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Renuka Bai v. Jai Prakash Sethy
Structured Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The instant matter is a revision petition filed under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure challenging an order dated 15-9-1992 of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Jabalpur, in Motor Vehicles Case No. 36 of 1992. The Tribunal made an interim award (ordering the owner of the offending truck, non-applicant No. 3 Rajendra Singh, to pay Rs. 25,000 to the claimant-applicant) while simultaneously exonerating the insurer (non-applicant No. 2, Oriental Insurance Company) from liability for that interim payment. The claimant contends that the insurer is also liable and therefore challenged the Tribunal's order by way of revision under section 115 CPC.
Procedurally, a show-cause notice was issued; counsel for the insurer appeared and addressed the Court, while the owner (non-applicant No. 3) did not file a separate revision and his counsel was absent at final hearing. The Court considered precedent (including a Full Bench decision) and the maintainability of the revision before addressing the merits briefly.
Relevant factual details appearing in the opinion include that a cover note (commencing liability from midnight of 2-2-1992) was produced by the claimant, a cheque from the claimant was encashed by the insurer on 4-2-1992, and the accident occurred on 4-2-1992.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the insurer and/or the owner/driver of the offending motor vehicle against whom an order of compensation is passed in terms of section 140, Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, have a right of appeal against that order under section 173 of the Act (the question as referred to the Full Bench).
- Whether the claimant's revision petition under section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code is maintainable to challenge the interim order under section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act (i.e., whether a High Court revisional remedy under CPC is competent in this context).
Arguments of the Parties
Applicant's Arguments (Claimant)
- The claimant challenged the Tribunal's exoneration of the insurer and argued that the insurer is liable to pay interim compensation along with the owner.
- The claimant's counsel contended that the Full Bench decision (Gaya Prasad v. Suresh Kumar) did not prohibit a claimant from filing a revision or that it should not be construed to preclude the claimant's revisional remedy; he relied on an earlier Division Bench decision in Krishna Gopal v. Dattatraya stating the Claims Tribunal is a Civil Court and orders are revisable under section 115 CPC.
- The claimant's counsel also submitted that if revision under section 115 is held not maintainable, the claimant would have only a limited scope under Article 227 of the Constitution and would thereby suffer if interim compensation is not paid.
Non-Applicant No.2 (Oriental Insurance Company) — Arguments
- The insurer's counsel submitted that the present revision is not maintainable in view of the Full Bench decision in Gaya Prasad v. Suresh Kumar and the subsequent decision in Dimple v. Lajja Ram, which preclude an appeal under section 173 and disallow revisional jurisdiction under section 115 in respect of orders under section 140.
- The insurer's counsel further contended that the covering note was obtained by the owner by committing fraud on the Insurance Company and that the policy payment was made only later; he supported the Tribunal's order exonerating the insurer from interim liability.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court (as stated in the opinion) |
|---|---|---|
| Gaya Prasad v. Suresh Kumar (Full Bench), 1992 MPLJ 485 | Answered the question whether appeal lies under section 173 against an order of compensation passed under section 140 (majority held: no appeal maintainable). | The Court relied on the Full Bench majority holding that no appeal is maintainable under section 173 against an order under section 140 and treated that decision as binding on the issue of maintainability of statutory appellate/revisional remedies in this context. |
| Dimple v. Lajja Ram, 1992 (1) MPJR 372 | Addressed whether an order passed for interim compensation under section 140 is revisable by the High Court under section 115 CPC (held: not revisable; special law governs). | Relied upon by the Court to support the conclusion that revision under section 115 CPC against an order under section 140 is not maintainable and that High Courts' interference should be through Article 227 where necessary. |
| Krishna Gopal v. Dattatraya, 1971 MPLJ Note 135 : 1971 JLJ 903 | Held that the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal is a Civil Court and that orders passed by it were revisable under section 115 CPC (earlier Division Bench view relied upon by claimant). | The Court recorded that the claimant relied on this earlier decision but, in light of the Full Bench and later authority, did not accept it as decisive for maintainability in the present statutory scheme under the Motor Vehicles Act. |
| Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pritamlal / Preetamlal, 1989 MPLJ 580 — 1989 ACJ 1129 | Earlier law that had allowed appeals/revision in similar circumstances. | The Full Bench decision (Gaya Prasad) expressly overruled the contrary law laid down in this decision; the present Court treated that overruling as authoritative. |
| Anirudh Prasad Ambasta v. State, AIR 1990 Pat. 49 | Full Bench decision of Patna High Court relied upon by the dissent to support broader remedy (appeals) in case of wrongful denial of no-fault compensation. | Not adopted by the majority; noted by the opinion as one of the authorities relied upon by the dissenting judge (Lahoti, J.) in support of the proposition that an appeal should lie. |
| United India Insurance Co. Dd. v. K. Raghavareddy, AIR 1989 A.P. 33 | Decision of Andhra Pradesh relied upon to support the view that orders under section 140 may be appealable. | Not followed by the majority; recorded as an authority relied upon by the dissenting judge to support appealability. |
| Shah Babulal Khimji (authority referenced) | Invoked for the proposition that special law may prevail over general provisions of the Civil Procedure Code (section 4 CPC interaction with special law). | Used in the reasoning (as cited by the majority and in Dimple) to support the view that orders passed under special statutory powers in the Motor Vehicles Act are to be governed by that Act and not by general revisional provisions of the CPC. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court first addressed the threshold question of maintainability. It treated the Full Bench decision in Gaya Prasad v. Suresh Kumar as binding on the point whether appeals under section 173 lie against orders of compensation made under section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. The Full Bench (by majority) answered that question negatively: no appeal is maintainable under section 173 against an order of compensation for "no fault" liability passed under section 140. The Full Bench expressly overruled prior contrary authority (Oriental Insurance Co. v. Pritamlal/Preetamlal).
