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Jagitkumar v. Jagdeeshchandra .
Factual and Procedural Background
This opinion addresses a question referred by a learned single Judge hearing an appeal concerning the eviction of a tenant from composite tenancy premises under the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961. The issue arose whether a landlord, having established bona fide requirement for either the residential or non-residential part of a composite tenancy accommodation, can obtain a decree for eviction of the tenant from the entire premises.
Legal Issues Presented
- In the case of a composite tenancy, if it is established that the landlord requires the non-residential part of the accommodation or the residential part of the accommodation, whether a decree for eviction of the tenant from the entire premises can be passed.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- If the landlord establishes a ground under Section 12(1) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961, he is entitled to a decree for eviction with respect to that portion of the premises for which the requirement is proved.
- Since a tenancy contract cannot be split, a decree for eviction of the tenant from the entire premises must be passed once a ground is established for any part.
Respondent's Arguments
- In a composite tenancy, the landlord must establish requirement for both the residential and non-residential parts of the accommodation to be entitled to eviction of the entire premises.
- Reliance was placed on Supreme Court decisions in Dr. Gopal Dass Verma v. Dr. S. K. Bhardwaj (AIR 1963 SC 337), Miss S. Sanyal v. Gianchand (AIR 1968 SC 438), and Has-mat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad (AIR 1961 SC 1711) to support this position.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Dr. Gopal Dass Verma v. Dr. S. K. Bhardwaj, AIR 1963 SC 337 | Interpreting eviction provisions under Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952, especially that eviction for composite tenancy cannot be granted if premises are not let separately for residential or commercial use. | Distinguished on facts; Madhya Pradesh Act differs in definition and scope, allowing composite tenancy eviction under conditions. |
| Miss S. Sanyal v. Gianchand, AIR 1968 SC 438 | Held that jurisdiction under Delhi Act for eviction from residential premises applies only when premises are let for residential purposes and not composite purposes. | Distinguished; Madhya Pradesh Act does not require separate letting for residential or non-residential purposes. |
| Has-mat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad, AIR 1961 SC 1711 | This precedent was cited but the specific rule or principle was not detailed in the opinion. | Referenced in support of respondent's position but not elaborated upon in the court's reasoning. |
| Firm Panjumal Daulatram v. Sekhi Gopal, AIR 1977 SC 2077 | Established that accommodation can be residential, non-residential, or both; landlord entitled to eviction of respective portions if bona fide requirement is proved. | Applied to clarify that landlord can seek eviction of residential or non-residential portions separately but decree cannot be split; entire premises eviction possible if dual requirement established. |
| Smt. Nai Bahu v. Lala Ram Narayan, AIR 1978 SC 22 | Confirmed that eviction can be sought for non-residential accommodation genuinely required, including portions used for personal use. | Applied to affirm that landlord need not prove requirement for every inch of accommodation for the same purpose. |
| Unspecified Supreme Court decision, AIR 1981 SC 1711 | Considered whether landlord’s requirement ends by obtaining other accommodation during pendency of proceedings. | Clarified that landlord’s requirement for non-residential accommodation is relevant and that the court should not search for imaginary residential requirement. |
| Tribhuban Purkash Nayyar v. The Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 540 | Use of preamble as a key to understand legislative intent without overriding clear statutory language. | Referenced to explain legislative intent behind the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court began by defining 'accommodation' under Section 2(a) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961, encompassing residential and non-residential parts as well as appurtenances and fittings. The court acknowledged the protective object of the Act for tenants but emphasized that it does not extinguish landlords' rights, only restricting them to prevent rack-renting.
Earlier views treated accommodation as either residential or non-residential with no composite category, but the Supreme Court in Firm Panjumal Daulatram v. Sekhi Gopal clarified that accommodation can be both. The landlord is entitled to eviction of the residential or non-residential portion if bona fide requirement is proved. However, since tenancy contracts cannot be split, the court cannot pass a decree for only part of the accommodation.
