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Daryasingh Harisingh And Another v. Kalma Nihala .
Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
This second appeal arises from a suit for possession of land in village Titranya (Khasra No. 53, 11.1 acres) in which the plaintiff-respondent sued on the basis of title (a Patta issued in his name and revenue credit in his name) and sought possession and mesne profits. The plaintiff alleged a cause of action arising from a demand for possession by registered notice dated 11-12-1954 and its non-compliance. The defendants denied the plaintiff's title, asserted their own title and long possession (claimed for generations, alternatively over 60–70 years), and pleaded adverse possession.
At trial the courts framed issues about the plaintiff's title and whether the defendants (and predecessors) had acquired title by adverse possession for over 12 years. The trial court found that the plaintiff's title was established and held that the defendants occupied the land as sub-tenants (permissive possession), decreeing the suit. The first appellate court affirmed the trial court, relying in part on several precedents. The present matter is a second appeal raising primarily the question of limitation (whether Article 142 of the Limitation Act applied and whether the plaintiff was required to prove possession within the statutory period).
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether Article 142 of the Limitation Act (period of 12 years for actions based on prior possession and subsequent dispossession/discontinuance) applies to the plaintiff's suit.
- Where the defendant is in admitted possession, who bears the burden of proving possession within the statutory period: the plaintiff who sues to disturb that possession, or the defendant asserting adverse possession?
- Whether the trial and appellate courts were justified in treating the defendant's possession as permissive (sub-tenancy) when that characterization was not pleaded or proved by the parties.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The plaintiff (appellant in this second appeal) had not alleged that the defendants were his tenants; the courts below erred in deciding the suit on that basis—i.e., they gave effect to a case not pleaded by the plaintiff.
- On the facts as presented, Article 142 of the Limitation Act is applicable (i.e., the plaintiff must establish possession within 12 years), and the plaintiff failed to discharge this burden. The appellant relied on several authorities (including 8 Moo Ind App 199 and AIR 1940 Mad 798 (FB)) to support that the onus lies on the plaintiff to prove his possession within the statutory period.
Respondent's Arguments
- The respondent contended that the plaintiff's title was clear, and therefore the defendant could not succeed unless he established title by adverse possession. In the absence of indication to the contrary, a presumption of tenancy or at least that the defendant's possession was permissive should be drawn.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| AIR 1933 Lah 105 | This decision was relied upon by the appellate court below in affirming the trial court's findings (as cited in the opinion). | The present court notes that the appellate court relied on this authority when confirming the trial court's conclusion of permissive possession; the present court did not adopt that reliance as definitive for the facts here. |
| Mt. Raushan Ara Begam v. Mahmud Beg (as cited) | Relied upon by the appellate court below (specific principle from the case not elaborated in the opinion). | The appellate court invoked this authority in confirming the trial court; the second-appeal court recorded that reliance but focused on limitation principles instead. |
| (S) AIR 1955 Nag 221, Ramchandra v. Vasant | Relied upon by the appellate court below (specific rule not detailed in the opinion). | Used by the appellate court in affirming the trial court; the second-appeal court referred to that reliance while analyzing the record and limitation issue. |
| 8 Moo Ind App 199 — Maharajah Koonwur Nitrasur Singh v. Baboo Nund Loll Singh | Privy Council authority cited for the proposition that where defendants are in possession for a long period the plaintiff seeking to disturb that possession must prove possession within the statutory period (burden on plaintiff). | The court relied on the Privy Council's observations (quoted) to support the proposition that the plaintiff must prove possession within twelve years prior to suit if seeking to disturb long-standing possession. |
| 16 Ind App 23 — Mohima Chundar Mozoomdar v. Mohesh Chundar Neogi | Privy Council observations that in ejectment actions where defendants are admittedly in possession, the onus is on the plaintiff to prove his own possession within the statutory period. | The court cited the Privy Council (quoted) to reinforce that the plaintiff must recover by the strength of his own title and prove possession within twelve years when defendants are in long-standing possession. |
| AIR 1940 Mad 798 (Full Bench) — Official Receiver v. Govindaraju | Held that where plaintiff pleads permissive possession of the defendant and fails to establish it, the plaintiff is nonetheless required to prove his possession within twelve years. | The court relied on the Full Bench decision as supporting authority for the proposition that the plaintiff must prove possession within 12 years even if he alleges the defendant's possession to be permissive. |
