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Hindustan Steel Ltd. v. Kaushal Construction Co.

Madhya Pradesh High Court
Oct 30, 1964
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Structured Summary of the Opinion (Revision under Section 33, Arbitration Act, 1940)

Factual and Procedural Background

This revision challenges an order of the District Judge, Durg at Rajnandgaon dated 30th December 1963, which dismissed the petitioner's application under Section 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 to have the effect of an arbitration agreement determined.

The material factual matrix in the opinion is as follows:

  • Hindustan Steel Limited, Bhilai Steel Project (the "Project") entered into a contract dated 21 June 1956 with Kaushal Construction Company (the "Company") for construction of a Gas Cleaning Plant. On 30 August 1957 additional work (Crane Track for Coal Storage in the Coal Preparation Plant) was awarded to the Company on the same contract terms.
  • The written agreement was a printed form with two superimposed clauses (Clause 39 and Clause 40) and also contained typed "Special Conditions of Contract." The construction works were completed by 31 January 1960.
  • Certain payments by the Project to the Company during the works are undisputed; disputes arose about other matters, notably final measurements. The Project contended final measurements were recorded and accepted by the Company; the Company denied acceptance, alleging coercion and protest.
  • Relying on arbitration clauses (Clause 40 of the General Conditions and Clause 12-A of the Special Conditions), the Company served a notice dated 5 June 1962 appointing an arbitrator; the Project appointed another arbitrator. The Project objected to the arbitrators' jurisdiction.
  • The arbitrators issued a brief order asserting competence to decide the disputes but directed the parties to seek a ruling from the Civil Court as to their jurisdiction. Proceedings before the arbitrators were stayed.
  • The Project then filed an application under Section 33 of the Arbitration Act seeking determination of the extent, scope and effect of the arbitration agreement. The District Judge dismissed that application; the present revision challenges that dismissal. On this revision the appellate court allowed the revision, set aside the order below and remitted the matter to the lower court to decide afresh the Section 33 application. Costs were ordered to abide the result below and a counsel fee of Rs. 150 was awarded.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, under Section 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, a party may apply to the Court during the pendency of arbitration proceedings for a determination of the effect, scope and extent of an arbitration agreement (i.e., which disputes fall within the arbitration clause) and whether the Court is bound to decide that question.
  2. Whether a Court has the power to dismiss an application under Section 33 seeking such a determination (including where the arbitration clause forms part of a broader contract and the determination may involve declaring the existence or validity of the contract).
  3. Whether a party is estopped from invoking the Court's jurisdiction under Section 33 by having submitted to the jurisdiction of arbitrators (i.e., whether submission to arbitration forecloses a later Section 33 application).
  4. Whether there is any comparable provision in English law to Section 33 of the Indian Arbitration Act that would affect the resolution of these questions (raised by reliance on English authorities).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's (Company) Position

  • This summary only includes positions expressly stated in the opinion: the Company invoked arbitration clauses in the contract, served notice under those clauses and appointed an arbitrator to resolve disputes between the parties.
  • The Company treated the disputes as referable to arbitration and sought arbitral resolution accordingly.

