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Abdul Hafeez Khan, A... v. Government Of Madhya...

Madhya Pradesh High Court
Mar 4, 1964
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Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner filed an application under Article 226 of the Constitution seeking a writ of certiorari to quash (a) a resolution dated 4 April 1963 of the Standing Committee of the Municipal Council, Bhopal and (b) the order dated 24 April 1963 pursuant to that resolution reverting the petitioner from the post of Octroi Superintendent to the post of Octroi Inspector.

Chronology and events (as stated in the opinion):

  • 15 February 1960: The petitioner was appointed to officiate as Octroi Superintendent by an order of the President of the Municipal Board.
  • 28 February 1961: The President confirmed the applicant's appointment as Superintendent, Octroi; thereafter the petitioner held the post on a permanent basis in the pay-scale of Rs. 175-25-300 plus allowances.
  • Respondent No. 4 (Anwarul Haque), a bead-clerk in the Municipal Council, filed a representation to the Government challenging the petitioner's appointment and claiming entitlement to the post.
  • 5 September 1962: The Government wrote to the Chief Municipal Officer, adhering to its interpretation that an Octroi Superintendent was an "Assessment or Revenue Officer" under Section 55(1) of the Bhopal State Municipalities Act, 1955 and advising that the matter be reviewed by the Municipal Council and proposals sent to Government via Collector and Commissioner.
  • 4 April 1963: The Standing Committee passed a resolution appointing Anwarul Haque as Superintendent, Octroi and reverting the petitioner to his prior post of Inspector, Octroi.
  • 22–24 April 1963: Notices and formal orders were issued implementing the Standing Committee's resolution; Chief Municipal Officer's order of 24 April 1963 appointed Anwarul Haque and reverted the petitioner.
  • The petitioner challenged these acts by invoking the writ jurisdiction under Article 226.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the petitioner's appointment as Octroi Superintendent by the President of the Municipal Board was legal under the relevant statutory scheme (primarily Section 55 of the Bhopal State Municipalities Act, 1955 and subsequent provisions in the Madhya Pradesh Municipalities Act, 1961).
  2. Whether the Standing Committee had the power to decide the legality of the petitioner's appointment and to revert him to his substantive post on finding that his appointment was illegal.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (as summarized in the opinion)

  • The Government had no jurisdiction to entertain or decide the representation made by Anwarul Haque in the absence of rules framed under Section 55(4) of the Act relating to appeals and representations.
  • The petitioner was not made a party to any proceedings in which the representation was heard.
  • Anwarul Haque did not possess the minimum qualifications prescribed by the Fundamental Rules for Municipal Employees, 1948, required for appointment as Octroi Superintendent.
  • The Government had no power to direct the Municipal Council to review the appointment of the petitioner or to consider the claim of Anwarul Haque.
  • The Government's interpretation that "Assessment or Revenue Officer" in Section 55(1) included an Octroi Superintendent was erroneous; an Octroi Superintendent was not an Assessment or Revenue Officer.
  • The Municipal Council already had a separate Revenue Officer post (of higher cadre) and therefore Government approval was not necessary for appointment to the Octroi Superintendent post.
  • The President could appoint the petitioner as Octroi Superintendent under the powers conferred on him by Section 48(a) and (e) of the Act.

Respondents' Arguments (Government, Municipal Council and Standing Committee)

