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Dammulal v. Kalawati Devi

Madhya Pradesh High Court
Feb 6, 1959
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Summary of Legal Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The Gulab Theatre in Jabalpur was owned by three brothers: Biranlal, Ballilal and Chhotelal. Chhotelal died leaving a son, Chokhelal. The three brothers had leased the theatre to Jamunadas for six years at Rs. 300 per month from 1 July 1944, with a renewable two-year term at Rs. 350 per month. Jamunadas entered an agreement (Exh. D-4, dated 28 May 1947) transferring his lease rights to defendants Nos. 1 and 2. Soon afterwards the building was damaged by fire; defendants Nos. 1 and 2 delivered possession back to the lessors for reconstruction.

On 23 October 1948 Chhotelal executed a lease in favour of the plaintiff for five years at Rs. 1,000 per month (Exh. D-7) and agreed to run cinema shows in partnership with the plaintiff (plaintiff to have a share of -/12/-). The document recorded that the plaintiff would pay Rs. 6,000 in advance for six months' rent, of which Chhotelal was liable for Rs. 1,500 as his partnership share. The plaintiff ultimately surrendered rights under that document in favour of defendants Nos. 1 and 2 as part of a later compromise.

Prior to the fire, the lessors had initiated proceedings before the Rent Controller seeking termination of the tenancy against defendant No. 2 and Jamunadas; that matter was compromised with defendant No. 2 agreeing to pay Rs. 450 per month (application Exh. D-11 dated 20 March 1948). Subsequently, defendants Nos. 1 and 2 sued the lessors for specific performance and possession in Civil Suit No. 13-A of 1948; that suit was also compromised and embodied in a decree dated 27 December 1949 requiring the defendants to execute a lease in favour of the plaintiffs and place them in possession.

Pursuant to the decree, a formal lease instrument was executed on 25 January 1950. Defendants paid Rs. 4,000 (and additionally Rs. 300) to the plaintiff in satisfaction of amounts she had previously paid as advance rent. The plaintiff alleged that defendants agreed to pay a further Rs. 7,000 by monthly instalments of Rs. 775 beginning 20 February 1950 (bond Exh. P-5), with a clause making the entire balance payable on default of any three instalments. Only Rs. 750 was paid toward the first instalment; the plaintiff sued for the balance (principal Rs. 6,250 plus interest and total damages claimed Rs. 6,731-4-0).

The suit proceeded ex parte against defendant No. 3. Defendant No. 2 admitted execution of the bond; defendant No. 1 denied executing the bond but admitted execution by defendant No. 2 and payment by defendant No. 2 of the sums to the plaintiff. Defendants generally contended that Chhotelal had no authority alone to lease the theatre and that the bond had been executed under undue pressure from the plaintiff's husband, Jamunaprasad Dube (P.W. 2). The lower Court rejected the defendants' pleas and entered a decree for Rs. 6,731-4-0 plus costs (with compensatory costs against defendants Nos. 1 and 2). The defendants appealed.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a judgment written by a judge after he had left his station (transferred or otherwise ceased to hold office) can validly be pronounced by his successor under Order 20, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  2. Whether Chhotelal had authority alone to grant a lease of the Gulab Theatre to the plaintiff and whether the lessors (including his brothers) implicitly acquiesced in that lease.
  3. Whether the bond (Exh. P-5) evidencing the agreed payment to the plaintiff was executed by all the defendants and thus binding on them.
  4. Whether the bond or the lease was procured by undue influence, coercion or collusion (including alleged interference by the plaintiff's husband), rendering the transaction voidable.
  5. Whether the compromise between the parties resolving competing claims to the theatre rights was binding on the defendants.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Case and Evidence

  • The plaintiff relied on the lease purportedly executed by Chhotelal on 23 October 1948 (Exh. D-7) and on the bond (Exh. P-5) under which defendants agreed to pay the balance consideration (Rs. 7,000 payable by instalments of Rs. 775 starting 20 February 1950).
  • The plaintiff asserted that she had been paid Rs. 4,000 (by way of satisfaction of advance previously paid) and later Rs. 300 and Rs. 750, but that defendants defaulted on the remainder; she claimed Rs. 6,250 principal plus interest and damages totalling Rs. 6,731-4-0.
  • Witness testimony (Jamunaprasad Dube, P.W. 2) was presented to prove execution and admission of signatures on the bond; attesting witness Balkrishna Tiwari (P.W. 11) corroborated the signatures.
  • The plaintiff denied that her husband had created any obstruction to defendants' running of cinema shows; she and her witnesses maintained that the transaction was bona fide and not induced by undue influence or collusion.

