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Harbans Singh v. Margrat G. Bhingardive
Factual and Procedural Background
The non-applicant (landlady) is a widow and co-owner of the disputed premises along with her two major sons; the property had been purchased by her late husband. The landlady filed an eviction application before the Rent Controlling Authority, Jabalpur, under section 23-A(a) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (the Act), seeking eviction of the tenant (the applicant) on the ground that the accommodation was bona fide required by her for occupation as residence for her two married sons and their children. She relied on being within the special category of landlords defined in section 23-J of the Act and sought to invoke the summary procedure under Chapter III-A before the Rent Controlling Authority.
The tenant appeared, denied the bona fide requirement and objected that bona fide need for married sons was not covered by section 23-A(a) and that the Rent Controlling Authority lacked jurisdiction since the special forum under Chapter III-A was not available for eviction sought for the bona fide need of the widow's married sons. The landlady applied to amend her eviction application to include that the premises were also required for her own residence; the Rent Controlling Authority allowed the amendment and proceeded with the eviction proceedings by order dated 28-12-1987.
The tenant filed a revision under section 23-E to challenge the Authority's order. The Single Judge noted conflicting Single Bench decisions on the legal question and referred the matter to this Full Bench for opinion on the scope of section 23-A read with section 23-J of the Act.
Legal Issues Presented
- The Full Bench formulated the central question as: "Whether out of several landlords of an accommodation including a widow, an application for eviction of the tenant by the widow alone, on the ground of her own bona fide need or joint need of herself and that of her married sons and their children, would be competent before the Rent Controlling Authority under section 23-A(a) read with section 23-J(iii) of the Act."
-
For convenience the Court divided the main question into two sub-questions:
- Whether a widow/landlady who is a co-owner (not sole owner) can alone initiate eviction proceedings against the tenant in the absence of other co-owners.
- Whether the widow, who alone falls in the special category of landlords under section 23-J(iii), can seek possession on the ground of her own bona fide need and for the bona fide need of her married sons who are co-owners but do not fall in the special category.
Arguments of the Parties
Tenant / Applicant's Arguments
- The tenant denied the landlady's claim of bona fide requirement for the premises.
- It was contended that the bona fide requirement asserted (for married sons) is not covered by section 23-A(a) and therefore the Rent Controlling Authority lacked jurisdiction under Chapter III-A.
- The tenant argued that because the premises were inherited, the widow and her children are co-owners and joint landlords; hence the widow alone cannot maintain an application under section 23-A(a) for either her own need or for the joint need of herself and her married sons, who are not in the special class defined by section 23-J and who did not join in the application.
Landlady / Non-Applicant's Arguments
- The landlady, being a widow, claimed to fall within the special category of landlords under section 23-J(iii) and thus to be entitled to seek eviction under the summary procedure in Chapter III-A before the Rent Controlling Authority.
- After the tenant's objection, the landlady amended her application to state that the premises were required both for her married sons and for her own residence, and relied on the authority of section 23-A(a) read with section 23-J to maintain the proceeding.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Smt. Sushila Devi v. Kedamath Gupta, A.I.R. 1987 M.P. 65 (1987 M.P.R.C.J. 193) | Held that the benefit of section 23-J was only for the widow alone and that where bona fide requirement was of co-owner sons, the widow alone could not invoke Chapter III-A. | Cited as a conflicting Single Bench view; the Full Bench noted this decision but ultimately did not follow it, observing it had been overruled by later Division Bench authority (Shivraj v. Ashalata) and inconsistent Single Bench decisions. |
| Saroj Thareja v. Tara Bai, 1988 M.P.L.J. 22 | Held that a widow landlady's application for bona fide need of herself as well as her son is competent before the Rent Controlling Authority under section 23-A read with section 23-J; plurality of ownership is not a disqualification. | Used by the Court as supportive authority for the proposition that a widow may seek eviction for herself and members of her family even if they do not themselves belong to the special category in section 23-J. |
