- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Chandrakant Soni v. Mukesh Sahu And Others
Judgment Summary: Application to bring Legal Representatives on record (I.A. No. 4763/95)
Factual and Procedural Background
This interlocutory application (I.A. No. 4763/95) was filed to bring the legal representatives (L.Rs.) of a deceased claimant on record in an appeal arising from an award passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal. Counsel for the proposed L.Rs. acknowledged a delay of nine months in making the prayer to bring the L.Rs. on record and sought condonation relying on recent amendments to the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (M. V. Act), which removed a previously existing six-month time limit for filing a fresh application for compensation. Counsel for respondent No. 4 (an insurance company) admitted the amendment and the benevolent intent of the M. V. Act. The court considered both the procedural delay and the question whether an appeal arising from a MACT award abates on the death of the claimant and whether the L.Rs. can prosecute the appeal for enhancement of compensation.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the delay of nine months in seeking to bring the legal representatives of a deceased claimant on record should be condoned in view of the recent amendment to the Motor Vehicles Act removing the earlier six-month time limit.
- Whether an appeal arising out of an award passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal abates on the death of the claimant (i.e., whether Order 22, C.P.C. applies to such appeals).
- Whether the legal representatives of a deceased claimant are entitled to prosecute the appeal further for enhancement of compensation after the death of the original claimant.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments (represented by Shri S. Patwa)
- Relied on several judgments (Chuharmal Issardas v. Haji Wali Mohammed; Maimuna Begum v. Taju; New Suraj Transport Co. v. Ruby General Insurance Co.) to argue that provisions of Order 22, C.P.C. are not applicable to appeals arising out of awards by Motor Accident Claims Tribunals and that the right to sue does not abate on death of a claimant.
- Argued that if the L.Rs. are entitled to continue the claim for compensation, then logically they should also be entitled to seek enhancement of compensation by prosecuting the appeal.
Respondent No. 4's Arguments (represented by Shri S. V. Dandvate)
- Acknowledged the recent amendment to the Motor Vehicles Act which removed the earlier six-month time limit and accepted the benevolent purpose of the statute (in relation to the delay application).
- Relied on the Supreme Court decision in Melapurath Sankunni Ezhuthassan v. Thekittil Geopalakutty Nair (AIR 1986 SC 411) to contend that the right to sue does not survive to the legal representatives in the circumstances relevant to that precedent, and by analogy argued that the L.Rs. may not have the right to prosecute further the present appeal for enhancement.
- Emphasized the distinction that the Supreme Court's observations in Melapurath Sankunni related to decrees arising in defamation suits (where a decree becomes part of the estate) and that those observations should be restricted to such contexts.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Chuharmal Issardas v. Haji Wali Mohammed, 1968 Acc CJ 391 | Held that provisions relating to abatement contained in Order 22, C.P.C. have no application to proceedings in respect of claims preferred before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal. | The court relied on this Division Bench precedent to support the proposition that Order 22, C.P.C. is not applicable to MACT proceedings and their appellate consequences. |
| Maimuna Begum v. Taju, 1988 Acc CJ 417 (Bombay High Court) | Criticised the maxim actio personalis moritur cum persona and held that the maxim should not be applied in India except where engrafted by statute; principles of justice, equity and good conscience should be followed so that the right to sue is not barred for L.Rs. | Used to support the view that the right to prosecute claims arising from motor accident proceedings should not be barred by the maxim and that L.Rs. can maintain proceedings. |
| New Suraj Transport Co. v. Ruby General Insurance Co., 1972 Acc CJ 416 (Punjab & Haryana High Court) | Interpreted Section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act to show that compensation applications are filed in a representative capacity and that proceedings do not abate on the death of a claimant; where the deceased was sole claimant, legal representatives could be brought on record. | This precedent was applied to underline that MACT claims are representative in nature and therefore survive death of a claimant, allowing L.Rs. to be substituted or brought on record. |
| Melapurath (Melapurath/Melepurath) Sankunni Ezhuthassan v. Thekittil Geopalakutty Nair, AIR 1986 SC 411 (1986 Acc CJ 440) | Held that generally the right to sue does not survive to the legal representatives of a deceased; but carved out a distinction where a decree (e.g., in defamation) becomes a decretal debt forming part of the estate and can be defended or prosecuted by L.Rs. | Cited by respondent to argue against survival of the right to prosecute the appeal for enhancement; the court in this opinion restricted the scope of Melapurath Sankunni to decrees (as in defamation suits) and did not allow its observations to be applied broadly to MACT awards without distinction. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court's analysis proceeded in two connected strands: (A) the procedural question of condoning delay to bring L.Rs. on record; and (B) the substantive question whether an appeal arising from a MACT award abates on the claimant's death and whether L.Rs. can prosecute the appeal for enhancement.
