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The State Of Madhya Pradesh v. Abdul Rashid .
Factual and Procedural Background
A complaint was filed by the Station Officer, Ghairatganj, against Abdul Rashid in the Court of the Sub‑Divisional Magistrate, Bagumganj under the Motor Vehicles Act. On March 31, 1961 the Sub‑Divisional Magistrate acquitted the accused under Section 247 of the Code of Criminal Procedure solely because of the non‑appearance of the complainant (the Station Officer). This appeal challenges that order of acquittal. The principal factual and procedural question before the Court was whether Section 247 CrPC applies where the initiating document is a "complaint" filed by a police officer (or, put differently in the opinion, whether a report by a police officer in a non‑cognizable case amounts to a "complaint" for the purposes of the Code).
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether Section 247 of the Code of Criminal Procedure applies to a case where a "complaint" is filed by a police officer.
- Whether a report made by a police officer in a non‑cognizable case falls within the definition of "complaint" in Section 4(1)(h) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Arguments of the Parties
Arguments advanced for the defence / Respondent (as recorded in the opinion)
- The defence argued that the expression "report of a police officer" in the definition of "complaint" (Sec. 4(1)(h) CrPC) should be read narrowly to cover only reports submitted in cognizable cases; when a police officer reports a non‑cognizable case to the Magistrate, that report should be treated as a "complaint".
- The learned counsel for the respondent relied upon State v. Mira Saheb (AIR 1957 Trav‑Co. 132) and related Travancore decisions (notably Saramma Zacharia v. State, AIR 1953 Trav‑Co. 43) to support the contention that a police report in a non‑cognizable case could be treated as a complaint for some purposes.
The opinion does not contain a detailed, separate account of the arguments advanced by the appellant (the State) beyond the Court's discussion of authority and legal principles; consequently, the above summarizes the specific arguments reported in the text.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| State v. Mira Saheb, AIR 1957 Trav‑Co. 132 | Relied upon (by respondent) for the proposition that proceedings initiated on a police report do not make an acquittal under Section 247 irregular; decision had relied on Travancore authority about police reports in non‑cognizable cases. | The Court found Mira Saheb inapplicable to the precise question before it and observed that Mira Saheb's reasoning rested on a Travancore precedent dealing with jurisdiction to take cognizance, not on whether a police report is a "complaint" under Sec. 4(1)(h) CrPC. |
| Saramma Zacharia v. State, AIR 1953 Trav‑Co. 43 | Discussed whether a police report of a non‑cognizable offence could be treated as a report under the equivalent of Sec. 190(1)(b); contained the view that if not, such a report would constitute a "complaint" under the definition in the Travancore code. | The Court distinguished Saramma Zacharia as addressing jurisdiction under Sec. 190 and not the narrower definitional question under Sec. 4(1)(h) of the Indian CrPC; thus it was not decisive on the present issue. |
| Public Prosecutor v. A.V. Ramiah, AIR 1958 Andh Pra 392 | Held that a charge sheet filed by police who investigated a non‑cognizable offence without magistrate order must be treated as a "complaint" (and that Section 247 could therefore apply when the complainant did not appear). | The Court rejected the reasoning of Ramiah's case, characterizing its view as confining "report of a police officer" to cognizable offences. The Court disagreed and held that a police officer's report is a "report of a police officer" even in non‑cognizable cases and thus excluded from the Code's definition of "complaint". |
| Jai Prakash v. State, AIR 1961 All 377 | Held that a report for prosecution based on police investigation into a non‑cognizable offence cannot be treated as a report within Sec. 190 and must be treated as a "complaint". | The Court stated it was unable to subscribe to the view in Jai Prakash and discussed the authorities relied upon there; the Court considered that Jai Prakash did not persuade it to treat police reports in non‑cognizable cases as "complaints" under Sec. 4(1)(h). |
