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Haji Fatma Bee v. Prahlad Singh .
Factual and Procedural Background
The dispute arises from a registered mortgage deed dated 29-4-1972 (Ex. P-2) under which the respondent-plaintiff (the mortgagor) mortgaged Khasra Nos. 14, 17 and 18 (total 6.63 acres) in Sehore District to the appellant (mortgagee) to secure a sum of Rs. 3,000/-. Possession of the property was delivered to the mortgagee, who was to enjoy its usufructs. The mortgage was described in the deed as usufructuary and provided a five-year period for repayment (until 28-4-1977).
By amendment to the plaint the respondent alleged that under Section 165(b) of the M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1959, the mortgage was void because the deed lacked the condition that on expiry of the stipulated period the mortgage would be deemed redeemed without any payment by the Bhumiswami and that the mortgagee would forthwith re-deliver possession. The respondent also claimed an account of profits (mesne profits) for the period from 29-4-1972 until delivery of possession and sought adjustment of the loan against those profits.
The appellant contended that until 28-4-1977 the respondent had no right to redeem and thus the suit filed on 7-5-1974 was premature; that the profits could not be appropriated towards the principal; and that Section 165(b) did not apply because the mortgage was anomalous rather than usufructuary.
At trial the court held the mortgagor had the right to redeem within five years and that the mortgage was void under Section 165(b) of the 1959 Code; it applied Section 65 of the Contract Act to direct mutual restitution and ordered that on payment of Rs. 600 the respondent obtain possession. The lower appellate Court affirmed that the mortgage was usufructuary and hit by Section 165(b) but directed that possession be delivered on 29-4-1977 and (without a cross-objection from the respondent) exonerated the respondent from paying Rs. 600. The defendant-appellant appealed to the present court.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the mortgage created by the deed dated 29-4-1972 is a usufructuary mortgage or an anomalous mortgage.
- Whether the mortgage is void under Section 165(b) of the M.P. Land Revenue Code (as pleaded, referenced in the opinion with differing years) because it lacks a condition of automatic redemption without payment and immediate re-delivery of possession on expiry of the period.
- Whether the usufruct/profits enjoyed by the mortgagee during possession can be appropriated against the secured principal where the mortgage is held void and reliefs are governed by Section 65 of the Contract Act.
- Whether the suit filed on 7-5-1974 was premature because the mortgagor had no right to redeem before 28-4-1977.
Arguments of the Parties
Respondent-Plaintiff's Arguments
- The mortgage deed (Ex. P-2) is void under Section 165(b) of the M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1959, because it lacks a clause that on expiry of the period the mortgage shall be deemed redeemed without payment and possession re-delivered.
- Possession was not delivered to the respondent on expiry of the period; the mortgagee is liable to account for profits/usufruct from 29-4-1972 until delivery of possession.
- Mesne profits were claimed at specified rates for two periods; the loan should be adjusted against the amount due from the appellant to the respondent.
Defendant-Appellant's Arguments
- The suit was premature because the respondent had no right to redeem until 28-4-1977 (i.e., within the five-year term) and therefore the claim was brought too early.
- Profits earned by the appellant could not be adjusted towards the principal amount of the loan.
