1. In this petition under Articles 226/227 of the Con stitution of India the petitioner has challen ged the impugned orders dated 26-8-85, passed by the Collector Seoni, confiscating the essential commodity i.e. foodgrains under Section 6A of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 for contravening the provisions of Clause 3(2) of the licence-conditions under M.P. Foodgrains Dealers Licensing Order, 1965 and condition No. 3(2) of the licence issued under the M.P. Pulses, Edible Oilseeds and Edible Oil Dealers Licensing Order, 1977, which have been upheld in appeal before the Hon'ble Minister for Food, Government of Madhya Pradesh vide 22-10-86 under Section 6C of the said Act.

2. (i) It is common ground that the petitioner Baijnath Kathal holds licences 'under M.P. Foodgrains Dealers Licensing iprder, 1965 and under. M.P. Pulses, Edible Oilseeds and Edible Oil Dealers Licensing Order, 1977. He has a shop in Budhwari Bazar, Seoni with Godowns in Budhwari Bazar in Ganj at Seoni and at Ugli, The last two places i.e. Ganj and Ugli are said to be located at a distance of approximately 3 and 78 Kilo-metres from the Budhwari shop.

(ii) Respondent No. 1 Shri M. K. Qureishi is one of the Food Inspectors at Seoni. It is further admitted that the said Food Inspector visited the shop premises on 8-7-84 for inspection of the shop and godowns. Under Condition No. 10 of the licence, it is enjoined that

"the licensee shall give all facilities at all reasonable times to the licensing authority or any officer authorised by it or the State Government for the inspection of his stobks and accounts at his shop, godown or other place used by him for the storage, sale or purchase of foodgrains and for the taking of samples of foodgrains for examination."

Respondent No. 1 Food Inspector inspected the register of daily accounts of foodgrains maintained at the shop. Thereafter, along with the petitioner, the Food Inspector proceeded to the Godown located in the mill-area belonging to Damodar Prasad but it was found locked. The Food Inspector, because of the non-availability of the keys of the godown about which the versions of the parties are divergent sealed it on 8-7-84 so that it could be inspected subsequently. The other three go-downs except the above one, were inspected. According to the entries in the stock register for 8-7-84, the opening stock of Kanki was shown as 439 Quintals 40 Kgs. and that of wheat : 14 Quintals 40 Kgs. The petitioner who was present throughout, stated that there were no 6ther transactions of sale/purchase. On inspection and physical verification of the stock on 8-7-84 of the three godowns, the wheat was found to be 14.8.0 Quintals and Kanki in 377 bags. The petitioner then stated that 62 bags are in the other Godown at Ganj. To recall, that Godown was not and could not be inspected on 8-7-84 because of the non-availability of the keys.

(iii) Subsequently, on the next day i.e. 9-7-84, (according to the respondents at 1 O'clock noon) the seal of the godown was broke open and on physical verification the Food Inspec tor found the following stock :

(iv) Shri Qureisht, Food Inspector submit ted his report dated 15-7-84 to the Collector along with the documents viz. the seizure memoranda dated 8-7-84 and 9-7-84, Supradginama, the statements recorded by him, the Dalhan and Tilhan registers relating to the entries from 1-1-84 to 8-7-84 and the bill book. The Collector, Seoni Under section 6b of e. c. act issued a notice in writing informing the petitioner of the grounds on which he proposed to confiscate the essential commodities and further directed the petitioner to make a representation in writing. He further specified that if the petitioner desires personal hearing, he should specify in writing. On 31-7-84, the petitioner submitted his representation in writing and stated that he has not committed any breach/breaches of the licensing order. As regards the godown situated at Ganj ward, he stated that as the key was with Anil Kumar son of Shri Damodar Prasad Agrawal, it was not possible to have physical verification done on the same day. As regards the excess quantity of the essential commodities referred above, he stated that they belong to one dealer Laxmi Narayan of Barghat who wanted to close his business and therefore on 8-7-84 itself at about 5.30 A.M. those food grains were received and entries thereof were made in the concerned registers and the Food Inspector was apprised thereof for his satisfaction; that the foodgrains were received in his absence and whatever disclosures he made to the Food Inspector on 8-7-84, related to the entries as then existed. Lastly, he prayed that he has not committed any breaches and the proceedings for confiscation are liable to be set aside and in case the Collector is not satisfied, then he may be afforded as opportunity of being heard and also for cross-examination.