| 18 Ind Cas 17 — Dharani Kanta Lahiri v. Gabar Ali Khan | Cited by the appellant as authority in support of limitation/burden propositions (specific principle not elaborated in the opinion). | The court recorded the citation among authorities relied on by counsel for the appellant while focusing its analysis on Articles 142 and 144 and leading authorities on burden of proof. |
| AIR 1930 PC 57(1) — Siddik Mahomed Shah v. Mt. Saran | Cited for the proposition that a plaintiff cannot in trial make out a different case from that pleaded in the plaint (i.e., the trial court should not permit the plaintiff to change his case). | The court invoked this precedent to criticize the trial court for allowing the plaintiff to assert at trial that the defendant's occupation was by leave and license (and the trial court further treating him as a tenant) when that case was not pleaded in the plaint. |
| AIR 1937 Nag 129 — Shankarsa v. Punam Chand | Discussed Article 142: where a plaintiff proves or admits prior possession and subsequent dispossession/discontinuance, Article 142 applies and the burden shifts accordingly; Article 142 applies irrespective of allegations in the plaint if dispossession/discontinuance is proved or admitted. | The court relied on the Nagpur High Court's observation to hold that the plaintiff's admission in the witness box that he had prior possession brought the case within Article 142, making it incumbent on the plaintiff to prove possession within twelve years. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court structured its analysis around the facts proved or admitted and the interplay between Articles 142 and 144 of the Limitation Act. The primary legal question was whether Article 142 (12-year limitation where plaintiff alleges prior possession and subsequent dispossession/discontinuance) or Article 144 (residuary article) applied.
Step-by-step the court reasoned as follows:
- Findings of fact: The record established (a) the plaintiff's title based on a Patta and revenue credit, and (b) that the defendant and his father had been in possession and enjoyment of the land for a period reportedly far in excess of twelve years, with revenue paid by the defendant though credited in the plaintiff's name. Multiple witnesses (Patel, Patwari, and another) testified to long possession by the defendant's family.
- On the pleadings: The plaint merely asserted title as the ground for ejectment and did not specify when or by what title the defendant entered into possession. The plaintiff, however, in his trial testimony admitted that the defendant had been in possession for five to six years and earlier; he also asserted (for the first time at trial) that the land had been given to the defendant and his father for maintenance under an oral agreement to return the land when required. The court observed that such an alteration of case at trial (asserting permissive occupation) should not have been permitted without being pleaded, citing AIR 1930 PC 57(1) — Siddik Mahomed Shah v. Mt. Saran.
- Burden of proof and limitation law: The court examined Articles 142 and 144 and explained that Article 142 covers suits based on prior possession and dispossession/discontinuance (with a 12-year period) and that Article 144 is residuary and applies only when Article 142 is inapplicable. The court emphasized established legal principles (citing Privy Council authorities and the Madras Full Bench) that where defendants are in admitted long possession the plaintiff, seeking to disturb that possession, must prove possession within the statutory period; anterior title alone does not relieve the plaintiff of that burden.
- Effect of plaintiff's admission in evidence: The court held that even though the plaint did not allege prior possession and dispossession, the plaintiff's admission in examination-in-chief that he had previously given the land for maintenance (and that the defendant had been in possession) brought the case within Article 142. The court relied on Shankarsa v. Punam Chand to support that an admission or proof of prior possession/dispossession invokes Article 142 irrespective of what the plaint alleges.
- Insufficiency of plaintiff's proof: Having concluded that Article 142 applied, the court found that the plaintiff failed to prove possession within twelve years of the suit. The evidence that weighed most strongly on the record (testimony of the Patel, Patwari and another witness) favored the defendant's long possession (30–32 years). The lower courts did not discredit those witnesses; they instead treated the defendant's possession as permissive/sub-tenancy without a basis in the pleadings or independent proof. The appellate court's reliance on Patwari's notation that the defendant was shown as a sub-tenant was not a sufficient basis to supplant the duty on the plaintiff to prove his possession within the statutory period.
- Conclusion of reasoning: Because Article 142 applied and the plaintiff failed to establish possession within the statutory period, the plaintiff could not succeed in the ejectment claim despite his Patta and revenue-credit evidence. The trial and appellate courts erred in deciding the suit on a basis (permissive tenancy) not properly pleaded or proved.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
The court's final decision was to allow the second appeal. The court ordered that the plaintiff's suit be dismissed with costs throughout. The core ruling can be summarized as: APPEAL ALLOWED; PLAINTIFF'S SUIT DISMISSED.