The court recognized the dilemma: denying partial eviction relief would unjustly harm the landlord, but granting eviction of the entire premises on partial requirement might be excessive. It was conceded that the landlord need not prove requirement for the entire accommodation for the same purpose; for example, a landlord can establish bona fide non-residential requirement for part of premises even if the rest is residential.
Decisions under the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952, cited by the respondent, were distinguished as the Madhya Pradesh Act defines accommodation differently and does not require separate letting for different purposes. The court found that under the Madhya Pradesh Act, a landlord who establishes bona fide requirement for a part of composite premises is entitled to eviction of the entire premises, provided other conditions in Section 12(1)(e) or (f) are met.
Holding and Implications
The court held that in a case of composite tenancy, if the landlord establishes bona fide requirement of either the residential part or the non-residential part of the accommodation, he is entitled to a decree for eviction of the tenant from the entire premises.
This decision means that the landlord need not prove requirement for both parts of the composite tenancy to obtain eviction of the whole accommodation. The ruling clarifies that tenancy contracts cannot be split for eviction purposes, and partial bona fide requirement suffices for eviction of the entire premises under the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961. No new precedent beyond the direct effect on the parties was set.
1. The following question has been referred to this Bench by the learned single Judge hearing this appeal:
"In the case of a composite tenancy, if it is established that the landlord requires the non-residential part of the accommodation or residential part of the accommodation. Whether a decree for eviction of the tenant from the entire premises can be passed."
2. Shri Chaphekar, the learned counsel for the appellant, contended that if a landlord was able to make out a ground specified in Section 12(1) of Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), he became entitled to a decree for eviction in respect of that portion of the premises, the requirements for which was established by him and as a contract of tenancy could not be split up a decree for eviction of the tenant from the entire premises had to be passed.
3. In reply, Shri Saxena, the learned counsel for the respondent, contended that in the case of a composite tenancy, the landlord had to establish requirement of residential as well as the non-residential part of the accommodation and unless that was done, he was not entitled to a decree for eviction of the tenant from the premises. Reliance was placed on the decisions of the Supreme Court in Dr. Gopal Dass Verma v. Dr. S. K. Bhardwaj (AIR 1963 SC 337), Miss S. Sanyal v. Gianchand (AIR 1968 SC 438) and Has-mat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad (AIR 1961 SC 1711).
4. Before we proceed to appreciate the contentions advanced on behalf of the parties, it would be useful to refer to the relevant provisions of the Act. Section 2(a) defines, 'accommodation' as follows:
"2 (a) "accommodation means any building or part of a building whether residential or non-residential and includes :
(i) any land which is not being used for agricultural purposes;
(ii) garden, grounds, garages and outhouses, if any, appurtenant to such building or part of the building;
(iii) any fittings affixed to such building or part of a building for the more beneficial enjoyment thereof;
(iv) any furniture supplied by the landlord for use in such building or part of building."
Section 12 (1) of the Act limits the right of a landlord to seek eviction of his tenant. The provisions lays down that unless one of the grounds specified in that sub-section has been made out, a decree for eviction of a tenant from any accommodation cannot be passed. The grounds material for the purpose of this case are those specified in Clauses (c) and (f) of Section 12 (1) of the Act which read as under:--
"12 (1) (e) that the accommodation let for residential purposes is required bona fide by the landlord for occupation as a residence for himself or for any members of his family, if he is the owner thereof or for any person for whose benefit the accommodation is held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or town concerned."
"12 (1) (f) that the accommodation let for non-residential purposes is required bona fide by the landlord for the purpose of continuing or starting his business or that of any of his major sons or unmarried daughters if he is the owner thereof or for any person for whose benefit the accommodation is held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable non-residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or town concerned."
