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Jernail Singh v. Kanhaiyalal .
Structured Summary of the Opinion (Civil Second Appeal — Tenancy under M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961)
Factual and Procedural Background
The respondent-landlord sued the appellant-tenant seeking eviction from a non-residential shop on Malgodam Road, Morena, under Section 12(1)(a) and (f) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961, and also claimed Rs. 282.50. The landlord's pleaded case was that he bona fide required the premises for his major son Laxminarayan to start a business and that he had no other reasonably suitable non-residential accommodation in his occupation within the town of Morena.
The appellant-tenant denied the landlord's claim of bona fide need and asserted that the landlord had, adjacent to the suit shop, a vacant non-residential accommodation in which his son could start business without evicting the tenant.
The trial Court framed issues, recorded evidence and answered relevant issues in favour of the plaintiff on the point that the plaintiff required the premises for his son and that no reasonably suitable alternative premises of the plaintiff were available within the municipal area of Morena. The trial Court decreed the suit under Section 12(1)(f) of the Act. The tenant's appeal to the first appellate Court was dismissed, the appellate Court concurring with the trial Court. The tenant then instituted this civil second appeal under Section 100 C.P.C.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether under Section 12(1)(f) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961, the burden to prove non-availability of reasonably suitable non-residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or town concerned lies upon the landlord-plaintiff?
- Whether the lower Court's finding as to non-availability of alternative non-residential accommodation is vitiated on account of wrong placing on the defendant the burden to prove availability of alternative non-residential accommodation?
Arguments of the Parties
Respondent-Landlord's Case (as pleaded)
- The landlord alleged that the appellant was his tenant of the suit shop and that he bona fide required the suit premises for his major son, Laxminarayan, to start a transport business.
- The landlord pleaded that he had no other reasonably suitable non-residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the town of Morena.
Appellant-Tenant's Arguments (as presented in the opinion)
- The tenant denied the landlord's bona fide need and alleged that the landlord possessed, immediately adjacent to the suit shop, a vacant non-residential accommodation in which the son could start business without evicting the tenant.
- By way of additional evidence in the appellate court, the tenant sought to produce two photographs—one of the suit shop and one of the adjacent accommodation—to show that the adjacent accommodation was non-residential (or capable of being used as such); this request was opposed by the landlord as mala fide and as trick photography.
- The tenant relied on case-law: (a) Moolchand (reported as AIR 1973 Madh Pra 301 / 1973 Jab LJ 430) for the proposition that classification between residential and non-residential is a mixed question of law and fact and depends on the primary purpose of the accommodation; and (b) Bhagwan Das (1981 M.P.R.C.J. (Notes)80) for the proposition that structural design, location and initial letting purpose are determinative and earlier use is not material, and that a landlord may convert premises from residential to non-residential.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Moolchand (1973 Jab LJ 430; AIR 1973 Madh Pra 301) | The decision holds that whether accommodation is residential or non-residential is a mixed question of law and fact; classification depends on the primary purpose of the accommodation (if primary purpose is residential, it is residential even if used partly for non-residential purposes and vice versa). | The Court observed the ratio is correct but noted there was no dispute here that the suit shop is non-residential. The Court declined the appellant's attempt to apply Moolchand's ratio to an adjacent accommodation (as opposed to the suit premises themselves) and emphasized that the primary purpose of the alternate accommodation, as found by concurrent findings, was residential. |
| Bhagwan Das (1981 M.P.R.C.J. (Notes)80) | Held that structural design, location and the purpose of initial letting are determining factors in classifying accommodation; earlier use is not material; a landlord may convert premises from residential to non-residential. | The Court noted this ratio is meant for deciding the nature of the suit accommodation and not for determining the character of an alternate accommodation in the landlord's possession; the trial and first appellate Courts had considered these aspects. |
| Hasmat Rai (cited as 1982 MPRCJ 1; AIR 1981 SC 1711) | The opinion refers to the Supreme Court decision but does not elaborate a specific rule from it for the present reasoning. | The Court expressly stated that the ratio of Hasmat Rai was "of no help to the appellant" in the facts of this case. |
| V. Ramachandra Ayyer (AIR 1963 SC 302) | Explains the ambit of Clause (c) of Section 100(1) C.P.C.: an "error or defect in the procedure" must relate to procedure and not merely to erroneous appreciation of evidence; however, if the lower appellate Court placed the onus on the wrong party or otherwise committed a procedural error impacting the result, that may justify interference. | The Court relied on and quoted this authority to explain when a High Court may interfere with concurrent findings of fact—i.e., interference is allowed only for errors of law or procedural defects as described, and not for mere erroneous appreciation of evidence. The Court concluded no such procedural defect or misplacing of burden was present in the instant case. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court approached two procedural and substantive strands of analysis: (A) whether additional evidence (two photographs) should be permitted in the appellate court under Order 41 Rule 27, C.P.C.; and (B) whether the concurrent factual findings below—particularly on non-availability of reasonably suitable alternative premises of the landlord—warranted interference in a second appeal under Section 100 C.P.C.
