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Santosh And Ors. v. General Manager, M.P.S.R.T.C. And Anr.

Madhya Pradesh High Court
Oct 13, 1988
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Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an appeal under Section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 challenging the award dated 30-11-1984 made by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Mandsaur in Claim Case No. 46 of 1980.

On 24-5-1980 the deceased, Babulal, was travelling as a passenger in a bus (registration C.P.F. 9160) owned by M.P.S.R.T.C., Bhopal and driven by respondent No. 2 (Nanuram). While the bus was crossing near Harkhyakhal–Neemuch–Mhow road a piece of wood protruding from a bullock-cart struck parts of the deceased's head and face through the bus window. The deceased subsequently died from those injuries. An ex gratia payment of Rs. 1,000 had been made to the appellants.

The claim petition was filed under Section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act on 11-9-1980 by the deceased's dependants: Gangabai (the widow, who died during pendency), appellant No. 5 (the mother) and appellants 1–4 (minor children). The petition sought Rs. 3,92,000, alleging the accident was caused by rash and negligent driving (bus driven too close to the bullock-cart). The petition stated the deceased was aged 35, ran an auto workshop and earned Rs. 800 per month.

The respondents contested the claim, asserting the bus was driven with proper care and alleging (in defence) that the deceased had put his head out of the window; the respondents also challenged the pleaded age and income of the deceased.

The Tribunal found the bus-driver negligent, accepted that the deceased was aged 35, assessed the deceased's monthly income and dependency figures (finding monthly dependency of Rs. 250 and applying a multiplier of 15), made various deductions (including on account of lump-sum payment, uncertainties of life and ex gratia), awarded Rs. 23,000 (plus Rs. 1,000 for mental pain and suffering) and allowed interest at 4% per annum from date of application until realization.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Tribunal's award deserves interference in appeal (i.e., whether the appellate court should revise the award).
  2. Whether the learned Tribunal applied correct principles in determining the quantum of compensation (monthly dependency, multiplier and deductions).
  3. Whether the rate of interest awarded by the Tribunal should be enhanced.
  4. Whether the defence of contributory negligence (that the deceased put his head out of the window) was a valid answer to the claim.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • The learned Tribunal failed to follow correct principles in determining compensation; the award is too inadequate.
  • The rate of interest awarded by the Tribunal (4% per annum) should be enhanced.

Respondents' Arguments (Cross-Objection)

