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Gopaldas v. District Judge, Indore

Madhya Pradesh High Court
Mar 30, 1989
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Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner (tenant) challenged an order dated 20-1-89 of the District Judge, Indore, which directed that Civil Suit No. 83-A of 1987 be transferred from the Court of the 7th Civil Judge, Class-II, Indore, to the Rent Controlling Authority, Indore, pursuant to Sections 24 and 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The petitioner sought relief under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India.

The background facts, as stated in the opinion, are:

  • On 24-6-85 respondent No. 3 (a widow) filed an application under Section 23-A(b) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961, seeking eviction of the petitioner-tenant because the accommodation was let for non-residential purposes and was allegedly required bona fide for the landlady's business use by herself and her son.
  • The petitioner obtained leave to defend under Section 23-C of the Act and challenged the jurisdiction of the Rent Controlling Authority.
  • On 14-8-87 the Authority held the landlady's requirement was not urgent under Section 23(3) and ordered transfer of the matter to the Civil Court; the matter was registered as Civil Suit No. 83-A of 1987 before the 7th Civil Judge.
  • The landlady obtained revision under Section 23-E before the High Court. The High Court, by its order dated 31-8-87 in Civil Revision No. 269 of 1987, set aside the Authority's order and remitted the case to the Authority for disposal according to law.
  • Following that High Court order, the Civil Judge dismissed the suit on the ground that, in view of the High Court's revision order, the suit could not proceed in the Civil Court; the Civil Court did not return the record or send it to the Authority.
  • The landlady applied under Section 24 read with Section 151 CPC to have the case transferred to the Authority; the District Judge allowed that application and ordered the record returned to the Authority through the District Judge's office. The petitioner challenged that order under Article 227.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the District Judge validly exercised powers under Section 24 (and Section 151) of the Code of Civil Procedure to transmit the record to the Rent Controlling Authority after the trial Court had dismissed the suit.
  2. Whether the High Court should exercise its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution to quash the District Judge's order directing transmission of the record to the Authority (the correctness and propriety of interfering with that order by writ).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (as presented)

  • The learned counsel for the petitioner (Shri R. G. Washmare) argued that once the Civil Judge dismissed the suit, no suit or proceeding was pending before the Civil Judge; therefore Section 24 CPC could not be invoked by the District Judge to transfer the case from the Civil Court to the Authority.
  • The petitioner contended the proper remedy, if the dismissal was objectionable, was to file an appeal and obtain a setting aside of the dismissal; only then could the suit be transferred to the Authority.
  • The petitioner argued the District Judge transgressed his jurisdiction under Section 24 when he ordered transmission of the record, and the impugned order should be quashed under Article 227. Counsel relied on Kikabhai v. Mt. Safia Bi (AIR 1937 Nag 381) and Mathura Prasad v. Ramcharanlal (AIR 1915 All 2).

The opinion does not set out detailed opposing arguments of the respondent parties in the decision text.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Kikabhai v. Mt. Safia Bi, AIR 1937 Nag 381 Relied on by petitioner concerning consequences where an ex parte decree existed and subsequent procedural steps; earlier authority considered the effect of concurrent procedural steps (appeal and application to set aside). The Court held this authority did not apply to the present facts because the factual matrix (ex parte decree and concurrent steps taken) differed; hence it did not govern the present decision.
Mathura Prasad v. Ramcharanlal, AIR 1915 All 2 Relied on by petitioner (similar context to Kikabhai) regarding procedural consequences after judgments/decrees. The Court found this authority inapplicable to present facts for the same reasons as Kikabhai.
Waryam v. Amar, AIR 1954 SC 215 Illustrates that the High Court's power of superintendence under Article 227 is not limited to administrative superintendence but includes judicial revision. Invoked to support the proposition that Article 227 enables the High Court to correct jurisdictional errors of subordinate courts and to supervise judicial functions.
Neelkanth v. State of Bihar, AIR 1962 SC 1135 Explains the scope of Article 227 and holds that where an appellate authority has ample revisional power, an order of such authority would not be set aside under Article 227 (even though the appeal might be technically incompetent) when it quashes a decision made without jurisdiction. Applied to justify refusal to quash the District Judge's order on a technical plea: the High Court treated the post-revision status (matter deemed pending before Authority) as decisive and declined interference under Article 227 that would perpetuate a void order of the Civil Court.
A.M. Allison & H.P. Brigg v. B.L. Sen & Others, AIR 1957 SC 227 Holds that proceedings by way of certiorari are discretionary and the High Court can refuse certiorari if satisfied there has been no failure of justice. Relied upon to support the proposition that quashing the District Judge's order would not be appropriate where doing so would restore a void order and there has been no failure of justice warranting certiorari.
Punjab Sikh Regular Motor Service, Bilaspur v. Union of India, 1987 MPLJ 776 : AIR 1988 Madh Pra 43 Applied for principle limiting interference by way of certiorari where quashing would restore a void order and not advance justice. Referred to as precedent for refusing to quash where the consequence would be to reinstate a void order; this Court relied on it in deciding not to quash the District Judge's order.
Babusingh v. State of M.P., Misc. Petn. No. 1348 of 1988 (9-3-89), reported in 1989 MPLJ 322 Recent decision of this Court that followed the reasoning in Punjab Sikh Regular Motor Service regarding non-interference where quashing would merely restore a void order. Used to show consistency of this Court's approach and to support refusal to grant certiorari in the present matter.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded along the following lines (as stated in the opinion):

