Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ

Madhya Pradesh State Road Trans. Corpn. v. Praveer Kumar Bhatnagar And Another

Madhya Pradesh High Court
Nov 26, 1992
Important Paras
Please sign up to view Important Paras.
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an owner's appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, challenging a Claims Tribunal award of Rs. 20,000 in favour of the claimant-respondent for injuries sustained in a motor accident on 13.1.1983.

At trial the owner-appellant contested liability primarily by asserting that the accident was not caused by the bus No. MPG 9570 owned by it and that the claimant had been injured in an accident caused by some other vehicle. The Tribunal, however, accepted the claimant's account: that he was travelling as a passenger in mini bus No. MPG 9570, the driver drove off when he was disembarking without warning, he fell and suffered fractures of both arms, was treated and operated upon at J.A. Hospital (admitted 13.1.1983 to 1.2.1983), and his co-passengers supported his version. The Tribunal rejected the owner's contention that the vehicle was a loading truck and not a public transport vehicle, and awarded damages against the owner under the M.V. Act.

The owner-appellant in this appeal raised a fresh/renewed contention that the Claims Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to make the award because the injury was an "employment injury" within the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948 ("E.S.I. Act") and therefore barred by Section 53 of that Act.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal had jurisdiction to entertain and decide the claimant's petition under the M.V. Act when the claimant was an employee covered by the E.S.I. Act and Section 53 of the E.S.I. Act bars recovery of compensation or damages "under any other law" in respect of an employment injury.
  2. Whether the claimant's injury fell within the deeming provisions of Section 51C(1) (and related Sections 51A and 53) of the E.S.I. Act—i.e., whether the injury was an "employment injury"—particularly in view of clause (b)(ii) of Section 51C(1) which excludes accidents occurring while the vehicle "is being operated in the ordinary course of public transport service."
  3. How the bar in Section 53 of the E.S.I. Act interacts with the M.V. Act's statutory "no-fault" liability and overriding provisions (Sections 92-E/144 and related provisions) — specifically whether Section 53 should be read ejusdem generis with reference to the Workmen's Compensation Act or more broadly to oust Claims Tribunal jurisdiction.

Arguments of the Parties

Owner-Appellant's Arguments

  • The Claims Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to award damages under the M.V. Act because the claimant was an employee covered by the E.S.I. Act and Section 53 of that Act bars recovery of compensation or damages under "the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 ... or any other law" in respect of an employment injury.
  • The owner relied on Sections 51A and 51C(1) of the E.S.I. Act to show that the accident amounted to an "employment injury" and so the E.S.I. bar applied.
  • At trial the owner also specifically contended the accident in fact was not caused by bus No. MPG 9570 owned by it and that the claimant's claim against the owner (his employer) was false because he had been injured in an accident caused by some other vehicle.
  • The owner relied on case-law (e.g., K.S. Vasantha; Annapurna; Abad Fisheries) which had interpreted Section 53 broadly to bar proceedings in the Claims Tribunal where the deeming provisions of the E.S.I. Act applied.

