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Surendra Sohane And Others v. Dr. Hari Singh Gour Vishwavidyalaya And Others

Madhya Pradesh High Court
Jan 22, 1991
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Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

Three petitioners (among others) were declared elected under Group C of Section 20(1) of the M.P. Vishwavidyalaya Adhiniyam, 1973 on 14-4-1988, as recorded in Annexure P-4. Additional persons were declared elected under Clause (xix) of Group C and others under Group B; those results are recorded in Annexure P-5.

The facts were stated to be undisputed; the petition raised a question of statutory interpretation. The University issued a notification under Section 52 on 18-8-1988 (the notification itself was not annexed to the petition or return but the date was accepted). A later notification dated 23-8-1990 (Annexure P-6) extended the operation of the supersession under Section 52(1) up to 31-12-1990 or until appointment of a regular Vice-Chancellor, effective from 18-8-1990.

On 5-9-1990 the University issued Annexure P-7, an election programme fixing fresh elections for constituting the Court. The petition challenging Annexure P-7 was filed on 14-9-1990. Interim applications to stay the elections were rejected by this Court, subject to one direction that elections to 15 seats in the graduates constituency under Clause (xix) of Group C of Section 20(1) be held subject to the ultimate result of the petition. The writ petition was fixed for final hearing in January 1991.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Court under Section 20(1) of the Act was constituted on 14-4-1988 (or at any time thereafter) such that members elected or nominated under Groups B, C and E could be said to have entered into office.
  2. Whether the term of office of members elected or nominated under Groups B and C (and included in Group E) is "conterminous with the term of the Court" (three years) in a manner that their tenure begins independent of the actual constitution of the Court.
  3. Whether Annexure P-7 (the University's 5-9-1990 notification fixing a fresh election programme) is valid in light of the construction of Sections 20, 23, 25 and the operation of Section 52 notifications.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' (as summarized in the opinion)

  • Reliance on the plain language of Section 20(3): the term of office of members under Groups B and C and those included in Group E is "conterminous with the term of the Court which shall be three years," and that this phrase means the members' tenure is coextensive with the Court's term, which begins only when the Court is duly constituted.
  • Support from Sections 23(2) and Explanation (4) to Section 25(1), showing that where three-year terms are prescribed elsewhere the operative commencement is tied to constitution/appointment; thus members do not hold office until the Court is constituted.
  • Annexures P-4 and P-5 explicitly state that the three-year term will be effective "from the date of constitution of the Court to be notified later" (therefore no membership in office until constitution is declared).

Respondent / Advocate-General (as summarized in the opinion)

  • Submitted that the word "conterminous" means only the finishing or ending time, and does not refer to the date on which the Court came into existence; thus members nominated or elected under Groups B, C and E would have a three-year term irrespective of whether the Court was yet constituted.
  • Raised, late in the proceedings, an alternative remedy under Section 55 of the Act (reference to the Kulpati for interpretation disputes), arguing the petitioners should have availed that remedy.
  • Pointed to Section 52(3)/(5) and Section 52(4)(iii) consequences of a Section 52 notification, arguing that persons holding office would cease to do so from the appointed date, and that Kulpati must take steps to constitute the Court, Executive Council and Academic Council upon expiry of the notification's operation.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by observing that the facts were not in dispute and that the dispute was one of statutory interpretation of Section 20 of the Act read with related provisions.

The Court analyzed the statutory language:

  1. Section 20(1) creates the Court with five groups of members (Groups A to E). Section 20(2) expressly fixes the term of office of members elected under Group D at one year "from the date on which they are declared elected."
  2. Section 20(3) provides that the term of office of members nominated or elected under Group B and Group C or included in Group E "shall be conterminous with the term of the Court which shall be three years." The Court read the qualifying phrase "which shall be three years" as referring to the term of the Court and not as an independent, free-standing commencement rule for the members' tenure.

Addressing the Advocate-General's contention that "conterminous" only fixes an ending time and has no reference to commencement, the Court rejected that argument as fallacious and contrary to the statutory scheme. The Court relied on dictionary meaning (Oxford English Dictionary) of "conterminous" as "exactly coextensive" and "exactly coextensive in time," noting the practical impossibility of fixing an end to something which has not yet begun. The Court held that the natural reading of the statute requires that the members' tenure be coextensive with the Court's term, which only commences when the Court is constituted.

The Court compared Section 20 with other provisions:

  • Section 23(2) prescribes three-year terms for members of the Executive Council (other than ex officio members), but contains a proviso that a member elected under item (iii) of Section 20(1) shall cease to hold office if he ceases to be a member of the Court—indicating that in some instances tenure is tied to membership of the Court.
  • Explanation (4) to Section 25(1) prescribes three-year terms for certain members of the Academic Council and was read as reinforcing the view that tenure begins with constitution/appointment; the Court found this supports the petitioners' construction that members do not hold office until the Court is duly constituted.

The Court examined Annexures P-4 and P-5 which expressly stated that the three-year term would be effective "from the date of constitution of the Court to be notified later" and that the term of membership of the elected teachers will commence from the date of constitution to be declared later. The Court treated these statements as confirming that no declaration of constitution was ever made.

Regarding the Section 52 notifications (the State's supersession power), the Court noted the timeline: an initial notification dated 18-8-1988 (not annexed) and an extension by Annexure P-6 dated 23-8-1990. The University issued Annexure P-7 on 5-9-1990 fixing fresh elections. The Court found that even taking these events into account, the central question remained whether the Court had ever been constituted on 14-4-1988; it concluded that it had not.

On the point of alternative remedy under Section 55 (reference to the Kulpati), the Court observed that the contention was raised late and, in any event, was of no consequence when the case was finally heard on merits. The Court declined to give effect to the alternative remedy point at that stage.

Bringing these strands together, the Court concluded that because the Court had never been constituted on 14-4-1988 or at any later time, members elected under the categories in Group C (and similarly Groups B/E as relevant) never entered office. Consequently, their terms could not be said to have expired; and the University's Annexure P-7 (5-9-1990 notification) attempting to fix fresh elections and thereby effect changes was vitiated as being in contravention of the statutory provisions.

Holding and Implications

The petition is allowed and Annexure P-7 is quashed.

Implications and direct effects:

  • The Court held that no Court was constituted on 14-4-1988 or thereafter (for the purposes relevant to the dispute), so the members declared elected on 14-4-1988 under Annexures P-4 and P-5 never entered office as members of the Court.
  • As a consequence, Annexure P-7 (the University's 5-9-1990 notification fixing fresh elections) is vitiated and set aside as contrary to the statutory provisions.
  • The Constitution of the Court shall now be completed taking into account the members either elected or nominated on 14-4-1988, or at any time thereafter if any, before the issuance of the notification under Section 52 of the Act.
  • There shall be no order as to costs.

Broader precedential effect: The opinion does not state or claim that it establishes any new, broader precedent beyond the resolution of the statutory construction and the direct dispute between the parties; the decision disposes of the petition and the impugned notification as described above.

Show all summary ...

1. The three petitioners, amongst others, were elected under the provisions of Group C of Section 20(1) of the M.P. Vishwavidyalaya Adhiniyam, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), on 14-4-88 which is borne out by Annexure P-4 to the petition. Some more persons were declared duly elected under the provisions of Clause (xix) of Section 20(1) of the Act read with statute No. 23 framed thereunder for Dr. Hari Singh Gour Vishwavidyalaya, Sagar. Some other members were declared elected under Group B of Section 20(1) of the Act read with Statute No. 25. This is borne out by Annexure P-5.

2. It is better to state at the outset that the facts in this case are not in controversy. It is only the question of interpretation of certain statutory provisions which is involved in this petition.

3. Section 20(1) begins to read as follows:

"The Court shall consist of the following persons, namely........."

It is not necessary to reproduce all the remaining provisions of Sub-section (1), but it is sufficient to take note of the fact that there are 5 groups of members under Groups A to E for constituting the Court.

4. As has already been mentioned above, the petitioners were elected from amongst the persons mentioned in Group C, whereas some others were elected under the members mentioned in Group B It is worthwhile to quote the provisions of Sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 20 of the Act which read as under:

"(2). The term of offiice of members elected under Group D of Section (1) shall be one Year.

(3). The term of office of members nominated or elected, as the case may be, under Group B and Group C or included in Group E of Sub-section (1) shall be conterminous with the term of the Court which shall be three years."

As has already been stated earlier, the Court is said to consist of the persons mentioned in 5 groups and it would bear repetition to say that the groups are A to E.

5. It will be seen from the provisions of Section 20(2) that the term of office of the members elected under Group D of subsection (1) has been fixed to be one year which means one year from the date on which they are declared elected. In contradistinction, the language of Sub-section (2) and Sub-section (3) clearly lays down that the term of the members nominated or elected under Groups B and C, or included in Group E of Sub-section (1) shall be conterminous with the term of the 'court' which shall be three years. It is not in dispute that the Clause 'which shall be three years' relates to and is with reference to the term of the court and not the term of nomination or election of the members. Therefore, the members either nominated or elected, as the case may be under Groups B and E and included in Group E of subsection (1) shall so remain during the period that the court is in existence, the period of which has been fixed to be three years from the date that it is constituted.

6. Learned Advocate General strenuously argued that the term 'conterminous' means only the finishing or the ending time and has no reference to the date on which the court came into existence. According to him, irrespective of the fact that the court did not come into existence, the members nominated or elected under any of the Groups mentioned in Sub-section (1) shall be for a period of three years as members of the court even though the court was not constituted. In our view, this argument is fallacious. The Statute itself makes a distinction between the term 'prescribed' in Sub-section (2) for the members elected under Group 1) on one hand and under Groups B, C. and E on the other. Where Sub-section (2) speaks of one year from the date when the members are elected from out of Group D, the tenure of members nominated or elected or included, as the case may be, under Groups B, C and E has been made conterminous with the term of the Court and the term of the Court has been fixed to be three years.

7. The Oxford English Dictionary lays down the meaning of the term 'conterminous' as being synonymous with conterminous and the meaning which is laid down as 'exactly coextensive' and another meaning which is laid down is 'exactly coextensive in time, range, sense, etc'. Therefore, there cannot be an end or a limit to a thing which has not come into existence at all. The whole question, therefore, would be as to whether the Court was constituted in terms of Section 20(1) irrespective of the fact that some members under Groups B, C, D and E were declared either elected or nominated. To accept the argument of the learned Advocate-General would be to do violence to the language of the statute which is against the principles of Interpretation of Statutes.

8. In this connection, a reference to Sections 23(2) and 25 of the Act is also relevant. Section 23(2) reads thus:

"Members of the Executive Council other than exofficio members shall hold office for a period of three years:

Provided that a member of the Executive Council elected under item (Hi) of Sub-section (1) shall cease to hold office as such member if he ceases to be a member of the Court."

It wilt thus be seen from this provision that the period of three years prescribed for members of the Executive Council other than exofficio members has been fixed from the date they are elected, but such member of the Executive Council who has been elected under item (iii) of Sub-section (l) of Section 20, has been fixed again to be with effect from the date he ceases to be a member of the Court.

9. Explanation (4) to Section 25(1) reads thus :

"All the members of the Academic Council other than exofficio members and members referred to in Sub-section (3) shall hold office for a term of three years."

This again has reference to the tenure of their office as three years from the date they are appointed as members of the Academic Council other than exofficio members and the members referred to in Sub-section (3) of Section 20. This also supports the contention of Shri Rajendra Tiwari, learned counsel for the petitioners that the language of Section 20(3) of the Act is so clear especially in contradistinction to the language of Section 20(2), read with the provisions referred to above, that there cannot be any escape from the conclusion that the Court shall be deemed to have come in existence when it is duty constituted. So long as the Court is not constituted, no member elected, nominated or coopted for the purpose holds office as a member of the Court.

10. It would again bear repetition to say that the Court never came into existence, and though the petitioners; amongst others mentioned in Annexures P-4 and P-5, never held office as members of the Court. We have stressed upon the construction of the statutory provisions as incorporated in Section 20(1) of the Act, read with Sections 23 and 25 of the Act for the purpose of coming to a conclusion with regard to the validity of Annexure P-7 which is the subject-matter of challenge in this petition.

11. For that purpose, a few other dates are relevant. On 18-8-88, the State Government issued a notification Under/Section 52 of the Act; Section 52 lays down that if the State Government, on receipt of a report or otherwise, is satisfied that a situation has arisen in which the administration of the University cannot be carried out in accordance with the provisions of the Act, without detriment to the interests of the University and it is expedient in the interest of the University to do so, it may, by notification for reasons to be mentioned therein, direct that the provisions of Sections 13, 14,20 to 25,40,47,48,54 and 68 shall, as from the date specified in the notification (hereinafter in this section referred to as the appointed date), apply to the University subject to the modifications specified to the Third Schedule. Sub-section (2) of Section 52 lays down that the notification issued under Sub-section (1) shall remain in operation for a period of one year from the appointed dale and the State Government has been empowered to extend the period from time to time by such further period as it may think fit so however that the total period of operation of the notification does not exceed three years.

12. Notification dated 18-8-88 has not been annexed either to the petition or to the return filed on behalf of the University, but learned counsel for the parties agree that it is the correct date on which the first notification Under/Section 52 was issued which is also borne out by a subsequent notification dated 23-8-90 (Annexure P-6) by which the period of the so-called supersession Under Section 52(1) was extended for a period up to 31-12-1990 or till the appointment of u regular Vice-Chancellor whichever was earlier with effect from 18-8-90.

13. Pursuant to (he deadline fixed in Annexure P-6 when the effect of the notification Under/Section 52 was to have ceased to have its effeet on 31-12-90, another notification was issued on 5-9-90 by the University which is incorporated in Annexure P-7 (which is the subject-matter of challenge in this petition). By this so-called notification of 5-9-90 (Annexure P-7), an election programme has been fixed for a fresh election of members for the purpose of Constitution of Court. When this petition was filed on 14-9-90, a Bench of this Court, while rejecting the prayer for ad interim writ, or for staying the operation of the notification (Annexure P-7), observed that the elections, as scheduled to be held on 20-12-90 and the date for sending ballot papers is fixed as 20-11-90. The matter again came up before a Bench of this Court on 15-11 -90 when the stay application was finally heard on 1.A. No. 7092/90 which was again rejected, but this Court, in its order, stated :

"It is directed that elections to the office of the members of the Court be held, but election to the 15 seats in graduates constituency under Clause (xix) of Group C of Sub-section (1) of Section 20 of the M.P. Vishwavidyalaya Adhi-niyam, 1973, shall be subject to the ultimate result of this petition."

This writ petition itself was fixed for hearing in January, 1991. Hence this petition has been put up for hearing so early.

14. Although learned Advocate-General half-heartedly took a point which was not taken in the return, but as a submission on a pure question of law, that an alternative remedy was open to the petitioners to resort to the provisions of Section 55 of the Act which prescribes that if any question arises regarding the interpretation of any provision of this Act or of any Statute, Ordinance or Regulation or as to whether any person has been duly elected, appointed as or is entitled to be, a member of any authority or other body of the University, the matter shall be referred to the Kuladhipati whose decision thereon shall be final....... The question of alternative remedy is of no consequence when the case has been finally heard on merits. It could have been well advanced for whatever worth it was, before the case was fixed for final hearing and before the case was heard. Only at the close of arguments on merits this point was taken. Therefore, we do not take any serious note of the submissions made by the learned Advocate-General with regard to alternative remedy and can be of no avail at this stage.

15. Learned Advocate-Genera! next invited our attention to the provisions of Section 52(3) of the Act for the purpose of pointing out as to the effect of the notification issued Under/ Section 52( I) of the Act. Section 52(5) lays down that before the expiration of the period of operation of the notification or immediately as early as practicable thereafter, the Kulpati shall take steps to constitute the Court, Executive Council and Academic Council in accordance with the provisions of the Act, as unmodified and the Court, Executive Council and Academic Council as so constituted, shall begin to function on the date immediately following the date of expiry if the period of operation of the notification or the dale on which the respective bodies are so constituted whichever is later.......

16. Section 52(4) reads as under :

"As from the appointed date, the following consequences shall ensue, namely :

(iii) every person holding office as a member of the Court, the Executive Council of the Academic Council, as the case may be, immediately before the appointed date, shall cease to hold that office."

According to his submission, every person who was holding office as a member of the Court constituted Under/Section 20(1) of the Act was not to hold office with effect from the date of the notification u/ Section 52( 1). We do not see how this question is germane to the main question at hand which at the outset, we have stressed, is as to whether the Court was constituted at all on 14-4-88. If no Court was constituted, none of the members mentioned in Anne-xures P-4 and P-5 can be said to have held his office as member of the Court.

17. To crown it all, we can once again refer to a portion of Annexures P-4 and P-5 which is very relevant for the purpose of coming to the conclusion as to whether the Court was constituted at all on 14-4-88 Under/Section 20( 1) of the Act. Para 2 of Annexure P-4 reads thus:

"As provided under Sub-section (3) of Section 20 ibid, the term of office of these members shall be conterminous with the term of the Court and shall be three years. This will be effective from the date of constitution of the Court to be notified later. So also in the last para of Annexure P-5, it is clearly mentioned that the term of membership of the elected teachers will commence from the date of constitution of the Court which will be declared later. (Underlining is ours for the sake of emphasis.) According to the arguments at all hands, such a declaration of the Constitution of the Court was never made. This reinforces our conclusion that the constitution of the Court was not complete under the provisions of Section 20(1) of the Act."

18. There is thus no escape from the conclusion that no Court was constituted either on 14-4-88 or any time thereafter. Therefore, the members elected within the categories mentioned in Group C of Section 20(1) never entered office as members of the Court at all and, therefore, their term cannot be said to have expired because it was to be coextensive with the life of the Court which was three years from the date that it was so constituted. The constitution of the Court which was not complete Under/Section 20(1)on 14-4-88 or any time thereafter, could not be held to become nugatory merely by the issuance of the impugned notification of the University as contained in Annexure P-7. We are, therefore, constrained to hold that Annexure P-7 is vitiated and is in clear contravention of the statutory provisions as engrafted in the Act.

19. We accordingly allow this petition and quash the impugned notification of the University as contained in Annexure P-7. As a necessary corollary, the Constitution of the Court shall now be completed taking into account the members either elected or nominated on 14-4-88, or at any time [hereafter, if any, before the issuance of the notification Under/Section 52 of the Act. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.