Respondent's (Project / Non-petitioner) Position

  • The Project objected to the jurisdiction of the arbitrators to decide the disputes (contending that certain disputes were outside the scope of the arbitration agreement).
  • The non-petitioner contended the petitioner had submitted to the jurisdiction of the arbitrators and therefore was estopped from seeking the Court's determination under Section 33 (this estoppel contention was raised and subsequently rejected by the court in the opinion).
  • Counsel for the non-petitioner (referred to as Shri Sen) relied upon English law authorities during argument but ultimately acknowledged that English law had no provision comparable to Section 33 of the Indian Arbitration Act (as recorded in the opinion).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Shiva Jute Baling Ltd. v. Hindley & Co. Ltd., AIR 1959 SC 1357 Illustrates that where an arbitration clause is part of a broader contract, Section 33 is concerned only with the arbitration-related terms and not unrelated contractual terms. Used to show that Section 33 focuses on arbitration terms within contracts and to explain the two ways an arbitration agreement may arise.
Municipal Board v. E. U. P. Electric Supply Co. Ltd., AIR 1958 All 506 Holds that a court has jurisdiction under Section 33 to decide whether an arbitration agreement is operative, effective or enforceable; such questions fall within the effect of an arbitration agreement. Cited with approval (including Takru J.'s observations) to support the proposition that Section 33 applications are the proper vehicle for deciding the effect and operability of arbitration agreements.
Heyman v. Darwins Ltd., 1942 AC 356 Statement that whether a dispute falls within an arbitration clause depends on the nature of the dispute and what disputes the clause covers. Quoted to emphasize that the classification of a dispute as arbitrable depends on matching the dispute to the scope of the arbitration clause.
Gava Electric Supply Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar, 1953 SCR 572 (AIR 1953 SC 182) Supports the principle that once a dispute is within the arbitration clause, the court should not enter into the merits of that dispute. Relied upon to back the court's view that jurisdictional questions should be segregated from merits and that arbitral jurisdiction, once established, excludes court probing into merits.
Andhra Co-operative Spinning Mills Ltd v. C. Shrinivasan, AIR 1958 Andh Pra 158 Supportive authority on the court's limited role once a dispute falls within the arbitration clause (relation to Section 34 jurisprudence). Cited as consistent with the court's approach to the scope/merits distinction in arbitration matters.
A.M. Mail & Co. v. Gordhandas Sagarmull, 1950 SCR 792 (AIR 1951 SC 9) Affirms that once a dispute is found to be within an arbitration clause, the court should not enter into the merits of the dispute. Used to reinforce the principle that courts do not decide merits where disputes are within the arbitration clause's scope.
Ruby General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pearcy Lal, AIR 1952 SC 119 Illustrates limits on amending a Section 33 petition to convert it into a challenge to the validity of an award; a party should follow proper procedural routes to challenge awards. Cited to distinguish facts where Section 33 determination of the arbitration agreement's effect was not in issue and to show procedural constraints on widening petitions under Section 33.
Ratllal v. Dalmia C. & P. Marketing Co., AIR 1943 Bom 229 The opinion lists this among several decisions cited by opposing counsel; the court records these do not take a view contrary to its own. Noted by the court as cited by counsel but not contrary to the court's conclusions on Section 33 issues.
Mukhlal v. Kesho Prasad, AIR 1919 Pat 252 Included among authorities cited; the opinion does not attribute a specific principle beyond noting its citation. Observed by the court as among the decisions cited by opposing counsel without conflicting with the court's view.
Noorbhai v. Allabux & Co., AIR 1917 Bom 246 Included among authorities cited by counsel; no distinct rule extracted in the opinion. Recorded as cited; the court did not find it contrary to the ruling reached.
Nandram v. Raghunath, AIR 1954 Cal 245 Part of a list of cases relied upon by counsel; specific principle not elaborated in the opinion. Noted by the court as cited but not contrary to the court's reasoning.
Bajrang Lal Laduram v. Agarwal Brothers, AIR 1950 Cal 267 Listed among cited cases; the opinion does not extract a separate principle from it. Noted; did not affect or undermine the court's conclusions.
Venkatachellam v. Suryanarayanamurty, AIR 1941 Mad 129 Listed among authorities cited by counsel; the opinion does not assign a particular rule to it. Recorded among citations but not treated as conflicting authority.
Louis Dreyfus & Co. v. Arunachala, AIR 1981 PC 289 Listed in the opinion among other cases cited by counsel (the opinion records the citation without drawing a specific rule from it). Noted among cited authorities; the court did not rely on it as contrary authority.
Gannon Dunkerley & Co. v. Union Carbide (India) Ltd., AIR 1962 Cal 360 Included among the cases cited; no distinct principle attributed in the opinion text beyond its citation. Mentioned as cited by counsel; did not displace the court's conclusions.
Jivarajbhai v. Chintamanrao Balaji, 1961 MP LJ 1087 Cited by counsel but expressly described by the court as "not apposite" to the present matter. The court observed the decision was inapplicable to the issues under consideration.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's reasoning proceeds from a textual and purposive reading of Section 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 and related provisions. The core analytical steps are:

  1. Interpretation of Section 33 — The court reads Section 33 as embracing three distinct categories of applications: (i) challenging existence of an arbitration agreement or an award; (ii) challenging validity of an arbitration agreement or an award; and (iii) obtaining a determination of the effect of an arbitration agreement or an award. When an application is made for the last purpose, the Court is obliged to determine the effect of the arbitration agreement (paras 5–8).
  2. Policy considerations — The court recognises that the law encourages arbitration but stresses that arbitrators cannot exceed their contractual jurisdiction. Thus, if a party contends a dispute is beyond the arbitration clause's scope, it is within that party's right to have the question determined by a Court under Section 33 (para 8).
  3. Timing — The court holds that Section 33 permits a party to apply to the Court for determination of the arbitration agreement's effect even during the pendency of arbitral proceedings; waiting until an award is made is not necessary. This interpretation aligns with the statutory scheme and the policy that jurisdictional questions should be determined at the earliest opportunity (para 9).
  4. Procedure and scope — Section 33 provides a speedy remedy (application rather than a suit) and allows determination on affidavits; where necessary, the Court may order evidence. The court contrasts Section 33 with other sections dealing with setting aside awards (Section 30) or other procedures (Sections 14–17), noting their distinct roles (paras 6, 9, 10).
  5. Contractual scope — Citing Shiva Jute, the court explains that when an arbitration clause is a term within a broader contract, Section 33 concerns only arbitration-related terms, not other contract terms irrelevant to the Section 33 application (para 7 and cited case at para 11).
  6. Power to dismiss — The court reasons that where the law gives a right to seek the Court's determination of an arbitration agreement's effect, it would be meaningless to hold that such an application could be dismissed. Concretely, the Court has no power to dismiss an application under Section 33 merely because the arbitration clause forms part of a larger contract or because a declaration as to contract existence/validity may be implicated (para 8).
  7. Support from precedent — The court relies on earlier decisions (for example, Municipal Board) to show that the judicial role under Section 33 is to decide whether an arbitration agreement is operative and effective. It also cites authorities (Heyman, Gava, A.M. Mail & Co.) to support the proposition that once a dispute is within the arbitration clause, the court should not enter into merits; but that distinction does not prevent the Court from determining whether a dispute falls within the arbitration clause (paras 9, 16–18).
  8. Rejection of estoppel and English-law reliance — The court rejects the estoppel argument that submission to arbitrators precludes a Section 33 application, noting there are no fetters in Section 33 as to when such an application may be made. The court also records that English law lacks a provision comparable to Section 33, limiting the utility of English authorities relied upon by opposing counsel (paras 10-a, 11).
  9. Conclusion and remedial step — On this basis the court concludes the lower court erred in dismissing the Section 33 application; the revision is allowed, the order below is set aside and the matter is remitted for fresh decision on the petition under Section 33 (para 12).

Holding and Implications

Holding:

REVISION ALLOWED; ORDER BELOW SET ASIDE.

Implications and practical consequences:

  • The appellate court remitted the matter to the lower court (District Judge, Durg at Rajnandgaon) to decide afresh the petitioner's application under Section 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 — i.e., the lower court must determine which issues fall within the jurisdiction of the arbitration agreement and which do not.
  • Proceedings before the arbitrators had been stayed; the lower court's fresh determination under Section 33 will guide whether particular disputes are to proceed in arbitration or before the courts.
  • Costs of the revision are ordered to abide the result in the lower court; counsel's fee of Rs. 150 was awarded by the appellate court.
  • No new overarching precedent is purportedly created by this decision beyond the court's interpretative conclusions on Section 33; the court elaborated existing principles (and relied on prior decisions) to confirm the Court's duty to decide the effect and scope of arbitration agreements during the pendency of arbitration proceedings.

Note: This summary is strictly confined to the content and reasoning contained in the provided opinion and does not add facts or inferences not present in the text.

Show all summary ...

1. This revision is directed against the order passed by the District Judge, Durg at Rajnandgaon on 30th December 1963 whereby be dismissed the petitioner's application under Section 33 of the Arbitration Act. 1940 (hereinafter called the Act) to have the effect of an arbitration agreement determined.

2. The Hindustan Steel Limited, Bhilai Steel Project, Bhilai (hereinafter called the Project) entered into, on 21st June 1956, a contract with Messrs. Kaushal Construction Company (hereinafter called the Company) for the construction of Gas Cleaning Plan) on the same rates as agreed with Messrs Khare and Tarkunde (P) Limited. Subsequently, on 30th August 1957, the work of Crane Track for Coal Storage in the Coal Preparation Plant, on the same contract, conditions and rates, was also awarded to the Company. The agreement is on a printed form with two clauses (Clause 39 and Clause 40) superimposed on it and is also supplemented by a typed document styled as " Special Conditions of Contract". The construction works were completed by 31st January 1960 Certain sums of money were paid from time to lime by the Project to the Company during the construction of the works. The extent of the payments so made is undisputed. But some other disputes, for instance, in respect of final measurements, arose between the parties. According to the Project, final measurements had been recorded and they had been accepted by the Company, while the Company denying that the measurement had been accepted as final, asserted that if there was any acceptance, that was brought about by coercion and was made under protest with a view to secure speech payment of out standings. It is not necessary for the purposes of this revision to state in detail the disputes that arose between the parties