Claimant-Respondent's Arguments

  • The Tribunal had jurisdiction; the claimant's version—that he was a passenger in mini bus No. MPG 9570 and was injured when the driver drove off while he was disembarking—was accepted on evidence (including co-passenger testimony and medical treatment at J.A. Hospital).
  • Although the claimant had filled a claim form under the E.S.I. Act for statutory "benefits," no action was taken on that application and the Corporation's hospital lacked the facilities to give him the treatment he received at J.A. Hospital for his serious injuries; thus the Tribunal correctly entertained the M.V. Act claim.
  • Reliance was placed on precedents (notably the Kerala Full Bench in Asokan v. Western India Plywoods Ltd. and the Mysore Division Bench in Hindustan Aeronautics v. P. Venu) supporting the view that Sections 53 and related provisions do not oust civil/Claims Tribunal jurisdiction in such circumstances.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Sarmaniya Bai v. Madhya Pradesh Rajya Parivahan Nigam, 1990 ACJ 862 (MP) Establishes that the Claims Tribunal possesses jurisdiction akin to a civil court and inherent jurisdiction to execute its awards; its plenary jurisdiction in tortious claims arising from motor accidents. Used to support the proposition that the Claims Tribunal's jurisdiction is not readily ousted and that it has inherent jurisdiction to decide tortious claims under the M.V. Act.
Raja Ram Kumar's case, AIR 1988 SC 752 Where a statute creates a right and provides machinery for its enforcement with finality, civil court jurisdiction may be impliedly barred even without an express ouster. Applied as the test to examine whether the E.S.I. Act creates a right and machinery that would implicitly bar Tribunal jurisdiction; court examined other E.S.I. provisions in light of this test.
Dhulabhai's case, AIR 1969 SC 78 (Constitution Bench) When an express bar is pleaded, examine the statutory scheme for adequacy of remedies, whether the special law creates special rights and a tribunal for determining them, and whether remedies normally associated with civil court actions are prescribed. Guided the court's interpretative approach to Section 53—to assess adequacy of E.S.I. remedies and whether E.S.I. was intended to exclude Claims Tribunal jurisdiction.
Employees' State Insurance Corporation v. Swadesh, 1991 MPLJ 914 Explains scope of E.S.I. Act: Corporation is a statutory insurer; E.I. Court decides statutory "benefits" under Section 75; E.I. Court does not determine tortfeasor's liability; Section 75(3) bars civil court only to the limited extent of enumerated matters. Relied upon to show that E.S.I. Act deals with specific statutory benefits and that E.I. Court's jurisdiction does not encompass tort claims against third-party tortfeasors—supporting the view of mutual exclusivity only to the limited extent specified in E.S.I. Act.
Gaya Prasad's case, 1992 ACJ 200 (MP) Affirmed that the Claims Tribunal's duty to decide claims founded on 'no-fault' liability is inexorable and that statutory provisions conferring such rights are indefeasible. Used to reinforce the primacy of the M.V. Act's statutory no-fault right and the Tribunal's duty to adjudicate such claims.
Shivaji Dayanu's case, 1991 ACJ 777 (SC) Authority referenced in context of no-fault liability under the M.V. Act. Cited as part of earlier Supreme Court authority supporting the Tribunal's role in enforcing statutory no-fault compensation.
N.K.V. Bros.' case, 1980 ACJ 435 (SC) Authority referenced regarding claims under the M.V. Act and related jurisdictional principles. Relied upon (along with Shivaji Dayanu) to show judicial support for the Tribunal's duty to decide no-fault claims.
Mahila Ramdei's case, 1987 ACJ 764 (MP) Held that the Claims Tribunal may be required to act suo motu in appropriate circumstances. Quoted to underline the Tribunal's proactive jurisdictional role under M.V. Act provisions.
Asokan v. Western India Plywoods Ltd., 1987 ACJ 358 (Kerala) (Full Bench) Held that Sections 53 and 61 of the E.S.I. Act did not bar a suit by an employee against his employer for negligence; construed E.S.I. provisions in a manner preserving pre-existing remedies. Relied on by the claimant; the court noted and discussed this Full Bench decision as supporting the view that E.S.I. provisions should not be interpreted to suppress antecedent remedies such as tort claims in certain situations.
Hindustan Aeronautics v. P. Venu, 1972 ACJ 266 (Mysore) Decision considered in Asokan; addressed interpretation of E.S.I. Act's bar provisions (Section 61 in that case). Referred to as part of the authorities underpinning the Full Bench's approach in Asokan which favoured preserving pre-existing remedies.
K.S. Vasantha, 1982 ACJ (Supp) 259 (Karnataka) Held that Section 53 could bar Claims Tribunal jurisdiction where Section 51C(1) applied and the vehicle was not in the ordinary course of public transport service. Distinguished on facts: the present case involved a vehicle being used in the ordinary course of public transport service, unlike K.S. Vasantha where the deeming provision was applicable and the Tribunal's jurisdiction was barred.
Annapurna, 1984 ACJ 238 (Karnataka) Followed K.S. Vasantha to hold claims not triable by Claims Tribunal where Sections 2(8) and 51C established "employment injury." Noted as consistent with K.S. Vasantha but distinguishable from the present facts where clause (b)(ii) of Section 51C(1) excludes the case from being an "employment injury."
Abad Fisheries, 1985 ACJ 349 (Kerala) Earlier Kerala authority on interpretation of E.S.I. provisions (later overruled by Asokan Full Bench). Characterised as misconceived for present purposes because the Full Bench in Asokan overruled it.
National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Chavaii Vijayalakshmi, 1987 ACJ 971 (AP) Followed the line of Abad Fisheries, Annapurna and K.S. Vasantha (took the view that Section 53 bars Tribunal jurisdiction in those cases). Observed but not followed by the court in this appeal; the court declined to accept that line of authority on the facts and reasoning presented in this judgment.
Chairman, Board of Mining Examination v. Ramjee, AIR 1977 SC 965 Used as authority for interpretative principle that socially beneficent statutes should be construed to avoid destroying pre-existing remedies unless clearly intended. Referred to (along with Hindustan Times) in support of the interpretative approach adopted in Asokan and accepted as persuasive by this court.
Hindustan Times Ltd., New Delhi v. Workmen, AIR 1963 SC 1332 Authority on interpreting socially beneficent legislation so as not to suppress antecedent remedies. Relied on indirectly via Asokan reasoning; the court agreed with this interpretative technique in the present context.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in a structured analytical manner, addressing the jurisdictional challenge by examining statutory text, the legislative scheme of both the E.S.I. Act and the M.V. Act, and relevant precedents.

