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Rajesh Namdeo v. Awadhesh Pratap Singh Vishwavidyalaya, Rewa
Summary of Opinion — Faizanuddin, J.
Factual and Procedural Background
The two petitions (Misc. Petition No. 2640/84 and Misc. Petition No. 2471/84) concern cancellation of admission and candidature in L.L.B. Part I for two petitioners who had passed B.Com examinations with aggregate marks below 40%. Rajesh Namdeo passed B.Com in 1980 and secured 39.5% aggregate; Ram Lakhan Gupta passed B.Com in 1982 and secured 38.5% aggregate. Both applied to the then Education Minister for special permission to be admitted to L.L.B. Part I at Law College, Satna (respondent No. 3), affiliated to Awadhesh Pratap Singh Vishwavidyalaya, Rewa (respondent-University). The Education Minister directed respondent No. 3 to admit the petitioners as special cases.
The L.L.B. Part I examination was scheduled for March 1984. Rajesh Namdeo was served with a memorandum dated 12 March 1984 cancelling his examination on the ground of having secured less than 40% in the qualifying B.Com examination. Ram Lakhan Gupta had appeared in the first paper on 31 March 1984 but was served a similar memorandum cancelling his examination before his second paper, on the same ground.
The petitions challenge those cancellation orders under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 filed returns in Misc. Petition No. 2640/84 (which were adopted in the other petition), contending that the admissions were contrary to Rule 5 of the Bar Council of India Rules (requiring at least 40% in the qualifying examination) and that cancellation was therefore justified.
The court directed that the order in this petition shall also govern disposal of Misc. Petition No. 2471/84 because common questions of law and fact arise in both. Ultimately, both petitions were dismissed without any order as to costs, and any outstanding security was to be refunded to the petitioners.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Education Minister (or any other authority) had competence to relax or condone the statutory requirement of at least 40% marks in the qualifying examination for admission to the law course and thereby validate the petitioners' admissions.
- Whether, once admitted and allowed to appear in the examination, the petitioners' candidature could be withdrawn (relying on Shri Krishan v. Kurukshetra University).
- Whether principles of estoppel or promissory estoppel could prevent the University from cancelling the petitioners' admissions and examinations, given prior acquiescence or provisional admission.
- Whether the failure to afford the petitioners an opportunity to show cause (a hearing) before cancelling admission and examination amounted to a violation of natural justice (relying on Bal Krishna Tiwari v. Reg. of A.P.S.U.).
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioners' Arguments
- The Education Minister was competent to permit admission in the petitioners' cases by condoning the 40% marks requirement, and therefore the University was not justified in cancelling admission and examination.
- Relying on Shri Krishan v. Kurukshetra University, once the petitioners were admitted and allowed to appear in the examination, their candidature could not be withdrawn.
- The respondents had acquiesced in the petitioners' attendance and studies; therefore, promissory estoppel should prevent cancellation of admission.
- Relying on the Full Bench decision in Bal Krishna Tiwari v. Reg. of A.P.S.U., cancellation without giving an opportunity to show cause was bad in law and violated principles of natural justice.
Respondents' Arguments
- The University admitted the petitioners contrary to the rules framed by the Bar Council of India; specifically Rule 5 requires at least 40% marks in the qualifying examination for admission to the course of instruction in law.
- Consequently, the admission and any candidature in the examination were rightly cancelled as they were in breach of the statutory rule; respondents relied on Rule 5 and an instruction (Annexure R-I) issued by the Bar Council of India to support the cancellation.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Shri Krishan v. Kurukshetra University ((1976) 1 SCC 311 : AIR 1976 S.C. 376) | Authority for the proposition that once a candidate is admitted and allowed to appear in an examination, his candidature cannot be withdrawn. | The court held that the decision in Shri Krishan had no application to the facts and circumstances of the present case and therefore did not assist the petitioners. |
| Bal Krishna Tiwari v. Reg. of A.P.S.U. (1978 M.P.L.J. 172) | Full Bench authority addressing failure to afford opportunity to be heard where interpretation admitted two views; held such failure could amount to violation of natural justice. | The court found the Full Bench decision distinguishable on facts: there the interpretation permitted two views and a hearing could have been materially useful; in the present case petitioners were admittedly ineligible under Rule 5 and no relaxation power existed, so lack of prior opportunity did not prejudice them and the decision did not help their case. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
1. The court began by noting the undisputed fact that both petitioners had obtained less than 40% aggregate marks in the qualifying B.Com examination (Rajesh Namdeo 39.5%; Ram Lakhan Gupta 38.5%). The court emphasized that eligibility for admission to the course of instruction in law is governed by statutory rules made under Section 49 of the Advocates Act, 1961.