A. On admissibility of additional evidence (Order 41 Rule 27, C.P.C.)
- The Court reproduced Rule 27 and identified the permissible grounds to admit additional evidence in the Appellate Court: (i) improper refusal of evidence by trial Court which ought to have been admitted; (ii) non-production despite due diligence; (iii) necessity for the Appellate Court to pronounce judgment or enable examination of witnesses; or (iv) any other substantial cause; plus a requirement to record reasons.
- The Court concluded that none of these grounds applied to the appellant's request. The appellant had had full opportunity to adduce his evidence at trial, and the application at appellate stage was not supported by any of the statutory justifications; it was therefore refused.
- Although the Court had the photographs before it (described as "mischief has been done" because the appellant relied heavily on them and abandoned the framed substantial questions of law), the Court evaluated their content and probative value. The photographs showed domestic materials inside the adjacent accommodation; the Court held that outward appearance (location in business locality, iron shutters, shop-like front) does not convert a residential accommodation into a non-residential one where the concurrent factual finding was that the accommodation was being used residentially.
- The Court also noted the landlord is entitled to use his accommodation according to his necessities; mere physical suitability or outward shop-like features do not override a factual finding of residential use.
B. On burden of proof and appellate interference under Section 100 C.P.C.
- The Court reiterated the settled legal proposition that it is for the plaintiff-landlord to prove the non-availability of reasonably suitable non-residential alternative premises in the town, i.e., the burden of proof on this point lies on the plaintiff. This was stated by way of observation consistent with established law.
- The Court examined whether the lower Courts had wrongly shifted the burden to the defendant or otherwise committed a procedural defect. Having reviewed the evidence and judgments of both Courts below, the Court found concurrent findings of fact that the landlord had no reasonably suitable alternative non-residential accommodation in his occupation. The Court found no misreading of evidence or procedural defect in the approach of the Courts below.
- The Court relied on V. Ramachandra Ayyer to underscore that interference in a second appeal is limited to errors of law or procedural defects such as placing onus on the wrong party. In the present case, the Court found no such defect and therefore declined to interfere with concurrent findings of fact.
- Consequently, the Court concluded that the appellant's attempts to re-open factual issues by new evidence or to reframe the litigation were not permitted in the second appeal and that the findings below should be maintained.
Holding and Implications
Core Ruling: The civil second appeal is dismissed and the judgments and decrees of the trial Court and the first appellate Court are maintained.
Direct consequences and directions spelled out by the Court:
- The appellant-tenant is directed to hand over vacant possession of the suit premises to the respondent-landlord on expiry of six months from the date of the High Court judgment.
- During the six-month period, the tenant must pay mesne profits for occupancy to the respondent every month, punctually on the 10th day of each month; failure to comply may result in shortening of the six-month period.
- Costs are awarded throughout; counsel's fees fixed at Rs. 100/- if certified.
