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Zaheer Ahmed And Another v. Kuladhipati, Bhopal University, Bhopal And Another
Concise Analytical Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioners, residents of Bhopal and described as interested in the affairs of Bhopal University, challenged by a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India the appointment of Shri R. C. Shukla (respondent No. 2) as Kulapati (Vice-Chancellor) of Bhopal University.
Under the Madhya Pradesh Vishwavidhyalaya Adhiniyam, 1973 (the "Adhiniyam"), Section 13 contemplates appointment of a Kulapati by the Kuladhipati (Chancellor) from a panel of not less than three persons recommended by a committee of three constituted under Sub-section (2) (and relevantly Sub-section (3)). In the present case the recommending committee submitted a panel consisting of only two persons (one of whom was respondent No. 2). The petitioners contended that Section 13(1)'s phrase "panel of not less than three persons" is mandatory, and that appointment from a panel of only two persons was therefore without authority of law and must be quashed.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the requirement in Section 13(1) of the Adhiniyam that the Kulapati be appointed from a "panel of not less than three persons" is mandatory (a sine qua non) or directory in nature.
- Whether an appointment of a Kulapati made by the Kuladhipati from a panel consisting of only two persons recommended by the committee is lawful and valid.
- What is the proper legal construction of the Scheme of Section 13 (the roles of the Kuladhipati and the recommending committee) in the context of ensuring appointment of a suitably qualified Kulapati.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioners' Arguments
- The petitioners contended that Sub-section (1) of Section 13 of the Adhiniyam is mandatory: the Kuladhipati has jurisdiction to appoint a Kulapati only out of a panel of not less than three persons recommended by the Committee.
- They argued that an appointment made from a panel of only two persons contravenes Section 13(1) and is therefore without authority of law and liable to be quashed.
Other Parties' Arguments
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondent's or State's specific arguments on the point; it records that learned counsel for the petitioner and the Advocate-General cited texts and decisions on mandatory versus directory enactments, but the detailed contrary submissions are not set out in the opinion.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Dr. S. C. Barat v. Hari Vinayak Patasker, 1961 MPLJ 1316 : (AIR 1962 Madh Pra 73 and AIR 1962 Madh Pra 180) | Held that provisions similar to Section 13 (specifically Section 11 of the Jabalpur University Act, 1956) were obligatory; an appointment of a Vice-Chancellor made out of a panel recommended by a committee appointed in contravention of the relevant provision was illegal and quashed. | The Court referenced this decision as a prior authority where similar statutory provisions were treated as obligatory; it formed part of the comparative material the Court considered in interpreting Section 13, but the Court distinguished the facts and concluded differently on whether the numerical panel requirement is mandatory here. |
| Dr. Ramsingh v. University of Saugar, 1973 MPLJ 561 : (1974 Lab IC 20) | Interpreted the requirement to recommend "persons" so that plural may include singular; held that a committee cannot recommend more names than there are suitably qualified candidates and that requiring more names than suitable candidates would create a deadlock. | The Court relied on this decision to support the view that a committee's obligation is to recommend qualified persons and that it may legitimately recommend fewer than the numerical plural if only fewer are suitable. |
| Liverpool Borough Bank v. Turner, (1981) 30 LJ Ch 379 | Statement (quoted) that no universal rule determines whether statutory provisions are mandatory or directory; courts must determine legislative intention by considering the whole scope of the statute. | The Court relied on this authority (Lord Campbell's dictum) as a guiding principle for determining whether the "not less than three" language is mandatory or directory, emphasizing intention and purpose of the statute. |
| Biswanath Khemka v. Emperor, AIR 1945 FC 67 | Illustrates that although negative words are generally construed as mandatory, exceptions exist and provisions expressed in negative terms have been construed as directory in certain contexts. | The Court cited this case to show that even negative or apparently mandatory words may be interpreted as directory depending on context and legislative intent. |
| State of U.P. v. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava; AIR 1957 SC 912 (referenced at p. 918) | Referenced in the context of principles of statutory interpretation (mandatory vs. directory); the opinion does not extract a specific proposition beyond referring to it for guidance. | Used as a supporting reference among authorities on statutory interpretation; the opinion cites it alongside other authorities when discussing how to determine whether a statutory requirement is mandatory or directory. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court commenced by construing Section 13 of the Adhiniyam as a whole. It observed that, while the substantive power to appoint a Kulapati vests in the Kuladhipati (the Governor), that power is hedged by the procedure set out in Section 13: a committee is to be constituted under Sub-sections (2) and (3) to investigate merits and recommend a panel to the Kuladhipati. The Court emphasised that the statutory scheme shows the legislature intended the committee to perform a substantive investigatory function into merit and suitability.