  1. Effect of the High Court's earlier revision order: After the High Court set aside the Authority's order and remitted the case, the Court reasoned that the case ought to have been tried and disposed of by the Authority; consequently, the Civil Court had no seisin (no jurisdiction to proceed) in the matter. The Civil Court should have returned the record to the Authority or transmitted it via the District Judge's office for the Authority to proceed.
  2. Nullity of the Civil Court's dismissal: The Civil Judge dismissed the suit despite lacking jurisdiction to do so. The Court reiterated the settled principle that an order or judgment rendered without jurisdiction is vitiated and must be set aside — "a right judgment or an order by a wrong Court is no judgment or order in the eye of law."
  3. Ministerial nature of transmission: The Court emphasised that only a ministerial act was required to transmit the record from the Civil Court to the Authority through the District Judge's office; no substantive adjudication by the Civil Court should have occurred after the High Court's revision order.
  4. Doctrine of actus curiae neminem gravabit: Applying the maxim that an act of the court shall prejudice no man, the Court reasoned that the plaintiff should not suffer for the trial Court's procedural mistake in dismissing the suit when it had no jurisdiction.
  5. Proper exercise of Section 24 CPC by the District Judge: For those reasons, the Court held that the District Judge correctly treated the Civil Court's dismissal as a nullity and appropriately exercised the power under Section 24 (and ancillary powers) to transmit the record to the Authority so that the rights of the parties could be adjudicated by the Authority in accordance with law.
  6. Scope of Article 227 and discretionary non-interference: The Court reiterated that Article 227 confers supervisory jurisdiction which includes judicial revision; however, writ relief such as certiorari is discretionary. The Court relied on Neelkanth and other authorities to conclude that even if there was a technical objection to the District Judge's exercise of Section 24 after dismissal, it was not appropriate to exercise extraordinary writ powers merely on that technicality where the effect of quashing would be to reinstate a void order of the Civil Court and thereby defeat substantive justice.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The petition is DISMISSED summarily, without notice to the other side.

Implications and direct effects:

  • The District Judge's order directing transmission of the record to the Rent Controlling Authority is upheld as a correct exercise of power in the circumstances, because the Civil Court acted without jurisdiction in dismissing the suit.
  • The dismissal by the Civil Court is treated as a nullity; consequently the rights of the parties remain to be adjudicated by the Authority in accordance with law.
  • The High Court declined to exercise writ jurisdiction under Articles 226 or 227 to quash the District Judge's order where doing so would result in restoring or validating a void order of the Civil Court — the Court emphasised that certiorari is discretionary and should not be used to perpetuate a void order or to permit a party to benefit from a judgment rendered by a court that lacked jurisdiction.
  • No broader or novel precedent was announced beyond applying established principles: (a) orders rendered without jurisdiction are void and may be treated as nullities; (b) Article 227 includes judicial superintendence; and (c) discretionary writ relief should not be granted where it would produce an unjust result by reinstating a void order.

Result as recorded in the opinion: "In the result, the petition fails and is accordingly dismissed summarily, without notice to the other side."

Show all summary ...

1. The petitioner-tenant aggrieved of the order (Annexure I) dt. 20-1-89 passed by the District Judge, Indore, on an application under Sections 24 and 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, whereby Civil Suit No. 83-A of 1987 was ordered to be transferred from the Court of 7th Civil Judge Class-II, Indore to the Court of the Rent Controlling Authority, Indore (hereinafter referred to as 'the Authority'), has preferred this petition under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India.

