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Nandkishore Mohanlal (Firm) v. Jhunjhunwala And Co. And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
The plaintiff is a partnership firm registered under the Indian Partnership Act, 1932 that instituted multiple suits for recovery of money. One suit claiming Rs. 1,05,965-70 was registered after the firm applied under Rule 1 of Order 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure to sue as an indigent person (registered as M.J.C. No. 2 of 1977). Other suits by the same plaintiff were registered as M.J.C. No. 10 of 1978 and C.S. No. 23-B of 1977 after similar applications.
On 5-2-1985, the respondents moved an application under Section 151 of the Code alleging that, in Misc. Appeal No. 160 of 1979, the High Court had held that the appellant was not an indigent person; respondents sought dismissal of the indigency applications in the present matters. The trial court, by separate but identical orders, rejected the applications in the two cases and 'dispaupered' the plaintiff (i.e., refused the pauper application). The plaintiff appealed against those orders, resulting in these appeals.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a partnership firm is a "person" within the meaning of Rule 1 of Order 33 of the Code and thus can sue as an indigent person.
- Whether a finding in one suit that the plaintiff is not an indigent person can be used as the basis to reject an indigency application in other suits brought by the same plaintiff.
- Whether, when determining pauperism of a suit brought in the name of a firm, the assets of the partners constituting the firm must be taken into account for deciding indigency under Order 33, Rule 1.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The finding in M.J.C. No. 2/78 (involving a claim for Rs. 63,000) that the firm was not an indigent person does not necessarily preclude the firm from filing other suits as an indigent person; a determination in one suit should not automatically govern other suits.
- Counsel emphasized precedents (such as Shree Shankarji and S. G. Sahib) suggesting that, in representative suits or suits by juristic persons, the inquiry into indigency should be confined to the means of the entity on whose behalf the suit is brought.
Respondents' Arguments
- The respondents argued that the firm had filed several suits involving large amounts and that the decision in Misc. Appeal No. 160 of 1979 (which went against the plaintiff on the issue of indigency) would have a direct impact on the indigency issue in the present cases; therefore the appellant is estopped from asserting indigency in these matters.
- It was also argued that a partnership firm is not a "person" within the meaning of Explanation I to Rule 1 of Order 33 because (a) the statutory definition of pauper prior to amendment referred to "his necessary wearing apparel" (a firm cannot have wearing apparel) and (b) Rule 3 of Order 33 requires the application to be presented by the applicant "in person" (a firm cannot present an application in person). Thus, respondents contended the term "person" should be read to exclude a firm.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Mohd. Hafez v. S. T. A. Tribunal, 1978 MPLJ 361 : (AIR 1978 Madh Pra 116) (Full Bench) | Partnership is an association of persons; firm name is a compendious method of describing partners; legal personality accorded to firm is a limited fiction and must not be carried too far. | Relied upon to support the view that a firm, as a collective description of partners, does not have a separate juristic identity like a company but may be treated as a "person" for certain purposes; used in reasoning whether a firm can sue as pauper. |
| Mrs. Bacha F. Guzdar v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay, AIR 1955 SC 74 | Authority relied upon in Mohd. Hafez regarding the legal treatment of firm and partners. | Used indirectly (through Mohd. Hafez) to show legal background for treating firm as an association of persons rather than a separate juristic entity. |
| Her Highness Maharam Mandalsa Devi v. Ramnarain Private Ltd., (1966) MPLJ 289 : (AIR 1965 SC 1718) | Authority relied upon in Mohd. Hafez regarding characterization of firm and legal personality. | Relied upon via Mohd. Hafez to support the discussion on legal fiction and firm identity. |
| Shree Shankarji v. Godavaribai, AIR 1935 Nag 209 | "Person" in Order 33 includes all who have a right to institute a suit; Order 33 applies to prospective plaintiffs or persons in whom a right to relief exists (including idols represented by Shebaits). | Applied to show that Order 33's term "person" is broad and can include entities acting through representatives; supports contention that non-natural plaintiffs may fall within Rule 1. |
| Swaminathan v. Official Receiver, AIR 1937 Madras 549 (Full Bench) | Suits may be instituted by natural persons and artificial persons (e.g., corporations, idols) and by representatives (executors, trustees, official receivers). | Used to support the proposition that Order 33 is not confined to natural human beings and that representative or artificial plaintiffs can be within its scope. |