  • The Government and Municipal Council contended that an Octroi Superintendent is an Assessment Officer under Rule 3(d) of the Rules for Assessment and Collection of Octroi Duty framed under the Bhopal State Municipalities Act, 1916, and that those rules were continued by the 1955 Act; thus an Octroi Superintendent falls within the term "Assessment or Revenue Officer" in Section 55(1) of the 1955 Act, making appointment by Government necessary.
  • If Section 55(1) did not cover the Octroi Superintendent, then the appointment would fall under Section 55(3) and could be made only by the Municipal Board (not by the President); and the President had no power under Section 48 to make the petitioner's appointment.
  • The Government said its communication dated 5 September 1962 was issued in exercise of its powers under Sections 27, 29 and 31 of the Act.
  • The Municipal Council admitted there is a separate Revenue Officer but stated that that officer concerned himself with house-tax, municipal property rent, water rate, etc., and had no concern with the Octroi Department.
  • The respondents maintained that, because the petitioner's appointment as Octroi Superintendent was illegal, his reversion to Inspector could not be characterized as punishment; and the Standing Committee had the power to decide the legality of the appointment and to revert him accordingly.
  • It was also contended by respondents that the Fundamental Rules for Municipal Employees prescribing qualifications for the post of Octroi Superintendent were invalid and not binding.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
K. S. Srinivasan v. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 419 (1958 SCR 1295) Authority for the proposition that if an appointment is irregular, unauthorized and invalid, termination of such appointment on discovery of the mistake cannot be regarded as an act of punishment. The Court relied on this decision to hold that the petitioner's reversion from an illegally held appointment to his substantive post did not constitute punishment and thus did not attract procedural safeguards applicable to disciplinary punishment.
G. K. Sinha v. Collector, Central Excise, AIR 1957 All 152 Holds that demotion resulting from non-compliance with appointment rules (i.e., invalid promotion) is not a "reduction in rank" within Article 311, and no opportunity under Article 311 is required in such a case. Used to support the conclusion that reversion arising from an invalid appointment does not give rise to disciplinary safeguards; supports the Court's view that reversion here was not punishment.
Vishweshwar v. Chairman State Transport Authority, M.P., AIR 1955 Nag 163 Observation that the safeguard in Article 311 applies where the appointment complained of is validly made. Cited to reinforce the principle that procedural protections for disciplinary action are not triggered where the appointment itself was invalid.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court identified two questions for decision: (1) whether the petitioner's appointment by the President was legal; and (2) whether the Standing Committee had the power to decide the legality of that appointment and to revert the petitioner.

On the nature and effect of the Government's 5 September 1962 communication, the Court observed that it did not constitute an order directing reversion or appointment; it was advisory in character (a suggestion that the Municipal Council review the appointment). Therefore the Court did not have to determine whether the Government had power to give the advice in that communication for the purposes of this petition.

Interpretation of Section 55(1) of the Bhopal State Municipalities Act, 1955:

  • The Court construed "an Assessment or Revenue Officer" in Section 55(1) to mean an officer in charge of assessments of all rates, taxes and duties and of all monies collected by the Municipality from all sources. Such an officer manages municipal assessments and income broadly.
  • By contrast, an Octroi Superintendent deals specifically with octroi duties and is not entrusted with assessments of all municipal rates and income.
  • The Court rejected the Government's expansive interpretation (which would lead to anomalous consequences such as treating even lowest octroi posts as "Assessment or Revenue Officer"). The existence of a separate, higher-cadre Revenue Officer in the Municipal Council supported the narrower construction.

Placement under Section 55(3):

  • The Court concluded that the post of Octroi Superintendent fell within Section 55(3) (servants other than those in subsection (1)) and therefore appointments to that post must be made by the Municipal Board or by an officer of the Board as authorized by rules framed by the State Government under that subsection.
  • There was no rule before the Court showing that the State Government had authorized the President to make such appointments under Section 55(3).
  • Rule 3(d) of the Rules for Assessment and Collection of Octroi Duty (framed under the 1916 Act) was held not to confer on the Government any power to appoint an Octroi Superintendent. Even if interpreted otherwise, such a construction would be inconsistent with Section 55(3) and the Court stressed that rules saved from the previous Act apply only to the extent they are consistent with the 1955 Act.
  • The conclusion followed that the Government's assertion that appointment to Octroi Superintendent required State Government approval was erroneous.