2. The material facts leading to this petition are that respondent No. 3, a widow, filed an application on 24-6-85 before the Authority under Section 23-A(b) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"), for getting eviction against the petitioner-tenant for the accommodation let for non-residential purpose as the same is required 'bona fide' by respondent No. 3 for the purpose of starting business by herself and her major son. On summons, the petitioner applied under Section 23-C of the Act for obtaining leave to defend, which was granted to the petitioner. The petitioner filed an application challenging the jurisdiction of the Rent Controlling Authority. The Authority, after hearing the parties, passed an order dt. 14-8-"87 holding that the requirement of the landlady is not urgent under Section 23(3) of the Act and ordered transfer of the case to the Civil Court as the Authority had no jurisdiction to try and entertain the application. Accordingly, the suit was transferred to the Court of the 7th Civil Judge, Class-II, Indore, which was registered as Civil Suit No. 83-A of 1987. In between, the landlady, aggrieved of the order dated 14-8-87 passed by the Authority, preferred a revision under Section 23-E of the Act before this Court. Vide Order Annex. E dated 31-8-87 passed in Civil Revision No. 269 of 1987, this Court set aside the order of the Authority and remitted the case to the Authority for disposal according to law, After this order, the learned Civil Judge, instead of transferring the matter to the Authority or directing the plaintiff to seek appropriate steps for transfer of the suit to the Authority, dismissed the suit holding that in view of the order of this Court in revision, the suit cannot proceed in the Civil Court. Hence, the suit was dismissed as the Civil Court has no power or authority to transfer the same to the Authority. The landlady preferred an application under Section 24 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure for transfer of the case to the Authority. That application was opposed by the petitioner. The learned District Judge allowed the application and ordered that as the order of the Civil Judge is a nullity in view of the order of the High Court, the Civil Court was having no jurisdiction to pass any order dismissing the suit and the appropriate course, at worst, was to return the plaint for presentation in the proper Court or to sent the record of the case to the Court of District Judge for being returned to the Authority. Hence, the District Judge allowed the application and the record of the case, which was pending before the Civil Court in view of the order of this Court, was ordered to be returned to the Authority through the office of the District Judge. It is this order, which has been challenged by the petitioner in this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

3. Shri R. G. Washmare, learned Counsel for the petitioner, made an assiduous effort to convince this Court for admission of the petition and for exercising the supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution contending that when the suit was dismissed by the Civil Judge, no suit or proceeding was pending before the Civil Judge. Hence, power under Section 24, C.P.C. for transfer of the case from the office of the District Judge to the Court of the Authority could not have been exercised, after the dismissal of the suit, the proper remedy was to file an appeal and to get the dismissal of the suit set aside and then only the suit could have been transferred from the Civil Court to the Authority. The District Judge has transgressed his jurisdiction while exercising the powers under Section 24, C.P.C., thus, the impugned order deserves to be quashed. Learned Counsel placed reliance on a case of the Division Bench of this Court in Kikabhai v. Mt. Safia Bi, AIR 1937 Nag 381, and a Division Bench case of the Allahabad High Court in Mathura Prasad v. Ramcharanlal, AIR 1915 All 2.

4. After hearing the Counsel, we are of the opinion that this petition has no merit and deserves to be dismissed summarily without notice to the other side, for the following reasons. It is apparent that after setting aside the order of the Authority by this Court in revision, the case which was transferred to the Civil Court, was to be tried and disposed of by the Authority in accordance with law. Therefore, the Civil Court was having no seisin of the case. In fact, after the order of this Court, the Civil Court ought to have returned the case to the Authority for proceeding with the case in accordance with law. In any case, if the Court was of the opinion that it had no power to transfer the case, either the Court should have directed the parties to take proper steps for transfer of the case or could have sent the record to the office of the District Judge for transmitting the same to the Authority. Instead of doing this, the Civil Court dismissed the suit when the Civil Court was having no jurisdiction to dismiss the same. Even if it is assumed that the Court was having no power to transfer the case and there was no option left but to dismiss the suit, the order of the trial Court cannot be sustained for want of jurisdiction as it is settled that an order or judgment rendered is vitiated due to want of jurisdiction, which has to be set aside. A right judgment or an order by a wrong Court is no judgment or order in the eye of law. After the order of this Court in revision, the case, though was pending in the Civil Court, but it would be deemed to be pending in the Court of the Authority and not in the Civil Court. Only a ministerial act was to be done through the office of the District Judge to transmit the record from the Court of the Civil Judge to the Court of the Authority. As no such steps were taken nor any opportunity was afforded to the parties to take proper steps, the Court committed a fault or mistake in dismissing the suit of the plaintiff and for this mistake or fault of the Court, a party cannot be made to suffer on a well-settled principle of "actus curiae neminem gravabit" (an act of Court shall prejudice no man). Bearing in mind this well-settled principle, the rights of the parties were to be determined by the Authority and not by the Civil Court as per the order of this Court in revision, and the rights so crystallised, the adjudication ought to have been in accordance with law; which having not been done and the suit having been dismissed wrongly, the District Judge rightly exercised the powers under Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure for transmitting the record to the Authority, holding that the order passed by the Civil Court is a nullity.