(v) In the above background, the Collector, Seoni passed the impugned orders dated 26-8-85 (Annexure-P-11) which have been upheld in appeal decided on 22-10-86 (Annexure-P-15).

3. The impugned orders have been assailed inter alia on the ground that the Collector erred in not believing the Certificate No. 1/47 dated 8-7-84 (Ann. P-8) declaring receipt and check at the Mandi outpost relating to the seized commodities; that the three affidavits Annexure P-5, P-6 and P-7 which were filed by the petitioner to show that another dealer Laxmi Narayan had sent those commodities as per his bill No. 41 dated 7-7-84 and Shri Damodar Prasad had brought those commodities in the truck on 8-7-84 to the godown; that Anil Kumar son of Damodar Prasad who had the keys of the Godown, had left for Jabalpur, had been wrongly disbelieved; that Shri Qureishi, Food Inspector, conducted the search and seizure outside his jurisdiction; that there is absence of mens rea; that the inspection was done on Sunday which is a Gazetted holiday; that the Collector has not acted fairly, reasonably and judiciously in exercise of his powers Under section 6a of the e.c. act and there was no application of mind; that the rules of natural justice demanded that the report of the Food Inspector could not be used against the petitioner without giving an opportunity of cross-examining the Food Inspector and to further adduce evidence; that those orders are illegal and are liable to be quashed.

4. The respondents filed a joint return, denying the averments made in the petition and contended that the Collector has also the appellate authority have passed appropriate orders giving adequate reasons that during the surprise check by Food Inspector along with the Asstt. Food Officer on 8-7-84, the petitioner was asked to deliver the key of the godown but he had avoided; but subsequently on 9-7-84, undeclared stocks of the essential commodities described earlier were found in the petitioner's godown; that the petitioner was given full opportunity of being heard before passing the impugned orders; that the grievance of the petitioner that he was not given any opportunity to adduce evidence is devoid of any substance because he never prayed for that and on 16-7-85 his counsel merely argued the case on the basis of available record; that looking to the fact that the petitioner's counsel around the case, the petitioner has foregone his right of cross-examination and putting any other kind of defence; that the findings of facts recorded by the two prescribed authorities are clear and cannot be re-agitated in the writ jurisdiction in the Court. For those reasons, they prayed that the petition is liable to be dismissed.

5. The respondents have placed the original records of the impugned proceedings which we have carefully scrutinized. Both counsel heard.