| Kundan Sugar Mills v. I. S. Syndicate, AIR 1959 All 540 (Full Bench) | The word "person" in the Explanation to Rule 1 includes a company unless repugnant in the context of Order 33. | Cited to counter the argument that inability to possess wearing apparel or inability to present application "in person" excludes corporate or non-natural plaintiffs from Rule 1; supports inclusive reading of "person". |
| S. G. Sahib v. Harnam Singh, AIR 1960 Punjab 73 | Provisions of Order 33 available to natural persons and other juristic or non-natural persons capable of bringing a suit; representative plaintiffs may be within Rule 1. | Relied upon to show Order 33 applies to non-natural plaintiffs and that the wearing-apparel and in-person arguments do not preclude such parties from Rule 1 relief. |
| Perumal Koundan v. T. J. D. Sanka Nidhi Ltd., AIR 1918 Mad 362 | Registered company or association may be unable to pay court-fee and Order 33 intended to apply to such cases. | Noted by the court (via S. G. Sahib) to show legislative intent that Order 33 need not be limited to natural persons only. |
| Nagpur Electric Light and Power Co. Ltd. v. Shreepathirao, AIR 1958 SC 658 | Approved observations that a company may fall within the scope of Rule 1 despite arguments about wearing apparel and presentation in person. | Used to reinforce that Rule 1's applicability to companies/non-natural persons has been accepted by the Supreme Court. |
| E. I. Coal v. E. I. C. Co. Workers' Union, AIR 1961 Patna 15 | A registered trade union (a body corporate under Section 13 of the Trade Unions Act) can institute a suit in forma pauperis. | Applied to demonstrate that bodies corporate and similar entities have been allowed to sue as paupers. |
| Jogesh Chandra v. Shri Iswar Braja Raj Jew Thakur, AIR 1981 Cal 259 | Deity as a juristic person is capable of suing as pauper. | Used to illustrate that diverse kinds of juristic persons/representative entities have been permitted to sue as paupers. |
| Devidas v. Municipal Committee, Nagpur, AIR 1934 Nag 104 | Where a fee is prescribed by law for plaint, a person not possessed of sufficient means to pay that fee is a pauper for the purposes of that suit. | Relied upon to state the basic test for pauperism when a fee is prescribed. |
| Fakruddin v. Iqbal Ahmad, AIR 1957 All 680 | Ad valorem fees are fees "prescribed by law"; where no fee is prescribed, the pauper is one not entitled to property worth Rs. 1,000 (post-amendment); the sufficiency of means to pay the prescribed fee may differ case to case. | Applied to explain that the test for pauperism depends on whether a prescribed fee exists and that assessments can vary between suits; supports conclusion that a single prior finding does not automatically decide other suits. |
| Nandkishore Mohanlal v. Shyamsunder Vimalkumar, Misc. Appeal No. 160 of 1979 (decided 30-11-1982) | When a suit is brought in the name of a firm, the suit is in substance on behalf of all partners; the assets of all partners may be taken into account for deciding an application under Order 33, Rule 1. | The division bench decision is treated as binding on the present court; the court held it need not re-examine the question and directed that the trial court should consider assets of the partners when determining indigency because the trial court had made no such inquiry. |
| Sundar Bharthi v. Trust Mandir Nageshar Nath, AIR 1940 Oudh 148 (Full Bench) | When a plaintiff sues in a representative character (mutawalli, trustee, shebait), the personal property of the representative is not to be taken into account; inquiry confined to property held in the representative capacity. | Cited to illustrate the line of authority holding that representative plaintiffs' personal assets are irrelevant to the pauper inquiry for the entity they represent (contrasting positions on representatives). |
| Vellingiri Naicken v. Beemiah Chettiar, AIR 1949 Mad 714 | Representative suit on behalf of villagers was held not maintainable by plaintiffs who are paupers when the persons they represent were possessed of means. | Used to show a contrasting authority where the means of those represented were relevant and could preclude pauper suit by representatives; cited as part of the debate on whose assets to consider. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded in a stepwise manner addressing the questions framed in the appeal.
First, on whether a firm is a "person" within Order 33, Rule 1, the court reviewed authorities (including Mohd. Hafez, Shree Shankarji, Swaminathan, Kundan Sugar Mills, S. G. Sahib and related decisions) and concluded that the term "person" in Rule 1 is broad enough to include firms and other non-natural or representative plaintiffs for the purpose of instituting suits in forma pauperis. The court emphasized precedents holding that corporations, trade unions, deities (as juristic persons), and representative plaintiffs have been treated as "persons" for the purposes of Order 33, thereby rejecting the contention that literal aspects such as "wearing apparel" or presentation "in person" exclude firms.
