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Chironjilal And Others v. Khatoon Bi And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
This second appeal was preferred by defendants No. 4 to 7 against the judgment and decree dated 28-1-1980 of the First Additional District Judge (Camp Basoda), Vidisha, in Civil Appeal No. 23-A/1978, which itself was an appeal against the judgment and decree dated 20-2-1978 in Civil Suit No. 502-A of 1975.
The plaintiff-respondent No. 1 instituted the suit on 21-10-1975 in respect of a suit land measuring 90 bighas and 10 biswas, seeking declaration, possession and mesne profits. The plaintiff alleged sole ownership and challenged a sale deed dated 23-6-1973, by which defendant No.1 (mother of defendants No.2 and 3) purportedly, as guardian, transferred half the land in favour of defendants No.4 to 7. Defendant No.1 admitted the plaintiff's claim but alleged fraud in the execution of the sale-deed and deficient consideration; defendants No.2 and 3 admitted the plaintiff's claim and contended that their mother was not authorised to execute the sale-deed on their behalf; defendants No.4 to 7 claimed ownership (Bhumiswamis) and possession since 26-9-1973 under the sale-deed.
The trial Court found that the original owner was Niyamat Khan, who had two women in a long cohabitation relationship producing Dakar Mohammad (of the legally wedded wife) and Hassu Khan (of Bhuribai). The trial Court held that Hassu Khan was not illegitimate because of presumed long cohabitation, and recorded that Bakar Mohammad (plaintiff's predecessor) and Hassu Khan were co-owners as per revenue records. The trial Court further found that under Section 359 of the Principles of Mahomedan Law a mother is not a legal guardian of minors' property and therefore could not validly execute the sale; despite that, the trial Court dismissed the plaintiff's suit because the plaintiff was not found to be the sole owner.
On appeal by the plaintiff the First Appellate Court decreed the suit: it held that Hassu Khan was the son of a concubine who had been turned out in 1939 and that thereafter the plaintiff and his predecessor were in exclusive possession; it held the sale void because Khatoon Bi (the mother) was not authorised to execute the sale on behalf of minors; and it concluded that defendants No.4 to 7 had no right or title and had forcibly occupied the land. The present second appeal by defendants No.4 to 7 was admitted by this Court on several substantial questions of law (set out below).
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether in absence of evidence to contrary the presumption of law ought to have been made in favour of valid marriage when there had been a lengthened and continuous cohabitation especially where alleged marriage took place long ago?
- Whether possession of the co-owner is presumed to be the possession of all co-owners unless it is established that possession is in hostility to co-owners?
- Whether plaintiff can acquire the rights of Bhumiswami over the suit land on the basis of adverse possession under the Tenancy Law (M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1959)?
- Whether the admission of Defendants No.1 to 3 is admissible in evidence under the provisions of Section 18 of the Evidence Act when defendants have parted with their interests and property?
- Whether the Court can award mesne profits for ante date of suit for which plaintiff has not sought a relief in plaint?
- Whether the Judgment and decree passed by the learned Additional District Judge suffers from infirmity of misreading of material evidence documentary as well as oral evidence on record and therefore are amenable to interest under Order 41 Rule 31 C.P.C. in view of Section 100 CPC?
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' (Defendants No.4 to 7) Arguments — (as presented by Shri Arun Mishra)
- Because of long and continuous cohabitation between Niyamat Khan and Bhuribai, there was a presumption under Section 114 of the Evidence Act in favour of a valid marriage and legitimacy of Hassu Khan; therefore Hassu Khan was an owner of half the property. (Reliance placed on Syed Habibur Rahman v. Altaf Ali; Fatma Binti Hafidh v. Administrator General Zanzibar; Gokal Chand v. Parvin Kumar.)
- The sale-deed executed by Khatoon Bi in respect of minors' shares should be treated as valid because in the absence of a legal guardian the mother acted as a de facto guardian (relying on Imambandi v. Mutsaddi) — this argument was advanced but the opinion records it as not helpful to appellants.