(A) Condonation of Delay
- The court observed counsel for the proposed L.Rs. admitted a nine-month delay in making the prayer and sought condonation by reference to a recent amendment to the Motor Vehicles Act (which removed a prior six-month limit for filing a fresh application for compensation).
- The court noted the benevolent character of the M. V. Act and that the legislative amendment was intended to avoid delay in obtaining relief. On that basis and because of the special circumstances of the matter, the court exercised discretion to condone the nine-month delay.
(B) Abatement and Right of Legal Representatives to Prosecute the Appeal
- The court reviewed relevant authorities: the Division Bench judgment in Chuharmal (holding Order 22 CPC inapplicable to MACT proceedings), the Bombay High Court decision in Maimuna Begum (criticising the maxim actio personalis moritur cum persona and favouring survivability of certain causes of action), and the Punjab & Haryana decision in New Suraj Transport (interpreting Section 110-A of the M. V. Act to treat claims as representative and not abating on death).
- The court also considered the Supreme Court decision in Melapurath Sankunni which held generally that the right to sue does not survive to the L.Rs., but recognized an exception where a decree (such as in defamation) becomes part of the estate and can be defended or prosecuted by L.Rs. The present court restricted the scope of Melapurath Sankunni to decrees arising in suits like defamation and declined to treat its observations as laying down a rule applicable to MACT awards generally.
- Drawing distinctions between the factual matrices of the cited cases (e.g., presence of other claimants on record, representation already on record, or the decree-nature of rights in defamation suits), the court concluded that the precedents supporting survivability and representative character of MACT claims were more apposite to the present matter.
- On the specific question whether L.Rs. can seek enhancement of compensation by prosecuting the appeal after the claimant's death, the court accepted the appellant's contention in logical terms: since the right to claim compensation survives to the L.Rs. (they can be brought on record and continue the proceedings), logically the right to seek enhancement in the appeal should also be available to them.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The court concluded that the appeal does not abate on account of the death of the claimant and that the legal representatives of the deceased appellant are entitled to be brought on record and to pursue the appeal, including the claim for enhancement of compensation. The court also condoned the nine months' delay in making the application to bring the L.Rs. on record.
Direct Orders / Consequences in the Case:
- The learned counsel for the appellant (Shri S. Patwa) was permitted to amend the cause title of the appeal to bring the proposed L.Rs. on record; such amendment was to be made within one week.
- After amendment, the appeal was to be listed for hearing on admission. Thereafter, within seven days the counsel for the appellant had to furnish a copy of the appeal memo to Shri Dandvate (counsel for respondent No. 4).
- The court explicitly exercised discretion to condone a nine-month delay, citing the benevolent object of the Motor Vehicles Act and the recent amendment removing the six-month time limit.
Implications beyond the parties: The opinion reasons that controversies arising from awards passed by Motor Accident Claims Tribunals permit the right to sue to be available to legal representatives; it restricts the applicability of the Supreme Court's observations in Melapurath Sankunni to decrees (such as in defamation suits). The court did not state that it was laying down a new binding precedent beyond the decision in this matter; the direct effect is the substitution/bringing-on-record of L.Rs. and permission to prosecute the appeal for enhancement of compensation in this case.
G. Chitre, J.
1. (On I. A. No. 4763/95) Shri S. Patwa for Appellant. Shri S. V. Dandvate for Respondent No. 4. Other respondents are absent. None present for them.