The majority reasoning (as summarized from Dr. T.N. Singh, J.'s judgment) treats Chapter X of the Motor Vehicles Act as a complete code dealing with "liability without fault in certain cases." The judgment emphasizes that section 168(1) proviso requires disposal of claims under Chapter X according to that Chapter alone, thus excluding applicability of statements in Chapter XII (which contains sections 168 and 173) to the extent they would permit appeals in respect of interim orders under section 140. The majority noted there is no provision in Chapter X for an appeal against an order under section 140. It also explained that although an order under section 140 disposes finally of one part of the claim (interim compensation), the overall proceedings continue until a final award under section 168.
Both Dr. T.N. Singh, J. and K.M. Pandey, J. (majority) recognized the claimant's concern about arbitrary refusals under section 140 and indicated that claimants are not entirely without remedy: the High Courts retain supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution to give relief with greater expedition where necessary.
The opinion also records the dissent of Hon'ble Lahoti, J., who relied heavily on earlier decisions (including Krishna Gopal and other High Court precedents) to contend that an order under section 140 should be treated as an "award" appealable under section 173, thereby providing a wider scope of hearing than revisional jurisdiction or supervisory powers under Article 227. The majority rejected that position and held that the scheme of the Motor Vehicles Act does not contemplate such appeals in respect of interim no-fault awards.
Applying this precedent and reasoning to the present petition, the Court concluded that the claimant's revision under section 115 CPC is not maintainable in respect of the Tribunal's order under section 140. The Court therefore declined to entertain the revision on maintainability grounds and directed that the claimant may pursue relief, if any, under Article 227.
The Court briefly dealt with merits "casually" and observed that, on the material before it, the insurer was prima facie liable: section 145 defines "liability" to include liability under section 140; section 147 requires a policy to insure against liability arising from use of a vehicle in a public place; a cover note/certificate of insurance falls within the definition of "policy of insurance"; the claimant produced a photocopy of the cover note effective from midnight 2-2-1992; a cheque was encashed by the insurer on 4-2-1992; and the accident occurred on 4-2-1992. From these facts (as stated in the opinion) the Court noted that the insurer appears to be jointly and severally liable. However, the Court expressly refrained from altering the Tribunal's order on the merits because it found the revision itself to be not maintainable.
Holding and Implications
Holding: DISMISSED — The revision petition under section 115 CPC is dismissed for being not maintainable in view of the Full Bench decision in Gaya Prasad v. Suresh Kumar and subsequent authority (including Dimple v. Lajja Ram).
Implications:
- The immediate legal effect is that the Tribunal's interim order (which ordered the owner to pay Rs. 25,000 and exonerated the insurer) remains undisturbed by this revisional petition.
- The Court noted that, on the material before it, the insurer appears prima facie liable under sections 145 and 147 and on the basis of the cover note and encashment of the cheque; nevertheless, the Court declined to interfere because the revision was held not maintainable.
- The claimant is advised that, if aggrieved, he may seek relief under Article 227 of the Constitution of India (supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court) rather than by way of revision under section 115 CPC or appeal under section 173 in respect of an order under section 140.
- The opinion follows and applies Full Bench and subsequent decisions; it does not purport to lay down a new principle contrary to the cited Full Bench ruling and therefore does not claim to create a new precedent.
