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Radhe Shyam Agarwal v. Kashinath Vaish And Another

Madhya Pradesh High Court
Nov 30, 1959
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Analytical Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The summary concerns a revision against an interlocutory order dated 29 June 1959 of the Civil Judge, First Class, Gwalior, refusing to stay Civil Suit No. 20 of 1955. Plaintiffs Kashinath and Rambabu instituted the first suit on 8 January 1955 for ejectment of the defendant Radhey Shyam from a ground-floor shop in a building called "Sweet Cottage" and for arrears of rent. The plaint alleged that Radhey Shyam took the shop by a rent note dated 16 June 1954 at Rs. 35 per month for 11 months and that certain payments were made (Rs. 30 on 26 June, Rs. 35 on 31 August and Rs. 35 on 6 October 1954), with arrears alleged for the period 16 June to 31 December 1954; a notice of eviction was given on 11 December 1954 determining the tenancy on 31 December 1954.

Before filing his written statement in the first suit, Radhey Shyam (together with his father and brothers) filed a separate suit for partition of joint Hindu family property in the Court of the District Judge, Gwalior, on 22 March 1955 (the second suit). The disputed shop was included in that partition suit.

Radhey Shyam filed his written statement in the first suit on 29 April 1955 denying execution of the rent note and tenancy status, asserting coparcenary rights in the joint family (firm Nandram Narain Das), admitting the payments but explaining them as receipts favourable to his son Laxmandas, and challenging the plaintiffs' right to sue.

On 6 August 1957 Radhey Shyam applied in the first suit for a stay under Section 10 or Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The trial Court refused the stay, concluding Section 10 did not apply and that a stay under inherent powers was not appropriate because the trial of the first suit would be confined to the contract of tenancy and would not require inquiry into title.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the first suit (ejectment and rent) should be stayed in favour of the second suit (partition) by application of Section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  2. Whether the trial Court should exercise its inherent powers under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure to stay the first suit pending determination of the partition (title) suit.
  3. If a stay is refused, whether there is a risk of conflicting decisions or res judicata effects between the two suits that would justify a stay.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's (Defendant Radhey Shyam) Arguments — as summarised in the opinion (Shri Patankar)

  • The first suit is a possessory/ejectment suit and preference should be given to the second suit, which is a title/partition suit.
  • A stay will avoid the possibility of two conflicting judgments on the defendant's status (tenant vs. coparcener) between the two courts.
  • If the first suit is not stayed, a finding in the first suit about the defendant's status might operate as res judicata (or at least in principle) in the partition suit.

Plaintiffs' Arguments (Opposing) — as summarised in the opinion (Shri Gupta)