Broader implication as to precedent-setting: The Court applied established authorities and rules (including the test for admitting additional evidence under Order 41 Rule 27 and the limited ambit of interference in a second appeal under Section 100 C.P.C.). The opinion does not purport to lay down a new principle of law; it maintains the concurrent findings below and refuses to admit additional evidence at appellate stage.
1. By this civil second appeal, the appellant-tenant challenges the judgment and decree passed by the Additional District Judge, Sheopur Kalian, camp Morena, in Civil Appeal No. 3A of 1982 dated 14-7-1982.
2. Respondent-landlord filed a suit against the appellant-tenant, for his eviction from the non-residential suit premises situate on Malgodam Road, Morena, on the grounds mentioned in Section 12(1)(a) and (f) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (for short, hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and also prayed for a decree of Rs, 282.50. In brief, the case of the respondent-landlord was that the appellant-defendant is his tenant of the suit shop, but he now bona fide requires the said non-residential accommodation for his major son Laxminarayan, to start his business and he has no other reasonably suitable non-residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the town of Morena.
3. Appellant-defendant repelled the contents of the plaint and averred that the alleged need of the landlord is not bona fide. He further pleaded that just by the side of the suit shop, the landlord has a vacant non-residential accommodation in which his son can start the business without evicting him from the suit shop.
4. The trial Court after framing the issues and recording the evidence of the parties, answered the issues as given below : --
(i) Defendant has deposited the due rent within two months from the date of notice of demand for arrears of rent and is, thus entitled to get the benefit of the provisions of Section 12(3) and Section 13(1) of the Act.
(ii) Plaintiff requires bona fide the suit premises for his major son Laxminarayan for the purpose of starting transport business.
(iii) Plaintiff has no other reasonably suitable non-residential accommodation of his own within the municipal area of Morena.
The trial Court, thus, decreed the suit of the plaintiff with regard to the ground provided under Section 12(1)(f) of the Act. The appellant-tenant aggrieved by this judgment and decree passed against him, preferred an appeal. The first appellate Court expressed its concurrence with the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court and dismissed the appeal. Hence, now the appellant-tenant invokes the jurisdiction of this Court under Section 100, C.P.C.
5. This Court on 1-12-1982 admitted this appeal on the following substantial questions of law : --
"(1) Whether under Section 12(1)f) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961, the burden to prove non-availability of reasonably suitable non-residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or town concerned, lies upon the landlord-plaintiff?
(2) Whether the lower Court's finding as to non-availability of alternative non-residential accommodation is vitiated on account of wrong placing on the defendant the burden to prove availability of alternative non-residential accommodation?"
6. Before taking up these questions, I propose to decide I.A. No. 2383 of 1985, filed with an affidavit by the appellant-tenant under the provisions of Order 41 Rule 27, C.P.C. By this application Shri R.D. Jain, learned counsel for the appellant, prays that the appellant be allowed to produce, as additional evidence, two photographs of the suit shop and that of the adjacent non-residential accommodation in the plaintiffs own possession. Shri R. C. Lahoti, learned counsel for the respondent, has not only hotly contested and opposed the said prayer orally but also in writing. According to him, this application of the appellant is not only mala fide, but the photographs are the result of trick photography, and it has been filed with an ulterior motive of delaying and defeating the decree passed in the plaintiff-landlord's favour. He further contends that on the face of the concurrent findings of fact and also on the ground that the appellant had full opportunity to adduce his evidence before the trial Court, this mala fide chess-move at this stage on the part of the appellant be thwarted in the ends of justice. The objection is well taken and needs elaborate judicial treatment. For a proper appreciation, Rule 27 of Order 41 C.P.C. is reproduced below :
"27. Production of additional evidence in Appellate Court. -- (1) The parties to an appeal shall not be entitled to produce additional evidence, whether oral or documentary, in the Appellate Court. But if-
(a) the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred has refused to admit evidence which ought to have been admitted, or (aa) the party seeking to produce additional evidence, establishes that notwithstanding the exercise of due diligence, such evidence was not within his knowledge or could not, after the exercise of due diligence, be produced by him at the time when the decree appealed against was passed, or
(b) the Appellate Court requires any document to be produced or any witness to be examined to enable it to pronounce judgment, or for any other substantial cause, the Appellate Court may allow such evidence or document to be produced, or witness to be examined.