The Court analysed the phrase "panel of not less than three persons" in the context of the overall purpose of Section 13. It reasoned that the committee's duty is to recommend suitably qualified persons, not to produce names purely to meet a numerical requirement regardless of suitability. If the committee cannot find three suitable candidates, it would be absurd and counterproductive to force it to recommend unsuitable persons merely to satisfy a numerical threshold — this could frustrate the statutory aim of securing a well-qualified Kulapati.
The Court further examined earlier decisions and principles of statutory interpretation. It quoted the oft-cited principle (Liverpool Borough Bank v. Turner) that whether a statutory prescription is mandatory or directory depends on legislative intention, discerned from the statute's purpose and context. The Court also relied on the Division Bench decision in Dr. Ramsingh (interpreting "persons" to include "person" where appropriate) to support the proposition that a committee may recommend fewer names if fewer candidates are genuinely suitable.
Applying these principles, the Court concluded that while the Kuladhipati is obliged to appoint only from those recommended by a duly constituted committee (or else exercise free choice upon the committee's failure), the numeric phrase "not less than three persons" in Sub-section (1) is directory rather than mandatory in every circumstance. Substantial compliance with the statutory requirement — i.e., recommendation of qualified and suitable candidates — suffices. Consequently, a panel containing fewer than three names, if composed of suitable persons, does not render the resulting appointment invalid.
On the facts, because the committee recommended two persons (including respondent No. 2), and the Court found that requirement of a three-person panel was directory, the Kuladhipati's appointment of respondent No. 2 from that panel was held valid.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The court held that the requirement in Section 13(1) that the Kulapati be appointed from a "panel of not less than three persons" is directory in nature; substantial compliance with the statutory scheme (i.e., recommendation of suitably qualified persons by the committee) suffices. Accordingly, the appointment of respondent No. 2 as Kulapati from a panel of two persons was upheld.
The direct procedural outcome recorded in the opinion is that the petition was dismissed and no order as to costs was made; any security amount in deposit was to be refunded to the petitioner.
Implications: The decision indicates that under the facts and reasoning applied in this case the numerical requirement in Section 13(1) does not automatically render an appointment invalid if the committee recommends fewer than three suitably qualified candidates. The Court thus stressed substance (qualification and suitability) over a rigid numerical formalism. The opinion does not state that it establishes any broader binding precedent beyond the ruling made and relies on earlier authorities and principles of interpretation in reaching its conclusion.
This summary is strictly confined to the substance of the provided opinion and does not add, infer, or interpret facts or law beyond what the opinion itself states.
1. The petitioners who are residents of Bhopal and are in-
terested in the affairs of the Bhopal University, Bhopal, challenge, through this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the appointment of Shri R. C. Shukla, respondent No. 2. as Kulapati (Vice-Chancellor) of the Bhopal University.
2. Under the scheme of the Madhya Pradesh Vishwavidhyalaya Adhiniyam, 1973 (Act No. 22 of 1973), (hereinafter referred to as the 'Adhiniyam'), a Kulapati of a University is to be appointed by Kuladhipati (Chancellor). For this purpose, the Kuladhipati is required to appoint a Committee of three persons including Chairman. The Committee is to recommend a panel of eligible persons to be appointed as Kulapati. On receipt of this panel, the Kuladhipati has to appoint one of the persons from that panel as Kutapati. Section 13 (1) of the Adhiniyam provides that a Kulapati shall be so appointed by the Kuladhipati out of the panel of not less than three persons recommended by the Committee.