- Section 165(b) of the M.P. Land Revenue Code is not attracted because the mortgage is not usufructuary but anomalous.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Vaddiparthi v. Cadimsetti, 68 Ind Cas 717 : AIR 1921 Mad 517 | Held that a term fixing a period (e.g., five years) for redemption when possession is given, which prevents earlier redemption, is a clog on the equity of redemption and results in the mortgage being no more than usufructuary. | The Court relied on this authority to support the proposition that a fixed-term clause may still be consistent with a usufructuary mortgage where the term otherwise operates as a proviso for redemption rather than converting the mortgage into an anomalous one. |
| Abboy Charan Malo v. Harendra Chandra Mandal, AIR 1940 Cal 437 | Fixing of a term for payment of mortgage money does not alter the character of a mortgage which is otherwise found to be usufructuary; a minimum time for redemption may serve as a proviso for redemption (reference to Section 62(b) of the T.P. Act). | The Court cited this decision to conclude that a stipulated minimum time in a usufructuary mortgage does not necessarily convert it into an anomalous mortgage. |
| Khan Behadur Mehrban Khan v. Makhana, AIR 1930 PC 142 (Privy Council) | Authority relied upon concerning principles that treat agreements converting a mortgage into a sale on default as a clog on redemption and thus void. | The Court noted that it followed this Privy Council decision in subsequent Indian authority (Chhoomal v. Afzal Husain) to hold that an agreement to convert mortgage into sale on default is void as a clog on redemption. |
| Chhoomal v. Afzal Husain, S.A. No. 72/65, dt. 14-2-1965 = 1966 MPLJ (Notes) 181 | Affirmed that an agreement to convert a mortgage into a sale on default within the stipulated period is a clog on redemption and void. | The Court followed this case in holding that the clause in the deed treating failure to redeem within the five-year period as a sale was a void clog and could not be given effect, supporting the characterization of the mortgage as usufructuary. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court began by identifying the key factual-legal issue: whether the mortgage was usufructuary or anomalous. It invoked the statutory definition of usufructuary mortgage under Section 58(d) of the T.P. Act: a transaction where possession is given to the mortgagee and rents and profits are to be utilised in lieu of interest or payment of mortgage-money (or both). Delivery of possession and enjoyment of usufruct are incidents of ownership that the mortgagee acquires upon execution.
The Court examined authorities (Vaddiparthi; Abboy Charan Malo; Chhoomal following Khan Behadur Mehrban Khan) to determine how a fixed redemption term interacts with the character of the mortgage. It noted precedent holding that a fixed term may be a clog on redemption where it operates to prevent redemption and thereby render the transaction effectively usufructuary; conversely, a stipulated period can amount to a proviso for redemption and not change the mortgage's character where appropriately framed.
Turning to the deed's terms (Ex. P-2, including the Hindi-language recitals quoted in the opinion), the Court found that possession had been delivered to the mortgagee who was to appropriate the usufruct and that a five-year redemption time was fixed. The clause that provided that failure to redeem within the stipulated period would convert the transaction into a sale was characterized as a clog on the equity of redemption and therefore void. The mere stipulation of a five-year redemption period did not change the mortgage from usufructuary to anomalous; the five-year limitation operated as a valid proviso for redemption under Section 62(b) of the T.P. Act.
Having held the mortgage to be usufructuary, the Court considered Section 165 of the M.P. Land Revenue Code (variously referenced in the text as the 1959, 1950 and 1965 enactments in different paragraphs). The Court quoted Section 165(2)(b) (as set out in the opinion) and concluded that although the mortgage's term (five years) did not exceed six years, the deed lacked the specific condition required by the statute: that on expiry the mortgage shall be deemed redeemed in full without any payment and that the mortgagee shall forthwith re-deliver possession. In the absence of that statutory condition the usufructuary mortgage was invalid under Section 165 and the mortgagee was bound to restore possession to the mortgagor.
On relief, the Court applied the mutual-restoration principle under Section 65 of the Contract Act (as relied upon by the trial Court) because the mortgage was void and benefits conferred under the contract ought to be returned. The appellant had enjoyed usufructs; the respondent had been enriched by the Rs. 3,000 advance. The trial Court had found that Rs. 2,400 of the loan had been effectively adjusted by way of usufruct enjoyed, leaving Rs. 600 payable by the respondent; the trial Court therefore directed payment of Rs. 600 in order to obtain possession. The lower appellate Court improperly, in the absence of a cross-objection by the respondent, exonerated the respondent from payment of Rs. 600. The present Court found the trial Court's adjustments (applying Section 65 of the Contract Act) to be lawful and concluded that the lower appellate Court's exoneration should be set aside to the extent of reinstating the Rs. 600 liability.
Holding and Implications
Core Ruling: The appeal succeeds and is partly allowed.