| State of Rajasthan v. Tarachand, AIR 1958 Raj 108 | Relied upon in Jai Prakash (as one of three cases) but noted in the opinion as not being in point for the present question. | The Court noted it was "not in point" for the present question; no substantive application was drawn from it. |
| Chidambaram Pillai v. Emperor, ILR 32 Mad 3 | Observed that if the alleged offence is non‑cognizable, there was historically no section empowering a police officer to make a report to a Magistrate. | The Court observed that this decision predated the 1923 amendment to Sec. 190 and therefore it was unnecessary to decide whether a police officer could make a report in a non‑cognizable case under the post‑amendment Sec. 190(1)(b). |
| State Of Orissa v. M.V. Apparao, 1961 (2) Cri LJ 518 (Orissa) | Addressed a complaint forwarded by Chief Inspector of Factories under Section 92 of the Factories Act and an acquittal for non‑appearance of the 'complainant'. | The opinion observed that the Orissa decision assumed the applicability of Sec. 247 without discussion; the present Court noted that no analysis of Sec. 247's applicability appeared in that report. |
| State of M.P. v. Abdul Qadar Khan, Cr. A. No. 329 of 1961 (MP) | Cited as taking the view consistent with the Court's conclusion that acquittal on the ground of non‑appearance of a police officer was without jurisdiction. | The Court cited it as an instance where a similar view was taken; used as supportive authority for the proposition that acquittal in such circumstances was without jurisdiction. |
| Emperor v. Babulal, ILR (1936) Nag 50 (AIR 1936 Nag 86) | Cited among authorities in support of the Court's position. | Referenced as one of several decisions supporting the Court's view that acquittal for non‑appearance of a police complainant was without jurisdiction. |
| Tarapada Sarkar v. State, AIR 1959 Cal 640 | Cited among authorities in support of the Court's position. | Referenced as supporting authority for the Court's conclusion relating to jurisdiction and acquittal for non‑appearance of police personnel. |
| Macbeth and Co. v. Chislett, 1910 AC 220 | Principle that a word's statutory definition in one Act should not be used to impose an unnatural or restricted meaning in another Act. | The Court used this principle to reject the argument that the restricted statutory definition of "complaint" in some other enactment should govern the meaning of "complaint" in the CrPC or vice versa. |
| Vanguard Fire & Gen. Ins. Co. Ltd. v. Fraser & Ross, 1960 (3) SCR 857 (AIR 1960 SC 971) | Principle that statutory definitions must be read in context; definitions may vary in meaning across different sections depending on subject and context. | The Court invoked this interpretive principle to explain why the definition of "complaint" in Sec. 4(1)(h) must be understood in the context of the CrPC and cannot be conflated with meanings in other enactments. |
| Raj Krishna Bose v. Binod Kanoongo, AIR 1954 SC 202 | Observation that courts should, where possible, construe apparently conflicting provisions so as to harmonize them. | The Court cited this as a guiding principle in reconciling provisions of the CrPC (for example, reading Sec. 4(1)(h) and Sec. 190 together) and in arriving at an interpretation that preserves the deliberate distinction drawn by the Code. |
| Veluswami Thevar v. Raja Nainar, AIR 1959 SC 422 | Cited as related authority on statutory interpretation principles. | Listed as additional authority reinforcing the Court's approach to interpretation (no detailed application beyond citation). |
| Machander v. State of Hyderabad, (S) AIR 1955 SC 792 | Statement about balancing rights — the accused should not be indefinitely harassed; limits upon prosecuting agencies' conduct. | The Court relied on these observations to refuse a retrial on account of "callousness and want of proper diligence" by the prosecution and to conclude it would be unfair to subject the accused to retrial. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court began by observing the textual and schematic relationship between Section 247 CrPC (which empowers a magistrate to acquit an accused for non‑appearance of a complainant) and the definition of "complaint" in Section 4(1)(h) of the CrPC. The Court stated that Section 247 is not attracted unless the case was instituted on a "complaint" and that the Code's definition of the word "complaint" expressly excludes "the report of a police officer."