Second, the court examined whether a prior finding in one suit that the plaintiff was not an indigent person could be decisive in other suits. Citing Devidas and Fakruddin, it noted the governing test for pauperism — where a fee is prescribed, pauperism depends on possession of sufficient means to pay that fee; where no fee is prescribed, different monetary thresholds apply. The court held that the question whether a person is possessed of sufficient means to pay the fee "may differ from case to case." Therefore, a determination that the plaintiff was not a pauper in one suit could not automatically be the ground for rejection of an indigency application in other suits without fresh inquiry.
Third, on the point whether assets of partners must be considered when a firm sues, the court discussed conflicting authorities about representative plaintiffs and noted the insertion of Explanation III by the 1976 Amendment (which provides that where plaintiff sues in representative capacity, indigency is to be determined with reference to means possessed in that capacity). However, because the Division Bench in Nandkishore Mohanlal v. Shyamsunder Vimalkumar (Misc. Appeal No. 160 of 1979) had held that when a suit is brought in the name of a firm the assets of all partners can be taken into account, the court accepted that decision as binding and observed that the trial court had not made the necessary enquiry as to sufficiency of means of the partners. Accordingly, the court determined it was not necessary to re-examine the matter and directed the trial court to determine indigency with reference to the assets of the partners forming the plaintiff firm.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The appeals are allowed; the impugned orders rejecting the applications to sue as indigent persons are set aside, and the matters are remanded to the trial court to dispose of the applications under Rule 1 of Order 33 of the Code in accordance with law.
Implications and direct consequences:
- The court held that a partnership firm is a "person" within the meaning of Rule 1 of Order 33 and is entitled to sue as an indigent person subject to fulfillment of the legal tests for pauperism.
- The court held that a prior finding of non-indigency in another suit is not by itself sufficient to reject an indigency application in other suits; the question of sufficiency of means must be considered in each suit because the test can vary by case.
- The court accepted the Division Bench decision in Nandkishore Mohanlal (Misc. Appeal No. 160 of 1979) as binding on the point that, when a firm sues, the assets of all partners may be taken into account in determining pauperism; accordingly, the trial court must make that inquiry, which it had not done earlier.
- Practical outcome: The trial court is directed to re-decide the indigency applications in accordance with the observations in this opinion; there shall be no order as to costs.
This summary is limited to and derived solely from the information contained in the provided opinion.
1. The order in this appeal shall also govern disposal of Misc. Appeal No. 1 of 1989 (Nandkishore Mohanlal v. Bissesarlal Gupta & Co. and 4 Ors.) Misc. Appeal No. 2 of 1989 ( Nand Kishore Mohanlal v. Murlidhar Brijlal and 2 Ors.).
2. The appellant/plaintiff is a partnership firm registered under the Indian Partnership Act, 1932. In a suit for recovery of Rs. 1,05,965-70 against the respondents, since the firm was unable to pay requisite court-fee of Rs. 5405/-, it applied under Rule 1 of Order 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as 'the Code') to sue as an indigent person, which was registered as M. J. C. No. 2 of 1977.
3. In Misc. Appeal No. 1 of 1989, the suit filed by the same plaintiff for recovery of certain amount against another set of defendant was registered as M.J.C. No. 10 of 1978. Yet in another suit for recovery of money against the respondents in Misc. Appeal No. 2 of 1989 the ame plaintiff sought permission to sue as an indigent person. After recording evidence and receipt of a report from the Collector the trial Court permitted the plaintiff to issue as an indigent person. The suit was accordingly registered as C. S. No. 23-B of 1977.
4. On 5-2-1985, the respondents, in this appeal moved an application under section 151 of the code alleging that the High Court in Misc. Appeal No. 160 of 1979 held that the appellant is not an indigent person, and therefore, the application under Rule 1 of Order 33 of the Code be dismissed.
5. The learned trial court, by separate but identical orders, rejected the applications in the two cases and dispaupered the plaintiff in the suit. Hence, the plaintiff appellant has filed these appeals.
6. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted the finding that the plaintiff firm is not an indigent person in M. J. C. No. 2/78 in-volving a claim for recovery of Rs. 63,000/-, will not necessarily mean that the plaintiff cannot file other suits as an indigent person. Counsel for the respondents argued that the firm has filed several suits involving very high slakes and applied for stay of proceedings in all the three cases on the ground that the decision in Misc. Appeal No. 160 of 1979 will have a direct impact on the issue of indigency in the three cases. The decision in that case went against him. Therefore, now he is estopped from arguing that the decision in that appeal has no bearing in the remaining cases. The finding that the plaintiff firm failed to prove that it is an indigent person must govern the disposal of the applications in these cases also. Apart from this, it was also urged that a partnership firm is not a "person" within the meaning of Explanation I to Rule 1 of Order 33 of the Code. In support of this, learned counsel submitted that definition of 'indigent person' as given in Explanations 1 to 111 before the Amendment in 1976, ran as under:
"A person is a 'pauper' when he is not possessed of sufficient means to enable him to pay the fee prescribed by law for the plaint in such suit, or, where no such fee is prescribed, when he is not entitled to property worth one hundred rupees other than his necessary wearing appeal and the subject-matter of the suit."
