Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ

Deepak v. State Of M.P .

Madhya Pradesh High Court
Jul 20, 1987
Important Paras
Please sign up to view Important Paras.
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant was convicted of murder under Section 302, IPC and sentenced to life imprisonment by the Additional Judge, Barwani, by judgment dated 20-03-1986 in Sessions Trial No. 170 of 1984. The incident occurred on a market day in a crowded market street in the Sub-Divisional Head Quarter of Barwani. The deceased, Rajendra (also referred to as Raju), was allegedly stabbed in the neck with a knife having an 8" blade, resulting in cutting of the carotid artery; he died within minutes of admission to the hospital. Dr. C. S. Gangrade (PW. 7) recorded injuries and a condition described in Ex. P/7, noting the injury as grievous and dangerous to life.

A telegraphic information was received at the police station at 17:15 hours; the police proceeded to the scene (entry in General Diary proved by S.P. Pande, PW. 15). Mohammad Hussain (PW. 10) had pressed the wound and accompanied the injured to the hospital; he lodged the first-information report, Ex. P/9, but later turned hostile. Majhalibai (PW. 9) was the sole eye-witness recorded by the prosecution, but she too turned hostile at trial. The trial Court, notwithstanding hostility of these witnesses, relied on portions of their statements and other corroborative and circumstantial evidence (identification material, recovery of a knife, chemical report on a T-shirt, and other circumstances) to convict the appellant. On appeal, these findings and the conviction were challenged; the present opinion dismisses the appeal and maintains conviction and sentence.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the conviction can be sustained where the sole eye-witness (Majhalibai, PW. 9) and the informant/witness (Mohammad Hussain, PW. 10) have been declared hostile by the prosecution.
  2. Whether belated recording of an eye-witness statement (recorded four days after the incident) necessarily renders that witness wholly unreliable.
  3. Whether the cumulative effect of corroborative or circumstantial evidence (identification, recovery of knife, chemical/serological reports, witness statements and demeanour) suffices to prove the appellant's guilt within the meaning of Section 3 of the Evidence Act and sustain a conviction under Section 302, IPC.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • Both the sole eye-witness (Majhalibai, PW. 9) and the informant (Mohammad Hussain, PW. 10) turned hostile; therefore, there is no legal evidence to sustain the conviction.
  • Majhalibai's statement was recorded four days after the incident; such belated recording affects her credibility and supports disbelief of her testimony.
  • Non-examination of a person named Bachchu (who, according to the appellant, persuaded Majhalibai to be a witness) adversely affects the prosecution case.
  • The appellant offered an explanation for stains on his T-shirt (that they might be catechu from sitting at a pan-shop), seeking to negate the inference of blood-stains linking him to the offence.
  • The trial Court erred in relying on testimony of witnesses who had been declared hostile and in drawing adverse inferences without sufficient corroboration.

Prosecution's Case (as reflected in the opinion)

  • The prosecution relied on Majhalibai's eyewitness account (insofar as parts were consistent), statements and entries recorded during investigation (F.I.R. Ex. P/9, statement Ex. P/11), and the demeanour of witnesses seen by the trial Court.
  • Identification material: Mohammad Hussain (PW. 10) had admitted signing an identification memo, Ex. P/10, and stated he had identified the appellant before the Tahsildar; the Tahsildar was examined as PW. 12.
  • Physical evidence and reports: recovery of a knife from a gutter; recovery of a black T-shirt at the appellant's instance; chemical examination (Ex. P/18) found staining consistent with blood on the T-shirt, though serological examination (Ex. P/17) could not determine origin because the sample was disintegrated.
  • The prosecution invited the Court to view all evidence in totality, applying Section 3 of the Evidence Act and relevant case law, rather than discarding partially hostile testimony wholesale.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Sat Paul v. Delhi Admn Principle that a witness's evidence is not automatically erased by contradictions elicited in cross-examination with the leave of the Court; it is for the trial Judge to assess whether the witness is wholly discredited or whether parts of the testimony remain reliable. The Court relied on this principle to justify accepting parts of Majhalibai's testimony despite her being declared hostile and despite contradictions; the trial Court's selective reliance on consistent parts of her evidence was treated as permissible.
State of Maharashtra v. Mohd. Yakub, AIR 1980 SC 1114 Interpretation of Section 3 of the Evidence Act: definition of 'proved' and the proposition that the law does not distinguish between circumstantial and other forms of evidence when assessing proof; courts should act on probable conclusions drawn from the totality of evidence. The Court invoked this authority to emphasize that evidence must be viewed in its totality and that absolute proof is not required; on such a view the cumulative evidence (witness statements, identification, recovery and chemical report) made the appellant's guilt probable enough to sustain conviction.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by setting out the factual matrix and the evidentiary record: an eyewitness account (Majhalibai, PW. 9), an informant/witness (Mohammad Hussain, PW. 10) who initially lodged the F.I.R. (Ex. P/9) but later turned hostile, identification material (Ex. P/10) and physical evidence (a knife found in a gutter and a black T-shirt recovered at the appellant's instance with a chemical report, Ex. P/18, indicating blood-stains while serology Ex. P/17 was inconclusive because the sample was disintegrated).

On the credibility issue, the Court addressed the principal attack that belated recording of Majhalibai's statement (four days after the event) made her unreliable. The Court examined contextual facts present in the record: Majhalibai was a non-resident labourer from the outskirts who had come to town on the market day; she had been at a water-tank near the place of occurrence where she was washing her hands and feet and witnessed the event in a crowded market area. The Court held that these circumstances provided a plausible explanation for delay in recording her statement and that the criticism based on belatedness was not decisive.

The Court also analyzed the significance of partial hostility. It relied on the legal principle (citing Sat Paul v. Delhi Admn) that contradictions or hostility elicited in cross-examination do not automatically "wash off" a witness's evidence; it is for the trial Judge to evaluate whether parts of the evidence remain trustworthy. The trial Court had examined demeanour and accepted parts of the witnesses' testimony; the appellate Court found no ground to disturb that factual appreciation, noting that no other infirmity was pointed out by the defence to justify interference.

With regard to identification and investigative steps, the Court noted that Mohammad Hussain had admitted signing the identification memo, Ex. P/10, and had been to the Tahsildar for identification. Although some procedural details (such as whether the identification memo was read over to PW. 10) were said to be unexplored on cross-examination of the Tahsildar (PW. 12), the trial Court still found the identification material to afford corroboration.

The Court considered the physical evidence: a knife recovered from a gutter (found by a police constable at the scene) and the appellant's black T-shirt recovered at his instance. While the knife was not found to be blood-stained on chemical and serological examinations, the Chemical Examiner's report (Ex. P/18) indicated staining consistent with blood on the T-shirt; serological origin could not be ascertained because the sample was disintegrated (Ex. P/17). The appellant's explanation that stains might be catechu was held to be falsified by the chemical examination to the extent that it undermined his account.

The Court emphasised the accepted principle (citing Section 3 of the Evidence Act and State of Maharashtra v. Mohd. Yakub) that proof requires a prudent conclusion based on all matters before the Court and that no distinction is drawn between circumstantial and direct evidence for the purposes of determining whether a fact is proved. Viewing the evidence in its totality — witness statements (accepted in part), identification material, recovery and chemical report — the Court concluded that there was material to show not only commission of the offence but also its commission by the appellant.

Finally, the Court observed that the trial Judge had the opportunity to see the witnesses and assess their demeanour. The appellate Court found no legal defect in the trial Court's appreciation of evidence that would justify interference. On these grounds the Court sustained the conviction and sentence.

Holding and Implications

DISPOSITION: The appeal is dismissed.

Direct Holding: The conviction and sentence of life imprisonment imposed on the appellant by the trial Court (Addl. Judge, Barwani) on 20-03-1986 in Sessions Trial No. 170 of 1984 are maintained.

Implications: The direct consequence is that the appellant's conviction under Section 302, IPC and the sentence of life imprisonment remain in force. The Court relied on accepted principles for evaluating partly hostile witnesses, corroboration by identification and physical evidence, and the statutory definition of "proved" under Section 3 of the Evidence Act. The opinion does not purport to lay down any new legal principle or override existing precedent; it applies established principles to the facts of this case to uphold the trial court's factual findings.

Note: This summary is strictly confined to the material contained in the provided opinion. No facts, arguments, or precedents beyond those expressly mentioned in the opinion have been added.

Show all summary ...

1. The appellant has been found guilty of the charge of murder and sentenced to undergo life imprisonment, by the Addl. Judge, Barwani, vide judgment dt. 20-3-1986, passed in Sessions Trial No. 170 of 1984.

2. It was on the weekly market day in a crowded market street, in the Sub-Divisional Head Quarter of Barwani that the appellant is said to have stabbed the deceased Rajendra in his neck with a knife, having 8" blade, resulting in cutting of carotid artery. Rajendra succumbed to his injury within minutes of his admission to the hospital. Condition of Rajendra, as noted by Dr. C. S. Gangrade (PW. 7) as per his report, Ex. P/7 was as follows:

G.C. - Poor Afebrile, P-100/Mt-feeble.

B.P. - Not recordable, Gasping.

Pupils-dialated & sluggishly reacting - unconscious.

INJURIES : - 1 - An incised wound 2 cm x 1/2 cm x 3 cm obliquely placed, 2 cm below the angle of mandible (R) neck & oozing of blood.

Nature of injury - Grievous & dangerous to life.

Duration - within 6 Hrs.

May be caused by - Hard & sharp object.

3. At 17.15 hrs. a telegraphic information was received at police station that stabbing had taken place in the street joining water-tank with Ranjeet-Chowk. Station House Officer with the police party immediately rushed to the spot.- (See Ex.P/15 - entry in General Diary of Police Station, proved by S.P. Pande( PW. 15)). The injured was lying in a precarious condition. Mohammad Hussain (PW. 10), with a view to prevent flow of blood, had pressed the wound with a piece of cloth. He accompanied the injured on a Thela (hand-cart) in the same position. Having arranged for the injured being sent to the hospital, the Station Officer went in search of the accused. He also instructed Mohammad Hussain (PW. 10) to come to the police station after getting the injured admitted to the hospital, for lodging a report. Accordingly, the first-information report, Ex.P/9, was lodged. Mohammad Hussain (PW. 10) has turned hostile, denying having lodged any such report although he admitted his signature on the F.I.R., Ex.P/9.

4. Majhalibai (PW. 9), the sole eye-witness and Mohammad Hussain (P.W. 10), who lodged the F.I.R., have turned hostile. It was, therefore, contended by the appellant's counsel that there is no legal evidence to sustain the charge against the appellant. The trial Court, however, placing reliance on certain statement of these witnesses and other pieces of circumstantial evidence has found the accused-appellant guilty of the charge under Section 302, IPC.

5. Apart from being hostile, the first reason assigned by the appellant's learned Counsel for disbelieving Majhalibai (PW. 9) is that her statement was recorded by the police four days after the incident. Ordinarily, it is expected of an eye-witness to any such occurrence to disclose the facts at the earliest opportunity. True it is that belated examination is a circumstance which affects credibility of a witness, but there are certain peculiar features of this case, which can and should not be overlooked.

6. First of all Majhalibai (PW. 9) is not a resident of the city. She is a resident of 'Amlya-Pani', situated on the outskirts of the town. She is a labourer. She had come to the town on the market day, Le. Sunday, when the incident occurred. The place of incident is just near the statue of ex-Maharaja of Barwani, in Ranjeet Chowk, on its southern side, there is a water-tank, meant for cattle, where this witness Majhalibai (PW 9) was washing her hands and feet. According to her both the accused were talking to the deceased. Continuing her statement, she added that the appellant Phantush alias Deepak suddenly hit the deceased oh his neck with a knife. The other accused Hira (since acquitted) had caught hold of Rajendra(Raju), the deceased After stabbing both took to their heels. Raju (Rajendra), though injured, in an attempt to chase the accused, ran after them but she could not say as to where they had gone. As it was a market day, after finishing her marketing she went home. She has not stated, nor has it been suggested to her in her cross-examination that she was still present at the spot when police came there. This is what she had seen in the crowded market

7. The situation and surroundings of the place have been further got clarified in cross-examination of the Investigating Officer, S.P. Pande (PW. 15). In Ranjeet Chowk, there is Adil Hardwere Stores and facing this Stores there is a road. On the market day, about 10 paces away from the stores, many jaggery sellers hold their shops on the road-side. Facing Adil Hardware Stores, there are two shops of jewellers and a cloth stores. Adjoining Adil Hardware Stores, there is hotel, a panshop, thereafter a house and a hair-cutting saloon, a typing Institute, followed by a shop selling specs and goggles and yet another shop by name 'Sangit-Sarita'. Facing the Barber's shop is the water-tank. It has come in the cross-examination of this witness that on the market day, the road facing Adil Hardware Stores and the specs shop, the road is extremely crowded.

8. Ignoring these market surroundings and the vast multitudes gathered on the market day would it be proper and natural to expect of a rustic woman like Majhalibai (PW. 9), to have rushed to the police to narrate the incident and disclose the name of the assailant- The criticism, therefore, levelled against this witness, does not seem to be justifiable.

9. It was also submitted that non-examination of Bachchu, who persuaded her to be a witness, adversely affects the prosecution case. Bachchu has been referred to by Majhalibai in her evidence. The Investigating Officer when questioned on this aspect of the matter has stated that Majhalibai did not refer to Bachchu in her statement recorded Under Section 162, Cr. P.C. Therefore, no question of examining Bachchu arose. Investigating Officer has further deposed that Majhalibai being a labourer, she was searched and her statement was recorded on 17-8-1984, when found. During investigation one Rameshchandra Bhatia, in front of whose house Rajendra had fallen was also contacted but as he was not at his house at the time of the incident, and was at his shop, his statement was not recorded. It was also urged that Majhalibai having turned hostile in her cross-examination, the trial Court has erred in placing reliance on her testimony. While admitting that she was witnessing the scuffle that was going on between the accused and the deceased, it was pointed out that Majhalibai in para 11 of her statement admitted in her cross-examination that she had not seen the appellant stabbing Rajendra. In the same breathe she stated that those who had gathered around were saying that it was Phantus (the appellant), who had stabbed and ran away.

