Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ

Sunil And Others v. Satya Narayna And Others

Madhya Pradesh High Court
Oct 19, 1984
Important Paras
Please sign up to view Important Paras.
Smart Summary (Beta)

Annotated Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff (non-applicant 1) instituted a suit for ejectment and arrears of rent against non-applicants 2 and 3, alleging a contract of tenancy: that non-applicants 2 and 3 had executed a mortgage by conditional sale in favour of the plaintiff with delivery of possession and had taken the accommodation back on lease for a monthly rent of Rs. 200, executing a rent note acknowledging the tenancy. The present applicants sought to be joined as defendants under Order 1, Rule 10 read with Section 151, Civil P.C., claiming they (together with non-applicants 2 and 3) were heirs of the original owner (late Ayodhya Prasad) and that they were in possession in their own right; accordingly, they asserted the defendants had no right to create the alleged mortgage and their interest would be affected by any decree. The trial court dismissed the applicants' joinder application on 10 February 1984. The applicants challenged that order by revision; the learned Single Judge found conflicting views in two earlier decisions of the Court (Ishaq Ahmed v. Ramsingh and Saifuddin v. Manibai) and referred the specific question (set out below) to a Division Bench for decision.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether in a landlord's suit for eviction from a residential accommodation of a Hindu male and the latter's widowed mother, on the averments that they executed a registered conditional sale deed and a rent note in the plaintiff's favour, the presence of the male defendant's younger brother, a younger sister, and their deceased elder brother's widow and her minor children (who claim to be in physical possession of the accommodation as coparceners and not as the plaintiff's tenants) is in law necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions in the suit?

Arguments of the Parties

Applicants' Arguments

  • The applicants applied for joinder under Order 1, Rule 10 read with Section 151, Civil P.C., asserting they are heirs of the late owner and are in possession of the suit house in their own right.
  • They contended that the defendants (non-applicants 2 and 3) had no right to create the alleged mortgage/conditional sale, and that if the present suit succeeded against those defendants, the applicants' interest would be directly affected and they would be dispossessed in execution of the decree.
  • Relying on Section 23 of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961, the applicants argued that to protect their interest they must be joined as parties because a decree in the landlord-tenant suit could result in their eviction.

Plaintiff / Non-Applicant 1's Position (as presented in the opinion)

  • The plaintiff's suit is founded on a contract of tenancy and the alleged mortgage by conditional sale followed by a tenancy (rent note). The plaintiff claimed no relief against the present applicants and proceeded on the basis that the dispute before the court was between himself (as landlord) and the defendants (as tenant).
  • Implicit in the judgment: the plaintiff did not wish to add the applicants as parties and treated the matter as a straight landlord-tenant suit based on contract, not a title dispute.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ishaq Ahmed v. Ramsingh, 1976 Jab U (SN) 81 Referenced as part of a conflict of views on joinder under Order 1 Rule 10. The Single Judge found a conflict with this decision and another; it formed part of the basis for referring the question to the Division Bench. The Division Bench did not adopt this view on the record; instead it sided with the contrary authority (Saifuddin).
Saifuddin v. Manibai, 1977 MP U (SN) 47 Represents the view that was ultimately held to be correct on the question of joinder in such landlord-tenant suits. The Division Bench held that the view in Saifuddin is the proper view and answered the referred question in the negative (applicants are neither necessary nor proper parties).
Panna Khushali v. Jeewanlal, 1976 Jab LJ 84; AIR 1976 Madh Pra 148 (Full Bench) Sets out principles for joinder under Order 1 Rule 10: distinction between "ought to have been joined" (necessary parties) and "whose presence may be necessary" (proper parties); tests for necessary parties; caution against altering the nature of the suit by joinder. The Court relied on the principles laid down in this Full Bench decision (including the two tests for necessary parties and the limitation on adding parties) to conclude the applicants were neither necessary nor proper parties.
Importers and Manufacturers Ltd. v. Pheroze Framroze Taraporewala, AIR 1953 SC 73 (Supreme Court) Principle that joinder of a proper party must not alter the character of the suit; joinder does not take the suit out of the relevant statutory scheme (here, Section 27 referenced in the opinion) if its character remains. The Court relied on the observation that if joining a person alters the character of the suit, that person should not be joined. This supported the conclusion that joinder should be refused where it would convert a landlord-tenant contract suit into a title suit.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Division Bench proceeded by analyzing the nature and scope of the plaintiff's suit and the legal principles governing joinder:

  1. The suit before the trial court is a landlord's suit founded on a contract of tenancy. The central questions are whether the contract of tenancy exists and whether the plaintiff is entitled to ejectment and arrears.
  2. It is a settled principle (as stated in the opinion) that in a suit based on a contract of tenancy the court should not adjudicate upon title. The court emphasized that the suit's success depends on proof or disproof of the tenancy contract and the grounds for ejectment.
  3. If the present applicants were joined, their joinder would necessarily invite adjudication of title-related issues (whether they are owners by inheritance, whether the defendants had the right to create the alleged mortgage and whether that binds the applicants). That would alter the nature and enlarge the scope of the suit from a contract-based landlord-tenant proceeding to a suit involving title.
  4. The plaintiff is the dominus litis (master of the suit) and cannot be compelled to add parties against whom he does not seek relief unless compelled by law. The court observed that avoiding multiplicity of suits is not a sufficient ground to force the plaintiff to change the nature of his suit by adding parties.
  5. The applicants relied upon Section 23 of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961, arguing that a decree for recovery of possession would bind all persons in occupation and thus their fears of dispossession warranted joinder. The court analyzed Section 23 and its proviso: the proviso preserves the position of any person who has an independent title to the accommodation—such a person cannot be evicted under a decree passed against a tenant alone.
  6. Consequently, even on the applicants' apprehension of execution under Section 23, the proviso protects those with independent title; that meant the applicants' concern did not make them necessary parties to the landlord-tenant suit.
  7. The court referred to and applied the tests and principles from Panna Khushali (Full Bench) distinguishing necessary parties from proper parties and the consequences of joinder that would change the character of the suit, and to the Supreme Court's observation in Importers and Manufacturers Ltd. that joinder should not alter the character of the suit.
  8. On this analysis the court concluded that the plaintiffs' case can be properly adjudicated without the presence of the applicants and that the applicants are neither necessary nor proper parties to the landlord-tenant suit.

Holding and Implications

Core Holding: The referred question is answered in the negative: the present applicants are neither necessary parties nor proper parties to the landlord's suit for eviction and arrears; they should not be joined in the suit.

Implications and direct effects:

  • The trial court's order dismissing the applicants' joinder application is supported by the Division Bench's view; the applicants are not to be added as defendants in the present suit on the grounds urged.
  • The Court advised that if the applicants have claims based on their asserted title or inheritance, the appropriate remedy for them is to file a separate suit to adjudicate those claims.
  • The Court aligned its decision with earlier authorities (notably Panna Khushali (Full Bench) and the Supreme Court in Importers and Manufacturers Ltd.) and held that joinder which would change the character of the suit is improper.
  • No order as to costs.

Note: This summary is confined strictly to the material contained in the provided opinion and does not add facts or inferences beyond that text.

Show all summary ...

1. This case has come up before us on a reference, whereby the following question has been referred to this Bench for decision :

"Whether in a landlord's suit for eviction from a residential accommodation of a Hindu male and the letter's widowed mother on the averments that they executed a registered conditional sale deed and a rent note in the plaintiffs favour, the presence of the male defendant's younger brother, a younger sister, and their deceased elder brother's widow and her minor children (claiming to be in physical possession of the suit accommodation as of right as coparceners and not as the plaintiff's tenants) is in law necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions in the suit?"

2. The short facts leading to this reference and essential for the decision of the question are these :

3. The plaintiff-non-applicant 1 herein has filed a suit for ejectment and arrears of rent against non-applicants 2 and 3 on the basis of a contract of tenancy between non-applicant 1 on the one part and non-applicants 2 and 3 on the other part. The case of non-applicant 1 is that non-applicants 2 and 3 executed a mortgage by conditional sale with delivery of possession of the suit accommodation to him and took it back on lease on monthly rent of Rs. 200/-, executing a rent note in his favour acknowledging the tenancy. In this suit the applicants herein filed an application under Order 1, Rule 10 read with Section 151, Civil P. C. for their being joined as defendants in the suit. In this application they submitted that the suit house belonged to late Ayodhya Prasad, the father of applicants 1 and 2 and non-applicant 2, they along with non-applicants 2 and 3 are the heirs of late Ayodhya Prasad and, as such, are in possession of the suit house in their own right, and the non-applicants 2 and 3 had no right to create the said mortgage. On these submissions, they contended that if the suit is decreed, their interest in the suit accommodation would be directly affected by the decree and in execution of that decree they would be dispossessed from the suit accommodation; therefore, they should be joined as defendants in the suit.

4. The trial Court vide its order dated 10th February 1984 dismissed the application of the applicants.

5. The applicants on being aggrieved filed the present revision. The learned single Judge on having found that there was a conflict of views in the two decisions of this Court, viz; Ishaq Ahmed v. Ramsingh, 1976 Jab U (SN) 81 and Saifuddin v. Manibai, 1977 MP U (SN) 47 referred the above question for decision by a Division Bench.

6. After having heard learned Counsel for the parties, we are of the view that the question should be answered in the negative.

7. The suit is between a landlord and a tenant based on the contract of tenancy. The suit of the plaintiff-landlord would succeed or fail on the proof or disproof of the contract of tenancy. It is a trite law that in a suit based on a contract of tenancy, the question of title cannot be gone into. If the applicants are allowed to be joined as a party, it would necessarily result in permitting the raising of a controversy as to the title to the suit accommodation, i.e. whether the applicants also are owners of the suit accommodation and whether the defendants in the suit had the right to create the mortgage in question and whether that is binding on these applicants. This would, no doubt, alter the nature of the suit and also enlarge its scope. For deciding the suit as filed by the plaintiff-non-applicant 1 herein it is not necessary to adjudicate upon and settle the controversy on the basis of which the applicants prayed for being joined as a necessary party. The plaintiff-non-applicant 1 herein has claimed no relief against the present applicants. The plaintiff is the dominus litis and cannot be forced to add parties against whom he does not want to fight unless it is a compulsion of the rule of law. The plaintiff cannot be required to alter the nature of the suit and enlarge its scope on the ground that the addition of the party would avoid multiplicity of suits.