Clause (b) of Explanation 1 inserted by Amendment Act of 1976. though now does not mention wearing apparel of the person provides that person would be considered an indigent person where no court-fee is prescribed for the plaint, if he is not entitled to property worth more than one thousand rupees other than the property exempt from attachment in execution of a decree, and the subject-matter of the suit. Proviso to section 60 of the code, which gives a list of properties exempt from attachment and sale in execution of decree, however mentions the necessary wearing apparel. A firm cannot wear apparels. Similarly, Rule 3 of Order 33 provides that the application shall be presented to the Court by the applicant in person. The plaintiff being a firm cannot present the application in person. He, therefore, argued that the word 'person' means a living person and not a firm.
7. First question for decision is whether a firm is a 'person' and can sue as an indigent person. In Mohd. Hafez v. S. T. A. Tribunal, 1978 MPLJ 361 : (AIR 1978 Madh Pra 116) (FB), it was held that a partnership is merely an association of persons for carrying on the business of partnership and in law the firm name is a compendious method of describing the partners, while in case of a company it stands as a separate juristic entity distinct from its shareholders. The legal fiction must not be carried too far and it is for some purposes that the law has extended a limited personality to a firm which is not a legal entity. The persons who are individually called partners are collectively called a firm and the name under which their business is carried on is called the firm name. Reliance was placed on Mrs. Bacha F. Guzdar v. Commr. of Income-tax, Bombay, AIR 1955 SC 74 (78) and Her Highness Maharam Mandalsa Devi v. Ramnarain Private Ltd. (1966) MPLJ 289 : (AIR 1965 SC 1718).
8. In Shree Shankarji v. Godavaribai, AIR 1935 Nag 209, the suit was filed by Shebait on behalf of idols along with an application for permission to sue in forma pauperis. It was held that the word 'persons' in Order 33 has reference to all those who have a right to institute a suit under the Code of Civil Procedure. Order 33 applies to all prospective plaintiffs or persons in whom any right to relief exists within the meaning of Order). Rule 1 of the Code. In Swaminathan v. Official Receiver. AIR 1937 Madras 549 (FB), it was held that suits under Civil Procedure Code can be instituted not only by natural human beings but also by artificial persons such as a corporation or an idol and also by persons like executors, administrators, trustees and Official Receivers who represent the estate of another. Therefore, having regard to the scheme of the Code, the context and object of the enactment would not exclude an Official Receiver from the category of persons within the meaning of Order 33, Rule 1, Civil Procedure Code.
9. In Kundan Sugar Mills v. I. S. Syndicate, AIR 1959 All 540 (FB), the Full Bench held that the word 'person' in the Explanation to Rule 1, would include a company unless there is anything repugnant in the context of the provisions of Order 33. In this decision, argument that a limited company cannot possess wearing apparel and cannot present an application in person, and therefore, compliance of Rules 1 and 3 is not possible and consequently it must appear that a limited company is not covered by the expression 'person' was closely examined. A Division Bench in S. G. Sahib v. Harnam Singh, AIR 1960 Punjab 73, was required to examine whether Shri Guruwara Sahib represented by Mahant could sue as pauper. The Court held that provisions of Order 33 are available not only to natural persons but also to other persons, juristic or otherwise who are capable of bringing a suit. The Bench took the notice of Perumal Koundan v. T. J. D. Sanka Nidhi Ltd., AIR 1918 Mad 362, wherein it was held that a registered company or any other association may be unable to pay court-fee payable suppose that the Legislature did not intend Order 33 to apply to such cases specially when it is remembered that the effect would be to allow debtors to escape payment and defeat or defraud the creditors and shareholders of company. The Explanation to Rule 1, no doubt states that where no court-fee is prescribed, the petitioner should not be entitled to property more than Rs. 100/-, "other than his necessary wearing apparel". The explanation simply allows deduction of the value of wearing apparel and can only mean that if the applicant has necessary wearing apparel, he can deduct its value. The rule could not be construed to mean that only persons who in law can possess wearing-apparel can sue as paupers. These observations were approved by the Supreme Court in Nagpur Electric Light and Power Co. Ltd. v. Shreepathirao, AIR 1958 SC 658.