  1. The court first observed that the specific statutory bar under Section 53, E.S.I. Act, relied upon by the owner-appellant, had not been pleaded in the identical form at the Tribunal stage; at trial the owner's principal contention was misidentification of the offending vehicle. The Tribunal, however, had accepted the claimant's factual case and awarded damages under the M.V. Act.
  2. The court then examined the legal question of whether Section 53's bar (which refers expressly to the Workmen's Compensation Act "or any other law for the time being in force or otherwise") extinguishes the Claims Tribunal's statutory jurisdiction under the M.V. Act. To resolve this it applied established tests from Apex Court authority (Raja Ram Kumar and Dhulabhai) requiring evaluation of whether a special statute creates a right and a complete machinery to enforce it such that civil/ordinary forum jurisdiction is impliedly or expressly barred.
  3. The court analyzed the E.S.I. Act's scheme (drawing upon the discussion in Employees' State Insurance Corporation v. Swadesh) and noted that the E.S.I. Act creates statutory "benefits" payable by the Corporation, enforces them via the E.I. Court under Section 75, and that the E.I. Court does not adjudicate tortfeasor liability or award damages according to the common law of torts. Section 75(3) expressly bars civil courts only to the limited extent of enumerated matters.
  4. The court contrasted this with the M.V. Act's scheme, under which the owner liability on the no-fault principle and the Claims Tribunal's power to order statutorily fixed sums are conferred with overriding effect by provisions such as Sections 92-E (old)/144 (new). The court treated this no-fault right under the M.V. Act as "indefeasible" and subject to legislative command requiring the Tribunal to decide such claims.
  5. Interpreting Section 53's phrase "or any other law for the time being in force or otherwise", the court applied canons of construction (ejusdem generis, noscitur a sociis) and read Section 53 in the context of Sections 51A and 51C. It held that those provisions constitute a narrowly tailored deeming provision: Section 51A creates a general presumption that an accident arising in the course of employment also arises out of employment, but Section 51C(1) specifically deems certain travel accidents to be employment injuries only when particular conditions are satisfied, and clause (b)(ii) of Section 51C(1) expressly excludes cases where the vehicle is "being operated in the ordinary course of public transport service."
  6. The court concluded that the deeming provision must be strictly construed and limited to the class of cases it was intended to cover. Reading Section 53 ejusdem generis with reference to the Workmen's Compensation Act and the limited class of matters enumerated in Section 51C(1) would avoid an absurdity and preserve the M.V. Act's overriding no-fault scheme.
  7. Applying these principles to the facts, the court found that the vehicle involved was a "public transport vehicle" being used as such at the time of the accident. Therefore clause (b)(ii) of Section 51C(1) excluded the case from being an "employment injury" under E.S.I. Act's deeming provision. Consequently, Section 53 did not operate to bar the claimant's M.V. Act claim before the Claims Tribunal.
  8. The court also reviewed conflicting authority (Kerala Full Bench Asokan and other High Court decisions). It accepted the interpretative approach of Asokan (construing social welfare statutes so as not to extinguish pre-existing remedies) as persuasive, distinguished cases (e.g., K.S. Vasantha, Annapurna) where facts brought the case squarely within Section 51C(1) excluding "ordinary course of public transport" and thus where Section 53 could bar Tribunal jurisdiction.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is dismissed and the Claims Tribunal's award is affirmed. The court held that the Tribunal had jurisdiction to pass the award under Section 110-B (old M.V. Act provision cited) and that the claimant's application under Section 110-A was not barred by Section 53 of the E.S.I. Act on the facts of this case.

