- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Chhotelal Bhailal Patel v. Akbarali And Another
Full Bench Opinion — Summary
Factual and Procedural Background
This Full Bench was constituted to decide a question referred by Hon. Vijaywargiya, J., in Civil Second Appeal No. 422 of 1979. The referred question arose because, during the pendency of an eviction suit, the plaintiff-respondents applied for leave to amend the plaint to add an additional ground of eviction under Section 12(1)(h) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (reconstruction requirement). The trial Court allowed the amendment; the Appellate Court reversed that order relying on a Division Bench decision reported at 1961 MPLJ 7. In the second appeal, respondents relied on a later Division Bench decision (1980 MPLJ 182) and a learned single Judge observed an apparent conflict between the two Division Bench decisions, leading to the present reference to the Full Bench.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a ground for eviction under Section 12(1) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, which did not exist at the time of filing the suit but came into existence during the pendency of the suit, can be made a ground for eviction by amendment of the plaint; and whether a decree for eviction can be passed on such a subsequently arising ground.
Arguments of the Parties
Plaintiff-Respondents' Position
- Plaintiffs sought leave to amend the plaint during the suit to add Section 12(1)(h) (reconstruction requirement) as an additional ground for eviction.
- On appeal and in the second appeal, plaintiffs relied on the Division Bench decision in Sunderlal Hazarilal v. Har Prasad (1980 MPLJ 182) to support the contention that amendment to add a ground arising during pendency should be permissible.
Defendant-Appellant's Position (as represented by Shri Waghmare)
- The defendant argued that the language of Section 12(1) of the Act precludes introduction of additional grounds for eviction after the institution of the suit; i.e., the provision rules out induction of additional grounds post-filing.
- The defendant relied upon the Division Bench decision reported at 1961 MPLJ 7 (Ratanlal Gulzarilal Vaishya v. Damodardas Girdharilal Vaishya) to support refusal of the amendment.
- At the Full Bench hearing the defendant's counsel was noted as unable to point to any specific injustice that would result from permitting the amendment.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Ratanlal Gulzarilal Vaishya v. Damodardas Girdharilal Vaishya (1961 MPLJ 7) | Division Bench decision relied upon by the Appellate Court to reverse trial Court's allowance of amendment; dealt with whether decree for eviction can be based on denial of plaintiff's title by defendant in written statement. | The Full Bench observed that the 1961 decision concerned denial of title and the principle that forfeiture must accrue before institution of suit (relying on Privy Council). The Full Bench found that the specific question of adding a new ground of eviction by amendment was not directly considered in that decision, and any contrary reading does not lay down correct law. |
| Sunderlal Hazarilal v. Har Prasad (1980 MPLJ 182) | Division Bench decision relied upon by plaintiffs; dealt with whether appellate Court could take cognizance of subsequent events after a decree under Section 12(1)(e). | The Full Bench noted that the 1980 decision held a landlord could introduce by amendment any ground other than those specified in clauses (a), (c), (d) and (o) of Section 12(1), but also observed that the permissibility of amendment was not the central question before that Division Bench; the 1980 decision did not directly settle the permissibility issue the Full Bench was asked to decide. |
| Zainab Bai v. Navayug Chitrapat Co. Ltd. (AIR 1969 Bom 194) | Support for view that grounds of ejectment are not part of the cause of action in an ejectment suit (as held by some courts). | The Full Bench recorded that some courts took this view but treated it in light of later Supreme Court authority which changed the legal landscape. |
| Premlal v. Jadavchand (AIR 1979 Raj 44) | Another decision reflecting that grounds of ejectment are not part of the cause of action (position taken by some courts). | The Full Bench noted this line of authority but indicated that subsequent Supreme Court authority undermined the proposition that grounds of eviction necessarily form the cause of action. |