The defence argument (as recorded) — that "report of a police officer" should be read narrowly to include only reports in cognizable cases and that police reports of non‑cognizable cases should be treated as complaints — was examined against the history of Section 190(1)(b). The Court noted that clause (b) of Section 190 originally used the phrase "police report" and that in 1923 it was amended to the broader wording "report in writing of such facts made by a police officer." The Court reasoned that the amendment was intended to permit Magistrates to take cognizance on the report of a police officer even in non‑cognizable cases.
The Court emphasized that when clause (b) of Section 190 was amended the definitional provision of "complaint" in Section 4(1)(h) was not altered to assimilate police reports into the definition of "complaint." From this the Court concluded that the framers deliberately excluded police reports from the Code's definition of "complaint" and that this exclusion extends to police reports in non‑cognizable cases as well. The Court rejected the narrow reading urged for the defence and the reasoning of some authorities that restricted "report of a police officer" to cognizable cases.
The Court distinguished cases (such as Saramma Zacharia and Mira Saheb) that dealt principally with the Magistrate's jurisdiction to take cognizance under Section 190 rather than with the narrower definitional question whether a police report is a "complaint" under Section 4(1)(h). It also engaged with decisions (such as Public Prosecutor v. A.V. Ramiah and Jai Prakash v. State) that held to the contrary, explaining why it considered those decisions unpersuasive: chiefly because the expression "report of a police officer" is not defined in a restrictive sense by the Legislature and the 1923 amendment to Section 190 indicates that police reports in non‑cognizable matters were intended to be covered by Section 190(b) while remaining excluded from the Code's definition of "complaint".
The Court invoked established interpretive principles (Macbeth & Co.; Vanguard Fire; Raj Krishna Bose) to support the approach that definitions must be read in context and not be transposed across statutes in a way that would defeat the Code's clear scheme. The Court emphasized that the Code draws a deliberate line of demarcation between cases instituted at the instance of the police and those instituted otherwise, which justified excluding police reports from the Code's definition of "complaint".
Finally, on the question of remedy, although the Court concluded that the Magistrate acted without jurisdiction in acquitting the accused under Section 247, it exercised equitable discretion not to order a retrial. That conclusion was grounded in the Court's assessment of prosecutorial negligence — the prosecution failed to appear at trial — and the jurisprudential admonition (Machander) that accused persons should not be indefinitely harassed and that limits must be placed on prosecutorial conduct.
Holding and Implications
Holding: Section 247 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is inapplicable to a case instituted on a report by a police officer (including reports in non‑cognizable cases), because the definition of "complaint" in Section 4(1)(h) CrPC expressly excludes "the report of a police officer."
Direct consequences and orders made:
- The order of acquittal passed by the Sub‑Divisional Magistrate under Section 247 CrPC was set aside as being without jurisdiction.
- The Court declined to order a retrial, noting that the prosecution acted "in an irresponsible manner" and that it would be unfair and unjust to subject the accused to a retrial in the circumstances.
- Accordingly, the appeal was partly allowed: the acquittal was set aside for lack of jurisdiction but no retrial was ordered.
Broader implications: The opinion articulates a clear interpretive position that for the purposes of the CrPC the word "complaint" has been given a restricted statutory meaning which excludes reports made by police officers, including reports in non‑cognizable cases. The Court relied on statutory history and principles of interpretation to harmonize Section 4(1)(h) and Section 190(1)(b). The opinion also emphasizes procedural fairness to the accused by refusing a retrial where the prosecuting agency has shown callousness; the text does not elaborate further on the precedential scope beyond the conclusions stated.
Shiv Dayal, J.:— This appeal is directed against the order of acquittal passed under Section 247 of the Cr PC. A complaint was filed against Abdul Rashid accused in the Court of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Bagumganj under the Motor Vehicles Act, by the Station Officer, Ghairatganj. On March 31, 1961, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate acquitted the accused just because of non-appearance of the complainant, S.O, Ghairatganj. The only question in this appeal is whether Section 247 of the Cr PC applies to a case where “a complaint” is filed by a police officer.