Implications:

  • The direct effect is that the award of Rs. 20,000 in favour of the claimant-respondent is confirmed and enforceable against the owner-appellant; parties are directed to bear their own costs.
  • The judgment emphasises that Section 53 of the E.S.I. Act does not automatically oust the Claims Tribunal's jurisdiction under the M.V. Act; the E.S.I. deeming provisions (Sections 51A and 51C) must be strictly and narrowly construed and read in harmony with the M.V. Act's overriding no-fault scheme. On the facts where the vehicle was operated in the ordinary course of public transport service, the injury was not an "employment injury" within the E.S.I. Act and Section 53 did not apply to bar the claim.
  • The opinion focuses on the consequence for the parties in this appeal. It does not announce or purport to lay down a broad new precedent beyond the interpretative conclusions expressly stated in the judgment.
Show all summary ...

1. This is owner's appeal preferred under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, (for short, 'the M.V. Act'), against an award of compensation of Rs. 20,000/- made in favour of claimant-respondent for the injury he suffered in a motor accident on 13.1.1983.

2. The only question forcefully agitated in this appeal by Mr. A.K. Shrivastava, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, is want of jurisdiction of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, (for short, 'the Tribunal'), to pass the award and to press that contention he has relied on Section 53, Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948, (for short, 'E.S.I. Act'), which is as follows:

53. Bar against receiving or recovery of compensation or damages under any other law.--An insured person or his dependants shall not be entitled to receive or recover, whether from the employer of the insured person or from any other person, any compensation or damages under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (8 of 1923), or any other law for the time being in force or otherwise, in respect of an employment injury sustained by the insured person as an employee under this Act.

He has also relied on Sections 51A and 51C(1) of the said Act which too are extracted below:

51-A. Presumption as to accident arising in course of employment.--For the purposes of this Act, an accident arising in the course of an insured person's employment shall be presumed, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, also to have arisen out of that employment.

51-C. Accidents happening while travelling in employer's transport.--(1) An accident happening while an insured person is, with the express or implied permission of his employer, travelling as a passenger by any vehicle to or from his place of work shall, notwithstanding that he is under no obligation to his employer to travel by that vehicle, be deemed to arise out of and in the course of his employment, if--

(a) the accident would have been deemed so to have arisen had he been under such obligation; and

(b) at the time of the accident, the vehicle--

(i) is being operated by or on behalf of his employer or some other person by whom it is provided in pursuance of arrangements made with his employer; and

(ii) is not being operated in the ordinary course of public transport service.

