Collector, Mandsaur and Ors., 1975) for the proposition that a no-confidence meeting can be adjourned.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a meeting summoned for the purpose of expressing a no-confidence motion can be adjourned for want of quorum.
  2. Whether, under the Madhya Pradesh Panchayat Raj Adhiniyam, 1993 and the Rules framed thereunder (particularly the Rules of 1994), an adjournment can validly postpone the meeting beyond the fifteen-day period prescribed by Rule 3(3) from the date of the original requisition.
  3. Who is authorised to fix the date of a no-confidence meeting and whether the presiding officer has power to adjourn or fix a fresh date in contravention of the statutory scheme (i.e., whether the Commissioner of the Division's role in fixing the date is mandatory and exclusive).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • A meeting called to express no confidence cannot be adjourned for want of quorum; if quorum is absent, the motion should be deemed to have failed.
  • Under the Adhiniyam of 1993, if a motion fails once, another no-confidence motion cannot be brought for a period of one year (in the case of President of Zila Panchayat); thus, deeming the original motion to have failed when quorum is absent has significant consequences and should follow from a failure to meet quorum.
  • The Rules of 1994 (under the Adhiniyam of 1993) contain a detailed procedure (including Rule 5 on manner of conducting a meeting) which differs materially from the earlier regime; those specific rules should govern and preclude adjournment in the manner that occurred.
  • The prescribed authority (the Commissioner of the Division) must fix the date within fifteen days; the presiding officer (Collector or Additional Collector) is only to preside and lacks authority to fix or adjourn the meeting beyond that scheme. Therefore a notice of adjournment originating from the Collector (rather than the Commissioner) is not valid in the petitioner's submission.

State's Arguments (Respondents)

  • Reliance on the Division Bench decision in Shankerlal v. Collector, Mandsaur and Ors. (1975), which held that a meeting convened to express lack of confidence can be adjourned and that the ordinary rules of quorum apply to such meetings.
  • Implicitly, the State contends that the presiding officer's adjournment was within lawful powers as understood under the authority of the cited decision.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Shankerlal v. Collector, Mandsaur and Ors., 1975 MPLJ 190 = 1975 JLJ 500 Authority for the proposition that a meeting convened to express lack of confidence can be adjourned and that ordinary quorum rules apply to such meetings. The Court examined and accepted the Division Bench's general proposition that a no-confidence meeting can be adjourned. However, the Court distinguished the precedent on the ground that the statutory scheme and rules (the 1994 Rules under the 1993 Adhiniyam) materially differ from the earlier Act and Rules considered in Shankerlal. Consequently, while the precedent's principle was acknowledged, the Court held that under the specific and mandatory provisions of Rule 3(3) of the 1994 Rules a meeting cannot be validly adjourned beyond the fifteen-day period prescribed from the date of the original requisition; thus the precedent did not permit the adjournment in the present case.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeds in the following manner:

  1. Identification of the core question: whether a meeting summoned to express a no-confidence motion can be adjourned for want of quorum.
  2. Comparison of statutory schemes: the Court noted material differences between the earlier Madhya Pradesh Panchayat Act, 1962 (and its rules of 1964) considered in Shankerlal and the Madhya Pradesh Panchayat Raj Adhiniyam, 1993 with the Rules of 1994 framed under it. The Court emphasised that the Rules of 1994 specify the method and manner for conducting no-confidence meetings in greater detail than the earlier law.
  3. Specific distinctions identified by the Court:
    • The 1994 Rules prescribe a detailed procedure for conducting no-confidence meetings (including Rule 5) that was not present in the 1962 regime.
    • Under the 1994 Rules, a meeting for expressing no confidence must be held within fifteen days; absent compliance, the original notice lapses (Rule 3(3) was cited).
    • The date of the meeting is to be fixed by the prescribed authority (the Commissioner of the Division), and thereafter a presiding officer (Collector or Additional Collector) is appointed. The presiding officer's role is to preside; the Rules do not vest in that officer the power to fix a fresh date or to adjourn in a manner that defeats the statutory time limit.
    • The 1993 Adhiniyam contains a provision that if a no-confidence motion fails then another meeting cannot be called for one year in relation to the President of the Zila Panchayat; this substantive consequence was absent in the earlier Act.
  4. Examination of Shankerlal: the Court acknowledged that Shankerlal is authority for the general proposition that a no-confidence meeting can be adjourned and that adjournment power under a general provision (sub-section (4) of Section 30 in the earlier Act) could apply where the specific rules were silent. The Court quoted the Division Bench's reasoning that, in the absence of express provision, the general adjournment power could apply to such meetings.
  5. Application to the present statutory scheme: nonetheless, the Court found the 1994 Rules are not silent; they are specific. Because Rule 3(3) imposes a mandatory time limit (fifteen days for holding the meeting), any adjournment that results in holding the meeting beyond that period would conflict with the statutory scheme. Therefore, even accepting the general principle from Shankerlal that adjournment is possible, the Court concluded that adjournment cannot be exercised so as to defeat the express and mandatory time limit prescribed by Rule 3(3).
  6. Conclusion tied to facts: applying the above legal analysis, the Court held that the particular adjournment recorded in Annexure P/1 (which the opinion states adjourned the meeting to a date beyond the fifteen-day period) was invalid because it did not comply with Rule 3(3) of the 1994 Rules.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: PETITION ALLOWED; NOTICE ANNEXURE P/1 HELD INVALID.