Power of the President under Section 48 (clauses (a) and (e)):

  • Clause (a) permits the President to exercise only those powers of appointment, punishment or dismissal which have been specifically vested in him. The 1955 Act did not vest in the President the power to appoint an Octroi Superintendent.
  • Clause (e) confers residuary powers ("all other duties, powers and functions of a Board") but, the Court reasoned, this residuary power cannot be used to circumvent or expand powers expressly dealt with in clauses (a) to (d). In particular, the residuary clause cannot be invoked to grant the President authority to appoint municipal servants where clause (a) already limits his appointment powers to what is expressly vested in him.
  • No Board resolution was shown to vest in the President the power to appoint, punish or dismiss an Octroi Superintendent.
  • Therefore the President had no power under Section 48 to appoint the petitioner as Octroi Superintendent.

Consequences of illegality of appointment:

  • Because the President had no power to make the appointment and the appointment was not made by the Board as required by Section 55(3), the appointment was illegal and invalid.
  • The Court relied on precedent (K. S. Srinivasan and others) to hold that termination/reversion of an appointment that was itself irregular or invalid is not an act of punishment and therefore does not attract the procedural safeguards applicable to disciplinary action (e.g., opportunity to show cause under Article 311).

Power of the Standing Committee under the Madhya Pradesh Municipalities Act, 1961:

  • The Standing Committee's resolution reverting the petitioner was passed after the Madhya Pradesh Act of 1961 came into force.
  • The Court construed Section 94(4) and 94(6) (as cited in the opinion) to determine that the post of Octroi Superintendent is not among the categories for which State Government approval is required under subsection (4), and that subsection (6) vests the power of appointing municipal officers and servants (other than those specified in subsection (4)) in the Standing Committee unless the State Government otherwise directs.
  • Because the Standing Committee had the power to appoint to posts such as Octroi Superintendent, it also had the power to decide on the legality of an appointment to that post and to revert a person whose appointment it found to be invalid.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The petition is DISMISSED.

Direct consequences of the decision (as stated in the opinion):

  • The petitioner's initial appointment to the post of Octroi Superintendent by the President of the Municipal Board was held to be illegal and invalid; the petitioner had no right to that post.
  • The Standing Committee had the power under Section 94(6) of the Madhya Pradesh Municipalities Act, 1961 to determine the legality of the petitioner's appointment and to revert him to his substantive rank on finding the appointment illegal.
  • The petitioner's reduction (reversion) in these circumstances did not constitute punishment, so disciplinary procedural safeguards did not apply.
  • The petition was dismissed; no order as to costs was made; the outstanding amount of the security deposit was ordered to be refunded to the petitioner.

Broader implications: The Court applied established authorities to confirm that reversion arising from an invalid appointment is not punitive and affirmed the allocation of appointing power under the statutory scheme (1955 Act and 1961 Act). The opinion does not purport to lay down a novel precedent beyond these applications of settled principles.

Show all summary ...

1. In this application under Article 226 of the Constitution the petitioner prays for the issue of a writ of certiorari for quashing a resolution dated 4th April 1963 of the Standing Committee of the Municipal Council, Bhopal, and the order dated 24th April 1963 made by the Municipal Council pursuant to that resolution reverting the petitioner from the Post of Octroi Superintendent to the post of Octroi Inspector.

2. The applicant was first appointed to officiate as "Octroi Superintendent by an order made toy the President of the Municipal Board on 15th February 1960. On 28th February 1961 the President passed an order confirming the applicant's appointment as Superintendent, Octroi. Thereafter, the petitioner continued to hold the post of Octroi Superintendent on a permanent basis in the pay-scale of Rs. 175-25-300 besides allowances. It appears that the respondent No. 4 Anwarul Haque, a bead-clerk in the Municipal Council, filed a representation to the Government against the appointment of the petitioner as Octroi Superintendent contending that the petitioner's appointment by the President was illegal and that he was entitled to be appointed to the post. When this representation was taken up for consideration, correspondence was exchanged between the Government and the Municipal Council, the Government taking the stand that the post of Octroi Superintendent was a post falling within the term "an Assessment or Revenue Officer" used in Section 55(1) of the Bhopal State Municipalities Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and as such the prior approval of the Government to the appointment of the petitioner to that post was necessary and as no such approval was obtained, the petitioner's appointment as Octroi Superintendent was illegal; and further that respondent No. 4 Anwarul Haque was qualified for being appointed as Octroi Superintendent. On the other hand, the Municipal Council took up the position that an Octroi Superintendent was neither an Assessment nor a Revenue Officer within the meaning of those expressions used in Section 55 (1);