As stated in the premable, the Act provides for the regulation and control of letting and rent of accommodation and the eviction of the tenants therefrom. It is true that the object of the Act is to give protection to the tenants, as urged on behalf of the respondent, by preventing unscrupulous and veracious landlords from charging exorbitant rent from tenants and evicting tenants, who refused to agree to the enhancement of their rent. It is, however, obvious that the aim of the legislature was not to extinguish all the rights of a landlord. Restrictions to the extent they are necessary for the purpose of preventing rack-renting and ejectment of tenants for the purpose of rack-renting have been imposed on the rights of a landlord. It is true that a preamble cannot be used to control or qualify precise and unambiguous language of an enactment, but it is a key to open the mind of the legislature, as observed by the Supreme Court in Tribhuban Purkash Nayyar v. The Union of India (AIR 1970 SC 540).
5. Now, the earlier view prevailing in this court was that the Act with respect to the bona fide requirement of the landlord has put the accommodation into two categories, residential and non-residential and that there was no third catagory viz., residential cum business. Therefore, when an accommodation was let for both residential and non-residential purpose, the courts tried to ascertain the primary purpose, for which the accommodation was let and classified the accommodation accordingly. However, after the decision of the Supreme Court in Firm Panjumal Daulatram v. Sekhi Gopal (AIR 1977 SC 2077), it is clear that the composite purpose of the lease would not put it out of the grounds set out for eviction under Section 12 of the Act. The Supreme Court held that an accommodation can be residential, non-residential or both. The following observations of the Supreme Court are pertinent (at p. 2079):--
"The residential portion is a part of the building and is an accommodation by definition. The non-residential portion is also a part of the building and is an accommodation by definition. The lease has been given for residential as well as non-residential purposes. The landlord is entitled to eviction of the residential portion if he makes out a bona fide residential requirement. Likewise he is entitled to eviction of the non-residential portion which is an accommodation if he makes out a non-residential requirement."
6. It is thus clear that a landlord is entitled to eviction of the residential portion if he makes out a bona fide residential requirement. Similarly, he is entitled to eviction of the non-residential portion if he makes out a non-residential requirement. In a case, where a dual requirement has been made out by a landlord, there is no difficulty in holding that he becomes entitled to eviction of the entire premises. The question that arises for consideration is whether a landlord is en-
titled to a decree for eviction from the entire premises when he has established the requirement of only the non-residential part or the residential part of the accommodation.
7. As held by the Supreme Court in AIR 1977 SC 2077 (supra), a landlord became entitled to residential or non-residential part of the accommodation when residential or non-residential requirement is established. But a decree for a part of the accommodation let out to a tenant cannot be passed because it is not permissible for a court to split up a contract of tenancy. To non-suit a landlord in such a case would mean that even though he has become entitled under Section 12 of the Act to the relief of eviction of a part of the accommodation, he is denied that relief. On the other hand, to grant, to the landlord a relief of eviction from the entire premises, would mean that even though he has established his requirement for a part of the accommodation only, he is granted the relief of eviction from the entire premises.
8. That brings us to the question as to whether the Act enjoins a landlord the duty to establish his requirement of the entire premises before he can be held entitled to eviction. It was conceded on behalf of the respondent that to entitle a landlord to the relief of eviction on the ground of requirement, it was not necessary for him to prove requirement for every inch of the accommodation for the same purpose for which it was let out. Thus, in a case where accommodation is let out for non-residential purpose, a landlord would be entitled to the relief of eviction if he is able to make out his requirement for non-residential purpose of a part of the premises let out, even though it is established that the remaining portion of the premises is not required by him for non-residential purpose but is required for residential purpose. This is dear from the decision of the Supreme Court in Smt. Nai Bahu v. Lala Ram Narayan (AIR 1978 SC 22), where it has been held that there is nothing in the Madhya Pradesh Act to bar an eviction from a building as non-residential accommodation is genuinely required not only for non-residential use but also a portion of it for personal use. It is true that in AIR 1978 SC 22 (supra), the Supreme Court was dealing with the provisions of Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1955, but for the purpose of the present enquiry, there is not material difference in the relevant provisions of the 1955 and 1961 Acts. The learned counsel for the respondent referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in AIR 1981 SC 1711 (supra) and contended that requirement of the landlord for the entire accommodation must be of the same class to which the accommodation belonged.