6. In context of Para 3 (supra), the main thrust of the contentions by the learned counsel Shri Verma is that there is violation of the rules of natural justice, inasmuch as, the petitioner was not given an opportunity to cross-examine the Food Inspector and further to adduce his own evidence. So far as section 6b of the e.c. act is concerned, it cannot be disputed that the petitioner was given a notice in writing informing him of the grounds on which it was proposed to confiscate the essential commodity; he was also given an opportunity of making a representation in writing as specified in the notice against the grounds of confiscation and was also given a reasonable opportunity of being heard. Thus, apparently Clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Section 6-B(1) seem to have been complied with. But, according to the learned counsel Shri Verma, a reasonable opportunity "of being heard" means that the petitioner should have had an opportunity of cross-examining the Food Inspector whose version appears in the report relied upon by the Collector and the petitioner should have been given an opportunity to adduce evidence about the matters stated in his representation by way of Explanation. The gist of his written Explanation/ Representation dated 31-7-84 is that the fourth godown at Ganj Ward could not be checked on 8-7-84 because the key was with Anil Kumar s/o Damodar Prasad Agrawal; that wheat, Alsi, rice and other commodities were received on 8-7-84 itself; that they were sent in the morning by another dealer Laxmi Narayan Barghat Whala with whom the petitioner had a talk "three or four days before that date" that this consignment; Unloaded in the godown of Ganj Ward, was received in the early morning on 8th July, 1984 and the petitioner was unaware thereof; that the consignment was also checked for purpose of the Krishi Mandi. But the original record shows that the petitioner was represented by an Advocate. The proceedings were mostly adjourned. But the important date is 9-10-84 when the petitioner who was present with his Advocate, filed four Affidavits that of Damodar, Prasad, Laxmi Narayan Baij-nath (Petitioner) and Anil Kumar and also filed the photostat copies of stock register entries from 1-7-84 to 31-7-84. The next material date was 16-7-85 when the petitioner's counsel was heard and thereafter on 26-S-85 the impugned order was passed by the Collector. The proceedings/ order-sheets do not anywhere indicate that the counsel appearing for the petitioner ever requested the Collector to cross-examine the Food Inspector and or to adduce evidence. On the other hand, the documents together with the four Affidavits referred above, were filed obviously for the purpose of evidence to be considered by the Collector. It seems that the petitioner took a sporting chance of having a favourable decision on basis of facts stated in his representation and supported by the Affidavits; and he cannot be permitted now to turn back at a later stage when in fact the decision had gone against him. That is why, this ground did not weigh with the appellate authority also. The Collector as also the appellate authority on facts, had found, that at the time of seizures, the statement of the petitioner was also recorded which obviously contains the petitioner's first version on the occasion of surprise check and seizures. For our satisfaction, we have seen original record, and we find, that Panchnama was prepared on 8-7-84, at about 11, O'clock, and the statement of the petitioner was recorded by the Food Inspector. Therein, the petitioner made statements about the opening stock in the books about Kanki and wheat 439.40 and 14.30 Quintals respectively; and further admitted, that there had not been any sale or purchase of these items; and stock of Dalhan Tilhan is nil; that the key is not available since it is with his (Petitioner's) son. Petitioner's statement was also recorded on the following day i.e. 9-7-84, mentioning that the sealed godown of Ganj Ward was opened and food-grains undeclared' as stated in the seizure-memo and Report, were found.

7. The subsequent version of the petitioner is, that the cohsighment was received at about 5.30 a.m. on 8-7-84 and he had given the key to Anil Kumar son of Damodar Prasad for unloading the same. Since Anil Kumar was not available, the Godown was sealed and this godown could be cheeked only-on 9-7-84. Anil Kumar's Affidavit has also been filed, and that of Laxmi Narayan dealer from whom those commodities are said to have been purchased. According to the Affidavit of Damodar, he had personally brought those commodities in a truck on 8-7-84 at 5.30 a.m. It is really intriguing to find that Damodar Prasad and Anil Kumar, who are both Panch witnesses in the two seizure memos and Supradginama dated 9-7-84, kept their lips tight. Similarly Damodar Prasad Agrawal is a witness to the seizure memo dated 8-7-84 also. The petitioner does not even whisper about any consignment actually received or to be received from the said Laxmi Narayan dealer. Food Inspector in the report had really stated that after verification of the commodities of the stocks and stock register, since there were nil stocks about Dalhan Tilhan and as per stock register, there was no sale or purchase of Dalhan Tilhan from 1-1-84 to 8-7-84, both the registers were left at the petitioner's premises.

8. It is all those circumstances which seem to have been considered by the Collector and the appellate authority in concluding that the explanatory circumstances projected by the petitioner are "sheer afterthoughts" and "the four affidavits filed on his behalf are untrustworthy". Both the impugned orders are "speaking orders" and indicate due application of minds by the concerned authorities. Under Article 227 Constitution of India, the High Court would interfere- only under limited circumstances. Such as, arbitrary or capricious exercise of jurisdiction, where there is violation of rules of natural justice, or where the findings are perverse, or based on no evidence at all. Such power is not to be exercised merely because there is an admission of a particular piece of evidence or rejection of a particular piece of evidence. Even if there are mistakes of facts or law they cannot be corrected under Article 227 Constitution of India. This Court cannot convert itself into a Court of appeal or a Court of revision sitting over the decisions of the inferior courts in exercise of powers under Article 227. (Refer, Mohd Yunus v. Mohd. Mustaqim) AIR 1984 SC 38. To reiterate, in the circumstances of this case, there has been compliance of Clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Section 6-B(1) of E.C. Act. The petitioner represented by his counsel never requested the Court (Collector) to cross-examine the Food Inspector and to adduce evidence, and yet four Affidavits were filed for consideration, along with documents, which have been duly considered by the concerned authorities while rejecting that piece of evidence as "afterthought" and "manipulated". Thus in view of the above factual matrix, there is no merit in this petition.