Defendants' Arguments and Defences

  • Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 contended that Chhotelal alone had no authority to grant a lease without reference to his brothers; therefore the lease to the plaintiff was not binding on them.
  • They argued that they had acquired rights through Jamunadas and that Jamunadas' transfer to them entitled them to continue possession. They also relied on prior dealings and the rent arrangement (including a compromise before the Rent Controller).
  • Defendants asserted that defendant No. 2 executed the bond under undue pressure from the plaintiff's husband, Jamunaprasad Dube (P.W. 2), who allegedly did not allow them to run the cinema shows without interruption; one defendant suggested Jamunaprasad acted as Chhotelal's pleader in a criminal case and used undue influence.
  • They further alleged, implicitly, that the plaintiff colluded with Chhotelal to defeat defendants' rights.
  • For procedural challenge, it was contended (on authority of Lalshah v Rikhiram) that the judgment had been written by a judge (Shri B.B.L. Shrivastava) after he left Jabalpur and hence was invalid and could not be delivered by his successor.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Lalshah v. Rikhiram, 7 CPLR 18 Cited for the proposition that a judge who ceases to be a judge has no jurisdiction to write a judgment and such a judgment cannot validly be delivered by his successor. The court described this authority as the basis of the defendants' procedural objection but disagreed with its reasoning and did not follow it.
Mt. Fatima v. D. Sinclair, Second Appeal No. 441 of 1887 D/- 22-3-1889 (Nag) Observations to the effect that a judgment derives its force from being written by a person who has jurisdiction; used in Lalshah with approval. The court reproduced the observations but ultimately rejected the restrictive interpretation urged from these authorities in light of later and consistent authority to the contrary.
Order 20, Rule 2, Code of Civil Procedure Statutory provision: "A Judge may pronounce a judgment written but not pronounced by his predecessor." The court interpreted Order 20, Rule 2 as authorising a successor to pronounce a judgment written by his predecessor even if the predecessor had ceased to hold office; the court held the impugned judgment validly pronounced under this rule.
Girjashankar v. Gopalji, ILR 30 Bom 241 Held under the old Code that a judgment written by a judge after transfer and pronounced by his successor was valid. Relied upon by the court as supporting the view that a successor can validly pronounce a judgment written by his predecessor.
Sundar Kuar v. Chandreshwar Prasad Narain Singh, ILR 34 Cal 293 Judgment written by a judge while on leave and pronounced by successor is valid. Cited by the court among authorities approving the validity of successor pronouncing a judgment.
Satyendra Nath v. Kastura Kumari, ILR 35 Cal 756 (Full Bench) Full Bench approved the view that a judgment written by a judge who went on transfer or leave and delivered by his successor was valid. Followed by the court as persuasive authority supporting the validity of the succession practice under Order 20, Rule 2.
Basant Bihari v. Secretary of State, ILR 35 All 368 Case where the judge had written the judgment after he had ceased to hold office and the judgment was held valid. Relied upon to support the court's conclusion that judgments so written may be validly pronounced by successors.
Lilawati Kuar v. Chhotey Singh, ILR 42 All 362 (AIR 1920 All 332) Judge had written the judgment on reversion to another post; principle supports validity of successor's pronouncement. Used as further supporting authority for the court's view on Order 20, Rule 2.
Baramdeo Pande v. Debidatt Singh, ILR 53 All 133 (AIR 1931 All 90) Held judgment written by a judge after he had resigned could be validly pronounced by successor. Relied upon by the court to show consistent judicial opinion in favour of successor-pronounced judgments.
Ghulam Rasul v. Mt. Gul Jan, AIR 1943 Pesh 11 Held that a judgment written by a judge after he had ceased to have jurisdiction could validly be pronounced by his successor. Cited to support the court's conclusion that the predecessor's loss of jurisdiction at the time of writing does not invalidate the judgment when pronounced by the successor.
Hargulal v. Abdul Gany Hajee Ishaq, ILR 14 Rang 136 (AIR 1936 Rang 147) Similar holding regarding validity of judgment written by a judge after he had ceased to hold jurisdiction. Adduced as further supportive authority for the court's interpretation of Order 20, Rule 2.
Mt. Kishni Bai v. Budhu Ram, AIR 1919 Lab. 265 Listed among authorities dealing with the validity of judgments written by judges who later ceased to hold office. Relied upon as part of the consistent body of case law supporting the court's view.
Pratap Kishore v. Gyanendranain, AIR 1951 Orissa 313 Another case cited in the same context of validity of successor's pronouncement. Used to demonstrate the precedent trend relied upon by the court.
Lakhiama Jiu v. Lokenath Das, AIR 1920 Pat 578 Included among cases upholding the validity of judgments written by judges who had ceased to hold office. Adopted as part of the jurisprudential foundation for the court's ruling on the procedural point.
Nagendra Bala Dasi v. Dinanath, AIR 1924 PC 34 Cited by defendants in support of a contention related to undue influence (counsel/client advantage) affecting transactions. The court observed the reliance but found nothing in the record to show the plaintiff had taken unfair advantage; the court held that any attack based on undue influence could only be maintained by Chhotelal or his brothers.
Balarama v. Vasudeva, AIR 1948 PC 7 Cited for the proposition that a compromise is binding where there is a bona fide dispute about rights. The court relied on this authority to support the conclusion that the compromise resolving competing claims was binding on the defendants given the bona fide dispute between the parties.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in two main strands: (A) the procedural objection to the judgment's validity and (B) the substantive merits concerning authority to lease, execution of the bond, alleged undue influence/collusion, and the binding effect of the compromise.