2. The operation of Section 247 of the Cr PC, is not attracted unless the case was instituted on a complaint. The word ‘complaint’ is defined in Sec. 4(1)(h) of the Code. That definition expressly excludes the report of a police officer. It is argued for the defence that the expression “report of a police officer” within the meaning of that definition connotes only that report which is submitted in a cognizable case, but when a police officer reports a non-cognizable case to the Magistrate, it tantamounts to a ‘complaint’. Out attention is invited to the provisions contained in Section 190 of the Cr PC. That section deals with the modes in which a Magistrate may take cognizance of an offence. Initially clause (b) ran thus:
“Upon a police report of such facts…,………” In 1923 this clause was amended evidently, to replace the expression “police report” which had been interpreted in a technical sense by a nontechnical expression “report in writing of such facts made by a police officer”. There had been a conflict of opinions as to whether the expression “police report” was confined to cognizable cases or concerned non-cognizable offences also where the police had no authority to investigate under Chapter XIV of the Code. The framers of the law obviously amended clause (b) so as to widen its scope. So that now a Magistrate can take cognizance of a case under Sec. 190(b) on report of a police officer even in a non-cognizable case. If the intention of the legislature was pot to exclude from the word “complaint” report of a police officer in a non-cognizable case for the purposes of Sec. 190, such a report fell within the purview of clause (a) of Sec. 190, and no amendment of clause (b) was necessary. Obviously enough the amendment was necessitated by the fact that the framers of the law did not call such a report as a “complaint”. It is excluded from the ambit of the word “complaint” as defined in Sec. 4(1)(h) of the Code. It seems to us clear that it was for that reason alone that the wording of clause (b) was modified so as to cover every report of a police officer whether in a cognizable or in a non-cognizable case. It must be remembered that the definition of the word “complaint” was not altered when clause (b) of Sec. 190 was amended. We see no warrant to read the words “but it does not include the report of a police officer” in a narrow and limited sense so as not to apply to the report of a police officer made in a non-cognizable case.
3. For these reasons, the only construction which is possible is that a case instituted on a report by police even in a non-cognizable case cannot be said to have been taken cognizance of on a “complaint”. The provisions contained in Section 247 of the Cr PC, are, therefore, inapplicable to such a case.
4. The learned counsel for the respondent relies on State v. Mira Saheb AIR 1957 Trav-Co. 132. That was a case under the Motor Vehicles Act. There it was contended on behalf of the State that the proceedings having been initiated not on a complaint but on the basis of a police report, the acquittal under Section 247 of the Cr PC, was irregular, This contention did not find favour with the learned Judges. They only relied on a decision of their Court in Saramma Zacharia v. State, AIR 1953 Trav-Co. 43, in which the question of jurisdiction of a Magistrate to take cognisance of a non-cognizable offence on the report of a police officer was dealt with, and there it was observed as follows:
“Further, if a report to a Magistrate by the police with respect to a non-cognizable offence could not be considered as a report within the meaning of Section 186(1)(b) of the Travancore Cr PC (corresponding to section 190(1)(b) of the Indian Cr PC) such report will constitute a complaint as that expression is defined in Section 4(1)(d) (corresponding to Section 4(1)(h) of the Indian Act).”