| V. Dhanapal Chettiar v. Yesodai Ammal (AIR 1979 SC 1745) | Supreme Court decision holding that determination of lease under Transfer of Property Act is unnecessary; making out a case under the Rent Act for eviction is sufficient. | The Full Bench treated this decision as changing the legal position: after this decision, it could not be regarded as well-settled that a ground of eviction under the Rent Act constitutes the cause of action; it affected how earlier authorities were to be read. |
| Ma. Shwe Mya v. Maung Mo Hnaung (AIR 1922 PC 249) | Privy Council observation that rules of Court are subordinate to the administration of justice and that full powers of amendment should be liberally exercised. | The Full Bench relied on this passage to support a liberal approach to amendments aimed at securing proper administration of justice. |
| Jai Jai Ram Ram Manohar Lal v. National Building Material Supply, Gurgaon (AIR 1969 SC 2267) | Rules of procedure are a handmaid to the administration of justice; procedural rules should serve substantive justice. | The Full Bench invoked this principle to emphasize that procedural rules should facilitate fair adjudication, including liberal exercise of amendment powers where appropriate. |
| Kisandas Rupchand v. Rachappa Vithoba Shilwant (1909 ILR 33 Bom 644) | Batchelor, J.'s test: can the amendment be allowed without injustice to the other side? | The Full Bench adopted this as the practical test to decide whether an amendment introducing a new ground arising during pendency should be permitted, asking whether injustice would result to the opponent. |
| Pirgonda Hongonda Patil v. Kalgonda Shidgonda Patil (AIR 1957 SC 363) | Supreme Court approval of the Kisandas test concerning injustice to the other side as the criterion for allowing amendments. | The Full Bench noted the Supreme Court's approval and applied the same standard (no injustice to the other side) when considering whether to permit the amendment. |
| Smt. Abnash Kaur v. Dr. Avinash Nayyar (AIR 1975 Delhi 46) | Full Bench, Delhi High Court: permitting amendment to plead a subsequent ground avoids multiplicity of proceedings and does not necessarily depend on language of the local Rent Act. | The Full Bench relied on this decision as persuasive authority that amendments to add subsequent grounds can avoid multiplicity and that the reasoning does not hinge on the particular statutory wording of the Rent Act in Delhi. |
| Maharaja of Jeypore v. Rukmani Pattamahdevi (AIR 1919 PC I) | Privy Council rule: denial by defendant of landlord's title in a suit does not effect a forfeiture usable in that suit because forfeiture must accrue before institution of the suit. | The Full Bench observed that the 1961 MPLJ decision had placed reliance on this Privy Council authority when dealing with denial of title; the Full Bench distinguished that context from the separate question of permitting an amendment to add a new ground. |
| Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad (AIR 1981 SC 1711) | Supreme Court rule: where possession is sought for personal requirement, the requirement pleaded must exist on the date of action and must subsist until the final decree or order for eviction is made; appellate courts can take subsequent events into account prior to a final order. | The Full Bench quoted this authority to show that a ground of eviction (personal requirement) must subsist until final decree; the Full Bench used the reasoning to explain that differences in drafting across Rent Acts do not materially affect whether subsequent events can be considered. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Full Bench proceeded in a step-wise manner to answer the referred question:
-
Whether a ground of eviction is part of the cause of action:
The Court noted that some earlier decisions had held that grounds of ejectment are not part of the cause of action (citing Zainab Bai and Premlal). However, it relied on the Supreme Court's decision in V. Dhanapal Chettiar v. Yesodai Ammal to conclude that determining lease status under the Transfer of Property Act is unnecessary and that establishing a case under the Rent Act alone can suffice. Consequently, it is not tenable to treat the proposition that a ground of eviction necessarily constitutes the cause of action as settled law.
-
Whether a plaintiff may, by amendment, add a cause of action that arose during pendency:
The Court applied principles favoring liberal amendment. It referred to the Privy Council (Ma. Shwe Mya) and the Supreme Court (Jai Jai Ram Ram) that procedural rules should serve the administration of justice and that courts should have full powers of amendment exercised liberally. The practical test—whether allowing the amendment would cause injustice to the other side—was taken from Kisandas and approved by the Supreme Court in Pirgonda. The Full Bench observed that the defendant's counsel could not point to any injustice arising from the proposed amendment.
