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Sonaram v. Jaiprakash And Others

Madhya Pradesh High Court
Jul 30, 1985
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Analytical Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

Two appeals (including Miscellaneous Appeal No. 91 of 1977, Smt. Kiran Devi v. Jaiprakash) challenge an award dated 17-3-1977 made by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Gwalior, in Claim Case No. 29 of 1974. The claimant, Jaiprakash alias Jainarayan (respondent No. 1), filed a claim under Section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 for Rs. 21,300/-, alleging that on 4-4-1970 a tempo (No. MFC 928) driven rashly struck him while he rode a bicycle, causing fracture of the left thigh and long hospitalisation with permanent deformity and loss of studies. The Tribunal awarded Rs. 4,000/- jointly and severally against Sonaram (appellant), Kiran Devi, and the Insurance Company. Both Sonaram and Kiran Devi separately appealed the Tribunal's award and the question of ownership/liability and adequacy of compensation were contested on appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the legal ownership of the tempo on the date of the accident rested with the registered owner Sonaram or with Kiran Devi (i.e., who is vicariously liable for the accident) — particularly in light of Exhibits D1 and D2 and Section 31 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939.
  2. Whether the compensation awarded by the Tribunal (Rs. 4,000/-) was adequate in law and, if not, what enhancement (if any) should be made by the appellate court exercising powers under Order 41, Rule 33, Civil Procedure Code.
  3. Whether additional heads of damage (medical expenses, food/milk expenses) should have been allowed, and whether the rate and commencement date of interest awarded by the Tribunal were appropriate.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant Sonaram's Arguments

  • Contended that on the date of the accident the vehicle was in the possession of Kiran Devi and, therefore, liability should rest upon her rather than upon him.
  • Took the witness box and asserted transfer to Kiran Devi (as per his testimony), but did not produce the registration certificate to show transfer of ownership at the R.T.O.

Appellant Kiran Devi's Arguments

  • Maintained that Sonaram remained the registered and real owner and that she was merely the financier — she had given money to Sonaram and did not purchase the tempo as transferee.
  • Relied on documents (Ext. D1 receipt and Ext. D2 special power of attorney) to show transaction, but neither document expressly evidences completion of statutory transfer or possession formalities at the R.T.O.; Kiran Devi did not testify on oath nor produce the registration certificate.
  • Argued (through counsel) that because statutory transfer formalities were not completed, she should not be held vicariously liable.

Claimant (Jaiprakash / Respondent No. 1) and Counsel's Contentions

  • Claimed Rs. 21,300/- for injuries and losses (details included specific heads: medical, nourishment, mental and physical suffering, loss of bicycle).
  • Counsel applied under Order 41, Rule 33 CPC to place additional evidence (certified radiologist's report) on record and argued that the Tribunal's award was inadequate and that medical and nourishment expenses and higher rate of interest (12% p.a. from date of application) should have been allowed.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Maina v. Niranjan Singh, 1976 Acc CJ 1 : (AIR 1976 Raj 71) Held that mere transfer of possession without reporting the sale/transfer to the registering authority under the statutory procedure does not confer title upon the transferee. The court relied on this authority to support the conclusion that, because Section 31 formalities were not complied with, the alleged transfer to Kiran Devi did not operate in law to transfer ownership; Sonaram remained the registered owner on the date of the accident.
Koksingh v. Smt Deokabai, AIR 1976 SC 634 Explains the appellate power under Order 41, Rule 33, CPC: an appellate court may pass or make such further or other decree or order as the justice of the case may require, even if the respondent did not appeal. The court invoked Koksingh to exercise its power under Order 41, Rule 33 to modify the Tribunal's award (admit additional evidence and make further monetary adjustments) in favour of the claimant despite no respondent appeal.
Vinod Kumar v. Ved Mitra, AIR 1970 Madh Pra 172 Provided self-imposed rules for assessing non-pecuniary damages: (i) award must be reasonable and moderate; (ii) regard to comparable awards; (iii) sums should be, to an extent, conventional. The court applied these criteria to assess whether Rs. 4,000/- was adequate as general damages and compared the case facts with prior awards to determine moderation and adequacy.
Deepti Tiwari v. Banwarilal, AIR 1966 Madh Pra 239 Illustration of application of assessment rules: awarded Rs. 4,000/- as general damages in a case of a young girl with spinal fracture. Used as a comparative precedent demonstrating the conventional sums applied previously; the court considered it in comparing the present award.
Bishwa Nath Gupta v. Munna, AIR 1971 Madh Pra 238 Another comparable award (Rs. 6,000/-) in a case similar to the present one. Served as a comparative benchmark; the court noted that comparable awards ranged and that Rs. 4,000/- in the present case was moderate in light of these decisions.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded through distinct stages of analysis, each tied closely to the materials and testimony before it:

  1. Ownership and Section 31 compliance:
    • The Court examined Exhibits D1 (receipt) and D2 (special power of attorney) and the statutory requirements of Section 31 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, which prescribe time-bound reporting requirements for transferor (14 days) and transferee (30 days) to notify the registering authority and transmit the certificate of registration.
    • Finding no compliance by Sonaram (transferor) or Kiran Devi (transferee) with Section 31 formalities, the Court applied the legal principle (as stated in Maina v. Niranjan Singh) that mere transfer of possession without reporting the sale does not confer legal title on the transferee.
    • The Court weighed witness testimony: notaries and marginal witnesses gave limited or equivocal evidence; some witnesses (NAW 2 and NAW 1) suggested financing rather than outright purchase; crucially, G. K. Sharma, an R.T.O. clerk, confirmed that tempo No. MPC 928 remained registered in the name of Sonaram. The absence of a produced registration certificate and Kiran Devi's failure to testify further undermined the claimed transfer.
    • Conclusion: Sonaram remained the registered owner on the date of the accident and is liable as the owner recognised under law; claimed inter partes transactions that did not comply with statutory procedure could not be recognised to shift legal liability.
  2. Admissibility of additional medical evidence and factual findings on injury:
    • On application (I.A. No. 2186 of 1985) the Court allowed a certified radiologist's report to be taken on record as additional evidence under the Court's powers (Order 41, Rule 33 CPC) because the Tribunal had held fracture not proved in absence of medical testimony.
    • The Court personally inspected the claimant, observed a marked limp and deformity in the left thigh, and treated the X-ray plates on record (which bore the claimant's alias) as indicative of fracture though not formally proved by the treating doctor; the claimant's testimony on the fracture was not challenged.
  3. Assessment of damages:
    • The Court applied the principles laid down in Vinod Kumar and related decisions to assess non-pecuniary damages: moderation, regard to comparable awards, and adherence to conventional sums where appropriate.
    • Comparative awards were considered: Deepti Tiwari (Rs. 4,000/- for spinal fracture in a 15-year-old) and Vinod Kumar (Rs. 5,000/- for compound fracture in a 17-year-old), and Bishwa Nath Gupta (Rs. 6,000/- in a similar case). The Court found the Tribunal's award of Rs. 4,000/- to be low but overall moderate and adequate in context.
    • Regarding pecuniary heads (medicines, fruits and milk), the Tribunal had disallowed them for lack of receipts. The Court observed the practical difficulty of producing receipts for such items and, exercising moderation, allowed Rs. 300/- for medicines and Rs. 300/- for fruits/milk (total additional Rs. 600/-) by partially amending the award under Order 41, Rule 33 CPC.
  4. Interest and other monetary adjustments:
    • While the Tribunal awarded simple interest at 5% per annum, the Court noted national bank rates and the claimant's plea for higher interest; however, it observed that only simple interest is payable in law. The Court increased the rate to 10% per annum (simple) from the date of application, finding that rate just and proper.
    • The Court also directed payment of counsel's fee of Rs. 300/- for this Court, if certified.
  5. Final allocation of liability and costs:
    • Given the ownership conclusion and the evidence, the Court held Kiran Devi not vicariously liable and allowed her appeal. Sonaram's appeal was dismissed. The Tribunal's award was modified so that only Sonaram (the registered owner) and the Insurance Company were liable to pay the damages and expenses as finally determined; Sonaram and the Insurance Company were to bear costs throughout.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The appeal of Kiran Devi is allowed and she is held not vicariously liable; the appeal of Sonaram is dismissed; the Tribunal's award is modified as detailed by this Court.