| Ghanshyamdas v. Sbivatdas, 1988 M.P.L.J. 260 | Similarly held that a widow could make an application for eviction for her bona fide need as also that of her son; plurality of ownership not disqualifying. | Noted as consistent with Saroj Thareja and relied upon as authority supporting the view adopted by the Full Bench. |
| Jagdish Prasad v. Sumitra Bai, 1986 M.P.R.C.J. 289 | Expressed the same view — that a widow within section 23-J could proceed for eviction though there were co-owners. | Referred to as another Single Bench subscribing to the view that the widow's application was competent. |
| Shivraj v. Ashalata, 1989 M.P.L.J. 202 (Division Bench) | Division Bench overruled Sushila Devi and held that a suit by joint landlords, where one is within the meaning of section 23-J, can be entertained by the Rent Controlling Authority and eviction relief can be granted if other co-owners do not object. | Relied upon by the Full Bench as authoritative support for the proposition that a co-owner who belongs to the special category may initiate proceedings and secure eviction where others do not object. |
| Sri Ram Pasricha v. Jagannath, (1976) 4 SCC 184 | Under general law in landlord-tenant suits the question of title is irrelevant; a co-owner is an owner of the composite property and absence of other co-owners is not a ground to throw out the suit. | Applied by the Full Bench to answer the first sub-question: a co-owner widow can initiate eviction proceedings in the absence of other co-owners (provided they do not object). |
| Kama Goet v. B.P. Pathak, (1977) 2 SCC 814 | Held that a co-owner is as much an owner as a sole owner and absence of other co-owners does not disentitle a co-owner from maintaining an eviction action when others do not object. | Followed by the Full Bench to support the conclusion that the widow, as co-owner, could initiate eviction proceedings. |
| Pal Singh v. Shri Sunder Singh, (1989) 1 S.V.L.R. (C) 54 | Followed earlier Supreme Court view on co-ownership and entitlement to sue for eviction. | Mentioned as a recent Supreme Court decision that followed the co-ownership principle relied upon by the Full Bench. |
| Kanailal v. Pammnidhi, A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 907 | Cited for the statutory interpretation principle that where statutory language is clear plain and unambiguous, courts must give effect to it rather than substitute their view of legislative intent. | Used to justify the interpretive approach: the Court gave effect to the plain language of section 23-A(a) and section 23-J rather than read in additional restrictions contrary to the text. |
| Senior Superintendent, R.M.S. v. K.V. Gopinath, (1973) 3 SCC 867 : A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 1487 | Also cited for principles of statutory interpretation where clear statutory language must prevail over perceived purpose when no ambiguity exists. | Relied upon by the Full Bench in support of the rule that unambiguous statutory language controls interpretation. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Full Bench proceeded by first noting that the facts were not in serious dispute and that the Single Judge had referred the point because of conflicting Single Bench decisions. Observing the absence of a precisely formulated question in the reference, the Court formulated the question itself and divided it into two sub-questions for convenience: (i) whether a co-owner widow can sue alone for eviction, and (ii) whether a widow who alone falls within section 23-J can seek eviction for her own bona fide need and that of her married sons who are not within section 23-J.
On the first sub-question the Court relied on Supreme Court authority (Sri Ram Pasricha v. Jagannath; Kama Goet v. B.P. Pathak; Pal Singh v. Shri Sunder Singh) to state the well-established principle that a co-owner is an owner of the entire property and that absence of other co-owners will not disentitle a co-owner from maintaining an eviction action when the other co-owners do not object. Applying that principle, the Court held that the widow, a co-owner, could initiate eviction proceedings in the absence of objection by other co-owners.
Turning to the second sub-question, the Court examined the text of section 23-A(a) and section 23-J and reviewed the legislative history: Chapter III-A (sections 23-A to 23-I) was inserted (by the Amending Act of 1983) to create a special summary procedure for eviction on bona fide need (originally drawn from clauses (e) and (f) of section 12). Subsequently an amendment by Ordinance and the M.P. Accommodation Control (Amendment) Act, 1985 introduced section 23-J to confine the special forum to specified categories of landlords (including widows) and added safeguards (like section 23-C requiring leave to defend for tenants).
The Court emphasized the legislative purpose: to provide an expeditious remedy for handicapped or specially situated landlords (as enumerated in section 23-J). However, the Court underscored the primacy of the statutory text: where language is plain and unambiguous the Court must give effect to it (citing Kanailal v. Pammnidhi and R.M.S. v. K.V. Gopinath).