(A) Procedural Issue — Validity of Judgment Written by Predecessor

  1. The defendants contended that the judgment was invalid because it had been written by Shri B.B.L. Shrivastava after he had left Jabalpur and thus he lacked jurisdiction to write it; they relied on Lalshah v. Rikhiram.
  2. The court considered Order 20, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure ("A Judge may pronounce a judgment written but not pronounced by his predecessor") and examined earlier decisions under the old Code and subsequent authorities.
  3. After reviewing a number of decisions (Girjashankar, Sundar Kuar, Satyendra Nath Full Bench, Basant Bihari, Lilawati Kuar, Baramdeo Pande, Ghulam Rasul, Hargulal, and others), the court found a consensus of judicial opinion holding that Order 20, Rule 2 empowers a successor to pronounce a judgment written by his predecessor even if the predecessor had ceased to have jurisdiction at the time of writing.
  4. The court rejected the narrower view urged by defendants (as stated in Lalshah and Mt. Fatima) that would read into Order 20, Rule 2 a requirement that the judge must still have jurisdiction when writing the judgment. The court concluded that such a limitation is not present in the text of Order 20, Rule 2 and therefore held the judgment validly pronounced by the successor.

(B) Substantive Issues — Authority to Grant Lease, Execution of Bond, Undue Influence, Collusion and Compromise