10. A volume of case-law has developed on this point. Merely affords a justifiable ground to discard his/her evidence as a whole. It may also be noted that the trial Court has also sought support from other corroborative circumstances before acting on her testimony. In reply to a specific question put to the witness in re-examination, she Stated that she had seen the accused scuffling with the deceased. When a witness is cross-examined and contradicted with the leave of the Court, by the party calling him, his evidence cannot, as a matter of law, be treated as washed off the record altogether. It is for the Judge of fact to consider, in each case, whether as a result of such cross-examination and contradiction, the witness stands throughly discredited or can still be believed in regard to part of his testimony. - See Sat Paul v. Delhi Admn .

11. The trial Court, after copiously quoting from the statement of both these witnesses, Majhalibai (PW. 9) and Mohammad Hussain (PW. 10), has scanned their evidence and on ultimate analysis believed Majhalibai (PW. 9). Although Mohammad Hussain (PW. 10) has supported the prosecution case to the extent that the accused, who was fleeing from the scene was being chased by the injured Rajendra, who was also shouting 'PAKDO PAKDO'. He also admitted that the boy (accused), who was being chased, while running dashed him, as a result of which he fell down, but he could not say about the colour of clothes that he was wearing. Mohammad Hussain (PW. 10) was confronted with his report, Ex.P/9 and the statement, Ex.P/11, wherein he had stated that the boy, who was being chased by the injured Rajendra, was wearing black trousers and black T-shirt. He disowned having made such a statement marked A to A in Ex.P/9 and A to A and B to B in Ex.P/11. He has further admitted that he had been to the Tahsildar for identification of the accused and also admitted that there were about 10 to 12 boys, whose faces were covered. On being cross-examined by the defence counsel this witness Mohammad Hussain (PW. 10) stated that the test identification parade was held in the Tahsil, where except for the Tahsildar and the boy, who had to be identified, no police men were present. He also admitted his signature on the identification-memo, Ex.P/10, showing that he had correctly, identified the appellant. All that he stated about his signature on Ex.P/10 is that he was asked to sign on it, which he did, although it was not read-over to him. Surprisingly enough the Tahsildar, Amarchand, who was examined as P. W. 12, has not been put a single question in his cross-examination about not reading over the identification-memo, Ex.P/10, to the witness Mohammad Hussain, (PW. 10), who had identified the accused.

12. The trial Court had the opportunity of seeing the demeanour of these witnesses and notwithstanding their being declared hostile, has found them to be reliable to the extent indicated above. Except for the fact that these witnesses were declared-hostile, no other ground has been made out by the learned Counsel for the appellant so as to justify interference with the appreciation of evidence, as has been done by the trial Court No infirmity has been pointed out. The trial Court has further referred to the recovery of a knife, which was found lying in a gutter. It was seen and found by a police constable. The police rushed to the scene of occurrence on receiving a telephonic message arid a knife was recovered from the gutter. If was but natural that it was not found to be blood stained on Chemical and Serolbgical Examination. But there is yet another circumstance - while denying blood-stains, on the black T-shirt, the appellant has admitted its recovery at his instance. His explanation is that as he was sitting on Pan-shop, it might be stained with catechu, but on Chemical examination, it has been found to be stained with blood, as per Chemical Examiner's report, Ex.P/18. However, on Serological examination, its origin could not be determined as disintegrated (See.Ex.P/17).

13. No doubt, human blood has not been found, but the explanation offered by the appellant, as regards stains on his T-shirt, in any case, stands, falsified - a circumstance going against him. Decisions propounding determination of origin of blood and going a step further, its grouping as well, are there. But this is not the only piece of evidence, being relied upon. It is one of the circumstances, which goes to falsity the stand taken by the accused. One sound principle of appreciation of evidence is to view it in its totality and not in isolation, and if so viewed, it points to the guilt of the accused.

14. There is material enough on record confirming and showing not only commission of the offence, but also its commission by the accused-appellant. Evidence Act does not insist on absolute proof for the simple reason that perfect proof in this imperfect world is seldom to be found. That is why under Section 3 of the Evidence Act, a fact is said to be 'proved' when, after considering the matters before it, the Court either believes it to exist, or considers its existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it exists. This definition of 'proof' does not draw any distinction between circumstantial and other evidence. (See State "of Maharashtra v. Mohd. Yakub AIR 1980 SC 1114 : 1980 Cri LJ 793.

15. For the foregoing reasons, this appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed. The conviction and sentence, as recorded against the appellant by the trial Court is maintained.