2. Section 49 of the Advocates Act empowers the Bar Council of India to make rules prescribing, inter alia, minimum qualifications for admission to a law degree course and standards of legal education. Pursuant to that power, the Bar Council framed Part IV of its Rules; Rule 5 expressly provides that admission shall ordinarily be on the basis of merit and that no student shall be admitted unless he has obtained, inter alia, 40% marks in the qualifying examination.
3. The court applied a plain reading of Rule 5 and concluded that it explicitly precludes admission of any student who has secured less than 40% in the qualifying examination. Because the petitioners did not meet this statutory threshold, they were not eligible for admission to L.L.B. Part I.
4. The court held that neither the Education Minister nor the University (or other respondents) possessed any power to relax or dispense with the statutory requirement in Rule 5. The court invoked the principle that where law requires a thing to be performed in a particular manner, it must be done in that manner or not at all. Consequently, the initial admissions effected on the Minister's direction were without jurisdiction and contrary to Rule 5.
5. Addressing the promissory estoppel argument, the court reasoned that estoppel cannot be applied against a statutory provision. Because Rule 5 is a statutory rule making 40% a condition precedent for eligibility, mere acquiescence or provisional permission to prosecute studies could not operate as an estoppel to validate an otherwise unauthorized admission. The court noted that Ram Lakhan Gupta's application bore a note that his admission was provisional, and once it was determined that he lacked eligibility under Rule 5, cancellation was not unjustified.
6. Regarding the contention based on Bal Krishna Tiwari (natural justice), the court distinguished that case: in Bal Krishna Tiwari the university's action involved an interpretation where two plausible views existed, and a hearing could have allowed the petitioner to place a favorable interpretation before the authority. Here, by contrast, the petitioners were admittedly ineligible under an unambiguous statutory rule and there was no power to relax that rule; therefore, affording an opportunity to be heard prior to cancellation would not have been productive and did not result in prejudice or injustice.
7. On the reliance upon Shri Krishan, the court concluded that the authority was inapplicable on the facts of the present cases and therefore did not prevent cancellation of candidature.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The petitions were dismissed. The court's core ruling is stated as: DISMISSED.
Direct consequences and implications:
- The admissions of the petitioners in L.L.B. Part I and their candidature in the L.L.B. Part I examination were lawfully cancelled because both petitioners were ineligible under Rule 5 (requiring at least 40% in the qualifying examination).
- Neither the Education Minister nor the University had power to relax the statutory requirement in Rule 5, so the initial admissions granted on the Minister's direction were held to be without jurisdiction.
- Arguments of promissory estoppel and of violation of natural justice were rejected on the grounds that estoppel cannot prevail against a statutory rule and that, given the admitted ineligibility and absence of any power to relax the requirement, a prior hearing would not have been productive or prejudicially omitted.
- The petitions were dismissed without any order as to costs. Any outstanding amount of security, if any, was ordered to be refunded to the respective petitioners.
Broader precedent: The court did not expressly state that it was laying down any new legal principle beyond applying the existing statutory rule (Rule 5) and established propositions (e.g., estoppel not running against statute). The decision is primarily an application of Rule 5 to the admitted facts of ineligibility; no broader legal change was announced in the opinion.
This summary is confined strictly to matters contained in the provided opinion and does not add or infer information beyond the text.
Faizanuddin, J.:— The order passed in this petition shall also govern the disposal of Misc. Petition No. 2471 of 1984 (Ram Lakhan Gupta v. Awadhesh Pratap Singh Vishwavidyalaya) as common questions of law and facts arise in these two petitions.