  • The amount of compensation awarded by the Tribunal is excessive and the award should be set aside.
  • The respondents maintained that the bus was driven with proper care and asserted contributory negligence on the part of the deceased (that he had taken his head out of the window).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
A.K. Surendran v. Ganpathy, 1987 ACJ 432 Explains that an application under Section 110-A can be based on Sections 1A and 2 of the Fatal Accidents Act; distinguishes causes of action under the two sections and discusses the flexible nature of the multiplier. Used to explain the distinct remedies under Section 1 and Section 2 of the Fatal Accidents Act and to support the approach that the multiplier is a flexible judicial figure to be determined having regard to multiple factors.
M.P.S.R.T. Corporation v. Sudhakar, AIR 1977 SC 1189 Approves the method of assessing damages by multiplying annual dependency (multiplicand) by a number of years' purchase (multiplier). Invoked to justify the multiplicand × multiplier methodology for assessing pecuniary loss.
State of M.P. v. Davi Rawat, 1981 JLJ 42 Elaborates the objective of capitalizing an annual loss into a lump sum (annuity concept) and explains why the multiplier is less than literal years of dependency. Quoted to explain the conceptual basis for using multiplicand and multiplier in assessing compensation.
Orissa Road Trans. Co. Ltd. v. Umakanta Singh, 1987 ACJ 133 States that any one of the three recognized methods of determining compensation may be adopted depending on facts; references the interest theory. Referred to show that the court may choose the most appropriate method based on circumstances and to link to interest theory jurisprudence.
Pushpa Thakur v. Union of India, 1984 ACJ 559 Adoption by the Supreme Court of the interest theory as a method of assessing compensation. Cited as authority for the interest theory as an accepted approach by the Supreme Court.
Jyotsna Dey & Ors. v. State of Assam, 1987 ACJ 172 Holds that span of life might be taken as 70 due to rise in life expectancy; confirms that deduction for uncertainties of life is relevant. Referred to for guidance on life expectancy and on the relevance of deductions for uncertainties when awarding compensation.
Subhan Alli's case, 1984 M.P. W.N. 434 Holds that dependants are not entitled to compensation for mental agony suffered by them. Used to support the proposition that mental agony to dependants is not compensable under the rules applied.
Sohan Lal v. Bal Swaroop Bal Bhatnagar, 1987 ACJ 113 Holds that compensation for loss of love, affection and consortium can be awarded (under headings like loss of love and affection of spouse, children and parents). Referred to confirm the scope of non-pecuniary heads of damage that can be awarded.
Pursharth Transport Company's case, 1981 M.P.W.N. 19 Explains that compensation determination involves guess-work and that conventionality (via multiplier rule) is a response to that uncertainty. Invoked to justify reliance on conventional approaches such as the multiplier rule.
Samindar Kaur's case, 1987 ACJ 7 Explains the import of the term "compensation" and states that the word "just" in the statute is broad and wide in amplitude. Used to support a liberal, non-niggardly approach to quantum.
Concord of India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nirmaladevi, 1980 ACJ 55 Holds that the quantum of compensation must be liberal and that the law values life and limb generously. Cited to reinforce that compensation calculations should be generous rather than niggardly.
(Unspecified) Suresh Kumar's case Authority for the proposition that a bus-driver owes a duty to keep a safe distance and that a passenger is not guilty of contributory negligence simply because a portion of his body is outside the bus in the normal course. Referred to support the proposition of driver duty and to counter the respondents' plea of contributory negligence by the passenger.
Shivlal v. Rukmabai & Ors., 1987 ACJ 341 (Used in context with quantum) Relevant to assessment of compensation figures. Listed among authorities the court regarded as pertinent in assessing that Rs. 60,000 would be just and proper in the present facts.
United Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Ratanamma, 1987 ACJ 435 (Used in context with quantum) Relevant authority on quantum/assessment approaches. Placed on the same list of authorities the court regarded as pertinent to justify the award fixed by the appellate court.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded by examining the record, the Tribunal's findings and the authorities on principles of assessment of motor-accident compensation. Its reasoning followed these principal steps:

  1. Liability / negligence: The respondents had pleaded that the bus was properly driven and alternatively asserted contributory negligence by the deceased (that he had put his head out of the window). The court observed that the written statement did not present a definite case that the deceased had put his head out for spitting, and the respondents' defensive evidence on that point was treated as an after-thought. On the material on record the Tribunal's finding that the bus-driver was negligent was held to be correct.
  2. Age of deceased: The evidence of Dr. Kulkarni (AW 2) stating the deceased was 35 years old remained unchallenged; the appellate court held the Tribunal's conclusion on age to be correct.
  3. Income and dependency: The court noted the written statement did not deny that the deceased ran "Gopal Auto Works" and observed some defence admissions (including by the driver) about visiting the workshop. The widow's (Gangabai's) evidence that she received Rs. 800–900 per month for household expenses was not independently corroborated; after allowing for exaggeration the court concluded that, excluding the deceased's personal expenses, a monthly dependency of Rs. 400 was a safe figure. The court held that the Tribunal had erred in assessing monthly dependency at Rs. 250.
  4. Multiplier and methodology: The court applied a multiplier of 15 (on the annualized dependency) to determine pecuniary loss, relying on established authorities which endorse use of multiplicand × multiplier or, alternatively, interest theory depending on the facts. The court reiterated that the multiplier is a flexible judicial figure to be determined by reference to life expectancy, age, earning capacity and other factors.
  5. Quantum and deductions: Taking annual dependency at Rs. 400 × 12 and applying multiplier 15, and allowing the usual deductions (for lump-sum payments, uncertainties of life and the ex-gratia already paid), the court found that a total compensation of Rs. 60,000 (inclusive of all claims) would be just and proper in the circumstances. The court listed several authorities as pertinent to support the quantum fixation.
  6. Interest and post-award directions: The court increased the rate of interest to 12% per annum from the date of application until realization (replacing the Tribunal's 4% rate). Directions were given for safeguarding minors' shares: amounts apportioned to minor appellants were to be deposited in a Nationalized Bank for the period of their minority at the maximum available rate, with quarterly interest payable to their next friend and limited withdrawals by the next friend for the minors' benefit; the share due to appellant No. 5 (the mother) was to be paid to her by the Tribunal.
  7. Costs and cross-objection: The cross-objection was dismissed. The respondents were directed to bear their own costs and to pay the appellants' costs in the appeal; counsel's fee of Rs. 500 was allowed if certified, payable to the next friend.