Consequences and immediate effects:

  • The Court held that the notice (Annexure P/1) by which the meeting was adjourned to a date beyond the fifteen-day period prescribed under Rule 3(3) of the 1994 Rules is not a valid meeting.
  • The requisitionist who had made the original request under Rule 3(1) of the Rules of 1994 is permitted to make a fresh requisition for convening a meeting of no confidence in accordance with the statutory procedure and timelines.
  • The Court distinguished the earlier Division Bench decision (Shankerlal) on the basis of material differences in the statutory and regulatory framework; the earlier authority was not applied so as to override the specific mandatory provisions of the 1994 Rules in this case.

The opinion does not state that it is laying down a broader new precedent beyond applying and distinguishing existing authority; its decision is cast as an application of the specific statutory and rule-based requirements to the facts before the Court, with the direct effect described above.

Show all summary ...

1. Can a meeting summoned with a view to express no confidence can be adjourned for want of quorum? This precise question has been raised in this petition preferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

2. The brief facts which have led to the filing of this petition be noticed as under.

3. The petitioner is a Member of Zila Panchayat, District Morena. Some Members of the Zila Panchayat moved the competent authority for getting a meeting convened for the purposes of expressing no confidence. This meeting was scheduled to be held on 9th of December, 1995 at 1.30 AM. The presiding officer found that quorum was not available. He adjourned the meeting to 20th of December, 1995. The information given by the presiding officer that the meeting has been adjourned from 9th of December, 1995 to 20th of December, 1995 is contained in Annexure P/l. This is being impugned in the present petition. As indicated above, the basic challenge is that a meeting called for expressing no confidence cannot be adjourned for want of quorum. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner as the requisite members of the Zila Panchayat were not present, the meeting should be deemed to have failed.

4. The stand taken by the petitioner is being opposed by the State. The basic reliance is being placed on a Division Bench judgment of this Court reported as Shankerlal v. Collector, Mandsaur and Ors., 1975 MPLJ190 = 1975 JLJ 500. The aforementioned authority supports the respondents that a meeting for no confidence can also be adjourned. As this position is sought to be distinguished on the ground that the provisions of the statute which were there before their Lordships in the above case are different from the provisions contained in the Madhya Pradesh Panchayat Raj Adhiniyam, 1993, it would be apt to notice the statutory provisions in both the Acts i.e., Madhya Pradesh Panchayat Act, 1962 (hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1962) and Madhya Pradesh Panchayat Raj Adhiniyam, 1993 (hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1993). The relevant statutory provisions are Section 24 of the Act of 1962 and Section 35 of the Act of 1993. These be noticed and read as under:

5. The rules enacted under the two statutes also does require to be noticed. Under the Act of 1962, Rule known as Madhya Pradesh Gram Panchayats (No-confidence Motion Against Sarpanch or Up-Sarpanch) Rules, 1964 were framed. Under the Rules of 1964, a notice was required to be given by the secretary of the Body and the meeting was to be called by him under his own signature. The presiding authority has been indicated in Rule 5 of the Rules of 1964. Under the Adhiniyam, 1993 also rules have been framed. These are known as Madhya Pradesh Panchayat (Gram Panchayat Ke Sarpanch Tatha Up-Sarpanch, Janapad Panchayat Tatha Zila Panchayat Ke President Tatha Vice-President Ke Virudha Avishwas Prastav) Niyam, 1994. In these rules, Section 3 deals with the requirement of giving notice. Rule 4 deals with appointment of presiding officer, Rule 5 deals with the method and manner in which a meeting is to be conducted, Rule 6 deals with the question as to how the minutes of the proceedings are recorded. As the two rules differ in some manner, therefore, it would be apt to notice rules also.

6. Reverting back to the decision in Shankerlal's case (supra), it has been held that no confidence motion can be adjourned and the rule of quorum which is applicable to other meetings would apply also to a meeting where no confidence is to be expressed.

7. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that there are material differences in the rules framed under the Adhiniyam, 1993 and these are pointed out by him as under :

(i) that, under the Adhiniyam of 1993 once a motion fails then another no confidence motion cannot be brought for a period of one year. According to him, when there is lack of quorum the no confidence motion should be deemed to have failed and by operation of law another meeting for expressing no confidence cannot be held before one year;

(ii) that, so far as the rules are concerned, it has been pointed that under the rules of 1964, there is no provision corresponding to Rule 5 of the Rules of 1994 which deals with the method and manner in which a motion for confidence is required to be held. This was not present in the Act of 1962, therefore, by analogy one had to lean upon the provisions of Section 30 of the Act of 1962 for the purposes of conducting the meeting. As in the present Adhiniyam, 1993, separate and detailed rules have been framed with regard to the manner and method in which a meeting is to be conducted, therefore, Section 44 of the Adhiniyam, 1993, would not be attracted for the purposes of this case;

(iii) that, under the Rules of 1994, a meeting for no confidence is to be held within a period of fifteen days and a date for this is to be fixed by the prescribed authority. The prescribed authority in the case of Zila Panchayat is the Commissioner of the Division. Once the Commissioner of the Division fixes a date then he further indicates the person who has to preside over the meeting. The person who is to preside over the meeting is Collector or the Additional Collector. Presiding Officer has no power to fix a date for meeting.

8. The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the person who is nominated to preside over the meeting is merely to preside over the meeting. According to him, he has to conduct the proceeding and he has no power to adjourn the meeting and again he has no power to fix a date. It has also been pointed out that for fixing a date one will have to depend upon the Commissioner of the Division. It is further argued that if the matter is to go before the Commissioner after the period of fifteen days has lapsed then the Commissioner would also not have any power to get a meeting convened.

9. The further argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that since a notice of the adjourned meeting has been given by the Collector, he is not the person who could be said to have been authorised to give a notice and the notice has to originate from the Commissioner.

10. I am of the view that there is material difference between the statutory provisions which were there before their Lordships of the Division Bench in Shankerlal's case (supra) and in this case. These are indicated as under:

(i) that, as to how a meeting is to be conducted is indicated in the rules of 1994 framed under the Adhiniyam, 1993. It was not so under the Act of 1962 which were considered by the Division Bench in Shankerlal's case (supra). It was precisely for this reason, the statutory provisions contained in the Act of 1962 with regard at holding of meetings were taken note of;

(ii) that, under the Rules of 1994 prepared under the Adhiniyam, 1993, a meeting for expressing no confidence has to be called within a period of fifteen days. If it is not done then the original notice would lapse. This factor was again missing under the rules framed under the Act of 1962;

(iii) that, the date of fixing a meeting is to be indicated by the prescribed authority and thereafter an officer has to be appointed for holding the meeting of no confidence under the rules of 1994. In the present case, the date is to be fixed by the Commissioner of the Division. The meeting is to be presided over by the Collector or the Additional Collector. Under the old Act which was being considered by the Division Bench, the fixation of meeting was to be by the same functionary and the Sarpanch or Up-Sarpanch as the case may be to preside over the meeting; and

(iv) that, the Adhiniyam of 1993 makes a provision to the effect that if a no confidence motion fails then another meeting for no confidence cannot be called for at least one year in case of President of Zila Panchayat. This was again missing in the old Act.

11. The above distinctions which have been pointed are material. As a matter of fact, the distinction pointed out that the method and manner of conducting the meeting of no confidence has been indicated under the Rules of 1994 is very material. There is no requirement of quorum being there in Rule 5. If this be the position then the meeting could not be adjourned. It is further to be seen that the officer who is presiding over the meeting is merely authorised to preside over the meeting. He has not been authorised to fix another date for the purposes of holding a meeting and in case a meeting is ordered to be held beyond the period of fifteen days then this would be in breach of the rules referred to above.

12. The decision given by the Division Bench of this Court in Shankerlal's case (supra) be now examined.

13. The above decision is an authority for the proposition that a meeting which is called with a view to express lack of confidence can also be adjourned. The relevant observations made are as under :

"....There is nothing in Section 24 or the relevant Rules to provide for a case like the present where the meeting could not be held at the time specified in accordance with Rule 4 due to absence of all Panchas on account of which it had to be adjourned. Section 24 and the corresponding rules are silent on the point of adjournment of the meeting so convened. In view of the express content of Rule 4 of the 1964 Rules, it cannot be doubted that the time of the meeting is required to be expressly stated in the notice given under Rule 4 to every Panch. Such a notice is required to be given seven clear days before the meeting. Thereafter the Rules are silent and make no provision to regulate an adjournment which may become necessary for several reasons including want of quorum as in the present case. It would be reasonable to hold that the provision of sub-section (4) of Section 30 which provides for adjournment of a meeting applies to such a meeting also the same being not inconsistent in any manner with Section 24 or the corresponding rules. To hold otherwise, would lead to the curious result that there would be no provision to govern the adjournment of a meeting required to be held under Section 24 of the Act where the same cannot be held at the specified time for any reason whatsoever, even though provision is made to regulate adjournment of ordinary meetings in sub-section (4) of Section 30. The further inevitable consequence would be that the power to adjourn a meeting convened for the purposes of Section 24 of the Act being undoubted for the reasons already given the same would be untrammelled even though such a meeting is bound to be an important one...."

Even if this view expressed by the Division Bench is accepted and it is conceded that a meeting summoned with a view to express lack of confidence is like any other meeting and can be adjourned, the question still remains whether this could be adjourned in manner which would be in conflict with the mandatory provisions indicated in the Rules of 1994. The question arises as to who could adjourn it and for which date? As noticed above, under the Rules of 1994, the decision as to when a meeting is to be convened is left with the Commissioner of the Division in this case. It is this officer who takes a decision to appoint a presiding officer. Again, the meeting for expressing lack of confidence has to be held within fifteen days from the date a request is made in this regard to the Commissioner of the Division. Thus, even if it is conceded that a meeting summoned with a view to express" lack of confidence can be adjourned even then the petitioner in entitled to the relief to the extent that this meeting could not be adjourned beyond fifteen days to be calculated from the date of the original request.

14. Thus, I am of the view :

(i) that, the Rules of 1994 are materially different from the statutory provisions which were under consideration before the Division Bench in Shankerlal 's case 1975 MPU 190 = 1975 JLJ 500, and

(ii) that, the Rules of 1994 and more particularly Rule 5 indicated a detailed procedure and no provision is made for adjournment of a meeting and even if it be conceded that the view expressed in Shankerlal's case (supra) that such a meeting can be adjourned even then in view of the provisions contained in Rule 3(3) of Rules, 1994, this meeting could not be adjourned beyond a period of fifteen days from the date of receipt of the notice referred to in Rule 3(1) of the Rules of 1994.

15. Accordingly, it is held that the notice, Annexure P/l by which meeting was adjourned to 12th of December, 1995, being beyond a period of fifteen days, as indicated in Rule 3(3) of the Rules of 1994, would not be a valid meeting. This petition is allowed. The requisitionist who sent a notice to the prescribed authority under Rule 3(1) of the Rules of 1994, would be at liberty to make a fresh requisition for getting a meeting of no confidence convened.