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Ghasiram Motiram Kulmi And Others v. Smt. Nannibai Nathulal And Another
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellants, residents of Mouja Kodaria, hired a mason named Nathulal to plaster the wall of a well that was already dug and deeper than 20 feet below ground level. During plastering, a portion of the wall collapsed, causing injuries to Nathulal, who subsequently died. The wife and mother of the deceased filed a compensation claim under the Workmen's Compensation Act before the appointed Commissioner. The appellants opposed the claim, arguing that Nathulal was not a "workman" under the Act. While other contentions were raised, the primary issue on appeal was whether Nathulal qualified as a workman under the Act, a point on which the Commissioner ruled against the appellants.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether Nathulal, the mason engaged for plastering the well wall, qualifies as a "workman" under Section 2(n) of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
- If the employment of Nathulal was of a casual nature, whether that excludes him from the definition of "workman" under the Act.
- Whether the work performed by Nathulal falls within the scope of "making an excavation" as specified in Clause XVI of Schedule II of the Act, given that the well was deeper than 20 feet.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments
- Nathulal was not a workman under the Act because he was not engaged in "making an excavation."
- His employment was of a casual nature and thus excluded from the Act's definition of workman.
Respondents' Arguments
- Nathulal qualifies as a workman under Section 2(n) of the Workmen's Compensation Act, specifically falling under Clause XVI of Schedule II.
- Even if the employment was casual, it was for the purpose of the employer's trade or business, which does not exclude him from the definition.
- Precedents support a wider construction of "making an excavation," including ancillary work such as plastering.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Popatlal v. Bai Lakhu, AIR 1952 Sau 74 | Interpretation of "workman" under the Workmen's Compensation Act and inclusion of casual workers engaged for employer's trade or business. | Supported the finding that Nathulal was a workman despite casual employment. |
| Sitharam Reddiar v. Ayyaswami, AIR 1956 Mad 212 | Definition of "workman" and applicability of compensation claims under the Act. | Used to uphold the appellant’s status as a workman under the Act. |
| Ramnivas v. Mt. Mariam, AIR 1951 Pat 260 | Clarification on the scope of work included under the Act's definition of workman. | Supported the broader interpretation of work covered under the Act. |
| Abdul Hussein v. Secretary of State, AIR 1933 Rang 244 | Employment for employer's trade/business includes casual employment within "workman" definition. | Confirmed that casual employment does not exclude workman status if for employer’s business. |
| Manton v. Cantwell, [1920] A.C 781 | Interpretation of "workman" under English law with similar provisions. | Affirmed that casual workers employed for trade/business purposes are covered. |
| Ellerman's City and Hall Lines v. Asis Thomas, AIR 1938 Bom 110 | Meaning of "monthly wages" includes average monthly wages, not strictly monthly payment. | Clarified wage considerations under the Act for eligibility as workman. |
| Alimohamed v. Shankar, AIR 1946 Bom 169 | Confirmed the interpretation of monthly wages and workman status. | Reinforced the interpretation that average monthly wages determine workman status. |
| Koynabai v. Bombay Municipality, AIR 1938 Bom 155 | Preferred a wider construction of "making an excavation" to include ancillary work. | Supported the wider interpretation that includes plastering and construction related to excavation. |
| Lysons v. Andrew Knowles and Sons, Ltd., Stuart v. Nixon and Bruce, [1901] A.C 79 | House of Lords precedent endorsing wider construction of work related to excavation. | Used to justify inclusion of ancillary tasks as part of "making an excavation." |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court examined the definition of "workman" under Section 2(n) of the Workmen's Compensation Act, emphasizing that casual employment does not exclude a person from the definition if the employment is for the employer's trade or business. The court relied on established precedents confirming this principle. The court then addressed whether Nathulal’s work fell within the scope of "making an excavation" as per Clause XVI of Schedule II. Although the well was deeper than 20 feet, the court considered whether plastering a wall after digging constitutes "making an excavation." The court preferred a wider construction of the phrase, consistent with the Act’s remedial purpose, to include ancillary work such as plastering and scaffolding related to excavation. This approach aligns with previous judicial interpretations favoring broader inclusion to fulfill the Act’s objective of providing compensation for work-related injuries. Consequently, Nathulal’s employment was held to fall within the definition of a workman, entitling his dependants to compensation.
Holding and Implications
The appeal is dismissed.
The court held that Nathulal was a "workman" within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act and that compensation was payable to his dependants. The decision reinforces a broad interpretation of "making an excavation" to include ancillary work and confirms that casual employment for the employer's trade or business does not exclude workman status. No other questions were raised, and the appeal was dismissed with costs. The ruling directly affects the parties by affirming the entitlement to compensation but does not establish a new legal precedent beyond applying existing principles.
1. The appellants, who are the residents of Mouja Kodaria engaged the services of a mason named Nathulal for plastering a wall of a well. The well had already been dug and was deeper than 20 feet below the ground level. While Nathulal was engaged in plastering a newly constructed wall of the well a portion of it fell down and he sustained injuries in that accident and died as a result. An application was thereupon submitted by the wife and the mother of the deceased for compensation under the provisions of Workmen's Compensation Act before the Commissioner appointed under the Act. The claim was opposed by the appellants on the ground that the said mason Nathulal was not a workman within the meaning of the term as used in the Act and as such the respondents were entitled to no compensation. There were other contentions raised besides this but the same are no longer material in view of the only point pressed in this appeal as to the deceased Nathulal being a workman under the Act, which the Commissioner found against the appellants.