(2) Wherever additional evidence is allowed to be produced by an Appellate Court, the Court shall record the reason for its admission."
A bare reading of this provision indicates that the additional evidence shall not be allowed in the Appellate Court unless one of these conditions is satisfied :
(i) improper refusal of evidence by the trial Court which ought, to have been admitted, or
(ii) non-production of . evidence notwithstanding exercise of due diligence, or
(iii) requirement of the Appellate Court itself for pronouncing judgment, i.e., impossibility to pronounce judgment without the said evidence, or
(iv) any other substantial cause.
Besides these causes, reasons must be shown as to why the evidence was not produced in the trial Court. The rule is clearly not intended to enable a party to the litigation to patch up the loop-holes or pitfalls of his case. I have to observe that none of the above-noted grounds is available to the appellant for the purpose of admitting his evidence. His prayer for adducing the said additional evidence at this appellate stage deserves to be turned down.
6A. But mischief has been done. This Court was shown the photographs. The appellant has advanced extensive arguments making these two holographs as the launching pad. During this process he has completely abandoned and forgotton the substantial questions of law framed. Shri Jain, learned counsel for the appellant, has also addressed this Court on facts and contended that from the photographs it is apparent that the accommodation, in which the respondent is said to be residing by the side of the suit shop, is actually a non-residential accommodation being used by the landlord as a residential accommodation with an ulterior motive of evicting the appellant from the suit shop. Shri Jain has drawn my attention to a Single Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Moolchand 1973 Jab LJ 430 : (AIR 1973 Madh Pra 301). In Moolchand's case it was held that the question whether a suit accommodation is a residential or non-residential accommodation, is a mixed question of law and fact. According to the ratio of Moolchand's case (supra), if the primary purpose is residential, the accommodation will be classified as residential even if it is also used for some non-residential purpose and vice versa. The ratio is correct, but there is no dispute in the case in hand as to whether the suit shop is residential, or non-residential accommodation. The suit shop is definitely a non-residential accommodation. What Shri Jain wants is that he wants to apply Moolchand's case's ratio to the adjacent accommodation, which, according to him, is non-residential, though, for the present, it is being used as a residential accommodation, while this ratio is clearly meant to be applied to suit premises only and not to other accommodation. Even if we stretch, as Shri Jain wants, still it is the primary purpose of the nature of the accommodation which is important. According to the concurrent findings of fact, the alternate available accommodation is being used by the landlord for residential purpose only.
7. Shri Jain, learned counsel for the appellant, has relied on the case of Bhagwan Das, 1981 M.P.R.C.J. (Notes)80. In this Single Bench judgment of this Court, it has been held that if the nature of the accommodation is of structural design, location and the purpose of initial letting are determining factors, and the earlier use of the accommodation is not material. This ratio is meant to be applied to the suit accommodation and not to alternate accommodation. Further observation in Bhagwan Das's case (supra) is that nothing prevents a landlord from converting his premises from residential to non-residential accommodation. This argument of Shri Jain was considered by the trial Court in paras 15 and 17 of its judgment and also by the first appellate Court in paragraphs 9, 10 and 11 of the impugned judgment. It would be relevant to observe that the fact of non-availability of an alternative accommodation in the town of Morena was pleaded and proved by the plaintiff-landlord, and the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Hasmat Rai 1982 MPRCJ 1 : (AIR 1981 SC 1711) is of no help to the appellant.