2. The petitioners in the two petitions had passed B.Com Examination securing marks less than 40 percent in aggregate. The petitioner, Rajesh Namdeo had passed the said B.Com Examination in 1980, whereas the petitioner Ram Lakhan Gupta had passed the B.Com Examination in 1982. Both of them applied to the then Education Minister to permit them to be admitted in L.L.B Part I as a special case in the Law College, Satna, respondent No. 3, which is affiliated to Awadhesh Pratap Singh Vishwavidyalaya, Rewa (hereinafter referred to as the ‘respondent-University’). The Education Minister directed the respondent No. 3 to admit the two petitioners in L.L.B Part I, as a special case. The Examination of L.L.B Part I had to be held in March 1984. The petitioner Rajesh Namdeo (Misc. Petition No. 2640/84) was served with a memo dated 12th March 1984 (Annexure E) cancelling his examination, on the ground that he had secured less than 40% marks in the qualifying B.Com Examination. The petitioner Ram Lakhan Gupta (Misc. Petition No. 2471/84) had appeared in the first paper on 31st March 1984, but before he could appear in the second paper, he was also served a similar memo, cancelling his examination on the same ground, that is to say, he too had secured less than 40% of marks in B.Com Examination. These are the two orders India these petitions which are under challenge under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
3. The respondents Nos. 1 and 2 alone have filed their separate returns in Misc. Petition No. 2640/84 which have been adopted in other petition also (Misc. Petition No. 2471/84). In their returns, the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 had taken the stand that the respondent No. 3 had admitted the two petitioners in L.L.B Part I against the rules of admission framed by the Bar Council of India and, therefore, their admission as well as examination was rightly cancelled by the respondent-University, by the impugned orders. It has been stated that in accordance with Rule 5 of the Rules framed by the Bar Council of India, no student is eligible for admission to the course of instruction in law unless he had, inter alia, obtained at least 40% marks in the qualifying examination. The respondents have thus relied on Rule 5 and the instruction (Annexure R-I) issued by the Bar Council of India in that behalf and have thereby supported the action taken by the University.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioners first submitted that the Minister of Education was competent to grant the permission for their admission in L.L.B Part I by condoning the requirement of 40% marks and, therefore, the respondent University was not justified in cancelling the admission and examination of the petitioners. Relying on the decision in the case of Shri Krishan v. Kurukshetra University, (1976) 1 SCC 311 : AIR 1976 S.C 376, he also submitted that the petitioners were once admitted and allowed to appear in the examination, their candidature could not be withdrawn. In our opinion, there is no force in any of the contentions advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners and the decision in the case of Shri Krishan (supra) has no application to the facts and circumstances of the present case.
5. It has not been disputed by the petitioners themselves that they had secured less than 40% marks in B.Com Examination. The petitioner Rajesh Namdeo had secured 39.5% marks in aggregate whereas the petitioner Ram Lakhan Gupta had secured 38.5% marks in aggregate in B.Com Examination, which was the qualifying examination for the purpose of admission in L.L.B Part I. Section 49 of the Advocates Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’) relates to the powers of the Bar Council of India to make regulations to carry out the purpose of the Act generally and on specified matters. Section 49 of the Act reads as under:
“Sec. 49: GENERAL POWER OF THE BAR COUNCIL OF INDIA TO MAKE RULES:
(1) The Bar Council of India may make rules for discharging functions under this Act, and, in particular, such Rules may prescribe:—
(a) The minimum qualification required to admission to a course of degree of Law in any recognised University.
(d) The standards of legal education to be observed by the Universities in India and the Inspection of Universities for that purpose.”
The Bar Council of India in exercise of the powers conferred on it by Section 49 of the Act reproduced above, has framed rules in Part IV of the Bar Council of India Rules, Rule 5 of which reads as under:—
“R. 5: Admission of student to the course of instruction in Law shall ordinarily be on the basis of merit. No student shall be admitted to the course of instruction in law unless he has, inter alia, obtained 40% marks in the qualifying examination for admission.”
6. A plain reading of Rule 5 reproduced above abundantly and explicitly makes it clear that no student can be admitted to the course of instruction in law unless he has secured at least 40% marks in the qualifying examination for admission. Admittedly, none of the two petitioners in the two petitions, had secured 40% marks in their B.Com Examinations. Consequently, the petitioners were not eligible for admission in L.L.B Part I course. In view of the statutory rule debarring the admission of a student to the course of instruction in law who has secured marks less than 40% in the qualifying examination, neither the Education Minister nor any one of the respondents would be competent to direct admission of the petitioners who had obtained marks less than 40% as no power of relaxation of the said requirement vests either in the Education Minister or in the respondents or any of them. It is a settled principle that if law requres a thing to be performed in a particular manner it has to be done in that manner alone or not at all. That being so, the admission of the petitioners in L.L.B Part I was wholly without jurisdiction and contrary to the provisions contained in Rule 5 referred to above.
7. Learned counsel for the petitioners next submitted that the respondents Nos. 1 and 3 were well aware of the fact that the petitioners had not secured 40% of marks in their B.Com examination, yet they were permitted to prosecute their studies and, therefore, the respondents' action in cancelling the admission is hit by the principles of promissory estoppel. In our considered opinion, there is absolutely no substance in this contention too for the reason that the principles of estoppel or promissory estoppel cannot be applied against any statute. As discussed above, Rule 5 is a statutory rule according to which no student can be admitted to the course of instruction in law unless he has, inter alia, obtained 40% marks in the qualifying examination for admission. Since the obtaining of 40% marks in the qualifying examination is the condition precedent for the eligibility for admission to the course of instruction in law, mere acquiescence or permission granted by the respondent No. 3 to the petitioners on the recommendation of the then Education Minister to prosecute their studies cannot operate as estoppel, the same being contrary to the statutory rule. It may not be out of place to mention that the application form for admission to L.L.B Part I filed by the petitioner Ram lakhan Gupta, was produced before us on which a note is appended to the effect that he was admitted only provisionally. If, ultimately, for the reasons stated above, it was found that he was not eligible for admission according to Rule 5, the cancellation of his admission cannot be said to be unjustified or bad in law.
8. Lastly, learned counsel for the petitioners relying on a Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of Bal Krishna Tiwari v. Reg. of A.P.S.U, 1978 M.P.L.J 172, contended that the impugned order cancelling the admission was bad in law as before issuing the same, the petitioners were not given any opportunity to show cause as to why their admissions and examination may not be cancelled. After careful examination of the Full Bench decision referred to above we find that the present case of the petitioners before us is quite distinguishable from the Full Bench decision of this Court and, therefore, the same does not advance the case of the petitioners. In the Full Bench decision referred to above, the result of the petitioner in that case was withheld by the University on the ground that he was not eligible to appear in the examination as an Ex-student candidate and that the admission accorded to him was under a mistake. This Court, therefore, took the view that as interpretation of expression “Ex-student candidate” in Ordinance 6(1), M.P Vishwavidyalaya Adhiniyam admitted of two interpretations and one of the two views could have been profitably placed by the petitioner before the authorities if he had been given an opportunity to do so and, therefore, in those circumstances, it was held that there was a violation of natural justice in not affording this opportunity to the petitioner of that case. But in the case before us the admitted position is that the petitioners were not eligible for admission by virtue of the statutory rule 5 referred to above and it was for this reason that they had approached the then Education Minister to permit their admission as a special case because they had not secured qualifying 40% marks in their B.Com Examination. This being, the admitted position and there being no power of relaxation vesting either in the Education Minister or in any of the respondents, it would not have been in any manner profitable to the petitioner even if, an opportunity of being heard in that behalf was afforded to them before their admission and examination was cancelled and the absence of such an opportunity in the special facts and circumstances of the present case has not resulted in any prejudice or in any injustice to the petitioner as admittedly the petitioners were not eligible for the said admission. That is why only provisional admission on the recommendation of the Minister was given and on examination of Rules when it was found that the petitioners could not be legally admitted, their admission and examination was cancelled.
9. In the result, both the petitions (Misc. Petition No. 2460/84 and Misc. Petition No. 2471/84) fail and are hereby dismissed but without any order as to costs. The outstanding amount of security, if any, be refunded to the respective petitioners.
Petitions dismissed.
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