Petition dismissed.
1. The present revision petition under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure is against the order dated 15-9-1992 passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Jabalpur, in Motor Vehicles Case No. 36 of 1992, refusing to allow the application of the claimant-applicant under section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act for interim compensation.
2. In this case, the non-applicant No. 3 Rajendra Singh who is the owner of the truck has been ordered to pay interim compensation of Rs. 25,000/- to the applicant. But the submission of the learned counsel for the applicant is that the non-applicant No. 2 Insurance Company is also liable to pay, which has been wrongly absolved by the lower Court.
3. A show cause notice was issued. Shri Gulab Sohane, learned counsel for the non applicant No. 2 Oriental Insurance Company appears. None appeared for other non-applicants. It seems that the aggrieved party if the non-applicant No. 3 Rajendra Singh has not filed any revision petition against the impugned order. In this revision, the non-applicant No. 3 is represented by Shri R.G Rai, Advocate, but he was absent when the case was heard finally.
4. Shri Gulab Sohane, learned counsel for the non-applicant No. 2 Insurance Company has submitted that the present revision of the applicant is not maintainable as held in a Full Bench decision of the Court in Gaya Prasad v. Suresh Kumar, 1992 MPLJ 485 and also subsequently in Dimple v. Lajja Ram, 1992 (1) MPJR 372. The parties have addressed on merits also. But in case the revsion is held to be not maintainable, it will be futile to go into the merits except casually.
5. The Full Bench decision of Gaya Prasad v. Suresh Kumar (supra) is a majority judgment of two Judges Dr. T.N Singh, J. and K.M Pandey, J. Justice R.C Lahoti dissenting. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the applicant that this judgment prohibits non-maintainability of the appeal under section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, by the owner, driver and the Insurance Company and not by the claimant. The learned counsel for the applicant also placed reliance on an earlier Division Bench decision of this Court in Krishna Gopal v. Dattatraya, 1971 MPLJ Note 135 — 1971 JLJ 903, in which the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal was held to be a Civil Court and the order passed by it was held revisable under section 115, Civil Procedure Code. The other difficulty and apprehension expressed by the learned counsel for the applicant is that in case it is held that the order is not revisable, then he has a very limited scope under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Thus, the claimant will suffer if no interim compensation is paid to him. The learned counsel for the Insurance Company refutes the argument of the learned counsel for the applicant and submits that the covering note obtained by the owner from the Insurance Company was by committing fraud on the Insurance Company. The payment of policy was made later. He supports the order passed by the Claims Tribunal.
6. Two questions were referred to the Full Bench in two separate appeals. In the present case, the question No. 1 in M.A No. 64 of 1991 is only relevant which is as under:
“Whether the Insurer and/or the owner/driver of the offending motor vehicle or vehicles against whom an order of compensation is passed in terms of the provisions of section 140, Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 has a right of appeal against that order under section 173 of the Act?”
This question has been finally answered as per majority judgment as under:
“First question arising out of Misc. Appeal No. 64 of 1991 is answered, as per majority opinion, in the negative. No appeal is maintainable under section 173, Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, against an order of compensation for “no fault” liability, passed under section 140 of the said Act. Law laid down to the contrary in Oriental Insurance Co. v. Preetamlal 1989 MPLJ 580 — 1989 ACJ 1129 would no longer hold good and that decision is overruled.”
7. Dr. T.N Singh, J., while writing the main judgment has considered the effect of section 140 under Chapter X of the Motor Vehicles Act and has held that Chapter X is a complete Code which is supposed to deal with all matters concerning “liability without fault in certain cases” and that position is buttressed by section 168(1) proviso, mandating disposal of the claim in that regard as per provisions only of Chapter X and thereby excluding applicability of the provisions of Chapter XII which contains section 168 as also section 173. No provision for any appeal against the order passed under section 140 is contemplated in the said Chapter. According to Dr. T.N Singh, J. although the order passed under section 140 disposes of finally one part of the claim, the proceedings do not terminate and they continue till final “award” is passed under section 168. The anxiety of the applicant regarding the arbitrary dismissal of the application of the claimant has also been dealt with by saying:
“…. Then the Tribunal refuses arbitrarily to pass an order under section 140, the claimants would not be remediless. High Courts, where appeals under section 173 are heard, possess supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution to give them due relief with greater expedition.”