3. However, it is to be noted that the plea of statutory bar raised before me in this appeal was not agitated in the same form before the Tribunal. Indeed, the specific plea that owner-appellant raised in the course of trial of the claim petition was that the accident was not caused by bus No. MPG 9570 owned by it. He suffered injury in the course of an accident caused by some other vehicle. On the date of accident, he had gone to the Labour Court to take steps in connection with some of his own case and there met with the accident and the claim against the owner, his employer, was a false claim. It is indeed not disputed that the claimant-respondent was employed as a storekeeper in the Central Workshop of the appellant at Gwalior. The Tribunal found, on the other hand, owner's case not established and accepted rather the case of the claimant that the offending vehicle was a mini bus bearing registration No. MPG 9570 and the claimant was travelling in that bus along with other passengers. On the date of the accident, he had first gone to the Parcel Office of the Railway Station from Central Workshop at Kampoo at about 10.30 a.m. in connection with some official business and when he was returning by the mini bus in question, MPG 9570, he wanted to disembark at a point near the office of Indian Oil, off the Stadium. He could hardly put on the ground one foot and before he could put his other foot also, the driver rashly drove away the vehicle without blowing any horn or giving any warning as a result of which he fell down on the ground and suffered fracture of bones of both arms. He examined the co-passengers Har Prasad and M.L. Maheshwari who supported him. He was confined in J.A. Hospital from 13.1.1983 to 1.2.1983 where his hand was operated upon and one steel rod was inserted. The Tribunal also found not established the case set up by the owner that the vehicle in question was a loading truck and it was not a public transport vehicle. Having reached the conclusion that the vehicle in question was driven rashly and negligently, the Tribunal made a composite award of damages against the owner-appellant, as aforesaid.

4. It is true, a specific issue (No. 5) was framed to decide the question of claimant's entitlement to award under M.V. Act on the ground that he could be given treatment in the hospital maintained by the Employees' State Insurance Corporation and he was entitled only to the 'benefits' contemplated under the E.S.I. Act and not damages awardable under the M.V. Act. That issue was decided against the owner and in doing so, the Tribunal reached the finding that although the claimant had filled up claim form for the 'benefits' contemplated under the E.S.I. Act, on that no action was taken. The other finding recorded is that in the Corporation's hospital, there is no provision for such treatment as he could get in the J.A. Hospital for the serious injury that he suffered.

5. This court's Full Bench in Sarmaniya Bai v. Madhya Pradesh Rajya Parivahan Nigam 1990 ACJ 862 (MP), has taken the view that the Tribunal possessed jurisdiction exercisable by civil court ordinarily to enforce claims founded on tortious liability and the Tribunal is, therefore, possessed of inherent jurisdiction like a civil court to execute its own award; the powers enjoyed by it under provisions of m.v. act do not exclude or impinge upon its inherent jurisdiction to deal with matters with respect to which no specific provision is made in the M.V. Act or under the Rules framed thereunder. The new forum's jurisdiction (albeit with respect to cases of tortious liability arising from a motor accident only) is obviously plenary like a civil court's; so ouster of its jurisdiction is not to be readily accepted notwithstanding claimant's option contemplated under Section 110-AA (old), 167 (new), to go to Workmen's Compensation Court in appropriate cases.

6. Reference, in this connection, may be made to the holding in Raja Ram Kumar's case, AIR 1988 SC 752, that

"wherever a right, not pre-existing in common law, is created by a statute and that statute itself provided a machinery for the enforcement of the right, both the right and the remedy having been created uno flatu and a finality is intended to the result of the statutory proceedings, then even in the absence of an exclusionary provision the civil court's jurisdiction is impliedly barred."
If that test is to be applied, other provisions of E.S.I. Act are to be examined to see if the said Act has created for the first time a right not preexisting at common law to enforce tortious liability arising out of a motor accident and created machinery also to enforce that right to bar impliedly Tribunal's jurisdiction in that reward. Because Section 53 of the said Act is not endowed with a non obstante clause to bar expressly Claim Tribunal's jurisdiction exercisable under the M.V. Act, it refers expressly only to Workmen's Compensation Act and debars proceedings under that Act in respect of an 'employment injury'. However, what meaning is to be attributed to the expression, 'or any other law for the time being in force or otherwise', which immediately follows it, poses really the moot question to be decided in this appeal.

