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Punjab Sikh Regular Motor Service, Bilaspur v. Union Of India And Others

Madhya Pradesh High Court

Jul 2, 1987

Judgment

Subsequent
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Concise Analytical Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The two writ petitions (Misc. Petition No. 3782 of 1985 and Misc. Petition No. 3794 of 1985) were filed by the same petitioner, M/s. Punjab Sikh Regular Motor Service, Bilaspur. The Regional Transport Officer, Bilaspur invited applications for permits on 16 February 1979; the petitioner (along with others) applied for permits on two routes: Bilaspur–Ramanujganj and Ambikapur–Bilaspur. Those applications remained pending for a long period and were published in the official gazette on 30 September 1983 and 29 June 1984. On 30 September 1983 Scheme No. 89 was published under Section 68C of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939; that scheme covered routes (including Bilaspur–Madai and Tara–Ambikapur) which overlapped with the routes for which the petitioner had applied.

The Regional Transport Authority (R.T.A.) granted permits to the petitioner on the two routes (the two permits were granted on 3 January 1985 and 18 April 1985). Various objectors — including M/s. Surguja Transport, Ambikapur, Khalsa Bus Service, Bilaspur and M/s. Janta Transport Co-operative Society — filed objections and thereafter appeals to the State Transport Appellate Tribunal (Madhya Pradesh). The Appellate Tribunal allowed the appeals challenging the grant of the permits and quashed the grants in favour of the petitioner. The petitioner challenged those appellate decisions by way of the present writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether permits granted after the publication of a draft scheme under Section 68C and before publication of an approved scheme (i.e., during the intervening period) are valid given the bar in Section 68F(1D) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939.
Whether delay by the Regional Transport Authority in disposing of pending applications (filed before publication of the draft scheme) can entitle an applicant to relief when permits are ultimately granted after the scheme's publication.
Whether Sub-section (1D) of Section 68F is constitutionally invalid for infringing Article 19(1)(f) (or Article 19(1)(g) as argued) of the Constitution.
Whether appeals under Section 64(1)(f) of the Act are maintainable where the objector had allegedly withdrawn objections (i.e., whether only a party who "opposed the grant of a permit" may appeal).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

The petitioner argued that its applications had been made in time (applications invited on 16 February 1979) and that the long delay in disposing of those applications by the R.T.A. meant the petitioner should not suffer; the petitioner contended that the permits granted to it should not be cancelled simply because they were issued after publication of the draft scheme.
Reliance was placed on Charan Transport Co. v. Kanan Lorry Service (AIR 1977 SC 1564) — the petitioner urged that delay beyond the applicant's control could prevent penalisation and that the reasoning in Charan Transport supported relief.
The petitioner contended that sub‑section (1D) of Section 68F was ultra vires as offending Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution (an argument the court notes and treats in context of the deletion of Article 19(1)(f)).
The petitioner argued that some appeals were not maintainable because objectors (e.g., M/s. Surguja Transport) had withdrawn their objections, and hence could not challenge the grant under Section 64(1)(f).

Opponents' / Respondents' Position (as reflected in the record)

Objectors (M/s. Surguja Transport, Khalsa Bus Service, M/s. Janta Transport Co-operative Society) filed objections and pursued appeals to the State Transport Appellate Tribunal challenging the grants; the Tribunal allowed those appeals and quashed the grants. The record therefore reflects the respondents' position that the grants were impermissible under the statutory bar in Section 68F(1D) following publication of the draft scheme under Section 68C.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Mohd. Ashfaq v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, U.P., AIR 1976 SC 2161	Where a scheme is published under Section 68‑C, no permit in respect of a route specified in the scheme can be granted or renewed during the intervening period between publication of the draft scheme under Section 68‑C and publication of the approved scheme, except limited temporary permits under the statutory exceptions.	The Court applied this principle to conclude that the two permits granted to the petitioner after publication of Scheme No. 89 (30 Sept. 1983) but before publication of an approved scheme were impermissible and therefore void.
Damodar Das v. R.T.A., Rewa, AIR 1977 Madh Pra 46 (Full Bench); 1977 MPLJ 1	Confirmed the purpose of Sub‑sections (1A) to (1D) of Section 68‑F to maintain the status quo from publication of the draft scheme under Section 68‑C until publication of the approved scheme, subject only to temporary permits; held that grant would offend the ban in Section 68F(1D) and the R.T.A. lacked jurisdiction.	Used by the Court to support the construction that the statutory bar preserves status quo and to reject the petitioner's contention based on delay; the Full Bench's reasoning was relied on to find the grants void and the restriction reasonable.
Charan Transport Co. v. Kanan Lorry Service, AIR 1977 SC 1564	Authority for the proposition that where renewal proceedings are delayed for reasons beyond the operator's control (including withdrawal and republication of a draft scheme), the operator's right to renewal may be protected; focused on renewals rather than fresh grants.	The Court distinguished Charan Transport: it applied only to renewals in a specific factual posture (withdrawal and republication of draft scheme) and thus did not help the petitioner, who sought a fresh permit (not renewal) and where the draft scheme was not withdrawn and republished.
Anna Transport Corpn. v. R.T.A., Dharmapuri, AIR 1980 SC 2044	Held that Sub‑section (1D) prohibits grant or renewal during the intervening period between publication of a draft scheme under Section 68‑C and publication of an approved scheme; limited the scope of Charan Transport.	The Court relied on this decision to reinforce that the statutory bar applied to grants during the intervening period and that Charan Transport could not be extended to cover the present facts.
A.M. Allison & H.P. Brigg v. B.L. Sen & Others, AIR 1957 SC 227	Held that writs of certiorari (and, more broadly, the exercise of extraordinary writ jurisdiction) are discretionary and the High Court can refuse to grant relief if satisfied there has been no failure of justice.	The Court relied on this principle to refuse extraordinary relief under Article 226 where quashing the Appellate Tribunal's order would restore a grant that is void; i.e., there was no failure of justice that warranted issuing the writ to resurrect a void grant.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded in a structured manner grounded strictly in the statutory scheme and precedent:

Identification of controlling facts: Scheme No. 89 was published under Section 68C on 30 September 1983; the petitioner's applications (filed earlier) were published subsequently and the R.T.A. granted permits on 3 January 1985 and 18 April 1985 — i.e., after publication of the draft scheme but before any approved scheme was published.
Statutory construction: By the plain language of Sub‑section (1D) of Section 68F, after publication under Section 68C and until the approved scheme is published, no permit in respect of a route specified in the scheme can be granted or renewed (subject only to limited temporary permit exceptions under the statute). The Court treated this provision as creating a bar to the grants in question.
Reliance on precedent: The Court cited Mohd. Ashfaq (SC) and the Full Bench decision in Damodar Das to show established precedent and reasoning that the legislation intends to maintain the status quo during the intervening period; these authorities were applied to hold the grants void.
Response to the petitioner's delay argument: The petitioner argued it had applied in time and suffered from R.T.A.'s delay; the Court rejected this argument. Charan Transport was considered but distinguished: Charan concerned renewal in a context where a draft scheme had been withdrawn and republished and thus protected renewal rights; here there was no withdrawal and republication and the matter related to fresh grants (not renewals). Anna Transport reinforced the limited scope of Charan Transport, and accordingly the petitioner's reliance failed.
Constitutional challenge: The petitioner argued Sub‑section (1D) offended Article 19(1)(f) (a provision since deleted) and, if treated as Article 19(1)(g), would be invalid. The Court found no substance in the constitutional attack: after deletion of Article 19(1)(f), and on the assumption of the petitioner’s intended reference to Article 19(1)(g), the restriction in Sub‑section (1D) was held to be a reasonable restriction in furtherance of the legislative purpose identified by the precedents (maintaining status quo and permitting only temporary exceptions).
Maintainability of appeals: The petitioner argued that some appeals were not maintainable because objections had been withdrawn by objectors. The Court observed that for the Ambikapur–Bilaspur route there were other appellants (e.g., Khalsa Bus Service and Janta Transport Co-operative Society) who were entitled to appeal; as to Bilaspur–Ramanujganj, though the appeal was by an objector who had withdrawn objections, the Court found that it would not be appropriate to exercise extraordinary writ jurisdiction to upset the Appellate Tribunal's order on such a technical ground where the underlying grant was void.
Discretion under Article 226: Applying the principle from A.M. Allison & H.P. Brigg, the Court held that it would not exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction to quash the Appellate Tribunal's order where quashing would have the effect of reinstating a void grant; there was no failure of justice necessitating such relief.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The writ petitions lack merit and are dismissed. The Court concluded that the permits granted to the petitioner after publication of Scheme No. 89 under Section 68C and before publication of any approved scheme were void under Sub‑section (1D) of Section 68F of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939.

Implications:

The direct effect is that the grants made to the petitioner (the two permits issued on 3 January 1985 and 18 April 1985) are void and the Appellate Tribunal's orders quashing those grants stand.
The petitioner's procedural complaints about delay by the R.T.A. and reliance on Charan Transport did not afford a basis for relief in these facts (fresh grants after draft scheme publication where the draft scheme was not withdrawn/republished).
The constitutional attack on Sub‑section (1D) was rejected: the restriction was treated as a reasonable legislative restriction in light of the statutory purpose and precedent.
No costs were ordered ("there shall be no order as to costs").
The opinion operates on established precedent and statutory construction; the Court did not purport to create a new principle beyond applying existing authorities to the facts presented.

This summary is limited to and derived exclusively from the contents of the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts beyond the opinion's text.

Show all summary ...

1. This order shall govern the disposal of Misc. Petition No. 3794 of 1985 also. Both these writ petitions have been filed by the same petitioner M/s. Punjab Sikh Regular Motor Service, Bilaspur.

2. Shorn of unnecessary details, the relevant facts are that Misc. Petition No. 3782 of 1985 pertains to the grant of a permit on Bilaspur-Ramanujganj route, whereas Misc. Petition. No. 3794 of 1985 pertains to Ambikapur-Bilaspur route. The Regional Transport Officer, Bilaspur, invited applications for grant of permits on 16th February, 1979. The petitioner along with others applied for the grant of permit on both these routes and his case is that this application was made within time. These applications, however, remained pending for long and ultimately it was on 30th September, 1983 and 29th June, 1984 that applications for the two routes were published in the official gazette. On 30th September, 1983 itself Scheme No. 89 was published under Section 68C of the Motor Vehicles Act 1939 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). This scheme is about routes and not about any area and the routes inter alia cover by the scheme were Bilaspur-Madai. and Tara-Ambikapur, These routes which have been included in the scheme constitute part of the routes in respect whereof applications were made by the petitioner for grant of permit. The R.T.A. granted permit to the petitioner on each of these two routes on the basis of the applications referred to above. M/s. Surguja Transport, Ambikapur (respondent No. 3 in M.P. No. 3782 of 1985) had filed an objection before the R.T.A. against the application of the petitioner for grant of permit on the Bilaspur-Ramanujganj route. In regard to Ambikapur-Bilaspur route, which is the subject-matter of M.P. 3794 of 1985. M/s. Janta Transport Co-operative Society (respondent No. 4 in that petition) was the applicant and the petitioner was a co-applicant. M/s. Surguja Transport, Ambikapur, who is respondent No. 5 in M.P. No. 3794 of 1985, had filed an objection against the grant of permit to the Janta Transport Cooperative Society whereas Khalsa Bus Service, Bilaspur (respondent No. 6 in M.P. No. 3794 of 1985) had filed an objection against the grant of permit to the petitioner who was co-applicant. Aggrieved by the order of grant of permits to the petitioner on Bilaspur-Ramanujganj route, M/s. Surguja Transport, Ambikapur preferred an appeal before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Madhya Pradesh, Gwalior (respondent No. 2). It also filed an appeal against the grant of permit to the petitioner on the Ambikapur-Bilaspur route. An appeal was preferred by M/s. Janta Transport Co-operative Society also who too was an applicant for the grant of permit on the said route. An appeal was preferred by Khalsa Bus Service, Bilaspur, also who was an objector to the grant of permit to the petitioner. The appeals challenging the grant of permits to the petitioner on the two routes aforesaid were allowed and the grant made in favour of the petitioner was quashed by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal.

3. Before dealing with the submissions made by learned counsel for the petitioner, we find it necessary to point out that on the facts of the instant case which are not disputed, namely, that Scheme No. 89 was published under Section 68C of the Act on 30th September, 1983 and that the said scheme is still pending, the approved scheme not havingyet been published, and in view of the plain language of sub-section (1d) of section 68f of the Act, the two permits granted to the petitioner on 3rd January, 1985 and 18th April, 1985 could not have been granted. The grant of permits to the petitioner is apparently, therefore, void. In this connection it may be noted that in Mohd. Ashfaq v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, U.P., AIR 1976 SC 2161 it was held :

"It will, therefore, be seen that where a scheme is published under Section 68-C, no permit in respect of a route specified in the scheme can be granted or renewed during the intervening period between the publication of the scheme under Section 68-C and the publication of the approved scheme, except a temporary permit to the State Transport Undertaking under Sub-section (i-A) or failing that a temporary permit to any other person under Sub-section (1-C) with this qualification that an existing permit can be renewed for a limited period."

A similar view was taken by a Full Bench of this Court in Damodar Das v. R.T.A., Rewa, 1977 MPLJ 1 : (AIR 1977 Madh Pra 46). In that case, applications were invited in regard to Bidhauli Sidhi route which included the highway between Amaliya and Bahari and it was held that grant of permit on this route would offend the ban in Section 68F(1D) and, therefore, the Regional Transport Authority had no jurisdiction to invite applications for the route.

4. The legal position that on the facts of the instant case the two permits granted to the petitioner were void admits of no doubt. Learned counsel for the petitioner, however, urged that since the petitioner had applied for the permits within limitation from 16th February, 1979 when applications were invited by the R.T.A. in this behalf, the petitioner cannot be allowed to suffer on account of the applications being kept pending till after the notification under Section 68C of the Act was published. According to him, since inordinate delay was caused by the R.T.A. in disposing of the applications of the petitioner, the ultimate grant of permits to the petitioner even if not sustainable in view of Section 68F(1D) of the Act did not deserve to be cancelled and the State Transport Appellate Tribunal committed an error of law in cancelling the grant. In this connection reliance has been placed by learned counsel on Charan Transport Co. v. Kanan Lorry Service, AIR 1977 SC 1564. In that case at the time a stage carriage operator's permit expired a draft scheme had already been published. In usual course and in compliance with Section 58, the permit holder had applied for renewal before 120 days ahead. But the State withdrew the draft scheme for some technical reasons and republished it after the operator's permit had expired. The R.T.A, rejected the operator's application for renewal. On writ petition, the High Court had granted renewal on a wider view of Section 68F(1D). On appeal lathe Supreme Court it was held that the renewal of permit must remain to the extent contemplated in the proviso to Section 68F(1D). The fact that the draft scheme was later withdrawn could not affect the right of the operator to a renewal. If for reasons beyond the control of the operator the renewal process got delayed or prolonged he could not be penalised. Save in this category of cases, all other permits which expired before the draft scheme was published suffered the ban of Section 68F(1B). However, no permit could enure beyond the time of the publication of the approved scheme. In the instant case, the draft scheme was at no point withdrawn and republished as was done in the case of Charan Transport Co. (supra). Further, the instant one is not a case of renewal of a permit but grant of a fresh permit. The case of Charan Transport Co. (supra) was distinguished by the Supreme Court in Anna Transport Corpn. v. R.T. A., Dharmapuri, AIR 1980 SC 2044 and it was held :

"It is not in controversy that Sub-section (1A) or Sub-section (1C) of Section 68-F are not applicable to the controversy. The rest of Sub-section (1D) provides that no permit shall be granted or "renewed", during the period intervening between the date of publication under Section 68C of any scheme and the date of publication of any approved or modified scheme, in favour of any person in relation to an area or route or portion thereof covered by that scheme.

As has been stated, a draft scheme of road transport service of the appellant-Corporation was published on June 4, 1976, under Section 68-C of the Act and as has been mentioned, that scheme overlapped a section of the Salem Krishnagiri route. It follows, therefore, that by virtue of the clear provision of Sub-section (1D) of Section 68-F of the Act, no permit could be granted or renewed during the period intervening between the date of publication of the aforesaid scheme under Section 68-C, that is, after June 4, 1976, and the date of publication of the approved or modified scheme, in favour of any person for any class of road transport service. The High Court, therefore, clearly went wrong in thinking that the case fell within the purview of the proviso to Sub-section (1D) and it consequently erred in taking into consideration the so-called rider to proposition No. 2 mentioned in this Court's judgment in Charan's case."

In the case of Damodar Das (AIR 1977 Madh Pra 46) (supra) it was held by a Full Bench of this Court :

"But the purpose behind Sub-ss. (1-A) to (1-D) of Section 68-F appears to be to maintain the status quo as on the date of publication of the scheme under Section 68-C until the approved scheme is finally published subject to the provision for grant of temporary permits in case of need for the intervening period. It was probably expected by Parliament that this intervening period would not be a long one and the process leading to the approval and publication of approved scheme would be over within a reasonable time. Parliament may have never thought that a scheme published in 1965 inviting objections within 30 days can remain in cold storage for nearly eleven years still awaiting approval, modification or rejection by the appropriate Government. Inaction of the Government in that behalf cannot, however, make any difference on a question of construction of the relevant statutory provisions."

In this view of the matter, we are not inclined to accept the submission made by learned counsel for the petitioner that simply because there was delay in the disposal of the applications made by the petitioner for grant of permits, the State Transport Appellate Tribunal committed any error of law in cancelling the permits which were void in view of the bar created by Section 68F(1D).

5. Learned counsel for the petitioner then urged that sub-section (1d) of section 68f was ultra vires inasmuch as it offended Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution. We find no substance in this submission after the deletion of Article 19(1)(f). Even if reference to Article 19(1)(f) by counsel for the petitioner during the course of arguments is taken to be a slip of tongue for Article 19(1)(g), we are of opinion that Sub-section (1D) aforesaid is not violative even of Article 19(1)(g). The restriction placed by this sub-section, keeping in view of t he purpose behind Sub-sections (1A) to (1D) of Section 68F of the Act as pointed out in the Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of Damodar Das (AIR 1977 Madh Pra 46) (supra), namely to maintain the status quo as on the date of publication of the scheme under Section 68-C until the approved scheme is finally published subject to the provision for grant of temporary permits in case of need for the intervening period, is a reasonable restriction.

6. Lastly it was urged that Section 64(1)(f) of the Act contemplated an appeal only by one who satisfied the test of "having opposed the grant of a permit". It was pointed out that the appeals preferred by M/s. Surguja Transport, Ambikapur, were not maintainable inasmuch as even though objections had been filed by M/s. Surguja Transport, Ambikapur, those objections had subsequently been withdrawn. In this connection it may be pointed out that so far as Ambikapur-Bilaspur route is concerned which is the subject matter of M.P. No. 3794 of 1985, as seen above, an appeal had been filed by Khalsa Bus Service also who was an objector. It is true that the objection of Khalsa Bus Service was decided ex parte, but in our opinion the ground on which the objection was dismissed would not make any material difference. That apart, an appeal had also been filed by M/s. Janta Transport Co-operative Society which was a co-appticant for the permit and was consequently entitled to prefer an appeal under Section 64(1)(a) of the Act. The order of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, therefore, does not deserve to be quashed in so far as the said route is concerned on this ground either. As regards BiEaspur Ramanujganj route, which is the subject matter of M. P. No. 3782 of 1985, it is true that the appeal in regard to this route was. preferred only by M/s. Surguja Transport, Ambikapur, who had withdrawn their objection, but on the facts of the instant case we are of the opinion that in view of our findings recorded above, it is not a fit case for the exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction of this court under Article 226 for quashing the order of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal on this technical plea. In A.M Allison & H.P Brigg v. B.L Sen & Others, AIR 1957 SC 227 it was held that proceedings by way of certiotari are not 'of course' and the High Court can refuse to issue a writ of certiorari if it is satisfied that there has been no failure of justice. As seen above, the grant of permit to the petitioner by the R.T.A. was void. It is also settled law that if the effect of quashing an order would be to restore an order which is void, it would not be appropriate to exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. The effect of quashing the order of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal in the instant case would be to perpetrate a void grant in favour of the petitioner. It cannot be said that any failure of justice would occur in the eye of law if the petitioner does not succeed in achieving the benefit of a grant which is void in law. Certainly, this Court would not be justified under Article 226 of the Constitution to assist the petitioner in achieving such a benefit.

7. In the result, we find no merit in any of these two writ petitions and they are accordingly dismissed, but there shall be no order as to costs.