8. If an alternative accommodation in the possession of the landlord is being used by him as a residential accommodation, though in a business locality, and the outward appearance of the said accommodation looks like a non-residential accommodation being fitted with an iron shutter at the front side, it cannot be said to be a non-residential accommodation. It is for the landlord to use his accommodation according to his necessity in any manner he likes. Because an accommodation is situate in a business locality, because it can be put to use for non-residential purpose, because its front is fitted with iron shutters and gives the look of a shop from outside, because it is situate by the side of the main road, such an accommodation cannot be branded as a non-residential accommodation on the face of the finding of fact that the said alternative accommodation is a residential accommodation. The photographs produced by the appellant clearly show that domestic materials of daily use, and not commercial articles, are inside the alternative accommodation,
9. Shri R.D. Jain, learned counsel for the appellant, has not addressed this Court on the substantial questions of law framed, and seems to have abandoned them, but while passing I observe that according to the settled proposition of law it is for the plaintiff and the plaintiff only to prove the fact of nonavailability of non-residential alternative premises in the town and not the defendant. I further observe that the finding of the first appellate Court that there was no other reasonably suitable non-residential accommodation of the plaintiffs own in his occupation in the town of Morena, cannot be said to be erroneous. In the concurrent findings of fact there seems to be no misreading of the evidence, and both the Courts below have taken all the important circumstances into consideration.
On being persuaded by Shri Jain's forceful advocacy, I have gone through the entire evidence -- both oral and documentary -- on record, but in the judgments of both the Courts below, no misreading of evidence was found. The law by now with regard to the jurisdiction of this Court under Section 100, Civil Procedure Code, is well settled.
10. It is settled that the concurrent findings of fact arrived by the Courts below cannot, in a second appeal, be interfered on the ground of erroneous findings of fact, howsoever gross the error might seem to be. But it is also true that if the High Court is satisfied that the 'decision is contrary to law or some usage having the force of law, or that the decision has failed to determine some material issue of law or usage having the force of law, or if there is a substantial error or defect in the procedure provided by the Code, or by any other law for the time being in force which may have produced error or defect in the decision of the case upon the merits, it can interfere with the conclusions of the lower appellate Court. The following observations of the Supreme Court in the case of V. Ramachandra Ayyer, AIR 1963 SC 302 will be relevant to quote :
"the error or defect in the procedure to which Clause (c) of Section 100(1) refers is, as the clause clearly and umambiguously indicates, an error or defect connected with or relating to the procedure; it is not an error or defect in the appreciation of evidence adduced by the parties on the merits. That is why, even if the appreciation of evidence made by the lower appellate Court is patently erroneous and the finding of fact recorded in consequence is grossly erroneous, that cannot be said to introduce a substantial error or defect in the procedure. On the other hand, if in dealing with a question of facts the lower appellate Court has placed the onus on a wrong party and its finding of fact is the result, substantially, of this wrong approach, that may be regarded as a defect in procedure, if in dealing with questions of fact, the lower appellate Court discards evidence on the ground that it is inadmissible and the High Court is satisfied that the evidence was admissible, that may introduce an error or defect in procedure. If the lower appellate Court fails to consider an issue which had been tried and found upon by the trial Court and proceeds to reverse the trial Court's decision without the consideration of such an issue, that may be regarded as an error or defect in procedure; if the lower appellate Court allows a new point of fact to be raised for the first time before it, or permits a party to adopt a new plea of fact, or makes out a new case for a party, that may, in some cases, be said to amount to a defect or error in procedure. But the High Court cannot interfere with the conclusions of fact -recorded by the lower appellate Court however erroneous the said conclusions may appear to be to the High Court."
The ultimate end of the aforesaid discussion is that this appeal has no force and is, therefore, dismissed with costs throughout. The judgment and decrees passed by the Courts below are maintained. Counsel's fees Rs. 100/- if certified.
11. But, before parting, having full realisation of the plight of the appellant-tenant, who is being uprooted from the suit Premises by the process of law, and who will face Himalayan difficulty in finding a new suitable non-residential accommodation for his business in the town of Morena, under Section 12(6) of the Act, the defendant-tenant is, therefore, .directed that he shall hand over the vacant possession of the suit premises to the respondent-landlord on the expiry of six months from the date of this judgment. He is further directed to pay the mesne profits for the occupancy of the premises during the abovenoted period, to the respondent every month regularly and punctually, on the 10th day of each month. Failure in compliance with this direction may result in shortening the period stated hereinabove.
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