8. Hon'ble K.M Pandey, J. agreeing with Hon'ble Dr. T.N Singh, J., has also held:
“A question may arise about the remedy available to a person, if the compensation under section 140 is arbitrarily refused, I think, the Legislature has taken care of it. The Courts of District Judges functioning as Claims Tribunals are expected to be careful about the intention of the Legislature and the right of the claimant. Not only this, but the High Court can also interfere in its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution.”
9. Hon'ble Lahoti, J. while dissenting with the majority view, has placed much reliance on the case of this Court reported in Krishna Gopal v. Dattatraya, 1971 MPLJ Note 135 : 1971 JLJ 903 and also on a Full Bench decision of Patna High Court in Anirudh Prasad Ambasta v. State, AIR 1990 Pat. 49 and so also on a decision of Andhra Pradesh in United India Insurance Co. Dd. v. K. Raghavareddy, AIR 1989 A.P 33. According to him, in the event of a claimant being wrongly denied compensation under ‘no fault liability’ clause, he too would have a right of appeal giving a wider scope of hearing than what is permitted in revisional jurisdiction or in exercise of powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. He was of a definite view’ that an order of compensation passed in terms of section 140 is an ‘award’ appealable under section 173. But the majority view was that no appeal lies under section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, against an order of compensation for “no fault liability” passed under section 140 of the Act. The law laid down to the contrary in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pritamlal. 1989 MPLJ 580 was held to be no longer good and the decision was overruled. Subsequently, Hon'ble Dr. T.N Singh, J. in Dimple v. Lajja Ram (supra) came to decide the point whether the order is revisable by the High Court or not and held “no”. According to him, the order passed for interim compensation under section 140 of the Act is an interim order and not revisable. While passing the judgment he has again considered the effect of the judgment and has come to the conclusion while interpreting the provisions of section 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure as under:
“A plain and simple reading of section 4 makes it clear that nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect any special or local law now in force or any special jurisdiction or power conferred.” Power to make an order under section 140 is a special power conferred on the Claims Tribunal under Special Law and any order passed by the Tribunal in exercise of that power is not to be effected obviously in any manner by any provisions of Civil Procedure Code including section 115, Civil Procedure Code. For that holding, inspiration may also be invoked from Shah Babulal Khimji. Obviously the High Court in dealing with any matter arising out of a proceeding before the Claims Tribunal under the Motor Vehicles Act would be exercising its jurisdiction with reference to provisions of that Act and not of Civil Procedure Code and it would be exercising “special jurisdiction” under that Act and it has to find powers for interfering with any order passed in that proceeding in revision not outside that Act; revision being not contemplated under the new Act that jurisdiction the High Court cannot assume unauthorisedly.”
10. In view of the Full Bench decision and the subsequent Single Bench decision referred to above, I am of the opinion that the present revision petition by the applicant claimant, whose application is not wholly rejected but only an order against the owner is passed, is not maintainable. If aggrieved he may approach this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
11. Dealing with the facts casually, I do not find the order of the lower Court exonerating the Insurance Company from payment of compensation, though interim, under section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Not only the owner but also the insurer is liable to satisfy the award made under section 140 of the Act. Section 145(c) defines “liability” as under:
““liability”, wherever used in relation to the death of or bodily injury to any person, includes liability in respect thereof under section 140”.
Under section 147(1) of the Act, a policy of insurance must insure the insured against any liability which may be incurred by him in respect of the death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place. It, therefore, follows that the Insurance Company is liable to indemnify the insurer for compensation awarded under section 140 of the Act.
12. In the present case, the applicant has filed the photo-copy of the covering note which commences the liability of the Insurance Company with effect from the midnight of 2-2-1992 i.e from 3-2-1992 to 2-2-1993. As per definition under section 145 of the Act in clause (d) “policy of insurance” includes “certificate of insurance”. Clause (b) of section 145 defines “certificate of insurance” asunder:
“certificate of insurance” means a certificate issued by an authorised insurer in pursuance of sub-section (3) of section 147 and includes a cover note complying with such requirements as may be prescribed, and where more than one certificate has been issued in connection with a policy or where a copy of a certificate has been issued, all those certificates or that copy, as the case may be.
13. In this case, admittedly, a cheque was encashed by the Insurance Company on 4-2-1992 and the policy is not cancelled by the Insurance Company. Though the accident took place on 4-2-1992, it will not absolve the Insurance Company from its liability to make payment. The liability of the Insurance Company is joint and several. But for the reason of the non-maintainability of the present revision petition discussed above, I do not want to interfere sitting singly in the order passed by the lower Court against the view of the Full Bench referred to above.
14. Consequently, the revision petition is dismissed. The applicant, if so desires, may take recourse under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
Petition dismissed.
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