A literal reading of section 23-A(a) shows that a "landlord" (as defined for Chapter III-A by section 23-J) may apply for eviction if the accommodation is bona fide required by the landlord for his own occupation, for any member of his family, or for any person for whose benefit the accommodation is held, and provided that person has no other reasonably suitable accommodation in his occupation in the city or town. The Court interpreted these provisions to mean that the applicant must belong to the special class defined in section 23-J, but the family member for whose bona fide need eviction is sought need not themselves belong to any special category; thus the presence of co-owner sons who are not in section 23-J does not preclude the widow from seeking eviction for their bona fide need.
The Court reconciled the conflicting Single Bench decisions by endorsing the view that a widow-landlord who falls within section 23-J can maintain an application under section 23-A(a) for her own bona fide need and for the bona fide need of members of her family (including married sons), and that plurality of ownership is not a disqualification where co-owners do not object. The Court noted supportive decisions (Saroj Thareja, Ghanshyamdas, Jagdish Prasad) and the Division Bench decision in Shivraj v. Ashalata which had overruled Sushila Devi.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Full Bench held that an application for eviction by a widow alone, out of several landlords (including co-owners), under section 23-A(a) read with section 23-J is competent where the eviction is sought on the ground of the widow's own bona fide need or the joint bona fide need of herself and her married sons and their children.
Implications and direct effects:
- The widow/non-applicant, being within clause (iii) of section 23-J, is entitled to invoke the summary procedure in Chapter III-A and to apply to the Rent Controlling Authority for eviction under section 23-A(a) for her own bona fide need and for bona fide need of members of her family even if such family members do not themselves fall in the special categories enumerated in section 23-J.
- The Full Bench resolved a conflict of Single Bench decisions by endorsing the approach that plurality of ownership (co-ownership) does not disqualify a widow in the special class from proceeding under Chapter III-A, provided other co-owners do not object.
- The matter was directed to be placed before the referring Single Judge for disposal in accordance with this opinion. The costs of the Full Bench proceedings were ordered to abide the ultimate result of the revision on merits.
- The opinion rests on interpretation of the statutory text and legislative history as set out in the judgment; the Court emphasized giving effect to the plain language of sections 23-A and 23-J when unambiguous.
Order accordingly.
OPINION
Faizanuddin, J.:— This case, on a reference by a learned Single Judge of this Court, was placed before this Full Bench, for consideration and opinion of a question of law as to the ambit and scope of section 23-J read with section 23-A of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (Act No. 41 of 1961).
2. The necessary facts giving rise to the legal question are not in serious dispute and lie in a narrow compass. The non-applicant is a co-sharer-owner of the suit premises along with her two major sons, she being the widow of her late husband G.D Bhingardive who had purchased the same. The non-applicant being a widow initiated proceedings before the Rent Controlling Authority, Jabalpur, by filing an application under, section 23-A(a) of the M.P Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (for brevity referred to as ‘the Act’) for eviction of tenant, the applicant herein, from the premises in his occupation originally on the plea that the said premises were required bona fide by her for occupation as residence for her two married sons and their children. The landlady/non-applicant being a widow claimed that she belongs to the special category of landlords defined in section 23-J(iii) of the Act and, therefore, she was entitled to pursue her remedy in summary proceedings as provided in Chapter III-A of the Act, before the Rent Controlling Authority on whom jurisdiction is conferred by virtue of the provisions contained in section 23-A of the Act.
3. The tenant/applicant entered appearance and besides denying the bona fide requirment as alleged by the landlady also took objection that the alleged ground of bona fide requirement of accommodation for residence of married sons of the landlady/non-applicant was not covered by section 23-A(a) and the Rent Controlling Authority having no jurisdiction, the landlady could not be permitted to take recourse to the special summary procedure provided in Chapter III-A of the Act. Thereupon the landlady/non-applicant moved an application for amendment of her original eviction application proposing an amendment to the effect that the premises in question were not only required bona fide by her for occupation as residence for her married sons and their families but also for her own residence. The Rent Controlling Authority allowed the said amendment by his order dated 28-12-1987, overruled the objection and continued the eviction proceedings.
4. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order of the Rent Controlling Authority, the tenant/applicant preferred Revision before this Court under section 23-E of the Act. The Revision came up for hearing before the learned Single Judge of this Court before whom the learned counsel appearing for the tenant/applicant assailed the jurisdiction of the Rent Controlling Authority by contending that in the present case the advantage of the special forum provided under Chapter III-A of the Act is available only to the widow in case she required bona fide the residential accommodation for her own occupation as spcified in clause (a) of section 23-A because she alone falls in the category of ‘landlord’ within the meaning of section 23-J of the Act and not her married sons and their children. It was, therefore, urged that the Rent Controlling Authority has no jurisdiction to entertain an application of the widow/landlady for eviction of tenant on the ground of bona fide need of accommodation for residence of her married sons or even for joint need of the accommodation for herself and her married sons in which event the remedy is by way of civil suit under section 12 of the Act.
5. During the course of arguments, learned Single Judge noticed conflicting precedents and divergent views of different single Benches of this Court on the aforesaid legal controversy. In Smt. Sushila Devi v. Kedamath Gupta, A.I.R 1987 M.P 65 : 1987 M.P.R.C.J 193. Rampal Singh, J. while construing the provisions of Chapter 111-A of the Act took the view that incorporation of section 23-J in the parent Act, by way of amendment in 1985, is only for the benefit of the widow and none else and if the bona fide requirement is not of the widow but that of her major sons who are also co-owners/landlords of the premises belonging to the general category of landlords, then the widow who alone is the landlady of the special category as defined in section 23-J, would not be entitled to make an application to the Rent Controlling Authority, for eviction of tenant. Quite contrary to this Dr. T.N Singh, J. in Saroj Thareja v. Tara Bai, 1988 M.P.L.J 22 and in Ghanshyamdas v. Sbivatdas, 1988 M.P.L.J 260 took the view that an application for eviction made by a widow landlady for her bona fide need as also of her son would be competent before the Rent Controlling Authority under section 23-A read with section 23-J of the Act and that plurality of ownership of any accommodation was no disqualification to disentitle a widow from getting the premises vacated from the tenant merely because there were some other persons also the owners of the premises. In view of these conflicting decisions which involved a serious question of frequent occurrence and great significance, the learned Single Judge was persuaded to make a reference to a larger Bench to resolve the controversy and the conflict in various decisions. This is how the matter was before this Full Bench.
6. Learned Single Judge while making a reference has not precisely formulated the question in controversy for determination by us and, therefore, having regard to the brief facts set out in the referring order, we shall ourselves formulate the question which looms for our adjudication. In our view the legal question, that arises for our consideration may be formulated as under:
“Whether out of several landlords of an accommodation including a widow, an application for, eviction of the tenant by the widow alone, on the ground of her own bona fide need or joint need of herself and that of her married sons and their children, would be competent before the Rent Controlling Authority under section 23-A(a) read with section 23-J(iii) of the Act.”
7. Learned counsel for the tenant/applicant contended before us that the premises in question were let out by the late husband of the landlady/non-applicant and after his death, landlady/non-applicant being his widow, as well as her children succeeded to the tenanted premises by inheritance and, therefore, the widow and her children all became the co-owners and joint landlords thereof. It was, therefore, urged that the widow alone cannot maintain an application under section 23-A(a) of the Act, either for her own bona fide need or for the joint need of herself and her married sons who are also joint landlords but do not belong to the special class envisaged in Section 23-J of the Act and have not joined the widow in making application for eviction.
8. Here it may be useful to refer to the relevant provisions of the Act with a view to properly appreciate the contentions advanced by the learned counsel for the tenant/applicant, particularly when their construction and interpretation is mainly the subject of controversy. Section 23-A of the Act which falls in Chapter III-A contemplates a special provision conferring a right on a landlord to submit an application to the Rent Controlling Authority for eviction of a tenant on one or more of the grounds specified in clauses (a) and (b) of section 23-A of the Act. The ground specified in clause (a) which alone is relevant for the purposes of the instant case is reproduced hereunder:
“Section 23-A(a): that the accommodation let for residential purposes is required ‘bona fide’ by the landlord for occupation as residence for himself or for any member of his family, or for any person for whose benefit, the accommodation is held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or town concerned.”