  • The decision to stay or not under Section 151 lies entirely in the discretion of the trial Judge and this Court should not interfere with that discretion (reliance placed on Keshardeo v. Radha Kissen, AIR 1953 SC 23).
  • The only issue in the first suit is whether a landlord-tenant relationship existed; a tenant cannot ordinarily assert title in himself or a third person.
  • A stay would prejudice the plaintiffs because the defendant would remain in occupation of the shop indefinitely while the partition suit proceeds.
  • Even if the partition suit is decreed in the defendant's favour, a co-sharer can nevertheless be a tenant of other co-sharers (reference to Mayne on Hindu Law as cited in the opinion).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Keshardeo v. Radha Kissen, AIR 1953 SC 23 Cited by respondents to support that stay under Section 151 is a matter of trial Court's discretion and appellate interference is limited. The court acknowledged counsel's reliance and treated the principle of trial Court discretion as relevant to the exercise of inherent powers under Section 151.
Logan v. Bank of Scotland, (1906) 1 KB 141 Stated the test for staying an action: stay if no injustice to plaintiff and defendant would suffer injustice amounting to vexation and oppression otherwise. The Court cited this case to summarise the established test for exercising inherent powers to stay a suit and applied that balancing test to the facts.
Sealey (otherwise Callan) v. Callan, (1953) 1 All ER 942 Authority on principles governing stays under inherent jurisdiction. Referred to as an illustrative authority supporting the legal position that such powers are to be sparingly exercised.
St. Pierre v. South American Stores, (1936) 1 K. B. 382 Another authority on the stay of proceedings under inherent powers. Referred to along with other authorities as background for the principles guiding stays.
Shiba Prasad v. Nilabji Bali, AIR 1947 Pat 45 Example reference for contesting execution/validity of a rent-note and challenges to lease. The court mentioned it as a relevant authority showing that defendant can contest execution/validity of alleged rent-note and pleaded defences such as fraud, misrepresentation or mistake.
Ma Kyaw v. Daw Kye U, AIR 1935 Rang 355 Holdings on staying a possessory suit when a counter suit for declaration of title is filed in the same Court (in that case under Section 9, Specific Relief Act). The court examined this decision and held it inapplicable to the present case because the specific context (a Section 9 Specific Relief Act possessory suit and a counter suit in the same Court) differed from the facts before it.
Raj Lakshmi Dasi v. Banamali Sen, AIR 1953 SC 33 Observations relied upon by petitioner; related to adjudication and effect of prior decisions (context given in the opinion). The Court observed those authorities did not apply to the present case because there was no special tribunal or special law involved and the controversies were different between the two suits.
Run Bahadur Singh v. Mt. Lachoo Koer, ILR 11 Cal 301 Referable authority when Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure is sought to be applied. Mentioned by the Court as an authority that may be referred to when Section 11 is in question; cited in the context of distinguishing applicability of res judicata principles.
Mulji Sicka and Co. v. District Council, Bhandara, AIR 1945 Nag 171 Another authority in the context of Section 11 and related questions of adjudication between different fora. Referred to in the same paragraph as the Run Bahadur Singh case when discussing the inapplicability of res judicata concerns between the two suits.
Bhurumal v. Jagannath, AIR 1942 PC 13 Passage (Sir George Rankin) regarding loans by managing members to junior members and effect on joint family property; used to illustrate possible outcomes on partition and enforceability of debts. The Court quoted the passage to show that obtaining a decree against a junior member in respect of a debt does not necessarily convert acquired property into joint property and to indicate there may be no inconsistency in holding both tenancy and co-ownership in different contexts.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court first addressed Section 10 CPC and rejected its applicability because the first suit (ejectment) was instituted earlier than the second (partition) and because Section 10 requires complete identity of parties and subject matter, which the Court found absent.

Turning to inherent powers under Section 151 CPC, the Court summarised the governing legal position: a Court has power to stay a suit pending a connected proceeding only to facilitate real and substantial justice; such power must be exercised sparingly and only to prevent injustice to either party or abuse of process. The Court recalled the settled test (Logan v. Bank of Scotland) that a stay is appropriate only if no injustice will result to the plaintiff and if continuing the action would subject the defendant to injustice amounting to vexation and oppression.

Applying these principles to the facts, the Court characterised the first suit as a straightforward eviction and arrears action brought in the plaintiffs' individual names, confined primarily to the question whether a tenancy existed between the plaintiffs and the defendant. The Court observed:

  • If the plaintiffs prove tenancy, they obtain ejectment on the ground of forfeiture within the meaning of Section 111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act, and Section 116 of the Evidence Act may also be engaged.
  • If the plaintiffs fail to prove tenancy, the suit will be dismissed without need to decide the parties' ownership rights.

The Court considered and distinguished authorities cited by the petitioner. It found Ma Kyaw v. Daw Kye U inapplicable because that case involved Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act and a counter suit in the same Court. The Court rejected the contention that an ejectment decree could properly operate as res judicata in the partition suit, emphasising that the second suit concerns partition and coparcenary questions that are "foreign" to the narrow tenancy issue before the Civil Judge and that parties are not identical.

The Court also expressed concern about permitting a general practice whereby tenants could file separate title suits to indefinitely delay eviction proceedings—an outcome it considered would amount to abuse and an absurd position if generally allowed. On balance, the Court concluded it was not satisfied that continuing the first suit would be an abuse of process and that the injustice of staying the suit (to the plaintiffs) was apparent.