  1. The court observed that defendants Nos. 1 and 2 had no title derived by a registered lease from Jamunadas; there was nothing to show they paid rent after the fire and during reconstruction, and Jamunadas had not executed a registered deed in their favour.
  2. Given the defaults alleged and the circumstances (including Chhotelal's custody of documents and his role in prior proceedings, Exh. D-11), the court found credible the testimony (P.W. 2) that Chhotelal managed the Gulab Theatre and therefore had authority to grant the lease to the plaintiff. The brothers' lack of objection indicated acquiescence.
  3. On the question whether the bond was executed by all defendants, the court relied on the plaintiff's husband's evidence and corroboration by an attesting witness (P.W. 11). Defendants had admitted signatures on the document; moreover, defendant No. 1 (D.W. 2) acknowledged having given a cheque for Rs. 4,000 to Chhotelal for payment to the plaintiff, implying knowledge of the bond and participation in the compromise. The court upheld the lower Court's finding that all defendants executed the bond.
  4. The court examined the undue-pressure allegation: the only supporting testimony came from defendant No. 2 (D.W. 4), who said that P.W. 2 told him that if consideration was paid, he would not create obstruction. The court found this insufficient to establish undue pressure. It also noted that if unlawful obstructions had occurred, defendants could have sought legal remedy; the bond was therefore not the product of undue pressure.
  5. As to collusion, the court found no evidence that the plaintiff colluded with Chhotelal to defeat defendants' rights. Chhotelal's grant to the plaintiff was attributed to defendants' own defaults in paying rent, and the plaintiff's claim was bona fide.
  6. Reliance by defendants on Nagendra Bala Dasi v. Dinanath (for an argument concerning advantage taken from a counsel-client relationship) was found inapposite on the facts; nothing showed the plaintiff had taken unfair advantage, and any attack on the transaction on undue-influence grounds could only be mounted by Chhotelal or his brothers if the transaction was induced by undue influence.
  7. Given there was a bona fide dispute over rights and that defendants lacked a registered legal title, the compromise reached between the parties was binding on the defendants; the court invoked Balarama v. Vasudeva to support this outcome.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is dismissed. The court affirmed the decree of the lower Court awarding Rs. 6,731-4-0 plus costs and upheld the award of compensatory costs against defendants Nos. 1 and 2.

Key Legal Conclusions and Immediate Effects:

  • The court held that under Order 20, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure a successor judge may validly pronounce a judgment written by his predecessor even if the predecessor had ceased to hold office at the time of writing; the impugned judgment was therefore validly pronounced.
  • The court upheld the lower court's findings that Chhotelal had authority to grant the lease to the plaintiff, that the bond was duly executed by all defendants, and that allegations of undue influence, coercion or collusion were not made out on the evidence.
  • The compromise resolving competing claims to the theatre rights was binding on the defendants; consequently the plaintiff's claim succeeded and the decree for sums claimed was sustained.
  • Direct consequence: the appellant-defendants remain liable for the decree amount and costs as awarded by the lower Court; the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.

Wider Precedential Note: The court explicitly rejected the narrower view (as represented by Lalshah v. Rikhiram and Mt. Fatima) that would require a judge to have jurisdiction at the moment of writing a judgment for that judgment to be valid when pronounced by his successor. Instead, the court followed a series of authorities to the contrary and interpreted Order 20, Rule 2 as permissive of successor pronouncement even where the predecessor had ceased to hold office. This interpretation was a determinative part of the court's resolution of the procedural objection in this case.

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3. A building at Jabalpur, called the Gulab Theatre, admittedly belonged to three brothers, Biranlal, Ballilal and Chhotelal. Chhotelal is dead and has left a son Chokhelal (D.W. 3). The three brothers leased the Gulab Theatre to one Jamunadas for a period of six years on a monthly rent of Rs. 300/- under a patta (Exh. D-5) dated 1st July 1944. The lease was renewable for a further period of two years on a monthly rent of Rs. 350/-. Jamunadas entered into an agreement with defendants Nos. land 2 vide Exh. D-4, dated 28th May 1947, for transfer of his rights for the remaining period of the lease. It appears that shortly afterwards the Gulab Theatre was damaged by fire and accordingly defendants Nos. 1 and 2 placed the lessors in its possession for reconstruction. Chhotelal thereafter executed an agreement of lease (Exh. D-7), dated 23 October 1948, in favour of the plaintiff, whereby he purported to give a lease of the Gulab Theatre to her for a period of five years on a monthly rent of Rs. 1,000/-. The document also evidences an agreement between them that they would run cinema shows in the building in partnership in which the plaintiff would have a -/12/-share. The document also shows that the plaintiff was to pay in advance to Chhotelal a sum of Rs. 6,000/- on account of the rent for six months, out of which Chhotelal was liable for Rs. 1,500/- according to his share in the partnership. This is the document the rights under which were said to be, ultimately surrendered by the plaintiff in favour of defendants Nos. 1 and 2.