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: The plaintiff's claim for possession and mesne profits was dismissed because the plaintiff failed to prove possession within twelve years as required under Article 142 of the Limitation Act once prior possession/discontinuance was admitted in evidence. The defendants' long possession stood as defeating the plaintiff's remedial claim on limitation grounds.
- On burden and pleadings: The decision reinforces that where a plaintiff, by pleading or by admission in evidence, invokes a case of prior possession and subsequent dispossession or discontinuance, Article 142 governs, and the plaintiff bears the burden of proving possession within the statutory period. The court also emphasized that courts should not decide a case on a factual characterization (e.g., tenancy/permissive possession) that the plaintiff has not pleaded or proved.
- Broader precedent: The opinion primarily applied existing limitation principles (as stated in cited authorities) to the facts; it did not purport to create a new legal rule beyond applying established authorities on burden and Article 142 versus Article 144.
Note: This summary strictly reflects only the information contained in the provided opinion and does not add external materials or inferences beyond that text.
1. This second appeal involves a question regarding limitation, It arises out of a suit for possession brought by the plaintiff-respondent for possession of land situated in the village Titranya bearing Khasra No. 53 measuring 11.1 acres and assessed to the revenue of Rs. 3-12-9. The suit was based on plaintiff's title and consequent right of the plaintiff to possess the same. There were no allegations as to when and how the defendant came into occupation and by what right. The cause of action was stated to be a demand for possession made by the plaintiff on 11-12-1954 by means of a registered notice and its non-compliance. Plaintiff claimed possession and mesno profits at Rs. 100/- per annum.
2. The suit was resisted by the defendants who denied plaintiff's title to the land and asserted their own title and possession since generations. They expressed their ignorance regarding the existence of Patta of that land in plaintiff's name and the circumstances in which it was obtained. They also pleaded adverse possession for a period in excess of 60 or 70 years openly and as of right. This circumstance, according to them, had brought about an end of plaintiff's title, if any, to that land and had created one in themselves.
3. On these pleadings issues regarding plaintiff's title and its loss by the plaintiff due to adverse possession by the defendants and their predecessors for over 12 years were framed.
4. The trial Court found plaintiffs title to the land in dispute to have been established. It further found that the defendants were in occupation as sub-tenants of the plaintiff. The possession of the defendants was consequently held to be permissive in character and they were therefore held not entitled to claim title of the land by adverse possession. The suit was consequently decreed.
5. The appellate court in a brief and superficial consideration of the evidence agreed with the trial court on both these issues and relying upon the decisions reported in AIR 1933 Lah 105, Mt. Raushan Ara Begam v. Mahmud Beg and (S) AIR 1955 Nag 221, Ramchandra v. Vasant, it confirmed the decision of the trial Court and dismissed the appeal.
6. In this second appeal Mr. Sanghi for the appellant contends that the plaintiff had nowhere asserted that the defendants were his tenants. The courts below in decreeing the suit on that basis have given effect to a case which the plaintiff had not put forward. On the case set up by the plaintiff, and the facts as they appeared on record it is Article 142 of the Limitation Act which is applicable. The learned counsel relied upon the decisions in 8 Moo Ind App 199, Maharajah Koonwur Nitrasur Singh v. Baboo Nund Loll Singh; AIR 1940 Mad 798 (FB), Official Receiver v. Govindaraju and 18 Ind Cas 17, Dharani Kanta Lahiri v. Gabar Ali Khan, in support of his contentions.
7. On the other hand the learned counsel for the respondent contended that the title of the plaintiff being clear the defendant cannot succeed unless he shows that he had acquired title by adverse possession. In the absence of any indication presumption of tenancy or at any rate permissive character of possession ought to be made.
8. Before considering the matter on authorities I would consider it necessary, in view of imperfect reference to the factual materials on record, in the judgment of the court below, to mention what facts have been either admitted or proved.
9. The plaintiff claims the land on the basis of title based on a Patta issued in his name by the Government as also on the strength of receipt-book regarding the credit of Revenue, in respect of this land, in his name in the Revenue Records. Both the courts below found this to be sufficient evidence of title unless it were displaced by what the defendant established regarding his possession and the character of it. The plaintiff's suit for possession involves the acceptance of the fact that the defendant is in possession.