2. This application has been preferred for bringing the legal representatives of deceased claimant on record. During the course of argument it has been noticed by the learned counsel for the L.Rs. of deceased claimant that there has been delay in making the prayer for bringing the L.Rs. on record. He prays for condoning the said delay in view of recent amendment in provisions of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as M. V. Act for convenience). Shri Dandvate, counsel for respondent No. 4 also admitted that there has been recent amendment in the provisions of m.v. act whereby time limit of six months which was in existence previously has been removed in respect of filing of fresh application for getting the compensation. There cannot be any debate on the point that provisions of m.v. act are benevolent and specially brought in force for the purpose of avoiding delay in getting the relief from Civil Courts by filing other suitable remedies. Thus, keeping in view the benevolent aspect of the enactment and the recent amendment by which the previously indicated time limit of six months has been removed, I hereby condone the delay of nine months by keeping in view the special circumstances of this matter only.
3. The second point which has been agitated is whether the appeal arising out of a controversy created by the award passed by the Tribunal stands abated on account of death of claimant or not. Shri Patwa has placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in the matter of Chuharmal Issardas v. Haji Wali Mohammed, 1968 Acc CJ 391, judgment of Bombay High Court in the matter of Maimuna Begum v. Taju, 1988 Acc CJ 417 and judgment of Punjab and Haryana High Court in the matter of New Suraj Transport Co. v. Ruby General Insurance Co., 1972 Acc CJ 416. He canvassed that provisions of Order 22, C.P.C. are not applicable to appeals arising out of the controversy caused by the award passed by the Tribunal in motor accident claim cases. Shri Dandvate, counsel appearing for respondent No. 4 insurance company placed reliance on the judgment of Supreme Court in the matter of Melapurath Sankunni Ezhuthassan v. Thekittil Geopala-kutty Nair, 1986 Acc CJ 440 : (AIR 1986 SC 411).
4. In the matter of Chuharmal v. Haji Wali Mohammed (1968 Acc CJ 391) (supra) Division Bench of this Court held that provisions relating to abatement contained in Order 22 of C.P.C. have no application to these proceedings (proceedings in respect of claim preferred by claimant before Motor Accident Claims Tribunal). The Division Bench of Bombay High Court held in Maimuna Begum's case (1988 Acc CJ 417) (supra) that the maxim actio personalis moritur cum persona cannot bar the right to sue claim by the L.Rs. of the deceased claimant because the maxim has been criticized even in the country of its origin as unjust, obscure in its origin, inaccurate in its expression and often resulting in grave injustice. Indian Courts have generally taken a view that the maxim should not be applied as a part of our law except, of course, where specifically engrafted in a statute and that the principles of justice, equity and good conscience should be followed. Punjab and Haryana High Court observed in New Suraj Transport Co.'s case (1972 Acc CJ 416) (supra) that a reading of Section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act would show that the applications for compensation are filed in a representative capacity. In case any person who has filed the claim dies the proceedings started in a representative capacity do not abate. If the other claimants are already on record, they can continue the proceedings. If the deceased was the sole claimant, his legal representatives or the persons for whose benefit the claim had been filed, could be brought on the record.
5. The Supreme Court in the case of Melepurath Sankunni (AIR 1986 SC 411) (supra) held that the question whether right to sue survives to the legal representatives of the deceased will have to be answered as no. It pointed out that the position, however, is different where a suit for defamation has resulted in a decree in favour of the plaintiff because in such a case the cause of action has merged in the decree and the decretal debt forms part of his estate and the appeal from a decree by the defendant becomes a question of benefit or detriment to the estate of the plaintiff-respondent which his legal representative is entitled to uphold and defend and is, therefore, entitled to be substituted in place of deceased respondent-plaintiff. Relying on this judgment Shri Dandvate argued that in the present appeal the claimant claimed enhancement of the compensation amount and the L.Rs. of deceased claimant are desirous of prosecuting the appeal further which the claimant has filed for enhancement of the compensation amount. According to Shri Dandvate the L.Rs. will not be having a right to prosecute further the present appeal keeping in view its peculiar nature.