2. Mr. Pandey who appeared for the appellants contended that Nathulal could not be said to be a workman as contemplated under the Act as he was not a person engaged for ‘making an excavation’ nor can it be said that his employment was not of a casual nature.
3. On the other hand Mr. Maharshi for the respondents contended that he would be a workman as defined in Section 2(n) of the Workmen's Compensation Act as he in the present context falls under clause XVI of Schedule II of the Act. The learned counsel relied upon the decisions reported in Popatlal v. Bai Lakhu, AIR 1952 Sau 74, Sitharam Reddiar v. Ayyaswami, AIR 1956 Mad 212 and Ramnivas v. Mt. Mariam, AIR 1951 Pat 260, in support of his contentions.
4. The term ‘Workman’ is defined by Section 2(n) of the Workmen's Compensation Act. Material part of it as applicable to the present case is:
“In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or conetxt, (n) ‘workman’ means any person (other than a person whose employment is of a casual nature and who is employed otherwise than for the purposes of the employer's trade or business) who is:
(i) ……………
(ii) employed on monthly wages, not exceeding four hundred rupees, in any such capacity as is specified in Schedule II, whether the contract of employment was made before or after the passing of this Act and whether such contract is expressed or implied, oral or in writing; but does not include any person working in the capacity of a member of the Armed Forces of the Union; and any reference to a workman who has been injured shall, where the workman is dead, include a reference to his dependants or any of them.
……………”
5. Now it appears clear from the definition that in order that a person should be a workman as defined if he be a person whose employment is of casual nature, then to exclude such a person from the definition lie should have been employed otherwise than for employer's trade or business. It therefore follows that if a workman is employed for the purpose of trade or business of an employer then even if his employment be of casual nature still he can fall within the category of a workman provided other conditions of the section are fulfilled: vide Abdul Hussein v. Secretary of State, AIR 1933 Rang 244, AIR 1956 Mad 212 and Manton v. Cantwell, [1920] A.C 781. In the last mentioned case Lord Birkenhead, L.C, in his speech in the House of Lords dealing with a similar expression in the definition of ‘workman’ under an English statute observed:
“The language of the passage I have just read is perhaps somewhat open to criticism on the question of draftsmanship, but the effect of it is nevertheless plain. The meaning of the second limb of the sentence is that if a man be employed for the purposes of the trade or business the employer is liable to him even though the employment be of a casual nature”.
6. Having regard to these authorities the fact that the employment of Nathulal might be of a casual nature would not be material as he was engaged for the purpose of the employer's business of agriculture, vide AIR 1952 Sau 74. But this is not all. It may be contended that in view of cl. (ii) of the definition only such workmen as are employed on monthly wages not exceeding Rs. 400/- who are included within the term and the persons employed on daily wages are not included. This contention has been considered in Ellerman's City and Hall Lines v. Asis Thomas, AIR 1938 Bom 110, where Beaumont, C.J, held, Sen, J., agreeing with it:
“I feel no doubt whatever that the meaning of the expression ‘monthly wages not exceeding three hundred rupees’ means wages which do not exceed on an average of Rs. 300/- a month. That construction is supported by S. 5.”
7. This decision is followed in Alimohamed v. Shankar, AIR 1946 Bom 169, by Macklin and Rajadhyaksha, JJ. I agree with this.
8. The next and more difficult hurdle in the way of the respondent is whether the said Nathulal can be said to have been employed in any such capacity as is specified in Schedule II. Now having reference to Schedule II, it appears that the only provision in Schedule II which can possibly apply is that contained in Cl. XVI which is as follows:
“employed in the making of any excavation in which on any one day of the preceding twelve months more than fifty persons have been employed or explosives have been used, or whose depth from its highest to its lowest point exceeds twenty feet.”
9. Now it is found that the well in question was deeper than 20 feet. That is a finding of fact. But the question is whether the workman in question can be said to have been employed ‘in the making of any excavation.’ The ‘expression’ is capable of a wider as well as a narrower construction. It may either mean a workman who is actually engaged in digging a well. It may even include a workman who is employed after the digging is over in making constructions such as a wall, plastering it and in raising scaffolding for the purpose. The question for consideration is whether we should adopt a narrower or a wider construction.
10. If we have a look at the preamble it is clear that the Act is designed to provide for payment by certain employers to their workmen compensation for injury by accident. Having regard to the scope and intention of the Act, it is the wider construction which should be preferred to the narrower one as held by the Bombay High Court in Koynabai v. Bombay Municipality, AIR 1938 Bom 155, where Beaumont, C.J, following the House of Lords' case of Lysons V. Andrew Knowles and Sons, Ltd., Stuart v. Nixon and Bruce, [1901] A.C 79. If this principle is clear, as it seems to me it is, then it is clear that the expression ‘making of excavation’ cannot be confined to mere process of digging but should include ancillary processes such as constructing wall to put it in sound condition, plastering the same or even raising necessary scaffolding for the purpose.
11. If we are to hold that if a workman is employed in the operation of actual digging then he is a workman under the Act and the compensation payable under it can be claimed for an accidental injury to him or for his accidental death but the moment the digging is complete any person engaged in completing the construction of the well or even a person engaged in preparing a scaffolding for aiding the process of digging is not a workman, it would be a strange result not in consonance with the object and spirit of the Act and would be clearly such as could not have been contemplated to flow by the framers of the Act.
12. For these reasons I agree with the view that the deceased in this case was a workman as defined in the Act and the compensation was payable to him under the provisions thereof. No other question is raised. The appeal is therefore dismissed with costs throughout.
ED/R.G.D
13. Appeal dismissed.
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