4. It appears that before the Gulab Theatre was burnt, the lessors had instituted proceedings against defendant No. 2 and Jamunadas before the Rent Controller for terminating the tenancy. That case was compromised, whereby it was agreed that defendant No. 2 would be paying Rs. 4507- per month as rent for the building. An application (Exh. D-II), dated 20th March 1948, to that effect was accordingly made before the Rent Controller and the case was dismissed. It appears that the building caught fire sometime afterwards. Subsequently, Chhotelal leased the premises to the plaintiff on 23rd October 1948 as already stated. This was during the pendency of the civil suit noted below.

5. Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 sued the lessors in the Court of the 1st Additional District Judge, Jabalpur (Civil Suit No. 13-A of 1948) for specific performance of the agreement of lease and also for possession of the building. That suit was compromised between the parties. Accordingly, an application (Exh. D-12), dated 12th December 1949, was presented before the Court on that date. The operative part of the compromise, which was embodied in the decree, dated 27 December 1949, is to the following effect:

"That the defendants do execute a lease of the Gulab Theatre in favour of the plaintiffs on terms and conditions stipulated in the draft lease deed attached herewith and place them in possession of the demised premises accordingly."

6. Exh. P. 6 is a draft copy of the lease deed, dated 27th December 1949, on the basis of which a formal instrument was executed by defendants Nos. 1 and 2 and the lessors on 25-1-1950. One of the terms thereof is reproduced below:

"Shri Dammoolalji issued one cheque of Rs. 4000/- in words rupees four thousand, in the name of Shri Chhotelal Sahu, on Imperial Bank, Raipur, which he gave in favour of Shrimati Kalawati Devi wife of Jamuna Prasadji Dube Advocate Ganjipura Jabalpur and obtained a receipt from her. Having received this cheque Mst. Kalawati Devi gave up the entitle possession. She had given the advance of Rs. 4000/- for running the very Cinema house. (We) shall pay the amount of Rs. 5000/- in words rupees five thousand in cash to Shri Chhotelal Sahu in presence of the Sub-Registrar at the time of registration. Thus we the tenants shall pay Rs. 9000/- in words rupees nine thousand."

It is not in dispute that the amount of Rs. 4,000/-, which was paid by defendants Nos. 1 and 2 to the lessors, was paid by them to the plaintiff in satisfaction of the amount that she had paid to them as advance on account of rent.

7. Besides the amount of Rs. 4,000/-, the plaintiff was paid Rs. 300/- by defendants Nos. 1 and 2. The case of the plaintiff was that they had agreed to pay to her Rs. 7,000/- more to complete the consideration for the surrender of her rights. That amount was payable in monthly instalments of Rs. 775/- beginning from 20th February 1950. The bond (Exh. P-5) further recites that

"in the event of any three instalments falling in arrears the entire balance will become payable at once."
It is also not in dispute that only Rs. 750/- were paid to the plaintiff towards the first instalment of the bond. She accordingly claimed Rs. 6,250/- on account of the principal and Rs. 481/4/- on account of interest at 6 per cent per annum by way of damages from 2lst April 1950 to the date of the suit, total Rs. 6,731-4-0.

8. The suit proceeded ex parte against defendant No. 3, Defendant No. 2 admitted execution of the bond in suit. Defendant No. 1 denied execution of the bond but admitted its execution by defendant No. 2. He further admitted that the plaintiff was initially paid Rs. 300/-, and latterly Rs. 750/- towards the bond, by defendant No. 2, but contended that his actions were not binding upon him. The general defence of both the defendants was that Chhotelal alone had no right to grant a lease of the Gulab Theatre to the plaintiff and the lease was not binding upon them inasmuch as they had an existing interest in the leasehold rights granted to Jamunadas. They also pleaded that defendant No. 2 had to execute the bond under undue pressure of the plaintiffs husband, Jamunaprasad Dube (P.W. 2), who did not allow them to run the cinema shows without interruption. It was also averred that Jamunaprasad Dube (P.W. 2) was a pleader if Chhotelal in a criminal case and had used undue influence on him to obtain the lease in favour of his wife,

9. The lower Court negatived the defence and passed a decree for Rs. 6,731/4/- plus costs against all the defendants, It also awarded compensatory costs against defendants Nos. 1 and 2. Hence the present appeal.