Direct consequences and specific reliefs ordered by the Court:
- The mortgage is held to be a usufructuary mortgage but void under Section 165 (for the reasons given: lack of the statutory condition of automatic redemption and re-delivery of possession on expiry).
- The respondent (mortgagor) is entitled to possession of the mortgaged land subject to the monetary adjustments ordered.
- The decree of the lower appellate court is modified to the extent that the appellant shall receive Rs. 600 from the respondent as directed by the trial court; the remaining parts of the decree are upheld.
- There shall be no order as to costs of the appeal.
Broader implications: The opinion applies existing statutory provisions (Section 165 of the M.P. Land Revenue Code as quoted) and established case law on clogs on redemption and mutual restitution (Section 65 of the Contract Act). The Court did not purport to lay down a new rule of wide application beyond these principles; it applied established authorities to the facts of the case to order mutual restitution and restoration of possession.
1. This is appeal by the defendant The respondent-plaintiff, vide the registered mortgage deed dt 29-4-1972 (Ex. P-2), mortgaged Khasra Nos. 14, 17 and 18, area 6.63 acres in Sehore District with the appellant, to secure a sum of Rs. 3,000/-. The amount so secured was to be repaid within a period of five years. Possession of the property was delivered to the mortgagee, who was to enjoy its usufructs. The mortgage was said to be usufructuary. By an amendment in para 3 of the plaint, it was pleaded that in view of Section 165(b) of the M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1959, the mortgage was void, because there was no condition in the mortgage deed that on the expiry of the period mentioned therein, the mortgage shall be deemed to be redeemed in full without any payment whatsoever by the plaintiff respondent As possession was not delivered to the respondent on the expiry of the period mentioned in the mortgage deed, it was pleaded that the mortgagee was liable to account for the profits and usufruct of the mortgaged land for a period from 29-4-1972 until the date of delivery of possession. The mesne profits were claimed at the rate of Rs. 600/- per annum from 29-4-1972 to 28-4-1974 and Rs. 1200/- per annum from 29-4-1974 until delivery of vacant possession of the property. The loan was to be adjusted towards this amount due from the appellant to the respondent. The appellant's defence to the suit was that till before 28-4-1977, the respondent had no right to redeem and the suit was, therefore, premature. No profits could be adjusted towards the principal amount. Section 165(b) of the 1959 Code was not attracted, because the mortgage in question was not usufructuary but was anomalous.
2-3. The trial Court held that the respondent had a right to redeem the mortgage at any time within five years and, therefore, the suit filed on 7-5-1974 could not be said to be premature. It was also found that the amount of profits earned by the appellant shall not be appropriated towards the principal amount secured under the mortgage. The respondent was entitled to redeem the mortgage on payment of the mortgaged money. The mesne profits earned could not be appropriated towards the mortgaged money. It was, however, held that the mortgage was void in view of Section 165 (b) of the 1959 Code, but in view of Section 65 of the Contract Act, the parties were liable to return to each other the benefits earned under the contract The final conclusion by the trial Court was that on payment of Rs. 6007- to the appellant, the respondent was entitled to obtain possession of the suit land. The defendant appellant felt aggrieved by this judgment and decree of the lower Court and, therefore, appealed. The lower appellate Court confirmed the finding of the trial Court that the mortgage was usufructuary and was hit by Section 165(b) of the 1959 Code. It was, however, held that as the period of five years from the date of mortgage was to expire on 28-4-1977. the appellant should deliver possession of this property to the respondent mortgagor on 29-4-1977 and also return the mortgage deed making necessary endorsement thereon and upon failure of the appellant to do so, the respondent was held entitled to obtain those reliefs through the process of the Court The defendant-appellant feels aggrieved by this judgment and decree and has therefore, appealed.