The Full Bench also drew on Smt. Abnash Kaur (Delhi Full Bench) to note that allowing amendment to introduce a subsequent ground avoids multiplicity of proceedings and does not depend on the precise language of the Rent Act in force elsewhere.
-
Interpretation of Section 12(1) of the M.P. Act:
The Court examined the wording of Section 12(1) which restricts the right to institute a suit for eviction to grounds specified in that section. The Court held this provision does not explicitly forbid adding a specified ground later by amendment; rather, it ensures that a plaint filed without a specified ground may be rejected for failure to disclose a cause of action. The Court acknowledged, however, that certain grounds by their nature (for example, a ground that requires existence prior to filing such as Section 12(1)(d)) may not be tenable if introduced after filing and therefore permitting such an amendment might be futile as a matter of substantive relief; but that futility does not impinge on the Court's jurisdiction to permit the amendment.
-
Effect of subsequent events and comparative statutes:
The Court considered the Supreme Court's decision in Hasmat Rai which requires that a personal requirement ground must subsist until final decree; the Full Bench used this to explain that appellate courts may consider subsequent events before finality. The Court also observed that differences in wording between the M.P. Act and other Rent Acts would not materially alter the conclusion on whether a ground arising during pendency may be considered.
-
Resolution of conflicting earlier decisions:
The Court found that the 1961 MPLJ decision did not directly decide the permissibility of adding a new ground by amendment and had addressed a different question (denial of title). Likewise, the 1980 MPLJ decision turned on whether appellate Courts could take subsequent events into account after a decree and did not directly decide the amendment-permissibility issue. The Full Bench therefore framed the issue itself and decided it on the principles summarized above.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Full Bench answered the referred question in the affirmative. It held that a ground for eviction under Section 12(1) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, which was not in existence at the time of filing of the suit but came into existence during the pendency of the suit, can be made a ground for eviction by amendment of the plaint and a decree for eviction can be passed on such a ground, if that ground is established by the plaintiff.
Immediate Consequences for the Parties
- The Full Bench directed that the case be placed before the learned single Judge for disposal in accordance with the law as declared.
- Parties shall bear their own costs of this reference.
Broader Implications (as stated or implied in the opinion)
The Full Bench clarified the legal position on the permissibility of amending a plaint to add an eviction ground that arises during pendency, applying established procedural principles favoring liberal amendments so long as no injustice results to the opposing party. The opinion distinguishes earlier Division Bench decisions that addressed different questions and applies Supreme Court authority (including V. Dhanapal and Hasmat Rai) to guide the appropriate test and approach. The direct legal consequence is that courts have jurisdiction to permit such amendments and may grant decrees on subsequently arising grounds if established at trial.
This summary is prepared exclusively from the content of the provided opinion and does not add information beyond what the opinion itself contains.
1. This Full Bench has been constituted to decide the following question referred by Hon. Vijaywargiya. J. in Civil Second Appeal No. 422 of 1979:
"Whether a ground for eviction under Section 12 (1) of the Act, which was not in existence at the time of the filing of the suit but came into existence during the pendency of the suit can be made a ground for eviction by amendment of the plaint and whether a decree for eviction can be passed on such ground?"
2. The facts giving rise to this reference; briefly are as follows:--
During the pendency of the suit for eviction, the plaintiff-respondents filed an application for leave to amend the plaint by claiming the relief of eviction on an additional ground specified in Section 12 (1) (h) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 196l (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'), that the suit accommodation was also required for reconstruction, which could not be done without evicting the defendant-tenant from the leased premises. The application for amendment was allowed by the trial Court, but on appeal, the Appellate Court relying upon a Division Bench decision of this Court in Ratanlal Gulzarilal Vaishya v. Damodardas Girdharilal Vaishya (1961 MPLJ 7) reversed that order. In the second appeal, it was urged before the learned single Judge, on behalf of the respondents, that the Appellate Court had committed an error in rejecting the application for amendment. Reliance was placed on the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Sunderlal Hazarilal v. Har Prasad (1980 MPLJ 182). The learned single Judge felt that there was an apparent conflict in the two Division Bench decisions of this Court in 1961 MPLJ 7 (supra) and 1980 MPLJ 182 (supra). That is how the aforesaid question came to be referred to this Full Bench.
3. To answer the question referred to us, it would be necessary to consider whether a ground for eviction under a Rent Act, can be held to be a part of the cause of action. Some courts have taken the view that grounds of ejectment are not a part of cause of action in a suit for ejectment (see Zainab Bai v. Navayug Chitrapat Co. Ltd. (AIR 1969 Bom 194) and Premlal v. Jadavchand (AIR 1979 Raj 44), But after the decision of the Supreme Court in V. Dhanapal Chettiar v. Yesodai Ammal. (AIR 1979 SC 1745), it is clear that determination of lease in accordance with the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act is unnecessary and that making out a case under the Rent Act for eviction of the tenant is by itself sufficient. It cannot (now) be taken to be well-settled that a ground of eviction under the Rent Act constitutes a cause of action.
4. The next question that arises for consideration is whether a plaintiff can by way of amendment to the plaint, add a cause of action which came into existence during the pendency of the suit. As observed by the Privy Council in Ma. Shwe Mya v. Maung Mo Hnaung (AIR 1922 PC 249), all rules of Court are nothing but provisions intended to secure the proper administration of Justice, and it is, therefore, essential that they should be made to serve and be subordinate to that purpose, so that full powers of amendment must be enjoyed and should always be liberally exercised. Rules of procedure as laid down by the Supreme Court in Jai Jai Ram Ram Manohar Lal v. National Building Material Supply, Gurgaon (AIR 1969 SC 2267) are intended to be a handmaid to the administration of Justice. It is true that Courts have declined to allow amendments when by permitting the amendment, injustice may result to the other side. The ultimate test, as observed by Batchelor, J. in Kisandas Rupchand v. Rachappa Vithoba Shilwant (1909) ILR 33 Bom 644, is can the amendment be allowed without injustice to the otherside? This observation of Batchelor. J. has been approved by the Supreme Court in Pirgonda Hongonda Patil v. Kalgonda Shidgonda Patil (AIR 1957 SC 363). Therefore, it is in the light of this test that we have to consider as to whether by permitting a plaintiff to amend the plaint by introducing a ground of ejectment, which has come into existence subsequent to the institution of the suit, injustice would result to the other side. Shri Waghmare, the learned counsel for the defendant was unable to point out any such injustice. We may, in this connection, usefully refer to the decision of the Full Bench of the Delhi High Court in Smt. Abnash Kaur v. Dr. Avinash Nayyar (AIR 1975 Delhi 46). It was urged on behalf of the defendant that the aforesaid decision of the Delhi High Court cannot be pressed into service while dealing with the provisions of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act 1961. We shall deal with this submission a little later, but we may add that the aforesaid decision of the Delhi High Court, does not turn on the language employed in the Rent Act in force in Delhi. The aforesaid decision emphasises that permitting a plaintiff to amend the plaint in such a case would result in avoiding multiplicity of proceedings, without any injustice being caused to the defendant.
5. The decision in 1961 MPLJ 7 (supra) on which reliance was placed by Shri Waghmare, the learned counsel for the defendant, dealt with the question as to whether a decree for eviction can be passed on the ground of denial of the plaintiffs' title by the defendant in the written statement. The Division Bench placed reliance on the decision of the Privy Council in Maharaja of Jeypore v. Rukmani Pattamahdevi (AIR 1919 PC I), where it was held that denial in a suit by the defendant of the landlord's title, would not work a forfeiture of which advantage could be taken in that suit, because the forfeiture must accrue before the institution of the suit. The question as to whether a plaintiff can, by amendment, add to the ground of eviction pleaded in a suit for eviction, any other ground of eviction did not directly come up for consideration in 1961 MPLJ 7 (supra). At this stage, we may also refer to the decision reported in 1980 MP LJ 182 (supra) on which reliance was placed by the plaintiffs. The question referred to the Division Bench in that case was whether an appellate Court could take cognizance of subsequent events happening after a decree had been passed by the lower Court in favour of the plaintiff under Section 12 (1) (e) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act 1961. It is true that the Division Bench in that case has held that the landlord could introduce in the plaint by way of amendment any ground other than those specified in Clauses (a), (c), (d) and (o) of Section 12 (1) of the Act, But as already observed, the question as to whether amendment in such cases is or is not permissible, was not before the Court. The short question for consideration was whether subsequent events could be taken note of by the appellate Court. This is clear from the question referred to the Division Bench which was as follows:--
"Whether an appellate Court can take cognizance of subsequent ovents happening after a decree has been passed by the lower Court in favour of the plaintiff-landlord under Section 12 (1) (e) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961?"