But the decision in AIR 1981 SC 1711 (supra) does not take a view different from that taken in AIR 1978 SC 22 (supra). The Supreme Court in AIR 1981 SC 1711 (supra) was considering the question as to whether the landlord would require the non-residential accommodation, eviction from which was sought, when his requirement of non-residential accommodation would end by obtaining vacant possession at other premises during the pendency of the proceedings. In that context, the supreme Court held that it was not permissible for the High Court, in the absence of any pleadings in that behalf, to go in search for some imaginary requirement of the landlord of accommodation for his residence. That decision is not an authority for the proposition that a landlord cannot seek eviction from a non-residential accommodation if it is established that he required only a part of that accommodation for non-residential purpose and that the remaining part is required by him for residence.
9. It is thus clear that even though it is established that a landlord requires a part of an accommodation let out and that that requirement is for the purpose for which the accommodation was let out, a landlord becomes entitled to seek eviction from the entire accommodation, provided the other conditions specified in Clause (e) or (f) of Section 12 (1) of the Act are satisfied.
10. The decision of the Supreme Court in AIR 1963 SC 337 (supra) and AIR 1968 SC 438 (supra) are distinguishable on facts. In AIR 1963 SC 337 (supra), the Supreme Court was considering the provisions of Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952. In this connection, we may usefully refer to the following observations of the Supreme Court in AIR 1978 SC 22 (supra), where the distinguishing features have been pointed out (at p. 27):--
"According to Mr. Sanghi when the house was let for non-residential purpose, the appellant cannot succeed in ejecting the tenant from the house for a composite purpose of residence as well as business and he submits that the principles laid down in Dr. Gopal Varma ( AIR 1963 SC 337) (supra) fully support him."
In Dr. Gopal Dass Varma (supra) this court was dealing with the provisions of Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952 (briefly the Delhi Act). Section 2 (g) defines premises under that Act thus:
"Premises means any building or part of a building which is, or is intended to be, let separately for use as a residence or for commercial use or for any other purpose......"
We may contrast the definition of accommodation in the M.P. Act with which we are concerned. Under Section 3 (a) of the M.P. Act 'accommodation' means:--
(x) any land which is not being used for cultivation:
(y) any building or part of a building and it includes:
(i) garden, open land and outhouses, if any, appurtenant to such building or part of a building.
(2) any furniture supplied by the landlord fur use in such building or part of a building.
(3) any fitting affixed to such building or part of a building for the more beneficial enjoyment thereof."
It is significant that in Delhi Act, intention to let separately for use as a residence or for commercial use or for any other purpose is expressly mentioned under Section 2 (g) thereof. The principle underlying the scheme for letting separately for different uses is reflected in the second schedule to the Delhi Act in both parts A and B (see paras 3 to 5 both in parts A and B). The said differentiation of purpose for separate letting does not find such significant importance in the M. P. Act as has been found by this court in the Delhi Act." Thus under the Delhi Act, 1952 a landlord could not seek eviction of a tenant from the premises let for commercial use. In AIR 1968 SC 438 (supra), the Supreme Court held that the jurisdiction of the court under Section 13 (1) (e) of the Delhi Act dealing with eviction from premises let for residential purposes, can be exercised only when the premises are let for residential purpose and not when premises arc let for composite purpose, because in that case, the premises are not let separately for use as a residence, to attract the provisions to Section 13 (1) (e) of the Delhi Act.
red to us is that in the case of a composite tenancy, if it is established that the landlord requires the non-residential part of the accommodation or residential part of the accommodation, a decree for eviction of the tenant from the entire premises can be passed.
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