6. It is to be noted that in the matter which was before the Division Bench of this Court Chuharmal was acting as agent of Mrs. Sadoribai (his wife) who was herself a co-applicant. In that matter the proposed L.R. of Sadoribai i.e. Chuharmal was already on record. Not only that but he was representing himself as agent of deceased Sadoribai. In the matter which was before Punjab and Haryana High Court (1972 Acc CJ 416) (supra), the othet claimants were already on record and they wanted to continue the proceedings. It is true that single Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court held in that matter that had the deceased been the sole claimant, his legal representatives or the persons for whose benefit the claim had been filed, could, be brought on record. In the matter which was before Division Bench of Bombay High Court the deceased Abdul had died and his widow and minor children were substituted as appellants in his place. In the present matter the victim preferred the present appeal for enhancement of the compensation amount and his L.Rs. are desirous of continuing it. Shri Dandvate has pointed out paragraphs 4 and 5 from the judgment of Supreme Court in the case of Melepurth Sankunni (AIR 1986 SC 411) (supra) for the purpose of canvassing his point so far as present matter is concerned. It is pertinent to note that the said judgment revolved around a decree passed in defamation suit which was attempted to be prosecuted further by L.Rs. of deceased. The observations to be prosecuted further by L.Rs. of deceased. The observations of Supreme Court in the said matter will have to be restricted to the decree which has been passed by the Court in a defamation suit.
7. The Division Bench of Bombay High Court has discussed the relevancy of maxim "actio personalis moritur cum persona" in Indian society and atmosphere. It has pointed out that even that maxim has been criticized in the country of its origin as unjust, obscure in its origion, inaccurate in its expression and often resulting in grave injustice. It has been pointed out that Indian Courts have generally taken the view that the maxim should not be applied as a part of our law except, of course, where specifically engrafted in a statute and that the principles of justice, equity and good conscience should be followed. The Bombay High Court has discussed some illustrations relevant to the maxim and has also made reference to Section 306 of Indian Succession Act. In the said judgment it has been opined that it was anomalous that while action can be maintained by an injured against wrongdoer for causing injury, no such action was permissible after his death. It also expressed the opinion that this anomaly was sought to be removed in England by Law Reforms Act and Fatal Accidents Act and soon thereafter even in India on similar lines the Legal Representatives Suits Act and the Indian Fatal Accidents Act were enacted as a result certain causes of action under the tort were made to survive and be available to the legal heirs. In paragraph No. 11 of the said judgment it has been pointed out that because of the unending rush of motor vehicles on the roads and constant increase of their use as mode of transport posed a constant threat of death and injury to persons as well as property and the long-drawn and expensive process of civil suit was considered too inadequate to render quick justice demanded by the situation. It was pointed out that, therefore, a now forum was created under the M. V. Act by inserting Sections 110-A to 110-F.
8. Thus, summing up all it will have to be concluded that in controversies arising out of award passed by Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, the right to sue is available to L. Rs. of deceased claimant.
9. The present matter is revolving around yet another different point and that is whether such L.Rs. have the right to claim enhancement of compensation by contesting the appeal further after the death of the original claimant. Shri Dandvate has argued that right to get enhanced compensation is a personal right available to such claimant only and it dies along with death of the claimant Shri Patwa submitted that when such right was available to L.Rs., right to have enhanced compensation should be also available to them. In logical corollary it will have to be concluded that when right to get compensation is available to L.Rs. by prosecuting further the claim or the appeal, right to get enhanced compensation should also be available to them.
10. Thus, in view of the discussion above, I come to the conclusion that the appeal does not abate and the L.Rs. of the deceased appellant are entitled to get themselves on record and pursue with this appeal. Learned counsel Shri Patwa is hereby permitted to make necessary amendment in the cause title of the appeal so as to bring the proposed L.Rs. of deceased appellant on record. It be done within a week and thereafter the appeal be listed for hearing on admission. Thereafter within seven days learned counsel for appellant to furnish copy of appeal memo to Shri Dandvate who is already representing respondent No. 4.
Alert