10. The judgment was written by Shri B.B.L. Shrivastava after he left Jabalpur on his transfer to Washim and was delivered by his successor Shri D.M. Aney. It was contended on the authority, Lalshah v Rikhiram, 7 CPLR 18 that after Shri B.B.L. Shrivastava left Jabalpur, he had no jurisdiction to write the judgment and accordingly it could not be delivered by his successor. The cited case was decided by Stevens, Officiating Judicial Commissioner, who relied upon the judgment delivered by the Judicial Commissioner's Court in a previous case, namely, Mt. Fatima v. D. Sinclair, Second Appeal No. 441 of 1887 D/- 22-3-1889 (Nag). The observations made in the previous case, which were relied upon with approval in the cited case, are as below:

"A Judge may pronounce a judgment written by his predecessor, but not pronounced (Section 199 Code of Civil Procedure) but this clearly implies that at the time of writing the judgment the Judge is exercising his jurisdiction. It cannot mean that a Judge who ceases to be a Judge may write a judgment and that judgment will be valid, if pronounced by the succeeding Judge. The judgment derives its whole force and effect from the fact that it is written by a person who has jurisdiction. Once the jurisdiction is gone, the judgment is worth nothing."

11. The relevant provision of the Code of Civil Procedure governing this question is Order 20 Rule 2 which is reproduced below:

"A Judge may pronounce a judgment written but not pronounced by his predecessor."

Dealing with the corresponding provision of the old Code, it was held in Girjashankar v. Gopalji ILR 30 Bom 241 that the judgment written (by a Judge after transfer and pronounced by his successor was valid. The same view was taken in Sundar Kuar v. Chandreshwar Prasad Narain Singh, ILR 34 Cal 293 in which the judgment was written by the Judge while he was on leave. This decision came to be considered by a Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Satyendra Nath v. Kastura Kumari, ILR 35 Cal 756 in which, approving the previous decision of the Court, it was held that the judgment written by a Judge, who went away on transfer or on leave, and delivered by his successor, was valid. The same view was taken in Basant Bihari v. Secretary of State, ILR 35 All 368 which was a case of a Judge who wrote the judgment after he had ceased to hold office, and in Lilawati Kuar v. Chhotey Singh, ILR 42 All 362: (AIR 1920 All 332) in which the Judge had written the judgment on reversion to another post. In Baramdeo Pande v. Debidatt Singh, ILR 53 All 133: (AIR 1931 All 90) the same view was held in respect of the judgment written by a Judge after he had resigned. In Ghulam Rasul v. Mt. Gul Jan, AIR 1943 Pesh 11 and also in Hargulal v. Abdul Gany Hajee Ishaq, ILR 14 Rang 136: (AIR 1936 Rang 147), it was held that the judgment written by a Judge after he had ceased to have jurisdiction over the Court could validly be pronounced by his successor. See also Mt. Kishni Bai v. Budhu Ram, AIR 1919 Lab. 265, Pratap Kishore v. Gyanendranain, AIR 1951 Orissa 313 and Lakhiama Jiu v. Lokenath Das, AIR 1920 Pat 578.

12. It would thus be observed that the concensus of judicial opinion has been that Order 20, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure empowers the successor to pronounce a judgment which was written by his predecessor after he bad ceased to have jurisdiction over the Court. To hold that the judge must have jurisdiction, before the judgment is written by him would be to read in Order 20, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure a limitation which in terms does not exist in it. With respect, therefore, we disagree with the view expressed by Stevens, Officiating Judicial Commissioner, in 7 CPLR 18 (Supra) and hold that the judgment under appeal was validly pronounced.

13. It will be observed that defendants Nos. 1 and 2 had not derived any title from Jamunadas as he had not executed in their favour any registered deed of a lease. It was probably because they did not also pay the rent of the building that the lessors had made an application against Jamunadas and defendant No. 2 to the Rent Controller for permission to terminate their tenancy. It is no doubt true that that case was compromised and an agreement was reached between the parties whereby defendant No. 2 agreed to pay enhanced rent to the lessors. But, soon after that, the building caught fire and was delivered by him to the lessors for reconstruction. There is nothing on record to show that during that time he paid any rent for the building. It was in these circumstances that Chhotelal, one of the lessors gave a lease of the building to the plaintiff and entered into a partnership with her to run the cinema shows.