that there was already a Revenue Officer for the Municipal Council and, therefore, the Government's approval to the appointment of the petitioner as Octroi Superintendent was not necessary; and that under Section 48 (e) of the Act all residuary duties, powers and functions of the Municipal Board had been vested in the President and he was, therefore, competent to make the petitioner's appointment as Octroi Superintendent. Ultimately, on 5th September 1962 the Government addressed a letter to the Chief Municipal Officer of the Municipal Council, Bhopal, adhering to the interpretation put by it on Section 55 (1) and adding that the matter of the appointment of a person to the post of Octroi Superintendent should be reviewed by the Municipal Council and the claim for promotion of the respondent Anwarul Haque should also be considered by the Municipal Council and that proposals for the appointment of a suit able person to the post should be sent to the Government through the Collector, Sehore, and the Commissioner, Bhopal.

3. After the receipt of this communication, the Standing Committee of the Municipal Council passed a resolution on 4th April 1963 appointing Anwarul Haque as Superintendent, Octroi, and reverting the petitioner to the post of Inspector, Octroi, which he occupied before he was appointed by the President's order dated 15th February 1960 to officiate as Octroi Superintendent. On 22nd April 1963 the petitioner was informed by the Chief Municipal Officer of the resolution passed by the Standing Committee on 4th April 1963. On 23rd April 1963 the President of the Standing Committee passed a formal order implementing the resolution dated 4th April 1963 of the Standing Committee. On 24th April 1963 the Chief Municipal Officer of the Municipal Council passed an order appointing the respondent No. 4 Anwarul Haque as Superintendent, Octroi, and reverting the petitioner to the post of Octroi Inspector.

4. It was argued by Shri Sen, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, that in the absence of any rules relating to appeals and representations framed under Section 55(4) of the Act the Government had no jurisdiction to entertain or decide the representation made by Anwarul Haque against the petitioner's appointment; that the applicant was not made a party to the proceedings of the hearing of the representation; that Anwarul Haque did not possess the minimum qualifications prescribed for the post of Octroi Superintendent by the Fundamental Rules for Municipal employees, 1948 and that the Government had no power to direct the Municipal Council that it should review the "matter of the appointment of the petitioner as Octroi Superintendent and consider the claims of the fourth respondent for appointment to the post. It was also urged that the interpretation put by the Government on the term "Assessment or Revenue Officer" occurring in Section 55(1) was altogether erroneous; that there was already a separate post of the Revenue Officer in the Municipal Council borne on a higher cadre than that of the Octroi Superintendent and filled by one Aejaz Hussain; that the post of Octroi Superintendent was not one falling either under Sub-section (1) or under Sub-section (3) of Section 55; and that, therefore, the President could, under the powers conferred on him by Section 48fa) and (e) of the Act, appoint the petitioner as Octroi Superintendent, without obtaining the Government's approval.