7. Apex Court's Constitution Bench in Dhulabhai's case, AIR 1969 SC 78, has held that when an express bar is pleaded, the scheme of the particular Act is to be examined to find adequacy or sufficiency of the remedies provided and to examine also if the special law creates a special right or a liability and provides for the determination thereof while requiring all questions about the said right and liability to be determined by the Tribunal constituted thereunder. Importantly, their Lordships also held, "whether remedies normally associated with actions in civil courts are prescribed by the said statute or not" must also be examined. Evidently, these guidelines are to be followed to divine the meaning of the expression "or any other law..." even if it is assumed arguendo that those words contemplate an express bar. Such words themselves do not carry the required jural force to destroy the strong presumption against ouster of jurisdiction by a special law professing to encroach on an occupied field providing the adjudicatory forum. That is Dhulabhai's mandate.

8. On the scope of the E.S.I. Act, the case of Employees' State Insurance Corporation v. Swadesh 1991 MPLJ 914, provides an illuminating study. The Corporation, it has been held, is not a contractual insurer; it is a statutory insurer and the Act deals with its duties and functions. The legal measure was enacted in terms of the constitutional directive embodied in Articles 39 (e) and 42 to make adequate provision for health-care and medicare of workers. Employees' State Insurance Corporation's liability to provide the employee the specified statutory 'benefits' under the Act with respect to the statutory risk covered was held to be exclusive, dependent solely on 'contributions' made both by the employer and the employee to the corpus of 'Employees' State Insurance Fund' envisaged under Section 26 of E.S.I. Act. The person entitled to enforce the specified statutory right under the said Act can do so in accordance with the provisions of section 75 providing for the 'question' or 'dispute' enumerated thereunder to be decided by the Employees' Insurance Court, (for short, 'E.I. Court'). In terms of Section 75(1)(e), that court can decide a 'question' or 'dispute' relating to 'the right of any person to any benefit and as to the amount and duration thereof. Periodical payment to the claimant in the scale and manner statutorily specified is to be made by the Corporation in such forms as, 'service benefit', 'maternity benefit', 'disablement benefit' and 'dependants' benefit'. It is apparent that the E.I. Court does not deal with a tortfeasor's liability and does not award against him damages/compensation according to the uncodified law of Torts for such of his act of omission or commission as is regarded as a wrong liable to be redressed under the English common law. Indeed, only in respect of an 'employment injury', defined in Section 2(8), claim either for 'disablement benefit' (as per Section 51) or 'dependants' benefit' (as per Section 52) is admissible and liability of the Corporation in that regard the E.I. Court can determine; no 'question' or 'dispute' relating thereto can be decided by virtue of Section 75(3) by a civil court. Although both right and remedy contemplated under E.S.I. Act are not pre-existing at common law, civil court's jurisdiction is barred by Section 75(3) expressly to the limited extent in respect of the enumerated matters. The two Acts obviously operate in different fields and deal with different types of rights and obligations; Claims Tribunal's jurisdiction under M.V. Act and of E.I. Court under E.S.I. Act are mutually exclusive.

9. We may refer now to the relevant provisions of M.V. Act, those of Chapters VII-A and VIII of old Act of 1939, re-enacted substantially in Chapters X, XI and XII of the new Act of 1988. In both Acts, provision in similar terms exists to enforce the liability of the 'owner' in the case of a motor accident to pay compensation on the principle of 'no fault' and that provision has, in categorical terms, been vested with overriding effect as per Sections 92-E (old) and 144 (new). The said provision was enacted as a result of judicial clamour raised in that regard as noticed by this court's Full Bench in Gaya Prasad's case 1992 ACJ 200 (MP) and taking cue from Apex Court's holding in Shivaji Dayanu's case 1991 ACJ 777 (SC) and N.K.V. Bros.' case 1980 ACJ 435 (SC), the view which this court took was that the Tribunal's duty to decide the claim founded on 'no fault' liability was inexorable because the right in that regard was indefeasible. The view taken in Mahila Ramdei's case 1987 ACJ 764 (MP), that the Tribunal is required to act suo motu was reiterated. The sum awardable on the principle of 'no fault' liability has remained statutorily fixed. The legislative command of Section 144 (new), 92-E (old), that