Note: The opinion indicates that the appellate court apportioned the compensation among the appellants "with due regard to the respective age," but the precise breakdown of that apportionment as set out by the court is not present in the provided text.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL PARTLY ALLOWED; CROSS-OBJECTION DISMISSED.

Direct effects on the parties (as set out in the opinion):

  • The Tribunal's award was revised: the appellate court awarded a total compensation of Rs. 60,000 inclusive of all claims (up from the Tribunal's award of Rs. 23,000 as ultimately recorded by the Tribunal after deductions).
  • The awarded compensation carries interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of application until realization (raised from 4% originally awarded by the Tribunal).
  • The amount apportioned to the minor appellants shall be deposited in a Nationalized Bank for the period of their minority at the maximum available rate; interest to be paid quarterly to their next friend and reasonable withdrawals permitted for the minors' benefit subject to the Tribunal's order. The amount apportioned to appellant No. 5 shall be paid to her by the Tribunal.
  • The respondents shall bear their own costs and pay the appellants' costs in this appeal; counsel's fee Rs. 500, if certified, payable to the next friend.

Broader implications: The opinion applies and reiterates established principles on assessment of motor-accident compensation (use of multiplicand and multiplier, flexibility of multiplier, consideration of life expectancy, deductions for uncertainties, and treatment of non-pecuniary heads). The opinion does not purport to lay down a new legal precedent; it applies existing authorities to the facts and adjusts the quantum and interest accordingly.

If Information Was Missing in the Provided Opinion

The provided opinion text indicates an apportionment among appellants (paragraph 23) but does not include the detailed numerical breakdown of that apportionment in the excerpt supplied. Therefore the exact apportionment amounts are not available in the provided opinion.

Show all summary ...

1. This appeal Under Section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (for short 'the Act') is directed against the award dated 30-11-1984 made by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Mandsaur in Claim Case No. 46 of 1980.

2. It is not in dispute that on 24-5-80 when the deceased Babulal was travelling as a passenger in the bus bearing registration number C.P.F. 9160 owned by the M.P.S.R.T.C. Bhopal and driven by its driver the respondent No. 2 Nanuram, he sustained injury on his head and on his face as a result of those parts of his body coming into contact with a piece of wood protruding from a bullock-cart while the bus was crossing the same near Harkhyakhal-Neemuch-Mhow road. Subsequently as a result of the injuries, Babulal met his death. An ex gratia payment of Rs. 1000/- has been made to the appellants.

3. The appellant No. 5 is the mother of the deceased Babulal. The appellants 1 to 4 are his minor children. They along with Gangabai the widow of the deceased who died during the pendency of the claim petition had filed it Under Section 110-A of the Act on 11-9-80 laying a claim in the sum of Rs. 3,92,000/- against the driver and the owner of the offending bus stating that the accident was occasioned due to rash and negligent driving too close to the bullock-cart. The protruding piece of wood had, through the window of the bus, injured the deceased. According to the claim petition the deceased aged 35 years was running an auto workshop and was having a monthly income of Rs. 800/- and was maintaining them.

4. The claim was contested by the respondents. According to them the bus was being driven with proper care and the accident must have occurred as a result of the deceased having taken out his head through the window of the bus. The averments as to the age of the deceased and his monthly income were also controverted.

5. At the conclusion of the trial the learned Tribunal held that the accident was occasioned due to the negligence of the bus-driver. It further held that at the time of his death the deceased was aged 35 years and was earning Rs. 700/- per month by doing the work of auto repairing. The monthly dependency was assessed at Rs. 250/- and the multiplier of 15 was applied. In view of the death of Gangabai and the age of Parvatibai, the Tribunal held that the appellants were deprived of Rs. 35,000/-. Making deduction of Rs. 6000/- on account of lumpsum payment and another deduction of Rs. 6000/- due to uncertainities of life, the appellants were held entitled to Rs. 23,000/-. A compensation in the sum of Rs. 1000/- towards mental pain and suffering to the appellants was allowed. After another deduction due to ex-gratia payment, ultimately award in the sum of Rs. 23,000/- has been made. On the aforesaid sum interest at the rate of 4% per annum from the date of application till realisation was also allowed.