14. The contention of defendants Nos. 1 and 2 that Chhotelal had no authority to enter into an agreement of lease with the plaintiff without reference to his brothers does not appear to have any foundation. It was Chhotelal alone who had entered into an agreement with defendant No. 2 in respect of the compromise of the case before the Rent Controller: See Exh. D-11. He was also the person who had custody of the documents, which were handed over to his son Chokhelal (D. W. 3) by his widow for production in Court. In these circumstances, we do not see any reason to doubt the testimony of Jamunaprasad Dube (P.W. 2), husband of the plaintiff, that the management of the Gulab Theatre was in the hands of Chhotelal In any case, his brothers did not demur to the lease created by him in favour of the plaintiff and, therefore, must be deemed to have acquiesced in it. In these circumstances, we confirm the finding of the lower Court that Chhotelal had authority to grant the lease of the building to the plaintiff.

15. This brings us to the question as to whether the bond in suit was executed by all the defendants. The evidence of Jamunaprasad Dube (P. W. 2), husband of the plaintiff, is that all the defendants had tome to his house with the bond duly executed and had admitted their signatures on the document before the attesting witnesses. His evidence is confirmed by Balkrishna Tiwari (P.W. 11), who was one of the attesting witnesses. Since the defendants had admitted their signatures on the document, the bond must be held to be proved as duly executed by them.

In fact, it appears from the evidence of defendant No. 1 Dammulal (D.W. 2) that he had himself given a cheque for Rs. 4,000/- to Chhotelal on the Imperial Bank, Raipur, for payment of the amount to the plaintiff, which formed a part of the consideration for surrendering her leasehold rights. This implies that he had knowledge of the bond which was executed to effect the compromise entered into with her. We accordingly uphold the finding of the lower Court that the bond was executed by all the defendants.

16. The contention of defendants Nos. 1 and 2 was that the plaintiff's husband, Jamunaprasad Dube (P W. 2), was interfering with the cinema shows run by them and accordingly they were forced to enter into an agreement with his wife. The only witness on this point is defendant No. 2 Shikharchand (D.W. 4). All that he said however. was that Jamunaprasad Dube (P.W. 2) had told him that if he paid consideration for his wife's legal rights, he would not create any obstruction. This does not amount to any undue pressure. In fact, if any unlawful obstruction was created by him, defendants Nos. 1 and 2 would have taken legal action against him. Jamunaprasad Dube (P.W. 2) has denied creating any obstruction is alleged. The bond was not, therefore, the result of any undue pressure on his part.

17. Although not so expressly pleaded, the defence of defendants Nos. 1 and 2 also appears to be that the plaintiff colluded with Chhotelal to defeat their rights. There is, however, evident that she was aware of any agreement between them and Jamunadas or that there was any collusion between her and Chhotelal. As already indicated above, Chhotelal granted a lease to the plaintiff because of the defaults committed by defendants Nos. 1 and 2 themselves in the payment of rent. The contention that the lease in her favour was collusive cannot, therefore, be sustained.

18. It was also contended that Jamunaprasad Dube (P.W. 2) was a counsel of Chhotelal in a criminal case, and, therefore, he must be made to give up the advantage which he had obtained for his wife from him. Reliance was placed upon Nagendra Bala Dasi v. Dinanath, AIR 1924 PC 34, There is however, nothing on record to indicate that the plaintiff had taken any unfair advantage from Chhotelal, and, in any case, the transaction could only be impeached by Chhotelal or his brothers, if it was induced by undue influence. This contention has, therefore, no force.

19. The circumstances of the case indicate clearly that there was a bona fide dispute as regards that rights between the plaintiff on the one hand and defendants Nos. 1 and 2 on the other which was compromised. As already observed, the plaintiff's claim to the property was bona fide since she had been granted a lease of the building by the manager of the family of the lessors while, for want of a registered document, defendants Nos. 1 and 2 had no real title to the property. Even if defendants 1 and 2 were accepted as tenants by the lessors orally, it does not follow that the plaintiff had no bona fide claim. In these circumstances, the compromise that was effected is binding upon the defendants: See Balarama v. Vasudeva, AIR 1948 PC 7.

20. The result is that the appeal fails. We see no reason to interfere with the award of compensatory costs. The appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs.