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Ramesh v. State Of Madhya Pradesh
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellant-accused (Ramesh) was convicted by the Sessions Judge, Shajapur (judgment dated 10-5-1991 in S.T. No. 176/90) of offences under Sections 302 and 449 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to imprisonment for life and 10 years rigorous imprisonment respectively. He appealed under Section 374 of the Criminal Procedure Code.
The prosecution case was that on 17-5-1990 the accused came to the house of the deceased, Shantabai, poured kerosene on her, set her on fire and ran away. The deceased suffered extensive burn injuries (medical evidence recorded 84% burns) and died on 17-5-1990 after being shifted to hospital and later to M.Y. Hospital, Indore. Multiple statements/dying declarations were recorded: orally to a neighbour (Satishsingh), orally to family members (Devisingh and Chandersingh), in writing to a Sub-Inspector (Ex. P8) and a formal dying declaration recorded by an Executive Magistrate (Ex. P5). An FIR/report (Ex. P2) was lodged the same day. Police seized an empty bottle and a half-burnt petticoat smelling of kerosene (seizure memo Ex. P3). The accused denied guilt at trial and claimed false implication; the Sessions Judge convicted him. The appeal challenges the conviction and sentences.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the conviction under Sections 302 and 449, IPC could be sustained on the basis of the dying declarations and related testimonial and circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution.
- Whether the identification of the accused as the person who set the deceased on fire was established sufficiently by the evidence on record.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The witnesses examined by the prosecution were inimical to the appellant (suggesting bias or hostility).
- The dying declarations could not be believed in the absence of independent corroboration.
- It was contended that from the dying declarations it was not established that the accused was the same Ramesh who set the deceased on fire (i.e., a challenge to identity).
Respondent's (Prosecution) Arguments
- The Public Prosecutor submitted that there was strong and cogent evidence in the form of multiple dying declarations (both oral and written) proving the charges against the accused beyond doubt.
- The prosecution relied on medical evidence, contemporaneous statements and seizure of items (empty bottle, half-burnt petticoat smelling of kerosene) to support the account that the accused poured kerosene and set the deceased on fire.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Munnu Raja v. State of M.P., (1976) 3 SCC 104 : 1976 Cri LJ 54 | Authority for the proposition that a conviction can be founded on a dying declaration if the court is satisfied it is true, free from prompting, coherent and consistent, even without corroboration. | The court invoked this principle to support the proposition that the dying declarations in the instant case, being consistent and free from prompting, could form the basis of conviction. |
| Kusha v. State of Orissa, AIR 1980 SC 559 : 1980 Cri LJ 408 | Support for the established law on dying declarations and their admissibility/weight when found reliable. | The court relied on this authority together with Munnu Raja to justify reliance on the deceased's consistent dying declarations to uphold conviction. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded by examining the evidence in these principal strands: medical proof of cause of death, testimonial accounts (including dying declarations and res gestae evidence), documentary actions by police, and the defence contentions.
- Medical evidence: The court noted that Dr. D.S. Mehta (P.W. 3) examined the deceased on 17-5-1990 and recorded 84% burn injuries (Ex. P1A). Dr. Vijay Agrawal (P.W. 8) performed the autopsy on 18-5-1990 and confirmed burns as cause of death (Ex. P6). Both doctors stated that the injuries could be caused by pouring kerosene and setting fire. The defence did not successfully challenge this medical evidence in cross-examination.
- Reliance on witnesses and dying declarations: The court observed that the child witness Rekha (P.W. 5) was rejected by the trial court for reasons of possible tutoring and doubtful presence at the scene. Consequently, the prosecution's case depended principally on dying declarations and the contemporaneous res gestae witness, Satishsingh (P.W. 9).
- Independent bystander evidence: Satishsingh (P.W. 9), who rented part of the accused's house opposite the deceased's house, reached the scene first, helped extinguish the fire, and reported that the deceased told him Ramesh (her neighbour/landlord) had set her on fire. The court regarded him as an independent, non-animosity witness whose testimony was unshaken in cross-examination.
- Corroboration by immediate family and report: Devisingh (P.W. 4) and Chandersingh (P.W. 1) corroborated the account that the deceased named Ramesh as the culprit. Chandersingh lodged a report (Ex. P2) at the police station the same day, which recorded that the deceased had disclosed the identity of her assailant—providing contemporaneous corroboration for the statements.
- Police-recorded statement and admissibility: Sub-Inspector Mahendrasingh (P.W. 10) recorded a statement (Ex. P8) by the deceased. The court treated this statement, recorded during investigation, as admissible under Section 32 of the Evidence Act and observed that it was consistent with earlier statements.
- Formal dying declaration: The formal dying declaration (Ex. P5) recorded by Executive Magistrate Siddheshwar Vyas (P.W. 6) was supported by a medical certificate from Dr. Mehta (P.W. 3) that the deceased was conscious throughout. The court found the magistrate's and doctor's testimony credible and saw no reason to doubt them.
- Consideration of corroborative material and defence objections: The court noted seizure of an empty bottle and a half-burnt petticoat smelling of kerosene at the scene (Ex. P3) as important corroborative circumstances. In reply to the defence point that the post-mortem did not detect kerosene smell, the court observed that the deceased had been treated and her clothes changed before autopsy, plausibly explaining absence of smell at autopsy—an explanation drawn from Dr. Agrawal’s testimony.
- Identity and motive: The court addressed the defence contention that the dying declarations did not establish identity. It pointed out that the deceased had named the accused and provided his father's name and residence to fix identity. Satishsingh’s testimony that he rented part of the accused's house further supported the accused’s identity as the person named by the deceased. The court also noted motive: quarrels between the deceased and accused days before the incident and the accused's alleged solicitation for the deceased to live with him.
- Legal standard on dying declarations: The court cited established authorities holding that a dying declaration, if found to be truthful, unprompted, coherent and consistent, can sustain a conviction even without corroboration. Applying that standard, the court found the multiple consistent statements of the deceased trustworthy.
- Conclusion of analysis: On the cumulative assessment—medical proof of death by burns, consistent and credible dying declarations (oral and written), independent eyewitness account, contemporaneous report and seizure of kerosene-related items—the court found both the charges under Sections 449 and 302 IPC proved beyond reasonable doubt against the accused.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The appeal is dismissed; the convictions under Sections 449 and 302, IPC are upheld and the sentences imposed by the Sessions Judge affirmed.
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: The appellant-accused remains convicted on both charges and must serve the sentences as awarded by the trial court. The appellant, who was on bail, is directed to surrender to his bail before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Shajapur, to serve out the sentence subject to the provision of Section 428, Cr.P.C., as stated in the judgment.
- No broader precedent declared: The opinion applies established principles regarding dying declarations and does not purport to lay down any new legal principle beyond affirming that consistent, unprompted dying declarations—when supported by corroborative circumstances and credible witness testimony—can sustain a conviction.
This summary has been prepared strictly from the content of the provided opinion. No information beyond the opinion text has been added.
1. Aggrieved by his conviction under Sections 302 and 449 of the I.P.C. and sentences of imprisonment for life and 10 years rigorous imprisonment awarded therefor respectively by the Sessions Judge, Shajapur vide judgment dated 10-5-91 passed in S.T. No. 176/90, the appellant-accused has preferred this appeal under Section 374, Cr.P.C.
2. Devisingh (P.W. 4) is the husband of the deceased Shantabai who died of burn injuries on 17-5-90. Rekha (P.W. 5) is their 9 years old daughter. Chandersingh (P.W. 1) is the nephew (sister's son) of Devisingh.
3. The case of the prosecution against the appellant-accused in the trial Court was that at the relevant time the accused lived in 'Nai Abadi' Maksi in front of the house of Devisingh, Satishsingh (P.W. 9) occupied portion of the accused's house on rent. Accused, it is said, used to insist Shantabai to come and live with him as his wife. The deceased, however, refused to oblige the accused. On 17-5-1990 around 1.00 p.m. Shantabai was alone in the house when the accused came there with a bottle of kerosene, poured kerosene on the body of the deceased, lit fire with the help of a match box and ran away. The deceased caught fire and started crying hearing which Satishsingh rushed to the spot and extinguished the fire by putting clothes over the body of the deceased. In the process Satishsingh also burnt his hands, Shantabai told Satishsingh that the accused has burnt her and fled away.
4. Devisingh who was out of Maksi at the relevant time on his return was told about the incident by Satishsingh. He informed Chandersingh about the incident and returned home where Shantibai related (narrated) the entire incident to him. Chandersingh lodged a report (vide Ex. P2) at P.S. Maksi the same day at 2.00 p.m. Sub-Inspector Mahendrasingh Pawar (P.W. 10) immediately rushed to the spot and recorded statement (vide Ex. P8) of Shantabai. An empty bottle and half burnt petticoat, both smelling of kerosene, were also recovered from the spot (vide seizure memo Ex. P2).
5. Shantabai has shifted to District Hospital, Shajapur where she was examined and treated for her injuries by Dr. D. S. Mehta (P.W. 3) the same day at 3.00 p.m. She had 84% burnt injuries all over her body as per report Ex.P. 1A. Her dying declaration (vide Ex.P5) was recorded by an Executive Magistrate Siddheshwar Vyas (P.W. 6) wherein the deceased again blamed accused Ramesh for having burnt her. She was then shifted to M. Y. Hospital, Indore for further treatment where at about 9.00 p.m. she succumbed to her injuries.
6. The police registered a crime under Sections 302 and 449, I.P.C. conducted inquest under Section 174, Cr.P.C. got the autopsy of the body of the deceased performed, arrested the accused and after other due investigation charge-sheeted him for trial.
7. At the trial, the accused abjured his guilt and pleaded to have been implicated falsely. He denied all the circumstances appearing against him in the prosecution evidence. The learned Sessions Judge after trial held him guilty convicted and sentenced as aforesaid.
8. The appellant has assailed his conviction as contrary to law and facts. The submissions on behalf of the appellant accused have been made by Shri Jaisingh Advocate, who has also taken us through the entire evidence on record. It was submitted that the witnesses examined by the prosecution were inimical to the appellant and that the dying declarations in question could not be believed in absence of independent corroboration.
As against it, the learned Public Prosecutor, has seriously supported the impugned judgment and submitted that there is strong and cogent evidence in the form of dying declarations both oral and written to prove beyond doubt the charges against the appellant accused.
9. It has not been disputed before us that on the relevant day Shantabai died of burn injuries. This is borne out fully by the medical evidence of Dr. D.S. Mehta (P.W. 3) and Dr. Vijay Agrawal (P.W. 8). Dr. Mehta had examined the deceased before her death on 17-5-1990 and found that she had 84% burn injuries all over her body as stated in the report Ex.P1A. Dr. Agrawal had performed autopsy of the body of the deceased on 18-5-1990 which confirmed presence of burn injuries all over her body which ultimately led to her death (vide report Ex.P6). The injuries, according to both the Doctors above could be caused by pouring kerosene and lighting fire to the body of the deceased. The information revealed by the medical evidence above could not be challenged by the defence in cross-examination. However, the moot question remains as to whether the accused did the deceased to death.
10. As regards the occurrence, although the prosecution examined Rekha (P.W. 5) the daughter of the deceased to depose of the same but the trial Court has rejected and rightly so the evidence of the child witness firstly because she appeared to had been tutored and secondly her very presence at the scene of occurrence was doubtful. The prosecution case thus depends wholly on the circumstantial evidence consisting of various dying declarations both oral and written said to have been made by the deceased immediately after the occurrence and prior to her death.
11. Satishsingh (P.W. 9) is a witness of res-gestae who at the relevant time occupied on rent a portion of house belonging to the accused just in front of the deceased's house where the occurrence took place. He was the first person to reach the scene of occurrence. He testified that at the relevant time he was at his house when hearing cries from the house of Shantabai he reached there and saw that Shantabai was in flames running here and there and crying. He extinguished the fire by putting some clothes on her body and in the process burned his own hands, the witness added. The deceased, he further stated, told him that Ramesh, his (witness') landlord, has put her to fire.
12. Devisingh (P.W. 4) the deceased's husband and his nephew Chandersingh (P.W. 1) have told the Court that on receiving information about the incident, Devisingh first went to Chandersingh, informed him about the incident and then they both came to the spot where Shantabai was lying with burn injuries and told them that Ramesh s/o Sewaram has set her to fire after pouring kerosene on her body.
13. The testimony of the PWs above could not be challenged successfully by the defence in their cross-examination. Satishsingh is totally independent witness. He and as a matter of that even Devisingh and Chandersingh also, had no grudge in implicating the accused falsely. A report of the incident (vide Ex.P2) was lodged with the police by Chandersingh immediately after occurrence and in that report also it was clearly mentioned that Shantabai has disclosed to him (Chandersingh) that it was accused Ramesh who had set her to fire. The report thus lands full corroboration to the prosecution story as spoken by the PWs above.
14. The deceased, as would appear from the medical evidence of Dr. Mehta (P.W. 3), was in her full senses even when she was brought to hospital after lodging of the report Ex.P.2 Under the circumstances it was only natural for her to relate (narrate) her tale to her husband and the other 2 PWs one of whom was her neighbour and the other a relation. The Court below has discussed at length the evidence of these witnesses and we find ourselves in full agreement with the learned Sessions Judge that their evidence inspired confidence.
15. It will be thus seen that the deceased made an oral statement before Satishsingh which was first in point of time and is also consistent and straight forward and has been deposed to by Satishsingh who is an independent witness and bears no animus against the accused. The second statement was made to Devisingh (P.W. 4) and Chandersingh (P.W. 1) which fully corroborated the version given by the deceased to Satishsingh and is supported by report Ex.P2 lodged by Chandersingh without any loss of time.
16. The third statement was made by the deceased to Sub-Inspector Mahendra Singh (P.W. 10) which was reduced in writing (vide Ex.P8) and has been deposed to by him on oath. He testified to have rushed to the spot on receiving report Ex.P2 and recorded the aforesaid statement made to him by Shantabai. This statement though recorded by a Police Officer during inquiry/ investigation is admissible in evidence under Section 32 of the Evidence Act. The statement is fully in tune with the earlier two statements made by the deceased as referred to above. In this statement also the deceased had clearly named the accused as the person who set her to fire.
17. The last statement (Ex.P5) of the deceased was made to Siddeshwar Vyas (P.W. 3), the Executive Magistrate, and which has been reduced in writing in question answer form. Furthermore, this dying declaration contains certificate of Dr. Mehta (P.W." 3) that the deceased was conscious from the beginning to end and at the time when the statement was recorded by P.W. 6. All this has been testified on oath by P.W. 6 Siddheshwar Vyas and P.W. 3 Dr. Mehta whose testimony again could not be challenged successfully in cross-examination. There is absolutely no reason whatsoever to doubt veracity of these two very responsible officers who had no reasons to take sides. In this statement also the deceased has clearly blamed the accused Ramesh for her burning and further explained that the accused had done so because she refused to go and live with him as his wife.
18. The law on "Dying Declaration" is well-settled. Suffice to say that although a dying declaration should be carefully scrutinised but if after perusal of the same the Court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and is free from any effort to prompt the deceased to make the statement and is coherent and consistent, there is no legal impediment in founding conviction on such a dying declaration even if there is no corroboration. See cases of Munnu Raja v. State of M.P., (1976) 3 SCC 104 : (1976 Cri LJ 54) and Kusha v. State of Orissa, AIR 1980 SC 559: 1980 Cri LJ 408).
19. In the case in hand we find that there are consistent statements made by the deceased two of which have been reduced in writing wherein she has clearly stated that the accused owing to her refusal to submit to his lust, had burnt her after pouring kerosene on her body. There is nothing on record to show that there was any effort to prompt her to make those statements which as already pointed out are coherent and consistent.
20. From the written dying declaration above it would further appear that the accused wanted the deceased to leave her husband and come to live with the former as his wife. Satishsingh (P.W. 9) has testified that there was some quarrel between the deceased and the accused 3-4 days prior to the occurrence. There was thus motive also, for the accused for committing the crime in question.
21. Testimony of Satishsingh (P.W. 9), Devisingh (P.W. 4), and Sub-Inspector Mahendrasingh (P.W. 10) further revealed that on the spot an empty bottle and half burnt petticoat smelling of kerosene were found which were subsequently seized by the police vide seizure memo Ex.P3. This is an important circumstances which further lands corroboration to the statements made by the deceased to various persons as aforesaid. It, was however, contended by the learned counsel for the defence that Doctor who conducted Post Mortem Examination did not find any smell of kerosene on the body of the deceased. It will, however, appear from the statement of Dr. Agrawal (P.W. 8) that earlier to the said post mortem examination, the deceased had been treated for her injuries by other Doctors and her clothes were also changed. Under the circumstances it was quite possible that the smell of kerosene must have extinguished by the time the autopsy was performed.
22. As a last leg it was contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that from the aforesaid dying declarations it is not established that the accused was the same Ramesh who set the deceased to fire. We are not all persuaded by the argument. The deceased had not only named her assassin but has given full description as to his father's name and residence to fix his identity. The identity of the accused was further established by the statement of Salishsingh (P.W. 9) who testified that at the relevant time he occupied a portion of the house of the accused on rent and that the deceased had clearly told him that it was his (Satishsingh's) landlord Ramesh who has burnt her. There can be thus no manner of doubt that it was the appellant-accused Ramesh and he alone who first trespassed into the house of the deceased, poured kerosene on her and set her to fire which ultimately led to her death. Both the charges under Sections 449 and 302, I.P.C. were therefore, brought home fully to the accused. His conviction on the aforesaid two charges and the sentences awarded to him are fully justified and call for no interference.
23. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed. The appellant-accused is on bail. He shall surrender to his bail before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Shajapur to serve out the sentence subject to the provision of Section 428, Cr.P.C.
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