9. The learned counsel has taken pains to refer case law for canvassing his contention that a reasonable opportunity of hearing, means, opportunity for cross examination and adducing evidence. Town Area Committee Jalalabad v. Jagdish Prasad (1979) 1 SCC 60 : (AIR 1978 SC 1407) and Union of India v. T. R. Verma AIR 1957 SC 882 were referred to. Those decisions are quite distinguishable since they related to disciplinary/ departmental proceedings. Rameshwar Rathord v. State of M.P. ILR (1981) Madh Pra 1008 is a case Under Section 6-A E.C. Act relating to confiscation but it is not directly helpful to decide the point involved. Malkhan Singh v. Inspector of Central Excise, Jabalpur ILR (1962) Madh Pra 197 : (AIR 1962 Madh Pra 112) was also referred which stated that the rules of natural justice' require that a party should have the opportunity of adducing all relevant evidence on which he relies; that) the evidence" of the opponent should be taken in his presence; and he should be given opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses examined by the other party. As an abstract proposition broadly stated there could be no dispute about this proposition.

10. However, on the question of violation of rules of natural justice, we may refer to some other authorities. In Union of India v. J.N. Sinha, AIR 1971 SC 40, the matter related to compulsory retirement under F.R. 56 and the contention was that "no reasons are given for compulsorily retiring" the respondent and admittedly "no opportunity was given to show-cause" against compulsory retirement. The High Court had held that this amounted to contravention of principles of natural justice. But their Lordships of Supreme Court in para 7 at page 42 observed:

"Fundamental rule 56(i) in terms does not require that any opportunity should be given to the concerned Government Servant to show cause against his compulsory retirement. A Government servant serving under the Union of India holds his office at the pleasure of the President as provided in Article 310 of the Constitution. But this "pleasure" doctrine is subject to the rules or law made under Article 309 as well as to the conditions prescribed under Article 311. Rules of natural justice are not embodied rules nor can they be elevated to the position of fundamental rights. As observed by this Court in Kraipak v. Union of Tndia AIR 1970 SC 150 "the aim of rules of natural justice is to secure justice, or to put it negatively, to prevent miscarriage of justice. These rules can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. In other words, they do not supplant the law but supplement it." It is true that if a statutory provision can be read consistently with the principles of natural justice, the Courts should do so because it must be presumed that the legislatures and the statutory authorities intend to act in accordance with the principles of natural justice. But, if on the other hand, a statutory provision either specifically or by necessary implication excludes the application of any or all the rules of principles of natural justice then the Court cannot ignore the mandate of the legislature or the statutory authority and read into the concerned provision the principles of natural justice whether the exercise of a power conferred should be made in accordance with any of the principles of natural justice or not depends upon the express words of the provision conferring the power, the nature of the power conferred, the purpose for which it is conferred and the effect of the exercise of that power."

(ii) In The Kesava Mills Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1973 SC 389, a case relating to the takeover of the Mills, where Rule 5 stated about "opportunity for hearing and being heard, including opportunity to adduce any evidence", the Court observed (at pp. 393-394 of AIR):

"The second question, however, as to what are the principles of natural justice that should regulate an administrative act or order is a much more difficult one to answer. We do not think it either feasible or even desirable to lay down any fixed or rigorous yard-stick in this manner. The concept of natural justice cannot be put into a strait-jacket. It is futile, therefore, to look for definitions or standards of natural justice from various decisions and then try to apply them to the facts of any given case. The only essential point that has to be kept in mind in all cases is that the person concerned should have a reasonable opportunity of presenting his case and that the administrative authority concerned should act fairly, impartially and reasonably. Where administrative officers are concerned, the duty is not so much to act judicially as to act fairly."