Direct consequences for the parties:

  • The Tribunal's award of Rs. 4,000/- in favour of the claimant is modified by an additional Rs. 600/- (Rs. 300/- for medicines + Rs. 300/- for fruits/milk) and the rate of simple interest is increased to 10% per annum from the date of the application.
  • Liability is fixed upon Sonaram (the registered owner) and the Insurance Company alone to pay the award and expenses; Kiran Devi is absolved of vicarious liability and will bear her own costs.
  • Sonaram and the Insurance Company will bear the costs through the proceedings. The claimant is entitled to a counsel fee of Rs. 300/- for this Court, if certified.

Broader implications: The opinion applies established principles (notably the need to comply with statutory transfer formalities under Section 31 of the Motor Vehicles Act and the appellate corrective power under Order 41, Rule 33 CPC). The Court did not purport to lay down a new precedent; it applied and followed existing authorities to the facts at hand.

Show all summary ...

1.This judgment shall also govern the disposal of Miscellaneous Appeal No. 91 of 1977 (Smt. Kiran Devi v. Jaiprakash) also.

2. These two appeals have been preferred against the award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Gwalior, (for short, hereinafter called 'the Tribunal') dt. 17-3-1977 in Claim Case No. 29 of 1974.

3. Jaiprakash alias Jainarayan, respondent No. 1 filed an application for compensation before the Tribunal under Section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (for short, hereinafter called 'the Act') of an amount of Rs. 21,300/-, impleading appellant Sonaram; the Insurance Company and Kiran Devi as the parties. According to this application, on 4-4-1970 at 7.00 a.m. the driver of tempo No. MFC 928 was driving the tempo rashly and negligently in a high speed and on the wrong side, while the applicant on his bicycle was going from Patankar market towards the High Court on his left side. When he reached the crossing of Lohia Bazar, the said driver hit him with the vehicle and due to this accident, he suffered several injuries. Consequently, he was admitted in the J. A. Hospital, Gwalior. According to him, the thigh bone of his left leg was broken and he was admitted on 4-4-1970 in the hospital and, after treatment, was discharged on 13-5-1980. But the thigh bone did not unite and he had to re-enter the hospital on 10-7-1970 and till the date of filing of this application, he was an indoor patient. According to the claimant, his left leg has not only become weak for the life but has also become deformed. Due to this accident, he could not appear in the annual examination of IXth class in which he was reading. Due to this injury and permanent deformity, he had to leave his studies continuously for two years. He claimed Rs. 550/- as expenses incurred for medicines; Rs. 500/- for fruits and milk, etc.; he demanded Rs. 10,000/- as claim for mental torture resulting from the injury and Rs. 10,000/- for the physical injury. He further demanded Rs. 250/- as loss for the bicycle. This claim application was contested by the appellant; the driver of the tempo (who died during the pendency of the proceedings before the Tribunal); the Insurance Company and Smt. Kiran Devi.

4. Before the Tribunal, the claimant-respondent No. 1 examined himself as A.W. 4 and also examined Brij Bihari Gupta (A. W. 1); Sitaram (A.W. 2) and Dr. D. C. Gupta (A.W. 3). Brijbihari Gupta (A.W. 1) was a student, who was also with the claimant-respondent No. 1 on the bicycle. He has described the impact of the tempo upon the bicycle and says that he became unconscious and the claimant Jaiprakash suffered injuries. Sitaram (A.W. 2) is father of the claimant, he has proved the amounts spent by him during the confinement of Jaiprakash. Sitaram (A.W. 2) and Brijbihari Gupta (A.W. 1) have, in material particulars, corroborated the testimony of the claimant Jaiprakash. The appellant and respondent Kiran Devi also examined Bhagwati Prasad Singhal (NAW 1); Durga Prasad (NAW 2); Ramkishan (NAW 3); Sonaram (NAW 4) and G. K. Sharma (NAW 5). The appellant himself took the witness box. From the side of the claimant-respondent No. 1, before the Tribunal several X-ray plates to prove the fracture of his thigh bone were produced in evidence, but the doctor, who treated his fracture, could not be examined before the tribunal.