"notwithstanding anything contained in any other provision of this Act or of any other law for the time being in force"
clearly contemplates that any person who is entitled to payment of the sum statutorily specified has the right to have an order from the Claims Tribunal in that regard on proving his claim. Section 53, E.S.I. Act, cannot kill that indefeasible right and indeed it was not meant to do so. The maxim reductio ad absurdum supports the proposition that it could not be within the contemplation of the legislature to provide for determination of two parts of the same claim at two different forums.

10. For the view taken I find intrinsic evidence of the legislature's intention of excluding cases of motor accidents, except cases of specified category dealable under Workmen's Compensation Act, on reading conjointly Sections 51A, 51C and 53, E.S.I. Act. The general presumption contemplated under Section 51A is obviously subject to the substantive provision expressly enacted in Section 51C. It will not be a case of an 'employment injury' when the injured is a passenger though he is an 'employee under the E.S.I. Act', if the employer's vehicle in which he is travelling is 'being operated in the ordinary course of public transport service'. Legislature clearly meant to bring within the purview of the E.S.I. Act only a limited class of cases by expressly specifying so albeit in terms of deeming provision of section 51c(1) and taking special care to exclude simultaneously the category of cases embraced by Sub-clause (ii) of clause (b), even when the case is of an 'employee under the Act' who suffers injury or dies in a motor accident involving the employer's vehicle. Not only is the deeming provision to be strictly construed to fulfil the limited purpose it is meant to serve, it is imperative that its harmonious coexistence is maintained with Section 144 (new), 92-E (old), M.V. Act and to achieve that object the expression "or any other law..." of Section 53 is to be read in ejusdem generis sense; the maxim noscitur a sociis also mandates that course. The term 'any other law' which follows immediately the clause "under the Workmen's Compensation Act or" must reasonably mean a law of the same genre as of the named Act. This construction accords well with similar provision in the M.V. Act [section 110-AA (old), 169 (new)] contemplating 'option' of the claimant to invoke concurrent jurisdiction made available in the case of the Workmen's Compensation Court instead of the Claims Tribunal. In the final analysis the result sought to be obtained by Section 53 of the E.S.I. Act, is that the said 'option' would be affected in case of persons to whom the deeming provision of section 51c [minus its clause (b) (ii)] is found applicable on facts established.

11. In the instant case, facts proved attract directly and undoubtedly the exclusionary clause (b) (ii) of section 51c. It has been established on evidence that the vehicle involved in the accident was a 'public transport vehicle' and it was being so used at the time of accident. I find, therefore, no scope to accept the contention that the claimant-respondent had suffered an 'employment injury' within the contemplation of the deeming provision of Section 51C(1) of the E.S.I. Act, so as to debar his claim lodged with the Tribunal being entertained and decided in contravention of Section 53 of the said Act.