6. The contention of the learned Counsel for the appellants in this Court is that the learned Tribunal has failed to follow the correct principles in the determination of compensation which is too inadequate. It is urged that the rate at which, interest has been awarded also deserves to be enhanced.

7. The contention of the learned Counsel for the respondent who have filed cross-objection is that the amount of compensation is excessive and that the award is liable to be set aside.

8. The point for consideration is whether the award deserves to be interfered with in appeal.

9. As pointed out in the decision in A.K. Surendran v. Ganpathy 1987 ACJ 432 an application Under Section 110-A of the Act can be based Under Sections 1A and 2 of the Fatal Accidents Act and that the cause of action under the two are distinct and different. While under Section 1 damages are recoverable for the benefit of the person mentioned therein, Under Section 2 compensation goes to the benefit of the estate. Under the said Section 2, damages can be claimed inter alia, for loss of expectation of life. Where the person entitled to benefit under the two sections is the same, he cannot be permitted to claim twice over the same loss.

10. Section 110-B of the Act provides that the Tribunal is to determine the just compensation. The Act does not lay down any method for its detemination and the same has to be done on the principles in the law of Torts as the claim for compensation on account of negligence in respect of motor vehicles is a breach of that law.

11. Compensation is thus claimed under the Act for pecuniary loss and non-pecuniary loss. Loss on account of mental and physical pain is non-pecuniary loss. So far as non-pecuniary loss is concerned, guess work is the only method.

12. In the decision in State of M.P. v. Davi Rawat 1981 JLJ 42 pointing out that in M.P.S.R.T. Corporation v. Sudhakar AIR 1977 SC 1189 the method of assessing damages by finding out the amount of annual dependency i.e. the multiplicand and the number of years' purchase i.e. the multiplier has been approved by the Apex Court it has been observed thus in paragraph 6:

The object in assessment of damages is to find out the capital sum required to purchase an annuity of an amount equal to the annual value of the benefit with which the deceased had provided the dependents while he lived and for such period as it could reasonably be estimated they would have continued to enjoy them but for his premature death. Such a capital sum is expressed as the product of multiplying an annual sum which represents the dependency by a number of years' purchase. This latter figure is less than the number of years which represents the period for which it is estimated that the dependents would have continued to enjoy the benefit of the dependency, since the capital sum will not be exhausted until the end of that period and in the meantime so much of it as is not yet exhausted in each year will earn interest from which the dependency for that year could in part be met.

13. From the decision in A.K. Surendran's case (supra) the following excerpt with respect to the multiplier to be adopted and the guess work involved in the calculation of compensation may profitably be repro duced:

The multiplier necessarily must remain flexible figure for the Judge to decide and reasonably be determined by having regard to the deceased's expectation of life, his age and health, the probable duration of his earning capacity, the possibility of his earning capacity being expanded or shrunk in the future, the expectation of life of the dependants and the probable duration of the continuance of the deceased's assistance to the dependants. The possibility of his liberality might have grown or wilted is also a relevant consideration.

Much of the calculation necessarily must be in the realms of hypothesis 'and in that region arithmetic is a good servant but a bad master' since there are so often many imponderables. In every case it is the over-all picture that matters and the court must try to assess as best as it can the loss suffered by each dependant having regard to all the circumstances but subject to the fact that 'it is the wood that has to be looked at, and not the individual trees.

14. As pointed out in the decision in Orissa Road Trans. Co. Ltd. v. Umakanta Singh 1987 ACJ 133 out of the three methods of determination of compensation any one can be adopted depending upon the facts and the circumstances of the case and that the interest theory has been adopted by the Supreme Court in the decision in Pushpa Thakur v. Union of India 1984 ACJ 559.

15. In the decision in Jyotsna Dey and Ors. v. State of Assam 1987 ACJ 172 the Supreme Court has held that the span of life should have been taken to be 70 in view of high rise in life expectancy. The decision further points out that the fact that compensation is being paid at a time and uncertainities of life are a relevant factor for deduction.