8. Learned counsel for the applicants had contended, relying on Section 23 of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (for short hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') that if they are not joined as parties and a decree is passed in the present suit against the defendants, who are non-applicants 2 and 3 herein, the applicants would be ejected in the execution of that decree and, therefore to protect their interest it is necessary that they should be joined as a party to the suit. The judgment that would be passed in the suit would be a judgment in personam and not a judgment in rem. It is a trite law that a decree, which is a decree in personam, would not bind persons who are not parties to the suit and who do not claim under the parties to the suit. The argument of the learned counsel for the applicants is based on an incorrect reading of Section 23 of the Act. Section 23 of the Act reads as under :

"23. Vacant possession to landlord.--Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, where the interest of a tenant in any accommodation is determined for any reason whatsoever and any decree or order is passed by a Court under this Act for the recovery of possession of such accommodation, the decree or order shall, subject to the provisions of section 16, be binding on all persons who may be in occupation of the accommodation, and vacant possession thereof, shall be given to the landlord by evicting all such persons therefrom :

Provided that nothing in this section shall apply to any person who has an independent title to such accommodation."

The proviso to the forequoted section clearly lays down that a person, who in occupation of an accommodation, is not a tenant and is also not there on behalf of the tenant, against whom a decree is passed, but who has his own independent title in the accommodation directed to be vacated, cannot be called upon to vacate the accommodation under the decree passed against the tenant and not against him. Thus, on the ground of apprehension of the execution of the decree against them under Section 23 of the Act also, the applicants are not necessary parties.

9. The questions involved in the suit are the contract of tenancy and the ground for ejectment. The suit would succeed or fail, as already stated hereinabove, on the plaintiffs proving or failing to prove the contract of tenancy and the grounds for ejectment. To decide these questions, the presense of the applicants is not necessary to enable the Court to effectually and completely adjudicate upon these questions. The question of proper parties had also to be decided bearing in mind the scope of the suit and, as already stated hereinabove, by adding these persons as parties, the nature of the suit would alter and scope would enlarge.

10. In the light of the foregoing discussion we are of the view that the present applicants are neither necessary parties nor proper parties. If they have any claim on the grounds urged in the application the better course for them is to file a separate suit. The view taken by us is in line with a Full Bench decision of this Court in Panna Khushali v. Jeewanlal 1976 Jab LJ 84 : (AIR 1976 Madh Pra 148) and the decision of the Supreme Court in Importers and Manufacturers Ltd. v. Pheroze Framroze Taraporewala, AIR 1953 SC 73.

11. The principle laid down regarding the joinder of parties in Panna's case (supra), as capsulised in the head notes, is set out hereinbelow :

(1) In Sub-rule (2) of Rule 10 of Order 1. There are two expressions (i) "who ought to have been joined" and (ii) "whose presence before the Court may be necessary." These expressions indicate that there are two categories of parties, (a) necessary party as indicated by the expression "ought to have been joined," and (b) proper parties as indicated by the expression "whose presence before the Court may be necessary." The Court has no jurisdiction or power to add a person as a party who is neither a necessary party nor a proper party.

The tests for determining whether a party is a necessary party are : --

(i) There must be a right to some relief against such party in respect of the matter involved in the proceeding in question.

(ii) It should not be possible to pass an effective decree in the absence of such a party.

The plaintiff is the dominus litis and cannot be forced to add parties against whom he does not want to fight unless it is a compulsion of the rule of law. The plaintiff cannot be required to change the nature of his suit on the ground that the addition of a party is necessary to avoid multiplicity of suits.

(2) In a suit for specific performance of a contract for sale in respect of a property against the defendant, some person who applies for being impleaded as party to the suit on the ground that he has a right by birth in the suit property, cannot be joined as a party under Order 1, Rule 10 of the Code, because if such a person was allowed to intervene in the suit as party the nature of the suit will change from a suit for specific performance of a contract to that of a suit for title."

12. In Importers and Manufacturers Ltd.'s case (AIR 1953 SC 73) (supra) the observation of the Supreme Court;

"The joinder of such a proper party cannot alter the character of the suit and does not make the suit any the less a suit between the landlord and the tenant or take it out of Section 27 of the Act."

goes to show that in case by joining a person as a party, the character of the suit is altered, then that person should not be joined as the party to the suit.

13. In this view of the matter, we are of the opinion that the view taken by the learned Single Bench in Saifuddin's case (1976 MP LJ (SN) 47) (supra) is the proper view. As already stated, the question is answered in the negative, i.e. in the present suit the applicants are neither necessary parties nor proper parties.

14. No order as to costs.