5. In the returns filed on behalf of the Government and the Municipal Council and its Standing Committee it has been stated that an Octroi Superintendent is, under Rule 3(d) of the Rules for the Assessment and Collection of Octroi Duty framed under the Bhopal State Municipalities Act, 1916, an Assessment Officer; that these Rules were continued by the 1955 Act, and, therefore, the Octroi Superintendent is an Assessment Officer within the meaning of that term as used in Section 55(1) of the Act; and that as under Section 55(1) an Assessment Officer could be appointed only by the Government the petitioner's appointment as Octroi Superintendent by the President was illegal. It has been further averred that if Section 55(1) did not cover the appointment of an Octroi Superintendent, then the appointment of any person to that post would fall under Sub-section (3) and could only be made by the Municipal Board and not by the President and that the President had no power under Section 48 of making the petitioner's appointment as Octroi Superintendent. The respondents say that the Government issued the direction dated 5th September 1962 to the Municipal Council in the exercise of its power under Sections 27, 29 and 31 of the Act. In the return filed on behalf of the Government no reply has been given to the petitioner's averment that there is already a separate post of a Revenue Officer in the Municipal Council and that that post is being held by one Aejaz Hussain; but in the return filed on behalf of the Municipal Council and the Standing Committee it has been admitted that there is a separate Revenue Officer. It has, however, been added in that return that the Revenue Officer is in charge of house-tax, municipal property rent, water rate etc., and has no concern whatsoever with the Octroi Department. The respondent also says that as the petitioner's appointment as Octroi Superintendent was illegal, his reversion to his substantive post of Inspector, Octroi, could not be said to be by way of punishment; and that the Standing Committee had the power to decide whether the petitioner's appointment was legal and to revert him and appoint the respondent No. 4 as Octroi Superintendent. It is also maintained by the respondents that the Fundamental Rules for Municipal Employess prescribing qualifications, for appointment to the post of Octroi Superintendent are invalid and have no binding force.

6. It is necessary at the outset to say that the communication which was addressed by the Government to the Municipal Council on 5th September 1962 did not embody any order of the Government that the petitioner should be reverted and that the respondent No. 4 should be appointed as Octroi Superintendent. In only contained a suggestion of the Government to the Municipal Council that the matter of the appointment to the post of Octroi Superintendent should be reviewed by the Municipal Council in the light of the opinion expressed by the Government in that communication. Such being the nature of that communication, the question whether the Government did or did not have the power to give the advice that it did does not really arise for determination. So also the question of the validity of the appointment of the respondent No. 4 as Octroi Superintendent does not arise for consideration in the present petition, and Shri Sen, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner did not rightly urge before us that question. The two questions that call for determination in this case are whether the petitioner's appointment as Octroi Superintendent by the President of the Municipal Council was legal, and whether the Standing Committee had the power to decide the legality of the appointment and revert the petitioner on finding that his appointment by the President was illegal. The material provisions of the Act having a bearing on these two questions are Sub-sections (1) and (3) of Section 55, and Section 48 (a) and (e); and Section 94 (4) and (6) of the Madhya Pradesh Municipalities Act, 1961, which came into force on 1st February 1962 repealing the Bhopal State Municipalities Act, 1956. The relevant provisions of the bhopal act run thus :

"55(1) In every Municipality there shall be an Executive Officer, Health Officer, Engineer, Ac counts Officer, and an Assessment or Revenue Officer, who shall be appointed by the Government:

* * * * (3) Subject to any general or special direction which the State Government may from time to time issue, a Board may, by special resolution, determine what servants other than those mentioned in Sub-section (1) are required for the efficient discharge of its duties. All such servants shall be appointed either by the Board or any officer of the Board as determined by the rules framed by the State Government in this behalf.

* * * *

48. The following powers, duties and functions of a Board may be exercised and shall be performed or discharged by the President of the Board and not otherwise, namely:--

(a) the powers vested in the President to appoint, punish or dismiss servants of the Board;

* * * *

(e) all other duties, powers and functions of a Board, with the exception of:

(i) those vested in an Executive Officer by Section 56 and where there is a Medical Officer of Health, by Section 57;

(ii) those specified in the second column of Schedule I; and

(iii) those delegated by the Board under Section 95."