The plaintiff did not state in his plaint when and by what title the defendant entered into possession. But in his statement at the trial he stated that the defendant has been in possession for the last five or six years and that prior to that he was in possession. According to him the land had been given by him and his father for maintenance to the defendant under an oral agreement that the land should be returned whenever the plaintiff would claim it back. This allegation was not made in the plaint and the trial court should not have permitted the plaintiff to make out a case different from that with which he came to court. Vide AIR 1930 PC 57 (1). Siddik Mahomed Shah v. Mt. Saran.
The trial Court went a step further. The plaintiff in the plaint alleged title simpliciter to oust the defendant. At the trial he asserted defendant's possession under his leave and license. The trial court however found that he was a tenant. I wonder how was this permissible for the court to do so, with what the plaintiff asserted in the plaint, and in the witness box. The appellate court also fell in line with the trial court upon the point.
10. The defendant in his statement asserted his possession. According to him his father was in possession and after his death about 15 or 16 years back he continued in possession and paid the revenue although he had not with him the receipt book issued under the authority of the Revenue Authorities. He expressed his ignorance as regards the circumstances under which the land came into possession of his family.
All that he knew was that his father used to till the land and after his death he did so. Patwari Anokhilal and Patel Dasharath stated that they saw defendant's father Harsingh to be in possession of this land and not the plaintiff and his father. The revenue in respect of this land, was paid by the defendant but was credited in plaintiff's name. According to Anokhilal the defendant was shown by him as sub-tenant but stated nothing on what basis he did it.
He admitted that even where the land is transferred under a private and unsanctioned sale the transferee is shown as a sub-tenant in the annual village papers. Patel Dasharath stated that he had been seeing the land in defendant's possession for the last 30 or 32 years. Kekadia another witness examined by the defendant also spoke about defendant's possession since long.
11. Thus the evidence clearly established plaintiff's title based on Patta and the crediting of revenue in his name and defendant's possession and enjoyment of the land for over a period far in excess of twelve years and the payment of revenue by him. There was no other material to determine origin of this possession and the character of it.
12. Who under these circumstances is entitled to succeed? Had plaintiff come to court with an allegation of his possession and subsequent discontinuance of his possession or his dispossession it would have been incumbent upon him to prove not only his possession but also the existence of such possession within 12 years of the date of the suit. Is the position altered by his not making any assertion regarding his possession and its discontinuance?
13. To appreciate this we have to bear in mind the provisions of Articles 142 and 144 of the Limitation Act. Article 142 provides for a period of limitation for a suit on the allegation of the plaintiff regarding his prior possession and subsequent dispossession or dicontinuance of his possession. The period of limitation is 12 years. Article 144 on the other hand is a residuary Article and applies where any other article is inapplicable. It is therefore clear that Article 144 can only come in where Article 142 is inapplicable.
14. It is well established that where the possession of the defendant is permissive in character being under pure license, it is consistent with continuance of plaintiff's title in Spite of such possession whatever may be its duration. In such a case unless the defendant succeeds in establishing that his possession has matured into title by reason of his adverse possession for over 12 years he cannot prevent the plaintiff from obtaining possession exclusive or joint as the case may be of the property by means of a suit.
It is a question of fact whether the defendant's possession is permissive in origin and character and the plaintiff, seeking to eject the defendant, relying upon such a fact has to assert and prove it. He cannot simply by emitting to assert anything beyond title seek to rake advantage on the ground of his title by suggesting that every possession with anybody else than the title-holder should be presumed to be permissive.
15. In a somewhat early case of the Privy Council reported in 8 Moo Ind App 199, the plaintiff claimed possession of certain land as falling within their Zamindari Mouza Gopalpore while the defendant asserted that it was part of Mauza Ram-pore and had been in their possession since long. The plaintiff lost in India and he appealed to Privy Council. In considering the question from the point of limitation their Lordships observed at! page 220:--
"The Appellant is seeking to disturb the possession, admitted to have existed for about eleven years, of Defendants, who insist on a possession of much longer duration as a statutory bar to the suit. It clearly lies on him to remove that bar by satisfactory proof that the cause of action accrued to him (for that is the way in which the Regulation puts it) on a dispossession within twelve years next before the commencement of the suit, and, therefore, that he, or some person through whom he claims, was in possession during that period. No proof of anterior title, such as would be involved in the decision of the boundary question in his favour, can relieve him from this burden, or shift it upon his adversaries by compelling them to prove the time and manner of dispossession. The lands in question may have been part of Mouza Gopalpore, and as such may have been enjoyed by his ancestor, and yet he may have lost, by lapse of time, his right to recover them. Their Lordships, therefore, propose to consider in the first place, what evidence there is that the Appellant, or any person through whom he claims, was in possession of lands in question at any time within twelve years next before the commencement of the suit."