4. As the fate of the suit mainly depends upon the finding as to kind of the mortgage, it has first to be seen whether the mortgage in question was usufructuary or anomalous. Section 58(d) of the T.P. Act defines usufructuary mortgage. According to this section, a usufructuary mortgage covers a transaction where the mortgagee is put in possession with the condition that the rents and profits are to be utilized in lieu of interest, or in payment of the mortgage-money, or partly in lieu of interest and partly in payment of mortgage-money. The delivery of possession and enjoyment of the usufruct is an incident of ownership to which the usufructuary mortgagee becomes entitled on execution of the security.
5. Ordinarily, a mortgage for a fixed term as distinguished from the one given "until payment of the mortgage money" would partake the character of an anomalous mortgage. Even in such cases, the question always is whether the condition is not a clog on redemption. In Vaddiparthi v. Cadimsetti, 68 Ind Cas 7l7 : (AIR 1921 Mad 517), it was held that the term in a mortgage with possession that it is redeemable only on expiry of five years and within twenty years from the date of its execution, was a clog on redemption and, therefore, the mortgage was no more than usufructuary. The Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Abboy Charan Malo v. Harendra Chandra Mandal AIR 1940 Cal 437 held that fixing of a term for payment of mortgage money would not alter the character of. the mortgage which was otherwise found to be usufructuary. Such a provision, according to the learned Judges, was merely a proviso for redemption. The laying down of a minimum time during which the mortgagor could redeem was held to be quite just in a usufructuary mortgage in view of the provisions of Section 62(b) of the T.P. Act In that case, the term was that the mortgagors undertook to take hack the property on payment of the principal sum in the month of Pous 1323 B.S. It was held that such a term would not take the mortgage out of the category of usufructuary mortgage, if it could he otherwise so held. This Court, following a decision of the Privy Council in Khan Behadur Mehrban Khan v. Makhana, AIR 1930 PC 142, held in Chhoomal v. Afzal Husain, S. A. No. 72/65, dt. 14-2-1965 = 1966 MPLJ (Notes) 181, that an agreement to convert a mortgage into a sale on default of payment within the stipulated period, has,always been regarded as a clog on redemption and for that reason void.
6. The relevant terms of the mortgage, as contained in the mortgage-deed (Ex. P. 2), are these : --
‘‘आज से 5 वर्ष की अवधि के लिए रहन बिल कब्ज बशर्त बैंय बिल वफा कर दी और कब्जा भी मुरतहिना साहिबा का स्थल विशेष पर जायदाद मरहूमा का दे दिया है।’’ लेकिन रहन की मुदत में इस भूमि से होने वाली आमदानी फसल आदि का हासील करने का हक मुरतहिना साहब का होगा क्योंकि जायदाद रहा बिल कब्ज भी है। ‘‘रहन का रूपया मु. 3, आज से 5 वर्ष की मुदत यानि 28 अप्रैल सन् - 1977 ईस्वी तक मैं राहित मुरतहिना सा. को अदा करके उक्त संपत्ती को मुक्त करा लूंगा। और कब्जा भी हासील कर लुंगा। लेकिन यदि रहन की मुदत समाप्त हो गयी और 28 अप्रैल सन् 1977 ई.
तक का कुल जो रहन मुरतहिना साहिब को मैं राहिन अदा न कर सका तो उस दशा में उक्त संपत्ती इसी रकम जरे रहन में वेबात यानी देय कतई हो जायेगी। ‘‘उस दशा में इस संपत्ती को फकउर रहन कराने का हक मुझे राहिन अथवा मेरे संबंधियों, वारसाना आदि का हक हासील नहीं होगा। From these recitals in the deed, it is clear that the mortgage was usufructuary as possession was delivered to the Mortgagee who was to appropriate the usufruct. A time of five years was fixed for redemption. The addition of the term that upon failure to redeem within the stipulated period, the transaction will be deemed to be one of sale being a clog on equity of redemption and, therefore, being void, cannot be given effect to, Similarly, the stipulation that mortgage shall be redeemed within a period of five years, is again incapable of changing the character of mortgage as usufructuary, because such a term may only act as a proviso for redemption. In a usufructuary mortgage, it is proper to have such a term in view of Section 62(b) of the T.P. Act. I am, therefore, of opinion that aforesaid terms fixing the time limit for redemption and for the provision that upon failure to redeem within the stipulated time, the mortgage shall be treated as a sale, do not have the effect of converting a mortgage from usufructuary to an anomalous one. The mortgage, in my opinion, has rightly been held to be usufructuary.