Sub-sections (4) and (6) of Section 94 of the Madhya Pradesh Municipalities Act, 1961 are as follows :

"94(4) The appointment of Revenue Officer^ Accounts Officer, Sanitary Inspector, Overseer. Revenue Inspector and Accountant shall be subject to confirmation by the State Government and no such post or the post of any other officer as may be specified by the State Government in this behalf shall be created or abolished and no alteration in the emoluments thereof shall be made without the previous approval of the State Government, and every appointment to, and dismissal from, such post, shall be subject to a like approval.

* * * *

6. Unless the State Government otherwise directs the power of appoining Municipal officers and servants other than those mentioned in or specified under Sub-section (4) shall vest in the Standing Committee."

7. At the time when the petitioner was appointed to officiate as Octroi Superintendent and later on when he was confirmed in that post, the Bhopal State Municipalities Act, 1955, was in force. Under Section 55(1) of the Act an Assessment or Revenue Officer in any Municipality could be appointed by the Government only. But an Octroi Superintendent is clearly not an Assessment or Revenue Officer envisaged by Section 55(1). By the expression "an Assessment or Revenue Officer" used in Section 55 what is meant is an Officer appointed in charge of assessments of all rates, taxes and duties and of all money which the Municipality collects and receives from whatsoever source and in whatever manner. It is true that a person appointed as Octroi Superintendent deals with octroi duties; but he is not entrusted' with the duties and powers of dealing with assessments of all kinds of rates, taxes and duties or with all the income of the Municipality under various heads. If the interpretation which was put by the Government in its communication dated 5th September 1962 on the expression "Assessment or Revenue Officer" as including an Octroi Superintendent is accepted, then the result is that even an octroi-post nakedar must also be treated as an Assessment or Revenue Officer; and he too also could not be appointed by the Municipal Council but could be appointed only by the Government. Section 55(1) did not clearly contemplate this absurd result. That the Municipal Counsil itself did not regard the post of an Octroi Superintendent as indistinguishable from, the post of an Assessment or a Revenue Officer is clear from the admitted fact that there is already in the Municipal Council a Revenue Officer. The post of a Revenue Officer in the Municipal Council is of a higher cadre and is at present being filled not by the petitioner or the respondent No. 4, but by another person.

8. The post of Octroi Superintendent clearly fell under Section 55(3); and an appointment to that post could be made either by the Municipal Board or any officer of the Board as stated in the rules framed by the State Government in that behalf. It is not the case of any party that the State Government had, by rules framed under Section 55(3), conferred on the President of the Municipal Board the power to make appointments under Sub-section (3). It is thus clear that under Sub-section (3) of Section 55, the post of an Octroi Superintendent could only be filled by the Municipal Board and not by the President. Appointments to the posts falling under Sub-section (3) of Section 55 could not even be made by the Government. The reliance placed in this connection by the opponents on Rule 3(d) of the Rules for the Assessment and Collection of Octroi Duty framed under the Bhopal Municipalities Act, 1916, is altogether misconceived. That rule only gives the definition of 'Superintendent, Octroi' as meaning the Officer appointed by the Board with the sanction of the Government for supervision, assessment and collection of octroi duty imposed by the Municipal Board, It did not confer on the Government any power to appoint an Octroi Superintendent. Even if the rule were to be read as conferring on the Government the power of appointing an Octroi Superintending the rule would be inconsistent with Section 55(3) which expressly says that all municipal servants falling under Sub-section (3) shall be appointed either by the Board or by any officer of the Board as determined by the rules framed by the State Government in that behalf. It is true that under Section 342 of the Act of 1955 the Rules made under the previous Act of 1916 were saved; but they were saved only in so far as they were not consistent with the provisions of the Act of 1955. It is thus plain that the stand taken by the Government in its communication dated 5th September 1962 that the appointment of a person to the post of an Octroi Superintendent 'required' the approval of the State Government was altogether erroneous. In our judgment, the appointment to the post of an Octroi Superintendent was governed by Section 55(3) of the Act and could be made either by the Municipal Board or by any officer of the Board as determined by the rules framed by the State Government in that behalf. It could not be made either by the President or by the Government.