10. In E. I. Coal v. E. I. C. Co. Workers' Union, AIR 1961 Patna 15, a Division Bench held that a registered trade union which is a body corporate within the meaning of Section 13 of the Trade Unions Act can institute a suit in forma paupersis. Similarly in Jogesh Chandra v. Shri Iswar Braja Raj Jew Thakur, AIR 1981 Cal 259, held that a Deity as juristic person is capable of suing as pauper.
11 From the foregoing cases, it must be held that a firm is a 'person' within the meaning of Rule 1 of Order 33 of the Code and is entitled to sue as an indigent person subject to fulfilment of other tests.
12. The next question is whether the Court below was right in rejecting the application for permission to sue as an indigent person merely on the ground that the appellant was held not to be an indigent person in another case. A test to determine pauperism of a person is (i) where a fee is prescribed by law for plaint in a suit a person who is not possessed of sufficient means to enable him to pay such fee was a pauper for the purposes of that suit. See Devidas v. Municipal Committee, Nagpur, AIR 1934 Nag 104 and also Fakruddin v. Iqbal Ahmad, AIR 1957 All 680. The later decision further held that if law lays down the fee payable on a plaint, it is a fee prescribed by law regardless of how it is calculated. Ad valorem fees payable on a plaint is as much a fee prescribed as fixed fee and that where no such fee is prescribed, person was not entitled to property worth Rs. 1,000/- other than the property exempt from attachment and the subject-matter of the suit. The question whether the person is possessed of sufficient means to pay fee prescribed by law may differ from case to case. Therefore, merely because the appellant/plaintiff was declared not to be an indigent person in one suit could not be made the basis for rejection of the applications in the aforesaid cases.
13. It was next argued that in order to ascertain whether the plaintiff firm is possess-ed of sufficient means, properties belonging to partners have to be taken into account to decide the question of indigency. In (Nandkishore Mohanlal v. Shyam-sunder Vimalkumar, Misc. Appeal No. 160 of 1979 decided on 30-11-1982, Shri G. P. Singh, C. J., speaking on behalf of the division bench, held that when a suit is brought in the name of a firm, the suit is in substance a suit on behalf of all the partners constituting the firm, The assets of all the partners can, therefore, be taken into account for deciding an application under Order 33. Rule 1 of the Code. Learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that in Shree Shankerji's case (AIR 1935 Nag 209) (supra) the Court held that in an application under Order 33, Rule 1 by the Idols represented by their Shebaits, the question whether Shebaits have funds of their down is irrelevant and enquiry should be confined to ascertain whether the Idols are pauper within the meaning of Order 33 of the Code. Similarly in S. G. Sahib's case. (AIR 1960 Pun 73) (supra) it was held that in considering the question whether the plaintiff is a pauper, only assets of person, juristic or otherwise on whose behalf the suit is brought and not the personal property of the person acting in the representative capacity are to be taken into consideration. In Sundar Bharthi v. Trust Mandir Nageshar Nath, AIR 1940 Oudh 148 (FB), also it was held that when a plaintiff sues in a representative character such as mutawalli, trustee or a shebait, personal property of the plaintiff is not to be taken into consideration and only property of the wakf or trust in the hands of the plaintiff in the representative capacity should be taken into account to determine whether he has sufficient funds to pay court-fees prescribed by law. As against this in Vellingiri Naicken v. Beemiah Chettiar, AIR 1949 Mad 714, it was held that a representative suit on behalf of the villagers for declaration of certain lands as communal lands is not maintainable by the plaintiffs who are paupers, when the persons whom they represent are possessed of means. Explanation III to Rule 1 of Order 33 of the Code has now been inserted by the Amendment Act of 1976 which provides that where the plaintiff sues in a representative capacity, the question whether he is an indigent person or not shall be determined with reference to the means possessed by him in such capacity. However in Nandkishore's case (supra), since Shri Singh, C. J. held that Explantion 111 has no application to the case, it is not essential for me to examine the question any further since the decision by the division bench, is binding on me. The trial court has also not made any enquiry as to sufficiency of means, by the plaintiff to pay court-fee. The Division Bench held that the enquiry has to be made with reference to the assets of the partners constituting the plaintiff firm.
14. In view of the foregoing discussions, the appeals are allowed. The impugned orders are set aside and the cases are remanded to the trial court to dispose of the applications under Rule 1 of Order 33 of the Code in accordance with law, with due advertence to the foregoing observations. There shall be no order as to costs.
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