16. Compensation can be claimed for the pain and suffering of the deceased if he had live for some period after the accident. But as pointed out in Subhan Alli's case (1984 M.P. W.N. 434) the dependants of the deceased are not entitled to compensation for mental agony to them. In the decision in Sohan Lal v. Bal Swaroop Bal Bhatnagar 1987 ACJ 113 it has been held that compensation on account of loss of love, affection and consortium under the heading loss of love and affection of spouse children and parents, can be awarded.

17. In the decision in Pursharth Transport Company's case 1981 M.P.W.N. 19 it has been held that as the determination of compensation also involves guess work, compensation to the L. Rs. should be conventional and this is the reason why rule of multiplier has been evolved. In the decision in Samindar Kaur's case 1987 ACJ 7 the import of the term 'compensation' has been explained and it has been pointed out that the word 'just' occurring in the section is of a very wide amplitude. It is true that a claimant should not be permitted to make a fortune out of mis-fortune that has be-fallen him but as pointed out by the Supreme Court in Concord of India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nirmaladevi 1980 ACJ 55 the determination of the quantum of compensation must be liberal, not niggardly since the law values life and limb in free country in generous scales.

18. A bus-driver owes a duty to the passengers to drive the motor vehicle at a safe distance from other vehicles and a passenger cannot be held guilty of contributory negligence when in normal course any portion of his body is out side the bus. In this connection the decision in Suresh Kumar's case may usefully be perused.

19. Assuming for the sake of argument that a passenger taking out his head out of the window of the bus would constitute contributory negligence, it is pertinent to point out that in the written statement the respondents did not come forward with a definite case that the deceased had himself taken out his head for spitting and the defence evidence to this effect has, therefore, rightly been discarded as an after-thought. In the ultimate analysis, we find that on the material on record the finding by the Tribunal on the point of negligence is correct.

20. The evidence of Dr. Kulkarni (AW 2) that the deceased was aged 35 years remains unchallenged and the conclusion on the point is held to be correct.

21. It is pertinent to point out that in the written statement it has not been denied that the deceased was running the Gopal Auto Works. Even Nanuram (NAW-1) has at one place stated that he had occasion to go to the workshop of the deceased. The version of Gangabai as AW 4 is that Khemraj, the brother of the deceased, also used to work in the garage. There is no independent evidence to corroborate the version of Gangabai at the trial that her deceased husband used to pay her Rs. 800/- to Rs. 900/-per month for household expenses. Allowing margin for exaggeration, as the deceased, it appears, was the sole bread-earner, it may safely be held that excluding expenses on the deceased, the monthly dependency was Rs. 400/-. The learned Tribunal certainly went wrong in assessing it at Rs. 250/-.

22. On a careful consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case we are of the view that taking the annual dependency at Rs. 400/- and applying the multiplier of 15 would constitute just compensation. In the instant case the accident occurred on 24-5-80. The victim died later and post-mortem was conducted on 25-5-80. Allowing deductions on account of lump sum payment uncertainities of life and ex-gratia payment, award of Rs. 60,000/- towards compensation inclusive of all claims would, in our opinion, be just and proper. In this connection the decisions in Shivlal v. Rukmabai and Ors. 1987 ACJ 341, United Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Ratanamma 1987 ACJ 435 and Jyotsna Day's case (supra) are pertinent.

23. The amount of compensation aforesaid, with due regard to the respective age, is apportioned as under amongst the appellants:

24. The aforesaid compensation would carry interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of application till realisation. The amount apportioned to the minor appellants shall be deposited by the Tribunal in any Nationalized Bank for the period of their minority at the maximum available rate of interest. They shall be entitled to this amount on their attaining majority. The amount of interest shall be paid quarterly to their next friend every quarter. Subject to the order of the Tribunal the next friend shall also be entitled to withdraw reasonable amount from the deposit for the benefit of the minors. The amount apportioned to the appellant No. 5 shall be paid to her by the Tribunal.

25. In the result the appeal is partly allowed in the terms stated above. The cross-objection is dismissed. The respondents shall bear their own costs and shall pay to the appellants the latter's costs in this appeal. Counsel's fee Rs. 500/-, if certified. The amount of costs shall be payable to the next friend of the appellants.