- Admissions by defendants No.1 to 3 should be inadmissible under Section 18 of the Evidence Act once they had parted with their interest in the property; reliance was placed on Dharamsingh v. Jalima and Shafiullah Khan v. Abdul Wahab.
- Possession by one co-owner is, unless shown to be hostile, to be presumed to be on behalf of all co-owners; to establish adverse possession against a co-owner there must be nec vi, nec clam, nec precario — reliance placed on P. Lakshmi Reddy v. L. Lakshmi Reddy, S. S. Gulam Ghonse v. S.S.A.M. Kamisul, and Shikharchand v. D.J.P. Karini Sabha.
- In written submissions it was further submitted that defendants No.4 to 7 purchased 45 bighas and were in possession only of that area and that the land was under attachment since 1981, hence they could retain possession until partition; this was noted by the Court but rejected because the sale was held void ab initio.
Respondent (Plaintiff) Arguments — (as presented by Shri K. B. Chaturvedi)
- Since 1939 Hassu Khan was ousted and the plaintiff and his predecessors had been openly and exclusively cultivating the land; the ouster was not secret but open with assertion of hostile title, establishing ouster and adverse possession such that any co-owner's right extinguished in favour of the plaintiff. Reliance placed on Kshitish Chandra v. Commr. of Ranchi and Gyan Singh v. Saran Singh.
- The sale-deed executed by Khatoon Bi on behalf of minors was void because under the Principles of Mahomedan Law (Section 359) a mother is not a legal guardian of minors' property and therefore has no power to alienate the minors' interest; reliance on Mulla and various decisions (Gurubax Singh v. Begum Rafiva; Patel Purushottamdas Narasibhai v. Bai Dhabu; Bhikaji Ramchandra Shimpi v. Ajagarally Sarafally Buhari) was placed to support the principle that such alienations are void.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Syed Habibur Rahman v. Altaf Ali, AIR 1922 PC 159 | Cited in support of presumptions under Section 114 of the Evidence Act (presumption of marriage from long cohabitation). | Counsel for appellants relied on it for presumption of marriage; the Court observed it was unnecessary to decide the presumption issue because the First Appellate Court had not recorded a finding on it. |
| Fatma Binti Hafidh v. Administrator General Zanzibar, AIR 1949 PC 254 | Cited in support of presumption of marriage / legitimacy from long cohabitation (Section 114). | Cited by appellants; Court did not decide the presumption question in this opinion. |
| Gokal Chand v. Parvin Kumar, AIR 1952 SC 231 | Cited—support for presumption of marriage/legitimacy under Section 114. | Cited by appellants; Court stated it was unnecessary to deal with the question of presumption/legitimacy in this appeal. |
| Gurubax Singh v. Begum Rafiva, AIR 1979 Madh Pra 66 | Cited for the principle that a mother is not a legal guardian of a Muslim minor's property and cannot bind the child by alienation. | Relied on by the Court (via Mulla and allied authorities) to support the conclusion that the mother had no power to alienate minors' immovable property, making such transactions void. |
| Patel Purushottamdas Narasibhai v. Bai Dhabu, AIR 1973 Guj 88 | Cited for the same principle that mother cannot alienate minors' immovable property. | Applied by the Court in support of the view that the sale executed by the mother on behalf of minors was void. |
| Bhikaji Ramchandra Shimpi v. Ajagarally Sarafally Buhari, AIR 1946 Bom 57 | Cited for the rule that a mother (or other non-legal guardian) cannot validly alienate minors' property. | Relied upon by the Court along with Mulla to declare the sale void. |
| Imambandi v. Mutsaddi, 45 Ind App 73 : AIR 1918 PC 11 | Authority on de facto guardians: a de facto guardian is merely a custodian and has no power to deal with immovable property of a minor. | Cited; the Court treated this decision as supporting that a de facto guardian cannot effect valid transfer of immovable property and used it to support the view that the sale was void and purchasers had no title. |
| Matadin v. Amhad Ali, (1912) 39 Ind App P. 49 | Cited for the settled law that de facto guardian has no power to transfer a Muslim minor's interest and such transfer is void ab initio. | Relied on by the Court to hold the sale void ab initio and that no title passed to defendants No.4 to 7. |