3. Relying on certain clauses in the arbitration agreement (Clause 40 of the General Conditions and Clause 12-A of the Special Conditions), the Company served with a notice dated 5-6-1962, on the Project. The Company appointed Shri Dildar Hussain. Consulting Engineer, Hyderabad, as an arbitrator and asked the petitioner to appoint another. The Chief Engineer of the Project appointed Shri M.C. Chacko, Deputy Chief Engineer (General). Bhilai Steel Plant, as an arbitrator. The Project objected to the jurisdiction of the arbitrators in the matter The arbitrators passed a very short order on the question of jurisdiction. They just said that they were competent to decide the disputes between the parties and directed them to obtain a ruling from the Civil Court with regard to their jurisdiction.

4. The Project then presented an application under Section 33 of the Act for determining the extent, scope and effect of the arbitration agreement. Proceedings before the arbitrators were stayed In short, the question before the Court was which of the disputes fell within the jurisdiction of the arbitration and which not When the law gives a right to the parties to get the cited of an arbitration agreement determined In the Court, it is without meaning to say that the application made for that purpose is dismissed. Can there be a dismissal of such an application ?

5. Section 33 of the Act enacts that-

"Any party to an arbitration agreement . . desiring to challenge the existence of validity of an arbitration agreement or an award or to have the effect of either determined shall apply to the Court and the Court shall decide the question on affidavits .

Provided that where the Court deems it just and expedient it may set down the application for hearing on other evidence also, and it may pass such orders for discovery and particulars as it may do in a suit."

It is clear enough that this section contemplates an application for three purposes' (i) when it is desired to challenge the existence of an arbitration agreement or the existence of an award, (ii) when it is desired to challenge the validity of an arbitration agreement or the validity of an award: and (iii) when it is desired to have the effect of an arbitration agreement or the effect of an award determined. When an application is made under this section for the last-mentioned purpose, it is imperative that the Court must determine the effect of the arbitration agreement of the effect of the award, as the case may be. The policy of the law is to encourage arbitration. At the same time the arbitrators cannot exceed the jurisdiction given to them under the arbitration agreement. Where one of the parties contends that a certain dispute, which is placed before the arbitration is outside the scope of the arbitration agreement, it is his right to have the question determined by the Court.

Even after an award is made, a party may challenge it on the ground that the arbitration exceeded the jurisdiction given to it under the arbitration agreement and the Court is then bound to determine the effect of the arbitration agreement. As I read Section 33 of the Act, its language is wide enough to enable a party to move the Court for determining the effect of an arbitration agreement even during the pendency of proceedings before the arbitration and it need not wait until an award is made. This view further accords with the scheme of the Arbitration Act and is in consonance with the policy of the law that the question of jurisdiction must be determined at the earliest opportunity Patently enough. Section 33 provides a speedy remedy for objecting to a reference of a dispute on the ground that it is beyond the scope of the arbitration agreement. The law has studiously provided for an application instead of a suit to be filed for the purpose, and the Court has further been empowered to decide the question even on affidavits, although where such a question cannot conveniently be decided on affidavits, the Court is entitled to examine witnesses.

6. Section 30 of the Act enumerates the grounds for setting aside an award. But that section does not deal with applications to set aside an award; it deals with the powers of the Court when an application is made to set aside an award. For the procedure to be followed one has to turn to Section 33. Proceedings under this section are entirely different from those under Sections 14 to 17 of the Act.

7. An arbitration agreement may come into existence in one of two ways; it may either arise out of an agreement which contains nothing else besides the arbitration agreement, or it may arise out of a term contained in a contract which deals with various other matters relating to the contract. In the latter case, Section 33 is concerned only with the terms relating to arbitration in the contract and not with the other terms of the contract which do not arise for consideration on an application under that section Shiva Jute Baling Ltd. v. Hindley & Co Ltd AIR 1959 SC 1357

8. for the foregoing reasons, it seems to me clear law that where, during the pendency of proceedings before an arbitration, any party to the arbitration agreement applies to the Court under Section 33 of the Act to have the effect of the arbitration agreement determined, the Court is bound to find out the questions on which the parties have joined issue and then to hold which of such issues fall within the jurisdiction of the arbitration. having regard to the arbitration agreement. The Court has no power to dismiss an application, not even on the ground that the arbitration agreement is a clause in a contract and the decision may involve a declaration as to the existence or validity of the contract itself.