9. Shri Chitale, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 4, Anwarul Haque, was not Inclined to dispute seriously the position that an Octroi Superintendent was not an Assessment or a Revenue Officer within the meaning of Section 55(1) and that he was a municipal servant governed by Sub-section (3) of Section 55; and that the appointment to the post of an Octroi Superintendent had "to, be made by the Board when no rules had been framed by the State Government authorizing any officer of the Board to make the appointment. He however, stressed the point that neither Clause (a) nor Clause (e) of Section 48 of the 1955 Act gave to the President the power to appoint an Octroi Superintendent. It was argued that under Clause (a) the President could exercise only that power of appointment, punishment or dismissal which had been vested in him; that the President had: not been vested with any power to appoint, punish or dismiss an Octroi Superintendent; and that in the face of the express provision contained in Clause (a), the residuary power given to the President by Clause (e) could not be invoked for clothing the President with the power which he did riot possess under Clause (a). It was further said that if the petitioner's appointment was illegal ab initio, then his reversion to the substantive post of Octroi inspector did not amount to any punishment so as to admit challenge to his reversion on the ground of non-compliance with the prescribed rules for taking disciplinary action against municipal servants and for imposing on them punishment of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank; and that Section 94(6) of the Madhya Pradesh Municipalities Act, 1961, which became operative when the impugned resolution was passed by the Standing Committee, gave to the Standing Committee the power to decide the question of the legality of the petitioner's appointment and to revert him on finding that his initial appointment was illegal.

10. In our opinion, this contention must be given effect to. It will be seen from the wording of Clause (a) of Section 48 that the President of the Board was competent to exercise and perform or discharge under that clause only those powers of appointment, punishment or dismissal in regard to municipal servants which had been vested in him. The Act of 1955 did not contain any provision vesting in the President the power to appoint an Octroi Superintendent. The petitioner did not place before us any resolution of the Board conferring on the President the power to appoint punish or dismiss an Octroi Superintendent. Indeed, on behalf of the petitioner the legality of his appointment as Octroi Superintendent by the President was sought to be justified not so much by reference to Clause (a) as by reference to clause (e) of section 48. This clause enabled the President to exercise and perform or discharge "all other duties, powers and functions of the Board" with the exception of those specified in that clause. The words "all other duties, powers and functions of the Board" used in Clause (e) clearly point to the conclusion that the residuary power could not be exercised by the President in regard to any of the matters and powers enumerated by Clauses (a) to (d). If under Clause (a) the President could exercise in regard to the appointment of municipal servants only those powers which had been vested in him, then clearly ho could not under the residuary power spoken of by Clause (e) make an appointment not covered by Clause (a). In the face of Clause (a), the President's powers to appoint, punish or dismiss municipal servants were confined to those vested in him. He could not claim, under the residuary powers given by Clause (e), the power to appoint any municipal servant.