5. The Tribunal, by the impugned award, has awarded compensation to the tune of Rs. 4,000/- only against the appellant, Kiran Devi and the Insurance Company. This award has been passed jointly and severally against these persons. The appellant and Kiran Devi have, by separate appeals, challenged the impugned award awarded by the Tribunal in favour of the respondent-claimant Jaiprakash.

6. The facts, as disclosed, indicate that the accident had taken place on 4-4-1970, and on 22-6-1969 Sonaram, appellant, after accepting an amount of Rs. 9,250/-, transferred the vehicle in favour of Kiran Devi. A receipt is alleged to have been obtained of this amount from Sonaram, the appellant. In the receipt (Ext. D1) he has written that he is the sole owner of the tempo M.P.C. 928, permit No. 702, stage 66, model 1965 and chassis No. 466145. It further says that the engine No. of this tempo is 123276. In this respect he also says that he has received an amount of Rs. 9,250/- from Kiran Devi wife of Bhagwan Singh. This receipt is said to have been certified by Bhagwati Prasad Singhal, Notary, on 29-7-1971. The marginal witnesses of this document are Durgaprasad son of Kalicharan and Ramkishan s/o Ramswaroop.

7. In both these appeals, Sonaram says that on the date of the accident, the vehicle was in possession of Kiran Devi and, hence, the liability should have been placed upon her and not upon him. Kiran in her appeal says that Sonaram was the registered and real owner of the vehicle. She further says that she was only the financier and, as the amount was needed by the registered owner of this vehicle, i.e., Sonaram, she has only given him the money not as purchaser but only as a financier. After Ext. D1, another document Ext. D2 was also executed by Sonaram in favour of Kiran Devi. This is a special power of attorney in which it is written that he is the owner of the tempo and is authorising Kiran Devi to do all what is necessary in the Office of the R.T.O. for obtaining the permission; for payment of the tax and for other purposes. But none of these documents Ext. D1 or Ext. D2, states as to whether Sonaram has transferred the possession of this vehicle to Kiran Devi on the date of the transaction or not. The Tribunal being in doubt as to who is the registered owner of the vehicle, in the interest of justice and also for being on the safe side, has awarded compensation jointly and severally against Sonaram, Kiran Devi and the Insurance Company. But as both Sonaram and Kiran Devi have challenged the findings of the Tribunal on this point, the fact of ownership has to be decided.

8. Section 31 of the Act provides that --"where the ownership of any motor vehicle registered under this Chapter is transferred,--

(a) the transferor shall, within fourteen days of the transfer, report the transfer to the registering authority within whose jurisdiction the transfer is effected and shall simultaneously send a copy of the said report to the transferee;

(b) the transferee shall, within thirty days of the transfer, report the transfer to the registering authority within whose jurisdiction he resides, and shall forward the certificate of registration to that registering authority together with the prescribed fee in order that particulars of the transfer of ownership may be entered in the certificate of registration."