The next case to be referred to is 16 Ind App 23, Mohima Chundar Mozoomdar v. Mohesh Chundar Neogi. In that case also plaintiff sued on his title in ejectment of the defendant who asserted his possession over 12 years. The observations of the Privy Council in that context are material. They say at page 26:--
"The learned Judge then says:-- 'When I showed above that the Plaintiffs are the rightful owners of the disputed land, it is for the ryot defendants to show that they are entitled to retain possession of these lands'. That, as a proposition of law, is one which hardly meets with the approval of their Lordships. This is in reality what in England would be called an action for ejectment, and in all actions for ejectment where the Defendants are admittedly in possession, and a fortiori where, as in this particular case, they had been in possession for a great number of years, and under a claim of title it lies upon the Plaintiff to prove his own title. The Plaintiff must recover by the strength of his own title, and it is the opinion of their Lordships that in this case the onus is thrown upon the Plaintiffs to prove their possession prior to the time when they were admittedly dispossessed, and at some time within twelve years before the commencement of the suit, namely, for the two or three years prior to the year 1875, or 1874, and that it does not lie upon the Defendants to show that in fact the Plaintiffs were so dispossessed."
16. In AIR 1940 Mad 798 the plaintiff pleaded permissive possession of the defendant and failed to establish it. The question which arose was whether the plaintiff in such a situation is bound to prove his possession within 12 years of the suit or it is for the defendant to establish his adverse possession for the statutory period? The Full Bench answered the question by holding that the plaintiff must prove his possession within 12 years.
17. Is the situation avoided by not making any assertion as to permissive character of the defendant's occupation? In my opinion not. If the plaintiff, who wants to disturb the existing possession of the defendant by relying upon the circumstance that the defendant's possession is permissive, the justice of the matter requires that he must allege and prove. If he does not allege, the Court ought to proceed on the assumption that he has no assertion of that character to make.
18. In AIR 1937 Nag 129, Shankarsa v. Punam Chand, Bose, J., observed at page 130:--
"Article 142 deals with a case when a plaintiff while in possession of the property has been dispossessed or has discontinued the possession, and so whenever this is proved or admitted that article must apply, and in my opinion it will apply irrespective of the allegations in the plaint. Of course what is stated there will to a large extent determine the initial onus, but the moment the defendant establishes dispossession or discontinuance of possession then even though he can assign no exact date for it, Article 142 will apply. I cannot see how the defendant can be in a worse position than he would have been if the plaintiff had admitted dispossession in his plaint. As I see it the burden would in such a case shift to the plaintiff and he would have to prove a title which was subsisting at the date of the suit."
19. Now in the present case though the plaintiff did not refer to his prior possession in the plaint he admitted that fact in his statement in the witness box. This admission apart from any other consideration takes the case out of Article 144 and it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove his possession within 12 years of the suit. The plaintiff no doubt asserted his possession about 5 or 6 years before the suit from the witness box but there is preponderating evidence consisting of the statements of the Patel, Patwari and one more witness besides defendant No. 1 that the defendant No. 1 and his father had been in possession tot over 30-32 years.
The courts below did not hold that these statements of these witnesses were incorrect. What they held was that the possession of the defendant was consistent with the continuance of plaintiff's title as the defendant was a sub-tenant. They did not however say what was the basis for such an assumption although it may have been based on what the Patwari stated namely that he had entered the defendant as a sub-tenant. It is difficult to see how, in the absence of any assertion or proof, the character of defendant's possession is determined by what the Patwari chose to say, feel or record.
20. On the whole as the case stands Article 142 of the Limitation Act applies and therefore Article 144 does not come into play and the plaintiff was bound to prove his possession within 13 years. He has failed to establish this. The plaintiff in these circumstances ought to fail.
21. Appeal is consequently allowed and plaintiff's suit is dismissed with costs throughout.
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