For these reasons the Court upheld the trial Judge's exercise of discretion in refusing the stay application of 6 August 1957.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The revision is dismissed; the application to stay the first suit was rightly rejected by the trial Court and the revision was dismissed with costs.

Direct consequences for the parties: the first suit (ejectment and arrears) will proceed in the Civil Judge's Court; the defendant's application for a stay under Section 10 or Section 151 CPC was refused and that refusal is upheld on revision. The Court did not lay down any broader new principle of law — the decision applies the established tests for staying proceedings and preserves the trial Court's discretion to refuse stays where the balance of injustice favours continuance.

Note: The opinion does not purport to decide final issues of title between the parties; it resolves only the interlocutory contest over staying the first suit and leaves substantive determination of tenancy and any partition issues to the respective suits.

Show all summary ...

1. This revision is directed against an interlocutory order passed by the Civil Judge, First Class, Gwalior on June 29, 1959 in Civil Suit No. 20 of 1955 whereby he has refused to stay the suit on the application of the defendant.

2. The facts material for this revision are these:-The plaintiffs, Kashinath and Rambabu, brought this suit on January 8, 1955, against the petitioner Radhey Shyam for ejectment from a shop and for arrears of rent on the allegations that the suit shop, situated in the ground floor of a building called "Sweet Cottage," was taken from them by the defendant on June 16, 1954, under a rent note executed by him at Rs. 35/- per month for 11 months; that the defendant paid Rs. 30/- on the 26th June Rs. 35/- on the 31st August and again Rs. 35/- on the 6th October 1954; that they were in arrears of rent from the 16th June to the 31st December, 1954; that the defendant started interferring with the plaintiffs' possession in respect of other portions of the house, that when the plaintiffs gave him a notice, he disputed their title and asserted his own; and that a notice of eviction was given by the plaintiffs on the 11th December, determining the tenancy on the 31st December, 1954. This suit was instituted on January 8, 1955, and was numbered as civil original suit No. 20 of 1955. This will hereinafter be called the First Suit.

3. Before filing his written statement in the first suit, Radhey Shyam along with his father and brothers filed a separate suit in the Court of the District Judge, Gwalior, for partition of joint Hindu family property alleging that Kashinath, Ram Babu and their sons together with the plaintiffs in that suit were all co-parceners of a Hindu co-parcenary. That suit was instituted on March 22, 1955 and will conveniently be called the second suit. In that suit the property in dispute in the first suit was also included.

4. Then Radhey Shyam filed his written statement in the first suit on April 29, 1955, wherein he denied to have executed a rent note as alleged by the plaintiffs, denied to be a tenant in the disputed shop, reiterated his status as a coparcener in firm Nandram Narain Das, a joint Hindu family firm, and alleged that since the suit shop belonged to that firm he was also a co-owner of the shop. He admitted to have paid the three amounts as asserted in the plaint but explained it by saying that Kashinath had represented to him that the payment of these monies would in no way prejudice his rights because he (Kashinath) was charging rent even from his own sons and, for the satisfaction, of the defendant, Kashinath handed over to him three receipts which had been passed in favour of his own son Laxmandas. Inter alia the plaintiffs' right to bring this suit was challenged.

5. On August 6, 1957, Radhey Shyam applied to the Court, in the first suit, to stay it under Section 10 or Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. That was opposed by the plaintiffs. The trial Judge held that Section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure was not attracted and that he did not consider, for the reasons he stated, that it was a fit case for stay in exercise of his inherent powers. The main consideration which weighed with him was that since in the first suit there would be no inquiry as to the title of the parties and the trial would be confined to the contract of tenancy, there would be no prejudice to the defendant.

6. Shri Patankar, learned counsel for the petitioner, strenuously contends that the first suit must be stayed because it is a possessory suit and preference must be given to the second one which is a title suit; secondly, the stay of the first suit will avoid the possibility of two conflicting judgments, for it is likely that in the first suit the Civil Judge may hold that the defendant is not a coparcener while in the second suit he may be declared to be a coparcener; and, thirdly that if the first suit is not stayed, finding by that Court whether the defendant is or is not a co-owner of the suit shop may operate as res judicata in his partition suit before the District Judge.