9. Weighty observations were made by Takru in Municipal Board v E. U. P. Electric Supply Co Ltd., AIR 1958 All 506 "The learned Munsif had jurisdiction under Section 33 to decide whether the arbitration agreement was operative and effective or not. Whether it should be enforced or not or whether it was frustrated or not. or whether it fell along with the other clauses of the contract or not are all clearly questions regarding the effect of arbitration agreement and Sections 32 and 33 Arbitration Act, bar suits for decision of such questions ....... . ...

It would be absurd, in our opinion, to contend that an application under Section 38 of the Arbitration Act for a decision on the effect of arbitration agreement is barred by the arbitration agreement itself An arbitrator may decide whether he has jurisdiction over the dispute or not but his decision is not binding upon the court because he cannot confer jurisdiction upon himself by a wrong decision. It is for the Court to decide exclusively whether he has jurisdiction or not and this is done through an application under Section 38. "

I respectfully concur with that view.

10. Viscount Simon in Heyman v Darwins, Ltd.. 1942 AC 356 (366) said :

" Whether a dispute falls within an arbitration clause in a contract must depend on what the dispute is and what disputes the arbitration clause covers."

Observations in Gava Electric Supply Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar, 1953 SCR 572: (AIR 1953 SC 182). and Andhra Co-operative Spinning Mills Ltd v C. Shrinivasan. AIR 1958 Andh Pra 158 which were cases on Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, support the above view, it was laid down in A.M. Mail & Co. v. Gordhandas Sagarmull 1950 SCR 792 : (AIR 1951 SC 9).. that once the dispute is found to be within the scope of the arbitration clause, it is no part of the province of the Court to enter info the merits of the dispute In Ruby General Insurance Co Ltd. v. Pearcy Lal AIR 1952 SC 119, the question, which was raised, was as to the validity of an award based on the ground that in spite of the Court's injunction directing the arbitrator not to pronounce any award, an award was in fact made pending an application under Section 33 of the Arbitration Act. For the first time, before the Supreme Court the applicant sought to amend his application by introducing certain additional facts and adding a prayer for declaring the award invalid Their Lordships observed that it was open in law to the applicant to file objections to the award in the Court where the award was filed, but not having taken that course and not having made any application in the Courts below for amending the petition under Section 33. the applicant could not ask the Supreme Court to go into the validity of the award by widening the scope of the original petition In that case, no question of determining the effect of the arbitration agreement arose, because there was no dispute between the parties as to whal it meant. That decision, therefore, does not help the non-petitioner here. The other decisions cited by Shri Sen do not take a view contrary to mine. They are : Ratllal v. Dalmia C. & P. Marketing Co. AIR 1943 Bom 229; Mukhlal v. Kesho Prasad; AIR 1919 Pat 252; Noorbhai v. Allabux & Co., AIR 1917 Bom 246; Nandram v. Raghunath AIR 1954 Cal 245; Bajrang Lal Laduram v. Agarwal Brothers AIR 1950 Cal 267; Venkatachellam v. Suryanarayanamurty, AIR 1941 Mad 129; Louis Dreyfus & Co. v. Arunachala AIR 1981 PC 289; and Gannon Dunkerley & Co. v Union Carbide (India) Ltd.. AIR 1962 Cal 360. Shri Sen also relied on Jivarajbhai v. Chintamanrao Balaji 1961 MP LJ 1087; but that decision is not apposite here.

10-a. It was also maintained for the non-petitioner that the petitioner was estopped, having submitted to the jurisdiction of arbitrators. In my opinion, what I have already said is sufficient to reject this contention There are no fetters imposed in Section 38 of the Arbitration Act as to the stage at which a party can get the effect of an arbitration agreement determined by the Court. No question of estoppel arises for getting the question determined which of the issues fall within the jurisdiction of the arbitration and which not.

11. Shri Sen endeavoured to rely on the English Law: but in the course of the hearing he realised that there was no provision in the English Law comparable to Section 33 of the Indian Arbitration Ac.

12. The revision is allowed. The order passed by the Court below is set aside. The case shall now go back to it for deciding afresh the petitioner's application under Section 33 of the Arbitration Act Costs of this revision shall abide the result in the lower Court. Counsel's fee Rs. 150.