5. Even otherwise, the matter has come to our notice. It is now settled that the power of superintendence conferred upon this Court by Article 227 of the Constitution is not confined to administrative superintendence only but includes the powers of judicial revision also. When any question of pure jurisdictional competence arises in any matter, it is not only competent, but pre-eminently desirable, for this Court, because of its constitutional duty of "superintendence envisaged under Article 227, to correct jurisdictional errors of the subordinate Court and under Article 227 of the Constitution, this Court is required to discharge its constitutional duties of superintending functions of "all Courts and Tribunals" within its territorial jurisdiction to ensure primarily that they do not transgress the respective jurisdictional limits prescribed by law in order that justice is administered in a smooth and orderly fashion. The power rather saddles the High Court with a duty to get the inferior "Courts and Tribunals" within their bounds of their authority and to see that they do what their duty requires and they do it in a legal manner (see Waryam v. Amar, AIR 1954 SC 215; and Neelkanth v. State of Bihar, AIR 1962 SC 1135). In exercising this duty, this Court has also power to act suo motu under Article 227 of the Constitution for discharging this duty. It is a case where the Civil Court has acted in grave deriliction of duty in not transmitting the case to the Authority even after the order of this Court in revision but the Civil Court dismissed the suit without having any jurisdiction to do so.

6. The Apex Court in the case of Neelkanth v. State of Bihar, AIR 1962 SC 1135, has held that where an Appellate Authority had ample revisional authority, the order of such authority would not be set aside under Article 227 (where such authority, on appeal, quashed a decision of an inferior authority, which was without jurisdiction, even though the appeal was incompetent). Even considering for a moment that the order of the District Judge is wrong and the power to transfer under Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure or powers under Section 151, C.P.C. could not have been exercised as no suit was pending on the date of the application as the suit was dismissed on 1-10-1988, in that case too, in view of our findings recorded above that the Civil Court was having no jurisdiction at all to proceed with the case as after the order of this Court, the case would be deemed to be pending in the Court of the Authority. In such circumstances, it is not a fit case for exercising the extraordinary powers of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution for quashing the order of the District Judge on this technical plea. In A.M Allison & H.P Brigg v. B.L Sen & Others, AIR 1957 SC 227, the Apex Court held that proceedings by way of certiorari are not 'of course' and the High Court can refuse to issue a writ of certiorari if it is satisfied that there has been no failure of justice. It is settled that if the effect of quashing an order would be to restore an order, which is void, it would not be an appropriate exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India. The effect of quashing the order of the District Judge in the instant case would be to perpetrate avoid order of the Civil Court (See a Division Bench decision of this Court in Punjab Sikh Regular Motor Service, Bilaspur v. Union of India, 1987 MPLJ 776 : (AIR 1988 Madh Pra 43)). Recently, this Court in Babusingh v. State of M.P. (Misc. Petn. No. 1348 of 1988 decided on 9-3-89 (reported in 1989 MPLJ 322) at Indore Bench) after placing reliance on the case of 1987 MPLJ 776 : (AIR 1988 Madh Pra 43) (supra), took the same view.

7. By the order of the District Judge, no injustice has been caused to the petitioner. The rights of the parties are yet to be determined by the Authority but in case a writ of certiorari is issued to quash the order of the District Judge, the petitioner would be successful in achieving the benefit of an order passed by the Civil Judge, who had no jurisdiction to pass such an order and whose order is void in law. Certainly, this Court would not be justified either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India to assist the petitioner in achieving such a goal. The authorities relied by the learned Counsel for the petitioner have no application in the present facts and circumstances of the case as in those cases, after an ex parte decree, simultaneous steps were taken, i.e. an appeal was filed and an application to set aside the ex parte decree was also filed. The appeal was dismissed. Then this Court in AIR 1937 Nag 381 (supra), held that the decree of the lower Court ceased to exist and the original Court was right in dismissing the application to set aside the ex parte decree, which is not the case here but on the other hand, the High Court, vide its order in revision, directed the Authority to proceed with the case in accordance with law. Therefore, the Civil Court was having no jurisdiction at all to pass any order in the matter.

In the result, the petition fails and is accordingly dismissed summarily, without notice to the other side.