3. In the present case, the panel so recommended consisted of only two persons including the respondent No. 2.
4. The contention of the petitioners is that the provisions of Sub-section (1) of Section 13 of the Adhiniyam are mandatory and the Kuladhipati gets a jurisdiction to appoint a Kulapati only out of the panel of not less than three persons recommended by the Committee or upon failure of the Committee to submit the panel, a person of his choice under Sub-section (7). It is, therefore, contended that the appointment of respondent No. 2 as Kulapati out of the panel of only two persons recommended by the Committee is not in accordance with the provisions of Section 13 (1) of the Adhiniyam, and, is thus without any authority of law and must, therefore, be quashed.
4. Section 13 of the Adhiniyam is as follows:--
"13. (1) The Kulapati shall be appointed by the Kuladhipati from a panel of not less than three persons recommended by the Committee constituted under Sub-section (2) or Sub-section (6):
Provided that if the person or persons approved by the Kuladhipati out of those recommended by the Committee are not willing to accept the appointment, the Kuladhipati may call for fresh recommendations from such committee;
Provided further that no person who has completed the age of 60 years shall be appointed as Kulapati.
(2) The Kuladhipati shall appoint a committee consisting of the following personas namely .-
(i) One person elected by the Executive Council;
(ii) the Chief Justice of Madhya Pra-desh High Court or a Judge of the Madhya Pradesh High Court nominated by him,
(iii) one person nominated by the Kuladhipati. The Kuladhipati shall appoint one of the three persons to be the Chairman of the Committee-
(3) For constituting the committee under Sub-section (2), the Kuladhipati shall, six months before the expiry of the term of Kulapati, call upon the Executive Council and the Chief Justice of Madhya Pradesh High Court to choose their nominees and, in the case of the latter to indicate if he would himself be willing to work on the committee and if any or both of them fair to do so within one month of the receipt of the Kuladhipati's communication in this regard, the Kuladhipati may nominate any one or both the persons as the case may be, and the person or persons so nominated shall be deemed to be the person elected or nominated by the Executive Council or the Chief Justice, as the case may be.
(4) No person who is connected with the University or any college shall be elected or nominated on the committee under Sub-section (2).
(5) The committee shall submit the panel within six weeks from the date of its constitution or such further time not exceeding four weeks as may be extended by the Kuladhipati.
(6) If for any reasons the committee constituted under Sub-section (2) fails to submit the panel within the period specified in Sub-section (5), the Kuladhipati shall constitute another committee consisting of three persons, not connected with the University or any College, one of whom shall be designated as the Chairman. The committee so constituted shall submit a panel of three persons within a period of six weeks or such shorter period as may be specified, from the date of its constitution.
(7) If the committee constituted under Sub-section (6) fails to submit the panel within the period specified therein the Kuladhipati may appoint any person whom he deems fit, to be the Kulapati."
5. The provisions of section 13 would indicate that the power to appoint a Kulapati of any University in the State vests in the Kuladhipati who is the Governor. Looking to the importance of the high office and in order to allow the concerned University also to have a say in the matter of appointment of its Kulapati, the legislature in its wisdom thought fit to appoint a Committee of three persons to recommend to the Kuladhipati names of qualified persons for the appointment as Kulapati. Such a committee is to be constituted in accordance with Sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 13 of the Adhiniyam. A combined reading of Sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 13 makes it clear that the power of the Kuladhipati in the matter of appointment of a Kulapati is not unfettered. His choice is limited to the persons recommended by the Committee constituted under Sub-section (2) or Sub-section (3). He can appoint a person of his choice as Kulapati of any University only upon failure of the committee to submit a panel within the specified time. It will, therefore, appear that although, the authority to appoint a Kulapati vests only in the Kuladhipati, the exercise of this statutory function is guided and controlled by the provisions of Sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 13. The sine qua non of exercise of this jurisdiction is the appointment of a Committee and a panel of qualified persons recommended by such a Committee and only upon failure of the Committee to recommend a panel, the Kuladhipati is free to appoint a person of his choice. To this extent, similar provisions contained in Section 11 of the Jabalpur University Act, 1956, were held obligatory and an appointment of a Vice-Chancellor made out of a panel recommended by a committee appointed in contravention of the relevant provision was held illegal and was quashed by a Division Bench of this Court in Dr. S. C. Barat v. Hari Vinayak Patasker, 1961 MPLJ 1316 : (AIR 1962 Madh Pra 73 and AIR 1962 Madh Pra 180).
6. The function of a duly appointed Committee under Sub-section (2) or Sub-section (3) of Section 13, however, stands on a different footing. The committee to be so constituted consists of -- (i) person elected by Executive Council; (ii) the Chief Justice or a Judge of the High Court nominated by the Chief Justice, and (iii) a nominee of the Kuladhipati. The categories of persons to be included in the Committee is itself indicative of the importance of the function it is to perform while recommending any person to the high and responsible office of the Kulapati. The merits have to be investigated by the Committee only. A duly qualified person alone and none else should be recommended for appointment of a Kulapati This is particularly so because if a panel is recommended to the Kuladhipati in accordance with Sub-section (1) and within the time specified therefor, then the Kuladhipati has to appoint one of the persons so empanelled and has no further choice. The Committee therefore, cannot be expected always to empanel and recommend a certain minimum number for it may not find such number of qualified persons. It may be that the Committee may find only one person or at times only two persons qualified to be recommended. If, therefore, it is to be held that the Committee should always recommend a panel of 'not less than' three persons, even if not found suitable, then the selection/appointment of Kulapati may even be not possible. It is not possible to comprehend that a panel of not less than three persons has to be recommended irrespective of the fact that the committee is unable to collect names of three suitable end qualified persons. The person or persons to be recommended have to be qualified and deserving. To hold otherwise, would not only be unjust but also detrimental to the interest of the University and the students seeking education there. It will, therefore, be reasonable to hold that the panel of persons to be recommended by the Committee in terms of Sub-section (1) only means panel of qualified and suitable persons. Consequently, it will also be reasonable to hold that the committee may recommend panel of even less than three persons if it finds that three persons do not qualify for that office. This view finds support from a Division Bench decision of this Court in Dr. Ramsingh v. University of Saugar 1973 MPLJ 561 : (1974 Lab IC 20). That was a case of appointment of a Professor in the Saugar University. The Executive Council in that case was the appointing authority. Restriction on the exercise of that power was imposed by insertion of Section 41-A by the Madhya Pradesh University Laws (Amendment) Act, 1965. A Committee constituted under, that provisions was to recommend 'persons' and that the Executive Council could make selection out of the persons so recommended. Question arose whether the Committee was bound to recommend more than one person, as the relevant provision required the Committee to recommend 'persons' and not person. Speaking for the Court, G. P. Shigh J. (as he then was), while holding that plural shall include singular and therefore, the word 'persons' shall also include 'person' in the context in which the word appeared, observed at p. 566 : (at p. 23) of the report that-
"If out of the candidates whose merits have been investigated by the Committee only one is found to be suitable for the post, the committee cannot recommend more than one name, because a person can only be recommended if he is considered suitable for the post. If only one person is considered suitable, his name alone will be recommended. In case it is held that the committee must always recommend more than one name, it would be impossible to make a selection if only one person is found to be suitable. Such a result, cannot be assumed to have been intended, because it will create a deadlock in those cases in which the committee is unable to find more than one suitable person."
7. Thus for what I have discussed above and looking to the object of the provisions contained in section 13 of the Adhiniyam, which aims at securing appointment of a duly qualified person to the high office of a Kulapati of a University by the Kuladhipati with the assistance of a committee of intellectuals including the Judge of a High Court, and also in view of the setting in which Sub-section (1) of Section 13 containing the words 'panel of not less than three persons' appear, I am unable to agree with the learned counsel for the petitioner that these words are mandatory and a panel of not less than three persons recommended by the Committee is sine qua non for the exercise of jurisdiction by the Kuladhipati to appoint a Kulapati of any University. Shri L. S. Sinha, learned counsel for the petitioner and Shri A. M. Mathur. learned Advocate-General were at pains to cite texts and decisions to show when a given statute is obligatory and when it is only directory. I need refer only to the oft-quoted decision by Lord Champbell in Liverpool Borouph Bank v. Turner, (1981) 30 LJ Ch 379. The Law has been stated in these terms:--
No universal rule can be laid down as to whether mandatory enactments shall be considered directory only or obligatory with an implied nullification for disobedience. It is the duty of the Courts of Justice to try to get at the real intention of the legislature by carefully attending to the whole scope of the statute to be considered.
See also State Of U.P v. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava.; AIR 1957 SC 912 at p 918 and Dr. S. C. Barat v. H. V. Pataskar, 1961 MPLJ 1316 : (AIR 1962 Madh Pra 73 and AIR 1962 Madh Pra 180). Reference may also be made to Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes (Eleventh Edition) pages 363-364 where the following pertinent observations appear:--
The reports are full of cases dealing with statutory provisions which are devoid of indication of intention regarding the effect of non-compliance with them...... It may, perhaps, be found generally correct to say that nullification is the natural and usual consequence of disobedience, but the question is in the main governed by considerations of convenience and justice, and, when that result would involve general inconvenience or injustice to innocent persons, or advantage to those guilty of the neglect, without promoting the real aim and object of the enactment, such an intention is not be attributed to the legislature. The whole scope and purpose of the statute under consideration must be regarded. The general rule is, that an absolute enactment must be obeyed or fulfilled exactly, but it is sufficient if a directory enactment be obeyed or fulfilled substantially.
The learned author proceeds to say:--
A strong line of distinction may be drawn between cases where the prescriptions of the Act affects the performance of a duty and where they relate to a privilege or power. Where powers, rights or immunities are granted with a direction that certain regulations formalities or conditions shall be complied with, it seems neither unjust nor inconvenient to exact a rigorous observance of them as essential to the acquisition of the right or authority conferred, and it is therefore probable that such was the intention of the legislature. But when a public duty is imposed and the statute requires that it shall he performed in a certain manner, or within a certain time, or under other specified conditions, such prescriptions may well be regarded as intended to be directory only in cases when injustice or inconvenience to others who have no control over those exercising the duty would result if such requirements were essential and imperative.
Though generally a command in negative form is construed as mandatory, yet the principle is not without exception, and, decided cases are not wanting where, though expressed in negative terms, the provision has been construed to be directory only. See Biswanath Khemka v. Emperor, AIR 1945 FC 67. Thus the rule that the negative words are usually mandatory, is like any other rule subordinate to the context, and the object intended to be achieved by the particular enactment.
8. From the above statement of the law and in view of the intention of the provisions contained in section 13 and from the object it seeks to achieve i. e., the appointment of a well qualified and suitable person to the office of a Kulapati, I am of opinion that while on the one hand it is obligatory on the part of Kuladhipati to appoint only that person as a Kulapati who has been recommended by the Committee appointed under Sub-section (2) or (3) of Section 13 and on its failure to so recommend, exercise his free choice to appoint any person, it is not mandatory for the Committee to always recommend a panel of 'not less than three persons'. This requirement of empanelling 'not less than three persons', is directory in nature and its substantial compliance will not render any appointment made out of that panel, invalid. In the instant case, therefore, the panel of two persons only recommended by the committee was in accordance with the statutory requirement. As the said panel included the name of respondent 2, his appointment made by the Kuladhipati as Kulapati of Bhopal University is valid. Accordingly, I uphold that appointment.
9. The petition is dismissed, but without any order as to costs. Security amount, if in deposit, be refunded to the petitioner.
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