1. I was anxious to dispose of this matter finally to-day as a very short point indeed concerning jurisdictional competence of trial Court to entertain the suit filed in the year 1983 is involved. Because respondents' counsel, Shri R D, Jain, has urged strenuously that I should first consider and dispose of today only the question of conversion of the instant petition under Section 115, CPC into one under Article 227 of the Constitution, the matter has remained again part-heard.

2. The application filed by the petitioner's counsel in this matter is I. A. No. 1125/86, which was not traceable on the last date as the application did not carry correct particulars of the instant revision. Happily the same is traced out and is placed on record to-day. Shri Jain had prayed a week's time on the last date to file reply to the application and he has renewed the prayer to-day. I am not at all inclined to consider the prayer as I have no hesitation to hold atonce that the question of law does not need any investigation of facts. The short ground on which conversion is urged is that the question agitated in the instant revision petition concerns jurisdictional competence of the trial Court 'and this fact is not at all denied by Shri Jain who rather himself submits that the trial Court had no pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain the suit because the suit ought to have been valued at over 10,000 rupees and instituted in a Court having pecuniary jurisdiction to try the suit. It is not disputed by Shri Kaushik that in this case the suit is valued at less than 10,000 rupees and his contention is that the suit has been rightly valued and, therefore, the trial Court, namely, the Civil Judge, Class II, had jurisdiction in law to entertain and try the suit.

3. Shri Jain has made a two-fold contention to-day in reply to petitioner's application which require consideration, Firstly, counsel submits, there is divergence of judicial opinion on the question of conversion and, therefore, it is pre-eminently desirable that there should be an authoritative decision on the point by a larger Bench. In making this prayer, counsel rightly concedes, the view consistently taken by me in this Court is that when any question of pure jurisdictional competence arises in any matter it is not only competent, but pre-eminently desirable, for this Court, because of its constitutional duty of "superintendence" envisaged under Article 227, to correct urisdictional errors of the subordinate Court. There should be no hesitation in such matter for this Court to act instantly and immediately to treat an application filed under Section 115, CPC as one made under Article 227 of the Constitution. Indeed, a High Court is required to discharge its constitutional duty of superintending, functioning of "all courts and tribunals" within its territorial jurisdiction to ensure primarily that they do not transgress respective jurisdictional limits prescribed by law in order that justice in the area over i which the High Court exercises jurisdiction is administered in a smooth and orderly fashion. There is high authority for the proposition that Article 227 does not contemplate "administrative superintendence" merely of High Courts but the constitutional jurisdiction includes the "power of judicial revision" also even in such cases where no appellate or revisional jurisdiction statutorily empowers the Courts to act in any particular matter. Because, the power rather saddles the High Court with a duty to keep the inferior Courts and tribunals "within the bounds of their authority and to see that they do what their duty requires and that they do it in a legal manner." [See, Waryam v. Amar, AIR 1954 SC 215; Nilkanth v. State of Bihar, AIR 1962 SC 1135). What, however, is of signal relevance to the determination of the question under consideration is Apex Court's view that the power under Article 227 can even be suo motu exercised, which indeed is inherent in the authority of the Court not only to quash a decision under Article 227 but also to issue further directions in the matter suo motu (See, Hari Vishnu v. Syed Ahmad, AIR 1955 SC 233, explained and followed in Deepika v. Gabriel, AIR 1978 All 27 (SB), S. Barrow v. State of U. P., AIR 1958 All 154).

4. Learned counsel has drawn my attention to a decision of a learned single Judge of this Court rendered on 18-6-86 in Civil Revision No. 63/80 (Mehernosh Marfitia v. Paras Kumar Gangwal) of this Bench wherein the revision petition preferred under Section 115, CPC were held inconvertible into a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution mainly on the ground that the latter was a "separate" proceeding, relying on the decision in Vishesh Kumar, AIR 1980 SC 892 with particular reference to the observations made in para 22 of the report. To. understand the import and purport of the said observations nothing better can be done than to extract the same in extenso :--

"It has been urged by the appellant in Vishesh Kumar v. Shanti Prasad ., No. 2844 of 1979) that in case this Court is of the opinion that a revision petition under Section 115, Civil P.C. is not maintainable, the case should be remitted to the High Court for consideration as a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution. We are unable to accept that prayer. A revision petition under Section 115 is a separate and distinct proceeding from a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution and one cannot be identified with the other."

5. The aforequoted observations admittedly and evidently did not constitute the ratio decidendi of the case. Counsel's inability to invoke Article 141 of the Constitution foreclose forensic investigation of the core controversy is, therefore, understandable but I would like to still stress that even an obiter or stray observations of their Lordships are entitled to great respect. However, a plain reading of the observations aforequoted make it abundantly clear that when a petition under Section 115, CPC was not maintainable the High Court's power and jurisdiction to consider the matter under Article 227 of the Constitution was not debarred. It was only held by their Lordships that they would not remit the petition to the High Court with a direction that the petition should be so considered. The rationale of this observation is very plain and clear. It may be noted at once that unlike the High Court, which has been explicitly, invested under Article 227 the discretion coupled with duty to exercise its powers thereunder, the Supreme Court is not similarly endowed. It is the discretion only of the High Court and High Court only to be exercised in such matters in any particular manner. As such there can be no judicial diktat from outside the Constitution to the High Court to exercise the discretion in any particular manner. I do not read anything in the observations of their Lordships to support the view which prevailed with the learned single Judge in Mehernosh Marfitia (supra) to hold that a petition under Section 115, CPC is not convertible by the High Court itself into a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution. The constitutional discretion is vested in the High Court and I would say, in case of exercise of power under Article 227 of the Constitution, it cannot be, in any manner, tampered with unconstitutionally to relieve it of its constitutional duty.