It would be equally relevant to refer to section 23-J also which also falls in Chapter III-A of the Act and provides the definition of ‘landlord’ for the purposes of Chapter III-A only which is reproduced hereunder:
“Section 23-J: Definition of landlord for purposes of Chapter III-A:— For the purposes of this Chapter “Landlord” means a Landlord who is—
(i) a retired servant of any Government including a retired member of Defence Service; or
(ii) a retired servant of a company owned or controlled either by the Central Government; or
(iii) widow or a divorced wife; or
(iv) physically handicapped person; or
(v) a servant of any Government including a member of defence services who, according to his service conditions, is not entitled to Government accommodation on his posting to a place where he owns a house or is entitled to such accommodation only on payment of a penal rent on his posting to such a place.”
9. In the instant case, the question formulated for consideration for the sake of convenience, may further be divided into twin questions as—
(i), Whether the widow/landlady who is a co-owner of the premises with others, alone can initiate proceedings for eviction of the tenant/applicant since she is not the sole owner of the premises but a sharer along with her sons, the property having been inherited from her late husband who originally owned the property; and
(ii) Whether the widow/non-applicant who alone falls in the special category of landlords as defined in section 23-J(iii) can seek an order for possession of the tenanted premises on the ground of her own bona fide need for residence and that of her married sons who do not fall within the special category of landlords as defined in Section 23-J.
In connection with the first part of the question, it may be stated that some of the decisions of the highest Court of Land provide a complete answer to the problem. In Sri Ram Pasricha v. Jagannath, (1976) 4 SCC 184 relying on certain precedents and a passage from “Salmond on Jurisprudence” it was observed that under the genral law, in a suit between landlord and tenant, the question of title to the leased property is irrelevant and, therefore, it is inconceivable to throw out the suit on account of non-pleading of other co-owners as such. Further, it has been held in the said report that jurisprudential it is not correct to say that a co-owner of a property is not its owner. He owns every part of the composite property along with others and it cannot be said that he is only a part-owner or a fractional owner of the property. This position will change only when partition takes place. This view was accepted and again reiterated by Supreme Court in Kama Goet v. B.P Pathak, (1977) 2 SCC 814 wherein it was held that a co-owner is as much an owner of the entire property as any sole owner and the absence of other co-owners will not disentitle a co-owner from maintaining an action for eviction when the other co-owners do not object to the same. This view was followed in a recent decision by the Supreme Court in Pal Singh v. Shri Sunder Singh (1989) 1 S.V.L.R (C) 54. This being the position of law, it has to be held that the widow/non-applicant, who is a co-owner/landlady of the premises with some others, can initiate eviction proceedings against the tenant in the absence of other co-owners if they do not object for the same.
10. This brings us to the question whether the widow/non-applicant, who alone falls in the special category of ‘landlord’ as defined in section 23-J(iii) can maintain an application before the Rent Controlling Authority under section 23-A(a) of the Act for the joint need of herself and her married sons who do not fall in the Special Category of landlords defined in section 23-J. But before we plunge into the aforesaid moot question posed by the learned counsel for the tenant/appellant, we would prefer first to look into the background and legislative history of the Rent Act, 1961, with a view to focus the real intent and purpose behind the provisions contained in sections 23-A and 23-J of the Act.
11. It may be pointed that originally when the M.P Accommodation Control Act, 1961 was enacted; and brought into force, it did not contain Chapter III-A at all as it finds place in the Act now carving out a Special Class of Landlords distinct from the remaining other Landlords, who deserve the benefit of the Special Procedure and a special forum on account of their need being more pressing because of the handicap from which they suffer as compared to the remaining other landlords. Originally a tenant may be evicted on one or more of the grounds contained in clauses (a) to (p) of sub-section (1) of section 12 of the principal Act by filing a suit in a civil Court. Out of the aforesaid clauses, clauses (e) and (f) relate to the eviction of tenant on the ground of bona fide requirement of accommodation for residential and non-residential purposes respectively. This Act was enacted for the protection of tenants and to save them from harassment by unscrupulous landlords. But in certain genuine cases pursuing the remedy by a lenghty and cumbersome procedure in civil Courts, it caused real and great hardship to some of the landlords on grounds of bona fide needs as the litigation originating from the civil court went upto the highest court of the land and it took decades to reach finality. It is common knowledge that by the time the evication decree attains finality after a long lapse of time in most cases either the soul of the landlord attains eternal peace or the ground which provided him a cause of action becomes extinct. If some how or the other, the landlord survived the bad weather of legendary length of eviction suit, one will find the landlord with his ever expanding family on the street as he will have to face another round of legal battle in never ending execution proceedings.