7. Since I have held the mortgage to be usufructuary, it is clear that in view of the provisions of Section 165 of the M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1950, the possession of the property mortgaged has to be given back to the mortgagor i.e., the respondent. Section 165(2)(b) is as follows:
"Subject to the provisions of Clause (a), no usufructuary mortgage of any land by a Bhumiswami shall hereafter be valid if it is for a period exceeding six years and unless it is a condition of the mortgage that on the expiry of the period mentioned in the mortgage deed, the mbrtgagf shall be deemed, without any payment whatsoever by the Bhumiswami to have been redeemed in full and the mortgagee shall forthwith re-deliver possession of the mortgaged land to the Bhumiswami."
Although the mortgage in question is only for five years and thus, does not exceed six years, but there is no condition in it that on the expiry of that period of five years, the mortgage shall be deemed without any payment to the mortgagor Bhumiswami to have been redeemed in full and the mortgagee shall forthwith deliver the possession of the mortgaged land to the Bhumiswami In the absence of such a condition, the mortgage in question cannot be held to be valid. The mortgagee, therefore, is bound to deliver possession to the mortgagor, i.e., the respondent.
8. The question now is about the relief to be granted to the respondent-plaintiff. I have earlier shown that he is entitled to possession of the mortgaged land The trial Court had directed the respondent to pay Rs. 600/- to the appellant, while directing delivery of possession to him. The lower appellate court, without any cross-objection from the respondent, has further exonerated the respondent even from the liability to pay Rs. 600/-. The view of the Courts below is that in view of Section 165 (b) and (c) of the M P. Land Revenue Code, a period of five years has been thought sufficient in case of a usufructuary mortgage for adjustment of the loan amount out of the usufruct It has, therefore, been held that the sum of Rs. 3,000/- which was secured under the mortgage in question, stood adjusted as the appellant remained in possession for more than six years of the execution of the mortgage. The learned counsel for the appellant could not demonstrate that Section 65 of the Contract Act was not attracted to the transaction in question. Since the mortgage was discovered to be void and is rendered so by force of Section 165 of the M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1965, it will be legitimate to ask the parties to restore the respective benefits which they derive under the contract. The appellant has enjoyed the usufruct, while the respondent has enriched himself by Rs. 3,000/-. The respondent is, therefore, bound to return Rs. 3,000/- and the appellant to return the benefit reaped. The trial Court found that out of this amount of Rs. 3,000/-, Rs. 2400/- stood adjusted against the usufruct enjoyed from the property. The respondent was, therefore, directed to pay Rs. 600/- only and to receive possession. 1 am not prepared to accept the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that the usufruct enjoyed could not be adjusted towards the Principal amount secured under the mortgage. As the reliefs to the parties are not being granted under the mortgage, but the equities are being adjusted in terms of Section 65 of the Contract Act, this question really does not arise. I am, therefore, of opinion that the adjustments made by the trial Court are perfectly in order. One noticeable feature is that the respondent was satisfied with the decree passed by the trial Court. He did not agitate against it by filing a cross-appeal or cross-objection before the District Judge that he was entitled to Interest or any other amount; and therefore, payment of Rs. 600/- could be squared up against any other amount. In the absence of any cross-objection, the lower appellate Court was not justified in exonerating the respondent even from the liability to pay Rs. 600/- as was determined by the trial Court. To this extent, therefore, the finding of the lower appellate Court has to be set aside.
9. The appeal succeeds and is partly allowed The decree of the lower appellate court is modified to the extent that the appellant shall get Rs. 600/- from the respondent The decree of the lower appellate court is varied to the extent that the respondent is made liable to pay Rs. 600/- to the appellant as directed by the trial court The remaining part of the decree is upheld Under the circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs of this appeal.
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