| Mohd. Amin v. Jari Ahmad, AIR 1952 SC 358 | Cited to show that transfers by de facto guardians in respect of Muslim minors' property are void. | Applied by the Court in concluding the sale was void and did not confer title on purchasers. |
| Ali Mohammed v. Ramnivas, AIR 1967 Raj 258 | Cited as an authority that transfers by de facto guardians are void ab initio. | Relied upon by the Court in reaching the conclusion that no title passed under the sale. |
| Mt. Anto v. Mt. Raoti Kuar, AIR 1936 All 837 (FB) | Cited for the proposition that a void transaction in respect of a minor's share cannot be ratified on attaining majority. | Cited by the Court to support the view that the minors could not ratify the void sale; the Court held ratification was not possible for a void transfer. |
| Kharag Narain v. Hamida Khatoon, AIR 1955 Pat 475 | Cited to show that void transactions relating to minors' shares cannot be ratified. | Applied by the Court in concluding that the sale could not be ratified and conveyed no title. |
| Vemaria Ramachandrayya Naidu v. Abdul Kadar, AIR 1948 Mad 37 | Cited for the same rule regarding non-ratifiability of void transactions by minors. | Relied on by the Court in support of the principle that the void sale could not be validated by subsequent conduct. |
| P. Lakshmi Reddy v. L. Lakshmi Reddy, AIR 1957 SC 314 | Cited for the proposition that possession of one co-owner is presumed to be on behalf of all co-owners unless ouster is established; adverse possession requires proof of ouster. | Cited by appellants in support of their submission on co-owner possession; the Court observed it was not necessary to decide the adverse possession question in this appeal. |
| S. S. Gulam Ghonse v. S.S.A.M. Kamisul, AIR 1971 SC 2184 | Cited for the law that a co-heir in sole possession is presumed to hold on behalf of others and ouster must be established to found adverse possession. | Cited by appellants; the Court did not decide the adverse possession issue in this appeal (held unnecessary to do so given other findings). |
| Shikharchand v. D.J.P. Karini Sabha, AIR 1974 SC 1178 | Cited concerning requirements to establish adverse possession against co-heirs. | Cited by appellants; the Court observed that the adverse possession question need not be decided for purposes of this appeal. |
| Kshitish Chandra v. Commr. of Ranchi, AIR 1981 SC 707 | Cited by the plaintiff to support the contention of ouster and acquisition of title by adverse possession. | Cited by respondent; the Court noted the argument but found it unnecessary to decide the adverse possession question because the sale to defendants No.4 to 7 was void. |
| Gyan Singh v. Saran Singh, (1992) 2 MPWN 33 | Cited by the plaintiff in support of the contention of ouster and adverse possession. | Cited by respondent; Court did not decide the adverse possession point as the void sale rendered such determination unnecessary for the outcome. |
| Dharamsingh v. Jalima, 1980 Jab LJ 738 | Cited to support the submission that an admission by a person who has parted with interest in property is not admissible under Section 18 of the Evidence Act. | Cited by appellants in argument; the opinion records reliance but does not expressly rule on admissibility under Section 18 in this judgment. |
| Shafiullah Khan v. Abdul Wahab, 1963 Jab LJ (SN) 14 | Cited for the same proposition on inadmissibility of admissions after parting with interest. | Cited by appellants; the Court's opinion notes the reliance but does not make an explicit, separate ruling on this point in the present judgment. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court analysed the matter primarily on the legal status of the sale-deed executed by Khatoon Bi on behalf of minors (defendants No.2 and 3) and on the consequences of that status for the purchasers (defendants No.4 to 7).
Key steps in the Court's reasoning, as stated in the opinion, were:
- The Court cited Mulla's Principles of Mahomedan Law (Chapter XVIII) and Section 359 which enumerates the persons who can be legal guardians of a minor's property (father, executor appointed by father's will, father's father, executor under will of father's father) and excludes the mother. On this textual and doctrinal basis the Court restated the settled rule that a mother is not a legal guardian of a Muslim minor's property and therefore cannot validly alienate the minor's share in immovable property.
- The Court observed authorities (including Gurubax Singh, Patel Purushottamdas Narasibhai and Bhikaji Ramchandra Shimpi) that support the principle that any alienation of a minor's immovable property by a mother (or other non-legal guardian) is void and not merely voidable. The Court treated those authorities as applicable to the present facts.
- The Court also considered and distinguished the argument that a mother might act as a de facto guardian (relying on Imambandi). It held that the de facto guardian is merely a custodian and, following authorities (Matadin, Imambandi, Mohd. Amin, Ali Mohammed), has no power to transfer immovable property of a Muslim minor; such transfers are void ab initio.
- On the question of ratification, the Court relied on authorities (Imambandi, Mt. Anto, Kharag Narain, Vemaria Rama..., and doctrinal exposition in Mulla) that a void transfer of a minor's share is not capable of ratification on attaining majority; hence the conduct of the minors after majority could not validate the sale.
- Because the sale-deed was held void ab initio as to the minors' shares, the Court concluded that no title passed to defendants No.4 to 7 and their position was no better than trespassers; therefore they could not resist a suit for possession brought by a co-owner.
- The Court stated that it was not necessary to decide a number of the other admitted substantial questions — including the presumption of marriage/legitimacy under Section 114 and the detailed question of adverse possession — because the invalidity of the sale sufficiently disposed of the appeal in favour of the plaintiff. The Court also noted that some questions had not been argued by counsel.
- On mesne profits the Court observed that no material had been placed before it and noted that the land was under attachment since 1981; it directed that questions relating to attachment and mesne profits be determined at the time of execution rather than in this second appeal.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The appeal is DISMISSED with costs. The Court awarded counsel's fee of Rs. 500 (if pre-certified).
Implications and direct consequences (as stated in the opinion):
- Because the sale deed executed by Khatoon Bi on behalf of minors was void ab initio, no title passed to defendants No.4 to 7; they are treated in the opinion as trespassers and cannot resist the plaintiff's action for possession.
- The decree of the First Appellate Court in favour of the plaintiff (which had set aside the sale and decreed the plaintiff's suit) stands, as the second appeal by the purchasers was dismissed.
- The Court did not decide broader contested legal questions (e.g., presumption of marriage/legitimacy under Section 114, or full determination of adverse possession/Bhumiswami rights under the M.P. Land Revenue Code) because resolution of the invalid sale was dispositive for the appeal; therefore the judgment does not purport to lay down new law on those unresolved issues.
- Mesne profits and matters related to attachment were left to be determined at the time of execution since no material on those aspects was placed before the Court in the second appeal.
This summary has been prepared exclusively from and constrained to the content of the provided opinion. No additional facts or inferences beyond the text of the opinion have been introduced.
1. The defendants No. 4 to 7 have preferred this second appeal against the judgment and decree dated 28-1-1980 passed by First Additional District Judge (Camp Basoda) Vidisha in Civil Appeal No. 23-A/ 1978, preferred against the judgment and decree d^ted 20-2-1978 passed in Civil Suit No. 502-A of 1975 by Civil Judge, Class I, Basoda.
2. Material facts leading to this appeal are these :-- The plaintiff-respondent No. 1 instituted a suit on 21-10-1975 against the respondents No. 2 to 4 (defendants No. 1 to 3) and the appellants-defendants No. 4 to 7, in respect of the suit land, area 90 bighas and 10 biswas, described in para 3 of the judgment of the First Appellate Court, for declaration and possession and for mesne profits at the rate of Rs. 1,000/ - per annum on the averments, that the plaintiff is the sole owner of the suit land, the sale deed executed on 23-6-1973 by the defendant No. 1 the mother of defendants No. 2 and 3 as their guardian for half of the land in favour of the defendants No. 4 to 7 is ineffective and void. The defendant No. 1 admitted the claim of the plaintiff and also contended that the defendant, Chironjilal, got executed the sale-deed by playing fraud upon her as towards consideration of Rs. 15,000/ -only Rs. 4,000/- were paid. Defendant Nos. 2 and 3 also admitted the claim of the plaintiff and contended that their mother, Khatoonbi was not authorised to execute the sale-deed on their behalf. The defendants No. 4 to 7 contended that they are the Bhumiswamis of the land and are in possession of the same. The land was a joint holding of plaintiff and Hassu Khan, who is recorded as co-owner in revenue records, the heirs of Hassukhan, the defendants No. 3 and 4 have transferred their right, title in the suit land by way of sale-deed executed by their mother, Khatoonbi, as guardian, the defendants No. 4 to 7 are in possession since 26-9-1973 on the basis of sale-deed.
3. The trial Court after appreciation of evidence and material on record, recorded a finding that original land-owner was Niyamat Khan, who had two wives, one legally wedded wife, from whose wed-lock Dakar Moham-mad was born and the other was Bhuribai, a concubine, who gave birth to Hassu Khan, but he was not illegitimate because of presumption of long (lengthaned) cohabitation of Niyamat Khan with Bhuribai. Plaintiff is the son of Bakar Mohammad, while Khatoon Bi is the wife of Hassu Khan and defendants No. 2 and 3, Ismile and Chhutta are sons of Hassu Khan. Both, Bakar Mohammad and Hassu Khan were co-owners of the suit land and were recorded as such in revenue records. Therefore, long sole possession of Bakar Mohammad in the absence of ouster of Hassu Khan, even though Hassu Khan with his wife left the village and was residing in village Biladana, right of Hassu Khan did not extinguish. As regards the sale-deed the trial Court recorded a finding that the plaintiff and the defendants being Sunni Mahomedan the sale-deed executed on behalf of defendants No. 2 and 3 by the defendant No. 1, the mother, as guardian was illegal and void, as under section 359 of the Principles of Mahomedan Law a mother as guardian of the property of minors cannot transfer the same. However, the suit was dismissed as the plaintiff was not found to be the sole-owner.
4. In appeal preferred by the plaintiff the suit was decreed holding that Hassu Khan was the son of concubine of Niyamat Khan, who was turned out of the house in the year 1939, since then plaintiff and his predecessor were in exclusive possession. The sale was void because Khatoon bi, the mother as guardian was not authorised to execute the sale-deed, the defendants No. 4 to 7 have no right or title to the land, which was forcibly occupied by them. Aggrieved of this judgment and decree, this second appeal was admitted by this Court on the following substantial questions of law:--
(i) Whether in absence of evidence to contrary the presumption of law ought to have been made in favour of valid marriage when there had been a lengthend and continuous cohabitation especially where alleged marriage took place long ago?
(ii) Whether possession of the co-owner is presumed to be the possession of all co-owners is unless it is established that possession is in hostality to co-owners ?
(iii) Whether plaintiff can acquire the rights of Bhumiswami over the suit land on tbe basis of adverse possession under the Tenancy Law (M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1959)?
(iv) Whether the admission of Defendants No. 1 to 3 is admissible in evidence under the provisions of Section 18 of the Evidence Act when defendants have parted with their interests and property ?
(v) Whether the Court can award mense profits for ante date of suit for which plaintiff has not sought a relief in plaint ?
(vi) Whether the Judgment and decree passed by the learned Additional District Judge suffers from infirmity of misreading of material evidence documentary as well as oral evidence on record and therefore are emin-able to interest under Order 41 Rule31 C.P.C. in view of Section 100 CPC ?
5. Shri Arun Mishra, learned counsel for the appellants contended that admittedly Bhuribai, who was Dasta, was living as wife of Niyamat Khan. It is well established on evidence that because of long cohabitation of Niyamat Khan with Bhuribai, Bhuribai acquired the status of wife. Hassu Khan was the off-spring of Niyamat Khan and Bhuribai, which was well acknowledged by Niyamat Khan and because of the long and continuous cohabitation for a number of years Niyamat Khan with Bhuribai there is a presumption under Section 114 of the Evidence Act in favour of marriage and against concubinage and the legitimacy of Hassu Khan, Therefore, Hassu Khan was owner of half of the property, counsel placed reliance on decisions - Syed Habibur Rahman v. Altaf Ali, AIR 1922 PC 159, Fatma Binti Hafidh v. Administrator General Zanzibar, AIR 1949 PC 254 and Gokal Chand v. Parvin Kumar, AIR 1952 SC 231.
6. It is not necessary for this Court to deal with this question as the First Appellate Court has not recorded any finding about the presumption of marriage and legitimacy of Hassu Khan. But, on the other hand, while confirming the findings of trial Court holding that the sale-deed executed in favour of the purchasers by Khatoon Bi on behalf of minors was void decreed the suit of the plaintiff.
7. Mulla, the learned Author, in his book of Principles of Mahomedan Law has dealt with the subject of 'Guardianship of Person and Property', in Chapter XVIII, Section 359 of which specifies the persons, who can be legal guardian of minor's property, which are-- (1) the father, (2) the Executor appointed by the father's will, (3) Father's father, and (4) the Executor appointed by the will of father's father. Mother, brother, uncle etc. are excluded. Hence, a mother being not legal guardian of the property of her minor children, she cannot bind the children by any act in relation of the property. Therefore, the mother has no power to alienate the interest of minor in the property, any alienation, sale, mortgage of minors' immoveable property by mother on behalf of minors is void and not binding. See Gurubax Singh v. Begum Ra-fiva, AIR 1979 Madh Pra 66 and Patel Purushottamdas Narasibhai v. Bai Dhabu, AIR 1973 Guj 88 and Bhikaji Ramchandra Shimpi v. Ajagarally Sarafally Buhari, AIR 1946 Bom 57.
8. Submission of Shri Mishra relying on a Privy Council decision in case of Imambandi v. Mutsaddi, 45 Ind App 73 : AIR 1918 PC 11 that in the absence of legal guardian mother was acting as a de facto guardian, the sale was valid, but, the decision is of no help. On the other hand, it supports the view that such de facto guardian has no power to deal with the immoveable property as de facto guardian acts merely a custodian of the propert of a minor. De facto guardian has been dealt with by Mulla in his book in Section 361 of Chapter XVIII. A person may neither be a legal guardian (S. 360), but have voluntarily placed himself in charge of the person and property of a minor, such a person is called de facto guardian is merely a custodian of the person and property of minor.
8A. It is settled law that a de facto guardian of muslim minor has no power to transfer any right or interest of the minor and such transfer is not merely voidable but void ab initio qua all the parties including those who were sui juris. See Matadin v. Amhad Ali, (1912) 39 Ind App P. 49, Imambandi's case, AIR 1918 PC 11 (supra), Mohd. Amin v. Jari Ahmad, AIR 1952 SC 358 and Ali Mohammed v. Ramnivas, AIR 1967 Raj 258.
9. Next, it was submitted that the minors upon attaining majority did not object to sale executed by the de facto guardian on their behalf, nor took any action for setting aside the sale, by their conduct, the defendants Nos. 2 to 3 have ratified the sale, has no merit as under the Mahomedan Law a void transaction in respect of minor's share is considered not voidable but is void, hence, cannot be ratified, nor any question of its ratification arises. See Privy Council decision in Imambandi's case, AIR 1918 PC 11 (supra), Mt. Anto v. Mt. Raoti Kuar, AIR 1936 All 837 (FB), Kharag Narain v. Hamida Khatoon, AIR 1955 Pat 475 and Vemaria Rama-chandrayya Naidu v. Abdul Kadar, AIR 1948 Mad 37 and Mulla's Principles of Mahomedan Law, Nineteenth edition, page 296, (S. 364).
10. In view of that the sale-deed executed by Khatoon Bi, on behalf of minors relating to the shares of minors in the property being void, no title passed to defendants Nos. 4 to 7, under such unauthorised transfer, the position of the defendants Nos. 4 to 7 is no better than trespassers, therefore, they cannot resist an action for possession. See Imambandi's case, AIR 1918 PC 11 (supra).
11. Coming to the next question that Hassu Khan was a 'co-owner' and the plaintiff did not perfect his title by remaining in continuous long possession of more than 12 years of agricultural fields. In view of Khasra entries wherein Hassu Khan is recorded as co-owner and that entry was never challenged, and there is no evidence of exclusive ownership of plaintiff's predecessors and plaintiff, and the ouster of Hassu Khan. Therefore, it was submitted that any statement or admission made by the defendants Nos. 1 to 3 after parting with interest is no admission under Section 18 of the Evidence Act. The admission of a person could be an admission only if it would be made during the continuance of his interest but once he has parted with his interest in property his admission is not admissible. That would be manifestly unjust that a person who has parted with his interest in property should be empowered to divest a right of another claiming in him by any statement which he may choose to make subsequently, reliance was placed on two decisions of this Court in case of Dharamsingh v. Jalima, 1980 Jab LJ 738 and Shafiullah Khan v. Abdul Wahab, 1963 Jab LJ (SN) 14.
12. Therefore it was submitted that in between the co-owner's possession of one co-owner will be that of on behalf of all and the ordinary classical requirement of adverse possession is that it should be nec vi nec clam nec precario i.e. possession required must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and in extent to show that it is possession adverse to the competitor, as it is well settled that in order to establish adverse possession of one co-owner as against another it is not enough to show that one out of them is in the sole possession and enjoyment of the profits of the properties. Ouster of the non-possessing coheir by the co-heir in possession should be made out, as a co-heir in possession is prescribed to be in possession on behalf of joint title, reliance was placed on P. Lakshmi Reddy v. L. Lakshmi Reddy., AIR 1957 SC 314, S. S. Gulam Ghonse v. S.S.A.M. Kamisul, AIR 1971 SC 2184, Shikharchand v. D.J.P. Karini Sabha, AIR 1974 SC 1178.
13. Shri K. B. Chaturvedi, learned counsel for plaintiff/respondent, placing reliance on decisions of the Supreme Court in case of Kshitish Chandra v. Commr. of Ranchi, AIR 1981 SC707 and a decision of this Court in case of Gyan Singh v. Saran Singh, (1992) 2 MPWN 33 contended that since 1939 Hassu Khan was ousted and plaintiff's predecessors we're cultivating the land, ouster was not secret but open with assertion of hostile title, the exclusive possession of agricultural fields with its enjoyment by the plaintiff and his predecessors to the knowledge of Hassu Khan fully establishes ouster. Therefore, even Hassu Khan was having any right in the property as co-heir his right of ownership extinguished ripening in the title of the plaintiff.
14. It is not necessary for me to deal with this question of adverse possession and acquiring Bhumiswami rights by the plaintiffs over the suit land on the basis of adverse possession under M. P. Land Revenue Code, 1959, though it is settled that even a person can acquire Bhumiswami rights by adverse possession, but, as alluded, the sale in favour of defendants Nos. 4 to 7 executed by Kha-toon Bi on behalf of minors was void, and that sale has also been challenged not only by minors but by Khatoon Bi also, by such sale no title convey to the defendants, therefore, even for argument's sake, plaintiff did not acquire title by adverse possession in the suit land, the defendants Nos. 4 and 7 do not get any advantage of that, as their position was that of a trespasser and a suit by a co-owner having an interest jointly in the property with others can maintain a suit against a trespasser, even if other co-owners are not made parties to the suit, which is not the case here, however, the heirs of Hassu Khan have supported the claim.
15. In regard to other substantial questions of law framed by this Court, no arguments were advanced by counsel for parties, hence, it is not necessary for me to decide those questions. However, Shri Mishra in para 10 of his written-submissions has submitted that the defendants Nos. 4 to 7 have purchased 45 bighas of land and they were in possession only of that area, and that land is under attachment since 1981, hence when the possession of the purchasers was not in excess of the share of vendors then possession can be retained till actual partition is effected between the plaintiff and heirs of Hassu Khan. How, this question arises as the sale was void ab initio the position of the purchasers is that of trespassers, therefore, they have no right to retain possession in any manner.
16. As regards mesne profits it is not necessary for this Court to observe anything as no material has been placed before this Court, that land is under attachment since 1981, even if it is under attachment that question shall be determined at the time of execution.
17. In the result, the appeal has no merit, and is dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 500/-, if pre-certified.
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