12. At the Bar, case-law is cited to support rival contentions to which I may refer now. Learned counsel Mr. P.L. Jain, appearing for the claimant-respondent, relied on Kerala High Court's Full Bench decision in Asokan v. Western India Plywoods Ltd. 1987 ACJ 358 (Kerala) and the decision considered therein of Mysore High Court's Division Bench in Hindustan Aeronautics v. P. Venu 1972 ACJ 266 (Mysore). In the last-mentioned Division Bench decision, award passed under Section 110-A was challenged, invoking Section 61, E.S.I. Act. The view taken was that Section 61 referred to an 'enactment' and the uncodified law of Torts was not an 'enactment' and on that ground, the bar thereunder was held not applicable. It was also held that the right to sue originating from the substantive law, namely, law of Torts, was not meant to be destroyed by the procedural provision of Section 61, E.S.I. Act: In the Full Bench case, the plea was raised, under Section 53, E.S.I. Act, against civil court's jurisdiction being barred to hear and decide an application of the claimant to sue as an indigent person. The claim had arisen from an accident in the roller mill installed in the factory of the employer resulting in amputation of claimant's left hand and compensation in the sum of Rs. 1,50,000/-was claimed. It was held that a suit by the employee against his employer claiming compensation for injury sustained by him owing to negligence of employer was not hit by Sections 53 and 61, E.S.I. Act. For the view taken, reliance was placed, inter alia, on two decisions of the Apex Court in the cases of Chairman, Board of Mining Examination v. Ramjee, AIR 1977 SC 965 and Hindustan Times Ltd., New Delhi v. Workmen, AIR 1963 SC 1332, to employ the interpretative technique of construing socially beneficent legislations in such manner as would not suppress remedies available anterior to their enactment. I am in respectful agreement with that view.

13. Learned counsel for the owner-appellant Mr. Shrivastava's reliance on the decision he cited may now be examined. On facts, K.S. Vasantha's case 1982 ACJ (Supp) 259 (Karnataka), is distinguishable because the bar pleaded under Section 53, E.S.I. Act, could be validly upheld by applying Section 51C(1) as in that case, unlike the instant case, the vehicle in which the claimants-employees were travelling was "not being operated in the ordinary course of public transport service". They were not the employees of Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation, owning the vehicle; but were employed in "New Government Electric Factory" and that factory had arranged a bus belonging to the Corporation for picking up the said workers from their respective places. It is true, at para 9 of the report, the court expressed the contrary view that the expression 'any other law' of Section 53, E.S.I. Act, is not to be read in ejusdem generis sense, but for that view the reason given is that the construction is "contrary to settled principle of interpretation and construction of statutes"; beyond that nothing is stated. In any case, the ratio (as manifested in para 13 of the report) is founded on Sections 2(8) and 51C, E.S.I. Act, in reaching the conclusion that it was a case of 'employment injury' within the meaning of the term used in Section 53, E.S.I. Act and, therefore, Claims Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain and decide the claim. Annapurna's case 1984 ACJ 238 (Karnataka), is also a decision of Karnataka High Court and indeed, based on its earlier decision in K.S. Vasantha's case 1982 ACJ (Supp) 259 (Karnataka), just discussed. At para 8, applying Sections 2(8) and 51C, similarly, the claim was held not triable by the Tribunal under M.V. Act. Reliance of Mr. Shrivastava on Abad Fisheries' case 1985 ACJ 349 (Kerala), is obviously misconceived because that decision is overruled by the Full Bench in Asokan's case 1987 ACJ 358 (Kerala). It is true, a learned single Judge of Andhra Pradesh High Court in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Chavaii Vijayalakshmi 1987 ACJ 971 (AP), has followed decisions in Abad Fisheries, Annapurna and K.S. Vasantha's cases (supra) (herein discussed) and has taken the same view on the interpretation of Section 53, but with due respect, it is not possible for me to accept that view having taken already a contrary view for reasons of my own, stated above. Briefly recapitulating, I reiterate, Section 75(1)(e), E.S.I. Act, not having taken away the right to claim compensation/damages for injury or death of a person arising from a motor accident, being enforced at the forum of civil court or any other forum, that right cannot be deemed killed by Section 53. The deeming provision of section 51c enumerating expressly the circumstances constituting deemingly 'employment injury' must be given restricted meaning in order that the overriding effect of M.V. Act in terms of Section 140 (new) and 92-A (old) is maintained to enforce legislature's command contemplated thereunder.

14. In the result, the appeal fails. The award passed by Claims Tribunal under Section 110-B, M.V. Act, 1939, is upheld as valid and enforceable. I hold that the Tribunal had jurisdiction to pass that award and the application made by the claimant-respondent under Section 110-A being not barred by Section 53, E.S.I. Act, that was correctly entertained and decided by the Tribunal. That award is confirmed. However, parties are left to bear their own costs.