11. From what has been stated above, it is plain that the President of the Municipal Board had no power under Section 48(3) and (e) to appoint the petitioner to the post of an Octroi Superintendent. As his appointment was not made by the Board as required by Section 55(3) of the Act, it was illegal. If the petitioner's appointment could not be regarded as valid and legal, then his reversion to his substantive post of Octroi Inspector, assuming that it was done by the competent authority, cannot amount to imposition of any punishment on him so as to require compliance of any rules with regard to dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of municipal employees. This is clear from the decision of the Supreme Court in K. S. Srinivasan v. Union of India? AIR 1958 SC 419: 1958 SCR 1295. The appellant K. S. Srinivasan in that case held "a quasi-permanent post as Public Relations Officer in the All India Radio". When the number of posts of Public Relations Officers was reduced to one and the remaining solitary post was filled by a permanent incumbent, Srinivasan's services were terminated. But the Government then appointed him to officiate as Assistant Station Director making the declaration that the post of Assistant Station Director offered to Srinivasan was one as held by him with a quasi-permanent status. This declaration was made without consulting the Union Public Service Commission which consultation was a condition precedent according to the Rules. When the Commission objected to the appointment as irregular and invalid, the Government cancelled its order appointing Srinivasan as Assistant Station Director and offered him an alternative inferior appointment as a matter of grace. Srinivasan refused to accept the lower post of Assistant Press Information Officer which was offered to him and later on challenged the validity of the order of the Government terminating his services by filing a petition under Article 226 in the Punjab High Court which was summarily rejected by that High Court. The matter then went to the Supreme Court, The majority of the Supreme Court held that Srinivasan's appointment to the post of Assistant Station Director was itself irregular, unauthorized and invalid; that the Government was right in terminating his services when it discovered its mistake; and that as his appointment was illegal, he was not entitled to any legal right and the termination of his appointment could not, therefore, be said to be an act of punishment. The decision of the Supreme Court in Srinivasan's Case, AIR 1958 SC 419: 1958 SCR 1295 (supra) is an authority for the proposition that if a man's appointment to a post is itself irregular, unauthorized and invalid, the termination of such appointment on discovery of mistake in the appointment cannot be said to be an act of punishment.

12. To the same effect is the decision of a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in G.K. Sinha v. Collector, Central Excise, (S) AIR 1957 All 152. In this case it was held that where a Government servant, who had been promoted to the selection grade, was later on demoted to his original post, not for any fault of his but because of non-compliance of rules relating to the appointments to the selection grade, there was no 'reduction in rank' within the meaning of Article 311 and the Government servant was not entitled to any opportunity of showing cause under Article 311 against the proposal to revert him. In Vishweshwar v. Chairmans State Transport Authority, M.P., AIR 1955 Nag 163 also it has been observed that the safeguard provided in Article 311 applies to cases where the appointment is validly made.

13. To the question whether the Standing Committee of the Municipal Council was competent to decide the legality of the petitioner's appointment and revert him on finding that he had not been validly appointed, Section 96(6) of the M. P. Municipalities Act, 1961, furnishes a clear answer. The resolution reverting the petitioner was passed by the Standing Committee on 4th April 1963, that is to say, after the 1961 Act came into force. For the reasons which we have already given while construing the term "Assessment or Revenue Officer" occurring in Section 55(1), it must be held that an Octori Superintendent is not a Revenue Officer for the purposes of Sub-sections (1) and (4) of Section 94 of the 1961 Act. Under Sub-section (4) of Section 94, the appointment of a Revenue Officer, Accounts Officer, Sanitary Inspector, Overseer, Revenue Inspector and Accountant and the appointment to any other post specified by the State Government can be made only with the approval of the State Government. The post of an Octroi Superintendent does not fall under any of these categories. Now, under Sub-section (6), unless the State Government otherwise directs, the appointment of municipal officers and servants other than those mentioned or specified in Sub-section (4) can be made by the Standing Committee. The petitioner did not urge before us that the Government had made an otherwise direction under Sub-section (6). If, then, the Standing Committee had the power of appointing an Octroi Superintendent, then it has also the power to decide whether the appointment of a certain person to the post was valid or invalid and to revert the person to his substantive post on finding that his promotion to the post of Octroi Superintendent was illegal.

14. For all these reasons, our conclusion is that the petitioner's initial appointment to the post of Octroi Superintendent by the President of the Municipal Board was illegal and invalid and he had no right to that post; that the Standing Committee had the power under Section 94(6) of the M, P. Municipalities Act, 1961, to determine the legality of his appointment and to revert Mm to his substantive rank on finding that his initial appointment as Octroi Superintendent was illegal; and that the petitioner's reduction in these circumstances did not in any way constitute an act of punishment on him. The result is that this petition is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs. The outstanding amount of the security deposit shall be refunded to the petitioner.