12. It is in this background and the circumstances as well as with a view to provide a quick, expeditious and efficacious remedy to the handicapped landlords for eviction of tenants based on ground of bona fide need, that the Legislature was compelled to extricate and physically lift clauses (e) and (f) from sub-section (1) of section 12 of the Parent Act, along with some other corresponding sub-sections of Section 12 and to amend and omit some other provisions (mention of which is not necessary for purposes of this case) and instal them in a separate and new Chapter III-A in the parent Act which contained section 23-A to section 23-1 by Amending Act of 1983. The effect of this amendment on account of the non obstante clause in section 23-A was, that the proceedings for eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement of the landlord could be entertained by the Rent Controlling Authority regulated by the speedy and special procedure prescribed in the newly added Chapter III-A.
13. But some times later, it was experienced that some unscrupulous landlords misused the special forum and procedure in evicting the tenants and, therefore, it was suggested that the availability of special forum be confined only to certain specified categories of landlords such as retired Government Servants including retired members of Defence Services; retired servants of a company owned and controlled by Central Government, a widow or a divorced wife and physically handicapped persons etc. Consequently the parent Act was again amended by Ordinance No. 1 of 1985 which was subsequently replaced by M.P Accommodation Control (Amendment) Act, 1985 (No. 7 of 1985) whereby a new Section 23-J (reproduced in paragraph 8 above) was introduced in Chapter III-A of the parent Act which defined ‘Landlord’ for the purposes of Chapter III-A only. A new section 11-A was also added which provides that the new forum and the special procedure was limited only to the Landlords of the Categories specified in section 23-J. Section 12 of the Principal Act was again amended by re-inducting Clauses (e) and (f) in sub-section (1) of section 12 along with all other corresponding provisions. Thus from the Legislative history and above discussion, it is evidently clear that the dominant object in all this exercise of amending and re-amending the Act was to afford some protection to handicapped landlords placed in special category by removing the rigour and the complicated cumbersome procedure of a suit in a civil Court and instead to provide a special summary procedure for a speedy, expeditious and efficacious remedy for the Special Class of landlords contemplated by section 23-J read with section 23-A of the Act.
14. From the above discussion, it is also apparent that according to the Law as it now exists, two types of procedure have been prescribed for eviction of tenants based on the ground of bona fide need for residence — a general procedure under section 12(e) of the Act for landlords in general and a special summary procedure for special class of landlords under Chapter III-A of the Act, introduced by the Amending Act, section 11-A whereof confers exclusive jurisdiction to the Rent Controlling Authority. Further, section 23-C of the Act contemplates that a tenant shall not be allowed to contest the prayer of the landlord for eviction from the accommodation, unless he discloses the grounds on which he seeks to contest the application for eviction and obtains leave from the Authority to defend. Thus besides placing certain landlords as defined in section 23-J in special category and prescribing special summary procedure for them, the Legislature gave further protection to them inasmuch as the application of a landlord belonging to the special category, filed for eviction of a tenant on the ground of bona fide need for residence has been treated analogous to the summary procedure for suits under Order 37 of the Code of Civil Procedure inasmuch as section 23-C of the Act provides that if the Authority is satisfied that the tenant had disclosed facts as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order for possession it may grant leave to defend, otherwise the order of eviction may be passed straight way by the Authority, after leave to contest is refused.