It is apparent that the registered owner of the vehicle Sonaram did not follow the procedure prescribed in Section 31 of the Act which deals with transfer of ownership of motor vehicles. It is also apparent from Exhibits D1 and D2 that though he had accepted cash amount from Kiran Devi, yet within 14 days he did not take any steps to do the needful as provided in Section 31 of the Act. Similarly, Kiran Devi, the transferee, also within 30 days of the transfer did not report the transfer to the registering authority, the contention of Shri D. K. Katare, learned counsel for Kiran Devi is that as the transfer of the vehicle had not been completed, his client Kiran Devi did not apply to the registering authority within 30 days of the alleged transfer. Be that as it may. But when the registered owner transfers the vehicle to some other person and does not take any step as provided under Section 31 of the Act, then it shall be deemed that there is no transfer of the vehicle in law. This view has been taken in the case of Maina v. Niranjan Singh, 1976 Acc CJ 1 : (AIR 1976 Raj 71). It has been held in that case that even if the possession of the vehicle is transferred to the transferee and the sale is not reported to the registering authority, then this mere transfer of possession would not confer any title upon the transferee. The deceased driver of the tempo, who, after filing his written reply, had died, has stated nothing as to in whose service he was: whether of Sonaram or of Kiran Devi. Let us, therefore, examine the evidence on record more closely. Bhagwati Prasad singhal (NAW 1) in para 2of his cross-examination says that Exhibits Dl and D2 do not contain the signatures of Kiran Devi. He further says that he cannot say whether she came to his office or not. He also says that he cannot say whether Kiran Devi paid any amount in his presence or not. Durgaprasad (NAW 2) says that Bhagwan Singh, the husband of Kiran Devi, paid Rs. 9,250/- to Sonaram. He further says that in his presence Bhagwan Singh said that he was financing Sonaram and he needed only the interest. In para 2 of his cross-examination, Durgaprasad admits that Kiran Devi had not purchased the tempo from Sonaram. Ramkishan (NAW 3) says that Sonaram had given the tempo to Kiran Devi for consideration; that the key of the tempo was handed over to Kiran Devi. He further says that Kiran Devi had said that till she is recorded as the registered owner by the R.T.O. she needs authorisation. Unfortunately, this witness was not cross-examined. Sonaram (NAW 41 himself states that he had transferred the vehicle to Kiran Devi, but he has not produced any registration certificate with regard to the vehicle. Kiran Devi neither examined herself on oath nor she has produced the certificate of registration of the vehicle in question. Her absence from the witness box is a fact to be taken into consideration. But facts may be as they are. Admittedly, appellant Sonaram was the registered owner of the vehicle on the date of the accident, and it is the registered owner, who, in my opinion, shall be held liable. Inter partes transactions may exist, but, if they are not in accordance with law, they cannot be recognised. G. K. Sharma (NAW 1), a clerk in the R.T.O's office, says that tempo No.MPC928 is registered in his office in the name of Sonaram. Hence, because the fact of transfer of ownership is not given in Exhibits D1 and D2, Sonaram remains, on the date of the accident, to be the registered owner of the vehicle, and the stray statement of Ramkishan (NAW 3) cannot be relied upon. Similarly, I am also not inclined to place reliance upon this part of the testimony of the appellant that he had given possession of the vehicle in the hands of Kiran Devi. It will, therefore, have to be held that the registered owner of this vehicle on the date of the accident was appellant Sonaram and not Kiran Devi, and it is the owner recognised under law, who is liable to pay the damages.

9. During the course of arguments, Shri N.D. Singhal, learned counsel for the claimant-respondent 1, has filed I.A. No. 2186 of 1985. Along with this application he has filed a certified copy of the report of the Radiologist, the reason being that the Tribunal has held that the factum of the fracture of the thigh bone has not been proved, as no doctor has been examined on this point. This application is allowed and the document is ordered to be taken on record as additional evidence. Shri Singhal has drawn my attention to the provisions of Order 41, Rule 33 of the Civil P.C., and makes a grievance that the compensation given to his client is very little. The medical expenses and the expenses incurred by the claimant on account of milk and fruits have also not been allowed to him by the Tribunal. His further submission is that the interest awarded is also very low, and it should have been at the rate of 12 per cent per annum and that too from the date of application.

10. The powers of the appellate Court to grant relief in favour of the respondent have been dealt with in Order 41, Rule 33, C.P.C. In the case of Koksingh v. Smt Deokabai., AIR 1976 SC 634, the Supreme Court has laid down the law in the following words :

"If an appellate Court is of the view that any decree which ought in law to have been passed was in fact not passed by the Court below, it may pass or make such further or other decree or order as the justice of the case may require. Thus, under Order 41, Rule 33, the High Court is competent to pass a decree for the enforcement of a charge in favour of the respondent notwithstanding the fact that the respondent did not file any appeal from the decree."

It is, thus, clear that while exercising the powers of an appellate Court under Order 41, Rule 33. C.P.C., even if there is no appeal filed by the respondent-claimant, this Court can award a decree, which ought, in law, to have been passed, but was not passed by the Court below. Let us, therefore, examine whether the decree passed by the Tribunal is correct or not. It has been held by the Tribunal that the driver of the tempo was negligent and driving the vehicle at a high speed. A driver owes a duty of care to pedestrians and that duty is higher when the pedestrians happen to be of tender years. In this case, the bicyclist-claimant-respondent No. 1 was of 16 years of age. General damages awarded by the Tribunal in favour of the claimant is Rs. 4,000/- only. The claimant wants the amount to be raised by this Court. I called the claimant in the Court, saw his left thigh and the injury upon it. He walks with a marked limp and the deformity is apparent. The fact of fracture of the thigh bone was proved by the claimant himself on oath. This part was not challenged. The X-ray plates, which are on record, show that they are of one Jainarayan. Jainarayan is the alias of the claimant. They do not seem to be forged or spurious in nature. The fracture of the thigh bone is apparent from these X-ray plates, they have not been proved by the Radiologist or the Doctor, who treated the claimant.