5. In that case the only question was whether the Magistrate could take cognizance, upon a report by a police officer of a non-cognizable offence. The question was of the jurisdiction of the Magistrate to take cognizance and not of the jurisdiction of the Magistrate to treat the report of the police officer as a complaint within the meaning of Sec. 4(1)(h). Relying on clause (b) of Section 190(1) of the Cr PC, it was held that the Magistrate had jurisdiction to take cognizance. That decision is therefore, inapplicable to the question with which we are dealing. And in Mira Sahab's case, AIR 1957 Trav-Co. 132 no other reasons are given for taking that view. Our attention is also invited to Public Prosecutor… v. A.V Ramiah…, AIR 1958 Andh Pra 392, where it is held that a charge sheet filed by a police officer, who investigates into an offence under Section 12 of the Gaming Act without an order of a Magistrate, must be treated as a complaint and not as a police report. On this basis it has further been held that for non-appearance of the complainant, an order under Section 247 of the Cr PC is legal and proper. The only reasoning to be found in this decision is that in the view of the learned Judges the expression “report of a police officer” in Section 4(1)(h) of the Cr PC, is confined only to cognizable offences where a police officer is empowered to investigate under Chapter XIV of the Code and since a police officer cannot investigate into a non-cognizable case without the order of a Magistrate, the label of charge sheet submitted by him is of no consequence. The expression “report of a police officer” is not defined in the Code. In the absence of any restrictive meaning having been assigned to it by the Legislature, a report made by a police officer even in a non-cognizable case is none the less a “report” and it is a report “of a police officer”. That being so, we are unable to persuade ourselves to agree that expression must be read as restrictive of the report made in a cognizable case.
6. Then we have before us the case of Jai Prakash v. State, AIR 1961 All 377, in which it is held that although there may be nothing illegal in an investigation carried on by a police officer into a non-cognizable offence without the order of a competent Magistrate, yet a report for prosecution based on the result of that investigation cannot be treated as a report within the meaning of Sec. 190 and must be treated as merely a complaint constituting the offence. In arriving at that conclusion the learned Judge has relied on three decisions: (1) State of Rajasthan v. Tarachand, AIR 1958 Raj 108, is not in point so far as the present question is concerned. (2) Ramiah's-case, AIR 1958 Andh Pra 392, has already been discussed by us. (3) The third case relied, on is Chidambaram Pillai v. Emperor, ILR 32 Mad 3 where these observations were made:
“If the alleged offence is a non-cognisable one, there is no section in the Code which empowers a police officer of his own motion to make any report to a Magistrate.”
7. That was a case decided prior to the amendment of 1923 and it is wholly unnecessary for us to go into the question whether a police officer could make a report in a non-cognizable case under Sec. 190(1)(b) of the Code.
8. For these reasons we are unable to subscribe to the view taken in the aforesaid decision.
9. State Of Orissa… v. M.V Apparao…., 1961 (2) Cri LJ 518 (Orissa), is cited. In that case the Chief Inspector of Factories, Orissa, had forwarded a complaint to the S.D.M, Sambalpur, for prosecution under Section 92 of the Factories Act. Eventually the accused was acquitted because of unaccounted for and unexplained absence of the ‘complainant’. The state filed an appeal against acquittal. The acquittal was upheld but we, do not find in the report of that decision any discussion whether Sec. 247 could apply to that case or not. It seems to us clear that position was just assumed.
10. We have already stated our reasons to hold that Section 247 of the Cr PC, has no application to the present case and the learned Magistrate acted without jurisdiction in acquitting the accused on the ground of non-appearance of the police officer who initiated the matter and on whose report the Magistrate took cognizance. This was also the view taken in State of M.P v. Abdul Qadar Khan, Cr. A. No. 329 of 1961, D/- 9-10-1961 (MP): in Emperor v. Babulal, ILR (1936) Nag 50 : (AIR 1936 Nag 86) and in Tarapada Sarkar v. State, AIR 1959 Cal 640.
11. It would be fallacious to argue that on the above interpretation a police officer will never be competent to file a complaint under the various special laws where cognizance cannot be taken except on a “complaint”. This argument may be illustrated thus. Under the Telegraph Act a Magistrate cannot take cognizance except on a complaint filed by a person authorised in that behalf. If a police officer is so authorised and he files a complaint under that enactment, it would be called a ‘complaint’ because of Sec. 4(1)(h) but our interpretation is that the expression “report of a police officer” includes a police officer's report in a non-cognizable offence so that it is not a complaint, and, since it falls outside the purview of complaint, the Magistrate would be disabled to take cognizance. The fallacy of this argument lies in disregarding the elementary rule of interpretation that the definition of a particular word in a particular statute cannot be used for interpreting that word in another statute. See Craies on Statute Law at page 153. In Macbeth and Co. v. Chislett, 1910 AC 220 (223), it is observed:
“It would be a new terror in the construction of Acts of Parliament if we were required to limit a word to an unnatural sense because in some Act which is not incorporated or referred to such an interpretation is given to it for the purposes of that Act alone”.