7. Shri Gupta, on the other side, opposes this revision with vehemence. The learned counsel argues that to stay or not to stay a pending suit under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure is a matter which rests in the entire discretion of the trial Judge and there cannot be any interference with that discretion by this Court. Reliance is placed on their Lordships' pronouncement in the case of Keshardeo v. Radha Kissen, AIR 1953 SC 23. It is further maintained that in the present suit the only question for determination will be whether the relationship of landlord and tenant existed between the plaintiffs on the one hand and the defendant on the other.

It is not open to the tenant to assert a title in himself or in a third person. Moveover, the plaintiffs will be prejudiced by the stay of the first suit because during the indefinite time which the second suit may take to end, the defendant will remain fn Occupation of the shop without any right. Above all, even if the second suit for partition is decreed in favour of the defendant in the first suit, that will have no bearing on the first suit inasmuch as one co-sharer can in the eye of law be the tenant of others, as stated in Mayne on Hindu Law (Eleventh Edn.) at page 378.

8. After giving my anxious consideration to the elaborate arguments advanced on both sides, I have reached the conclusion that the first suit must not be stayed. I give my reasons below.

9. The stay under Section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure is out of the question in the present suit which was instituted earlier than the second suit. Moveover, for the application of Section 10 there must be a complete identity of parties and also identity of the subject matter which is not the case here.

10. Now, before the facts arc considered for the application of Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the legal position must be summed up. It is undoubted law that, apart from Section 10 of the Code, a Court has inherent powers to stay a suit pending the decision in a connected suit or proceeding in order to facilitate that real and substantial justice is done. The pre-eminent principle that a conflict between parties must be resolved according to a fair judicial trial and substantial justice must be rendered to the parties, can never be lost sight of.

Inherent powers to stay an otherwise competent suit can be exercised only for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. That jurisdiction must be sparingly exercised. Courts have evolved certain well defined principles for the exercise of that power. It is to be satisfied that if the suit is stayed the plaintiff will not suffer injustice, while if the action is continued the defendant will be a victim of such injustice as may amount to vexation and oppression. And the onus to make out both these points is on the defendant. It was held in Logan v. Bank of Scotland, (1906) 1 KB 141:

"The Court will stay an action, brought within the jurisdiction in respect of a cause of action arising out of the jurisdiction if satisfied that no injustice will be done thereby to the plaintiff, and that the defendant would be subject, to such injustice in defending the action as would amount to vexation and oppression, to which he would not be subjected if an action were brought, in another and accessible Court where the cause of action arose."

Reference may also be made to the observations in Sealey (otherwise Callan) v. Callan, (1953) 1 All ER 942 and St. Pierre v. South American Stores, (1936) 1 K. B. 382.

11. The first suit is a simple suit for eviction and arrears of rent by a landlord against his tenant. I have carefully perused the plaint. The plaintiffs have not sued the defendant Radhey Shyam either as manager or coparcener of a joint Hindu family firm. Their suit, as framed, is in their individual names. Their plain allegation is that Radhey Shyam executed a rent note in favour of the two plaintiffs and he entered into possession of that shop as their tenant.

Prima facie it appears to me (it is not necessary to apply my mind fully or to give a decision there on today) that this suit will succeed or fail on the sole question whether or not it was on the basis of a tenancy between the parties to this suit that the defendant entered into the disputed shop. If the plaintiffs prove that issue, they get a decree for ejectment on the ground of forfeiture within the meaning of Section 111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act and, in that event, Section 116 of the Evidence Act will also come into play.

If they do not succeed in proving that issue, their suit will be dismissed without going into the question whether they are or are not the exclusive owners of the suit premises. It is certainly open to Radhey Shyam to contest the execution of the alleged rent-note and also, if it is otherwise permissible to contest the lease and to contest his own status as a lessee on the ground that the alleged rent note invalidates the lease or otherwise make it null and void, for example, by reason of fraud, misrepresentation, mistake, etc. Shiba Prasad v. Nilabji Bali, AIR 1947 Pat 45 may be referred to.