The impact of subsequent events on a suit for eviction on the ground specified in Section 12 (1) (e) of the Act, has been dealt with by the Supreme Court in Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad (AIR 1981 SC 1711), at page 1717 as follows:--
'Therefore, it is now incontrovertible that where possession is sought for personal requirement it would be correct to say that the requirement pleaded by the landlord must not only exist on the date of the action but must subsist till the final decree or an order for eviction is made. If in the meantime events have cropped up, which would show that the landlord's requirement is wholly satisfied then in that case his action must fail and in such a situation it is incorrect to say that as decree or order for eviction is passed against the tenant he cannot invite the Court to take into consideration subsequent events. He can be precluded from so contending when the decree or order for eviction has become final. In view of the decision in Pasupuleti's case (supra) the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Taramal's case must be taken to have been overruled and it could not be distinguished only on the ground that the definition of 'tenant' in the Madhya Pradesh Act is different from the one in Andhra Pradesh Act." The aforesaid decision clearly establishes that the ground for eviction must not only exist on the date of the action but must subsist till the final decree or an order for eviction is made. This decision therefore, makes it clear that the difference in the two clauses, one occurring in the M. P. Act that "no suit for eviction can be filed except on a, ground specified in the Act" and the other occurring in other Rent Act that "no decree for eviction shall be passed unless a ground specified in the Act has been made out" would not be of much consequence for arriving at the decision as to whether a case for eviction has been made out by the defendant.
6. It was, however, urged on behalf of the defendant by Shri Waghmare that the language of Section 12 (1) of the Act rules out induction of additional ground for eviction after the institution of a suit for eviction. The contention cannot be upheld. Section 12 (1) of the Act merely provides that no suit shall be filed for eviction except on a ground specified in that section. This restriction on the right to institute a suit for eviction only emphasises that if a suit for eviction were to be brought without disclosing a ground specified in Section 12 (1) of the Act, then in that case, the plaint would be liable to be rejected for failure to disclose cause of action. There is nothing in the language of Section 12 (1) of the Act, which forbids addition of a ground for eviction in a suit for eviction already instituted in accordance with the provisions of Section 12 (1) of the Act. It may be, that in some cases, the requirement of a particular ground specified in Section 12 (1) of the Act is such as cannot be fulfilled unless that ground has come into existence prior to the filing of the suit, as in the case of a ground specified in Section 12 (1) (d). But tenability of a ground sought to be added by way of amendment, does not affect the jurisdiction of a Court to permit that amendment. It may be that in such a case, it would be a sound exercise of discretion by the court, if leave to amend is refused inasmuch as a decree for eviction cannot be passed on such a ground. But as already observed, this aspect of the matter has no impact on the question of jurisdiction of the Court to permit the plaintiff to amend the plaint by adding a new ground for eviction. Any observation to the contrary which can be read in 1961 MPLJ 7 (supra) or 1980 MPLJ 182 (supra) does not, in our opinion lay down correct law.
7. To sum up, our answer to the question referred to us, is that a ground for eviction under Section 12 (1) of the Act, which was not in existence at the time of the filing of the suit, but came into existence during the pendency of the suit, can be made a ground for eviction by amendment of the plaint and a decree for eviction can be passed on such ground, if that ground is established by the plaintiff.
8. The case shall now be placed before the learned single Judge for disposal.
Parties shall bear their own costs of this reference.
Alert