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"The requirements of natural justice must depend on the circumstances of the case, the nature of the enquiry, the rules under which the Tribunal is acting, the subject-matter that is being dealt with and so forth."

(iii) M/s. Shrikrishnad as Tikara v. State of M.P., AIR 1977 SC 1691, one of the contentions was that the lessee of the mining lease had not been given a reasonable opportunity to explain why the lease should not be cancelled. In para 8 it was observed :

"Nor are we impressed with the contention that natural justice has been breached. Here is a case where admittedly, the conditions of the contract had been broken and the obligations under the rules had been violated. The reply to the show-cause notice has set out all that need be set out. The facts are simple. The explanation is non-exculpatory. The only plea is for condonation. The lessee having been heard, natural justice has been complied with. The fact that in the second notice by the Collector a personal hearing was offered, does not mean that the failure personally to hear the petitioner was a contravention of the canon of natural justice in the first case. It is well-established that the principles of natural justice cannot be petrified or fitted into rigid moulds. They are flexible and turn on the facts and circumstances of each case. Has there been an unfair deal by the authority? Has the party affected been hit below the belt? Has he had a just opportunity to state his plea? Having regard to the features of the present case, we are hardly satisfied that the order is bad on this score."

(iv) Mohinder Singh Gill v. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi, AIR 1978 SC 851, five Judges of the Supreme Court approved the view taken in Kraipak's case (AIR 1970 SC 150) (supra), reported in and following observations were quoted (at p. 871 of AIR):

"The aim of the rules of natural justice is to secure justice or to put it negatively to prevent miscarriage of justice. These rules can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. In other words they do not suppllant the law of the land but supplement it."

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What particular rule of natural justice should apply to a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of that case, the framework of the law under which the enquiry is held and the constitution of the Tribunal or body of persons appointed for that purpose. Whenever; a complaint is made before a Court that some principle of natural justice had been contravened the Court has to decide whether the observance of that rule was necessary for a just decision on the facts of that case.

11. In view of the case law, referred above, we find that the statutory requirements in the proceedings contemplated Under section 6b of e.g. act had been complied with. There was never any prayer to cross-examine the Food Inspector and to adduce other evidence besides the four affidavits-evidence, filed by the petitioner, for consideration of the same. If such request for cross-examination and adducing evidence, as now stated before us, would have been made to the Collector, there is no reason to infer that the same, on consideration of fair play, would have been disallowed, though of course, some such further enquiry before the statutory authority may not ordinarily be expected, and in fact not meant to be like elaborate proceedings in a Court governed by elaborate procedures and rules of evidence. That is why, the separate administrative forum has been provided though principles of natural justice have been incorporated in Section 6B. The request for cross-examination, therefore, could have been tailored to the situation as required. The requirement of fairness implies that an administrative authority must act in good faith and without bias and must not act arbitrarily or capriciously.

12. It was also contended that the Food Inspector conducted the search and seizures outside his jurisdiction and had acted under bias and bad faith. The allegations about bias or mala fides are not specific. On the contrary, they are very vague. As regards the matter about territorial jurisdiction of F.I. this ground should have been raised before the Collector as also the appellate authority and has bean raised for the first time in Writ Petition. However, under the Notification No. 7430-5326-XXX-(i)-7 dated 26-10-77, in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-clause (a) of Clause 19 of the Madhya Pradesh Pulses and Edible Oils Dealers Licensing Order, 1977, in column No. (2), the Food Inspectors and Assistant Food Inspectors (Food & Civil Supplies) seem to have been conferred the powers to exercise powers of entry, search and seizure etc. This aspect therefore does not call for further discussion.

13. In view of the factual matrix and the law stated above, we find that this petition is devoid of any substance and is accordingly, dismissed. The petitioner shall bear his own (posts and pay that of the respondents. 'Counsel's fee Rs. 150/-.