12. Shri Patankar has cited to me a decision reported in Ma Kyaw v. Daw Kye U, AIR 1935 Rang 355 where it is held:

"Where one party files a suit for recovery of possession and the opposite party files a counter suit in the same Court for declaration of title against the first party, the proper action for the Court is that, under the inherent powers of the Court, the hearing of the possessory suit should he stayed until the question of title to the land has been decided."

After going through the report it is clear that it has no application to the present suit. There the 'possessory suit' was one under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act and that was stayed because of a counter suit for declaration of 'title' having been filed by the opposite party in the same Court.

13. The other apprehension of Shri Patankar that if the first suit is decided against Radhey Shyam and a decree for ejectment is passed, it will operate as res judicata at least on principles, if not in terms, in the second suit seems to be misconceived. The second suit in the District Judge's Court is for partition of a joint Hindu family on the allegation that a coparcenary was constituted by the plaintiffs and the defendants in that suit. That controversy is foreign to the first suit. The parties are not identical. No adjudication against Radhey Shyam as to his status as tenant in the disputed shop can be of any avail in the second suit.

There, questions directly and substantially in issue are entirely different. In my opinion, the observations of their Lordships in Raj Lakshmi Dasi v. Banamali Sen, AIR 1953 SC 33, which have, in the words of Shri Patankar, created a fear in the defendant's mind do not apply to this case. Here there is no question of adjudication by a special tribunal constituted under a special law. And if Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure is sought to be applied, the decision of the Privy Council in Run Bahadur Singh v. Mt. Lachoo Koer, ILR 11 Cal 301 and the decision in Mulji Sicka and Co. v. District Council. Bhandara, AIR 1945 Nag 171 may be referred to.

14. I also do not see any possibility of two conflicting decisions in the two suits, the nature and scope of which, and the controversies in which, are entirely different,

15. It is unnecessary for me to go into the question whether a decree for ejectment in the first suit against Radhey Shyam as the tenant will have any effect on his rights in the second suit. It is for the defendant to advise himself. But the observations of Sir George Rankin in the case of Bhurumal v. Jagannath, AIR 1942 PC 13 may be borne in mind:

"Where the managing member of a joint Hindu family advances loan to a junior member it is wrong to jump to the conclusion that what appears to be a loan is not in truth a loan because there is a joint business or some other joint property. In such cases the junior member upon a partition will be entitled to his share in the assets of the joint business which made the loan including the debt due from or money recovered from himself. There is no more paradox in this than already lies in the fact of the family or a firm having made him a loan. When a decree has been obtained against the junior member in respect of the loan advanced to him by the family, the property acquired by him out of the loan cannot be treated as joint property."

If ultimately the Courts take the view that on the one hand Radhey Shyam is the tenant in the suit shop of the first suit and is also a co-owner of all the properties belonging to the alleged joint Hindu family, of which that shop is a portion, prima facie, I do not see any inconsistency; no one knows to which coparcener the disputed shop may be allotted on partition.

16. All the above considerations aside, I have also to see whether it will be laying down correct: law or a correct practice that a suit for eviction should be stayed just because a counter suit for declaration of title is instituted by the defendant of the ejectment suit. If that was permitted, every tenant will be able to continue his unauthorised stay on the rented premises and protract litigation just by instituting a suit for declaration of title to that property -- however imaginary and frivolous the title may be. That will lead to an absurd position and cannot be generally allowed. I do not see in this case any remarkable feature which can persuade me to interfere with the discretion exercised by the trial Judge. Since I am not satisfied that the continuance of the first suit will be an abuse of the process of the Court and since the injustice which will be caused to the plaintiffs by its stay is apparent, I hold that the defendant's application of August 6, 1957, has been rightly rejected.

17. This revision is, therefore, dismissed with costs.