11. Let us now examine whether the compensation awarded to the claimant by the Tribunal is in accordance with law or not. The question of awarding non-pecuniary damages is well settled. The victim is entitled to claim damages for the loss of limb, pain and suffering, loss of amenities and the injury itself. These are the heads under which damages are to be awarded. But from its very nature there is always an uncertainty in making an award of damages for non-pecuniary damage. For removing the uncertainty to some extent, a Division Bench of this Court in Vinod Kumar v. Ved Mitra, AIR 1970 Madh Pra 172 has given directions to work out the rules for assessing damages. These rules are (i) the amount of compensation awarded must be reasonable and must be assessed with moderation; (ii) regard must be had to awards made in comparable cases, and (iii) the sums awarded should, to a considerable extent, be conventional. These self-imposed rules by this Court are the indications, according to which the award should be made. These rules were followed in the case of Deepti Tiwari v.

Banwarilal, AIR 1966 Madh Pra 239, where a young girl of 15 years suffered a fracture of the spine. She was awarded a sum of Rs. 4,000/-

as general damages. In Vinod Kumar's case (supra), a student of 17 years of age, was knocked down by a truck. His left leg came under the vehicle and he suffered a compound fracture of tibia and fibula, and was awarded a sum of Rs. 5,000/-. In the case of Bishwa Nath Gupta v. Munna, AIR 1971 Madh Pra 238, which is similar to the case in hand, an amount of Rs. 6,000/- has been awarded. Keeping the ratio of these cases in view, the award of Rs. 4,000/- as compensation, though, no doubt, low, seems to be moderate and adequate. For now allowing the expenses of medicines, fruits and milk, the Tribunal has given reason that the amounts were not properly proved by producing the receipts of the items. This view of the Tribunal does not seem to be practical.

Sometimes, persons whose kith and kin are confined in the hospital, do forget to take receipts of the medicines from the shops.

Similarly, fruit vendors and milk vendors are never seen to be passing receipts for fruits and milk. If the claimant was successful in proving these expenses, then the Tribunal should have allowed the amounts to the claimant. Rs. 500/-

have been claimed as expenses of treatment and medicines, and Rs. 500/- have been claimed as expenses incurred on fruits, milk and other power giving substances. These figures do not seem to be exact. In my view, they are in round figures. However, Rs. 300/-

can be said to have been spent on medicines, and similarly, a similar sum can be said to have been spent on fruits and milk. 1, therefore, partly amend the award exercising my powers under Order 41, Rule 33C.P.C. and award a further compensation of Rs. 600/- more in the award.

12. So far as the grievance of the claimant with regard to the low rate of interest is concerned, the law provides for the award of simple interest. The interest awarded at the rate of 5% per annum is very low, when the nationalised banks are giving interest at the rate of 12% per annum. But, keeping in view that only simple interest has to be awarded, in my view, awarding 10% interest from the date of the application will be just and proper. With these observations, the award passed by the Tribunal is modified to the extent indicated above.

13. The upshot of the above discussion is that the appeal of Kiran Devi (M.A. No. 91 of 1977) is allowed and it is held that she is not vicariously liable to pay the compensation. She will bear her own costs. The appeal filed by Sonaram (M.A. No. 80 of 1977) is dismissed, as it has no force. The award passed by the Tribunal shall be modified as indicated hereinabove and also to the extent that only Sonaram, the appellant, and the Insurance Company shall be liable to pay the damages and the expenses throughout, as finally awarded by the Tribunal and by this Court. Sonaram and the Insurance Company shall also bear the costs throughout. Jaiprakash alias Jainarayan the claimant, respondent, shall get counsel's fee Rs. 300/- of this Court, if certified.