12. In Vanguard Fire and General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Fraser and Ross, 1960 (3) SCR 857 : (AIR 1960 SC 971), their Lordships have said:
“It is well settled that all statutory definitions or abbreviations must be read subject to the qualification variously expressed in the definition clauses which created them and it may be that even where the definition is exhaustive in as much as the word defined is said to mean a certain thing, it is possible for the word to have a somewhat different meaning in different sections of the Act depending upon the subject or the context. That is why all definitions in statutes generally begin with the qualifying words unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context…………………………… In view of this qualification, the Court has not only to look at the words ‘but also to look at the context, the collocation and the object of such words relating to such matter and interpret the meaning intended to be conveyed by the use of the words under the circumstances.”
13. In Raj Krishna Bose v. Binod Kanoongo, AIR 1954 SC 202, their Lordships observed:
“Whenever it is possible to do so it is the duty of the Court to construe provisions which appear to conflict so that they harmonise.”
14. See also Veluswami Thevar v. Raja Nainar, AIR 1959 SC 422.
15. The word ‘complaint’ is not a term of art. It means complaining; expression of grief and dissatisfaction; expression of censure or injuries; a grievance. But for the purposes of the Code of Criminal Procedure — and for those purposes only—it has been defined in the Code and has been given a restricted meaning in so far as any report of a police officer which complains of an offence has been expressly excluded. Why this is done is transparent from the scheme of the Code. The Police as one of their main duties, investigate into offences. That is a special function of the Police Department. Different procedures are enacted in the Code of Criminal Procedure for the trial of an offence for which a police officer makes a report and for the trial of an offence about which any person other than a police officer makes a complaint. Compare, for instance, Sec. 207 with Sec. 207A, section 251A and S. 252. It was, therefore, absolutely essential to draw a clear line of demarcation between a case instituted at the instance of the Police and a case otherwise instituted or taken cognizance of. By using the word ‘complaint’ for the second and by excluding the applicability of that word to the first the framers of the law drew that clear and distinct line of demarcation. Whether a police officer is empowered to investigate under Chapter XIV or not is altogether a different aspect and that cannot be confused with the question whether his report falls within the purview of the definition of ‘complaint’ in Sec. 4(1)(h) or not.
16. This discussion leads us to conclude that the report of a police officer in a non-cognizable case will not be a complaint within the meaning of Section 4(1)(h) of the Cr PC although it will be so for the purposes of other enactments; for instance, under the Telegraph Act. The word ‘complaint’ as it occurs in other laws cannot be given the same limited and restricted meaning as has been expressly assigned to it in the Code of Criminal Procedure for the purposes of that Code.
17. Now the question is whether we should order a retrial. Our answer is in the negative. The prosecution acted in an irresponsible manner before the trial Magistrate. No one cared to appear on its behalf on the date of hearing.
18. For such callousness and want of proper diligence on the part of the prosecuting agency the accused cannot be made to suffer. Here we recall the observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Machander v. State of Hyderabad, (S) AIR 1955 SC 792.
“Justice is not one-sided. It has many facets and we have to draw a nice balance between conflicting rights and duties. While it is incumbent on us to see that the guilty do not escape it is even more necessary to see that persons accused of crime are not indefinitely harassed. They must be given a fair and impartial trial and while every reasonable latitude must be given to those concerned with the detections of crime and entrusted with the administration of justice, limits must be placed on the lengths to which they may go.”
19. Applying these observations here and having regard to the nature of the offence in the present case, we are of the opinion that it would be unfair and unjust to send it for a re-trial.
20. In the result this appeal is partly allowed. The order of acquittal is set aside as being without jurisdiction. There shall be no re-trial in this case.
JF/K.S.B
21. Appeal partly allowed.
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