15. Now having held that the widow/non-applicant alone can maintain an action for eviction of the tenant with the consent of other co-owners, the position is crystallised by the above discussion. Admittedly the landlady is a widow. Having regard to the provisions of Clause (iii) of section 23-J of the Act which defines landlord for purposes of Chapter III-A, there can be no dispute that the widow/non-applicant belongs to the special class of landlords who are entitled for the special summary procedure of making an application to the Rent Controlling Authority for eviction of the tenant. A bare perusal of the clear language employed in clause (a) of section 23-A will show that if confers a right on a landlord belonging to any of the categories enumerated in clauses (i) to (v) of section 23-J of the Act to make an application to the Authority for eviction of the tenant on the ground that the accommodation is required “bona fide” by him for occupation as residence for himslef or for any member of his family or for any person for whose benefit the accommodation is held by him. The precise and plain words used in Clause (iii) of section 23-A pointedly disclose the intention of Legislature that a landlord-can seek eviction of a tenant either for his own bona fide need or for the bona fide need of any member of his family or even for the bona fide need of any person for whose benefit the accommodation is held even though such member of his family or other person does not fall in any of the categories of landlords enumerated in clauses (i) to (v) of section 23-J. The requirement of the provisions of section 23-A(a) read with section 23-J will be satisfied if the person who makes the application belongs to the special class of landlords. No other meaning can be assigned to the provisions of clause (a) of section 23-A except the one stated above. This was also the view expressed by Single Bench of this Court in cases of Saroj Thareja and Ghanshyamdas (supra). The same view is subscribed by yet another Single Bench in Jagdish Prasad v. Sumitra Bai, 1986 M.P.R.C.J 289. In a recent decision in the case of Shivraj v. Ashalata, 1989 MPLJ 202 a Division Bench of this Court in which two of us (G.G Sohani, Hon'ble Acting C.J and K.M Agarwal, J.) were the members, overruled the decision in Sushila Devi's case (supra) and held that a suit by joint landlords out of whom one is a landlord within the meaning of expression as defined - by section 23-J of the Act, can be entertained by the Rent Controlling Authority and when the other co-owners, if any, do not object to eviction, the relief of eviction can be granted if the accommodation is bona fide required by the landlord for starting the business of the major son or daughter.
16. Learned counsel for the tenant/applicant, however, urged that having regard to the reasons and objects of the Act, no application for eviction of a tenant would be maintainable unless the eviction was sought for the bona fide need of such member of the family or for any person for whose benefit the accommodation is held, who belongs to any of the special categories of landlords. He, therefore, urged that the provisions of sections 23-A and 23-J of the Act should be viewed and interpreted in the light of aims and objects of the Act and the intention of the Legislature. There is no doubt that the Courts always lean towards a construction which would help in giving effect to the true intention of Legislature and the object underlying a statute. But if the language used by the Statute is plain and unambiguous, then a Court cannot construe the enactment differently because what the Court thinks was the object of Legislature. It is almost an elementary principle of interpretation of a statute that neither the preamble nor the supposed object of an Act can control the express language of the Statute. They merely help in the matter of construction if there is any ambiguity. But where the language is clear, the Court is bound to give effect to the language. If there is some ambiguity and if more than one constructions are possible then the Courts accept the one which is consistent with the objects of the Act and as explained by the preamble. See Kanailal v. Pammnidhi A.I.R 1957 S.C 907 and Senior Superintendent, R.M.S v. K.V Gopinath, (1973) 3 SCC 867 : A.I.R 1972 S.C 1487 para 3.
17. In the present case before us if we examine the language of section 23-A and clause (a) thereof it would be clear from the plain and unambiguous words and language used therein that they are capable of only one construction that the person who falls in the category of special class of landlords is authorised to take action for eviction of the tenant either for his own bona fide need or for the bona fide need of any member of his family who may not belong to any of the special class of landlords. If we accept the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the tenant/applicant then in that event we would be doing violence to the plain language and words used in the provisions under consideration by reading into the said provisions the words that “the member of the family for whose bona fide need, the application has been filed by the special class of landlord, should also belong to that category.” But Law of Interpretation of Statute does not permit such a course. Consequently the result is that the application made by the widow/non-applicant under section 23-A(a) of the Act for eviction of the tenant/applicant herein on the ground of her bona fide need and that of her married sons who are members of his family is competent and maintainable before the Rent Controlling Authority.
18. In the light of the above discussion, our answer to the question referred to in paragraph No. 6 of this opinion is that out of several landlords of an accommodation including a widow, an application for eviction of the tenant by the widow alone, on the ground of her own bona fide need or joint need of herself and that of her married sons and their children, who are members of his family would be competent before the Rent Controlling Authority under section 23-A(a) read with section 23-J of the Act.
19. The case shall now be placed before the learned Single Judge for disposal in accordance with Law in the light of the opinion rendered herein. The costs of these proceedings shall abide by the ultimate result of the revision on merits.
Order accordingly.
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