6. However, on the one hand I feel it necessary to stress that Vishesh Kumar (AIR 1980 SC 892) (supra) does not negate or nullify the view taken by me in this Court; on the other hand it is equally necessary to stress that it provides no foundation for the view taken in Mehernosh Marfitia (supra). I also read quite a lot in their Lordships' observations in their recent decision reported in AIR 1984 SC 1401, (State of U. P. v. District Judge, Unnao) which, in my opinion, buttress the view taken consistently by me to invoke my jurisdiction under Article 227 ex debito justitiae. A rigid and inflexible view by the High Court of its jurisdiction under Article 227 has been judicially described by their Lordships. It has been held that "Article 226 or 227 was devised to advance justice and not to thwart it". What is more heartening to be recorded is also that in Calcutta Chemical Co., AIR 1969 Pat 371, Untwalia, J. as his Lordship then was, speaking for the Court repelled the objection to interference in the matter saying, "since all these cases are before me and are heard by Division Bench, it makes no difference that the application is under Section 115, CPC or under Article 227 of the Constitution." The Division Bench also held in that case : "To all intent and purpose the scope of the application under Section 115, CPC or under Article 227 of the Constitution is not very different." In Karri Venkata Narasayyamma, AIR 1957 Andh Pra 378 the same view was taken saying, "Even assuming that the terms of Section 115(c), CPC, do not warrant interference, the High Court in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, is entitled to set right the error, in the interests of justice."

7. However, the legislature itself has now expressed its mind on the question in the recent amendment of section 115, cpc (in 1976) wherein the new proviso contemplates the material ingredient in the form of "failure of justice." That the jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution has also to be exercised to advance the "cause of justice" having been authoritatively held by their Lordships of the Apex Court in the case of District Judge, Unnao (AIR 1984 SC 1401)(supra), I have no hesitation to state immediately that the view taken by Patna and Andhra Pradesh High Courts, which is in line with the view taken by me consistently in this Court, leaves no scope for reconsideration of the question and reference of the question to a larger Bench. Truly speaking the submission in this regard must be held misconceived despite the holding in Mehernosh Marfitia (supra) wherein the learned single Judge was not invited to take note of the law settled on high authority that the power under Article 227 could be exercised' suo motu, which proposition ipso facto rendered useless any objection to conversion. Indeed, in order to exercise its discretion to hear any grievance concerning lack of jurisdictional competence of a subordinate Court, when brought to its notice even by means of an application, the High Court merely discharges, its constitutional duty inscribed in Article 227 and it must be deemed to have acted suo motu in the matter.

8. Now, a few words on the second part of Shri Jain's contention that even if the conversion is held permissible I cannot hear the matter unless the petition is placed before a Division Bench for admission. This question had came up before me in the case of Jagdishlal Dhodhy v. State of M. P. in Second Appeal No. 110/83, when by an order passed on 10-7-86, the question was dealt with and disposed of by me in following terms--

"His further objection, which I reject outright at once, is that I have no jurisdiction to deal with the matter at the admission stage. There is no merit in the contention because I have simply made a direction for conversion to deal with the question of jurisdictional error for which the matter has not to be admitted afresh. The Second Appeal had already been admitted as the jurisdictional question was involved which has to be decided by this Bench itself. If I had jurisdiction to hear the second Appeal sitting singly for which it was listed before me, I see no reason why I cannot decide the same under Art, 227 of the Constitution."

If anything more on this aspect of the matter has to be said, then reference appropriately may be made to the decision in Calcutta Chemical Co. (AIR 1969 Pat 371) (supra). Indeed, it being settled on high authority, as earlier alluded, that the High Court under Article 227 can exercise the power suo motu, which evidently can be done only at the hearing stage I do not see any constitutional handicap in the technical requirement that an application on which discretion is exercised to act suo motu, has to be first heard for ''admission" by Division Bench. It may be further added that rules of procedures are handmaids of justice and they are not made to act as obstacles in the process of due and expeditious administration of justice. I have not been shown any positive bar under the Rules of this Court by which such "conversion" is prohibited or which requires admission of a 'converted' petition by a Division Bench invariably in all cases. I have no doubt that cause of justice shall be advanced and not defeated if hearing of this matter is expedited and not protracted by a direction for it to be listed once again for admission and then for hearing on merits. Indeed, when I am convinced that there is merit in petitioner's contention "that the question of trial Court's jurisdictional competence is examinable and I have applied my mind to the question in allowing the conversion, I do not see what further purpose will be served by listing it once again for consideration of the same question again by two Judges of this Court, instead of one Judge sitting singly.

9. for all the foregoing reasons LA. No. 1125/86 is allowed. The petition under Section 115, C.P.C. stands converted and treated as a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution to enable me to exercise my jurisdiction thereunder. Office is directed to re-register the petition and to list the same for final hearing on 26th July, 1986, as prayed. The matter remains part-heard.