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Rashmi Cement Limited v. Trafigura Beheer B.V

Calcutta High Court
Nov 29, 2010
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Structured Summary of the Opinion (Bhaskar Bhattacharya, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from a respondent-initiated application under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. A learned Single Judge of this Court, by an order dated 5 October 2010, modified an earlier ad interim injunction (dated 1 October 2010) and issued a fresh interim order. That interim order directed the present appellant to export to the respondent the contracted quantity of 40,000 metric tonnes of iron by 15 October 2010 from any port; alternatively, if such export could not be completed within the stipulated time, the appellant was required to furnish a bank guarantee equal to 20% of the sale price of US$4,864,000 (calculated at the conversion rate on the date of issue) in favour of and to the satisfaction of the Registrar, Original Side. The order further provided that, in default of furnishing such security, all immovable properties of the appellant would be attached. The Single Judge also directed the appellant to file an affidavit by 18 November 2010. The appellant was dissatisfied and filed the present appeal.

The bench composition included Bhaskar Bhattacharya, J., and Dr. Sambuddha Chakrabarti, J., the latter concurring in the result.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, on the basis of the averments made in the application under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the learned Single Judge was justified in passing an interim order that operates in the nature of attachment before award (attachment before judgment).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (Mr. Banerjee)

  • The appellant raised a pure question of law in support of the appeal.
  • The respondent's allegations were based on breach of an agreement to supply iron for export; the respondent's alleged remedy was for damages of an unquantified amount.
  • Where the claim is for unquantified damages, an interim measure in the nature of attachment before award cannot be issued unless the applicant specifically alleges that the respondent (here, the appellant) has begun transferring or has already transferred assets with the intent to defraud creditors or to avoid payment of any award.
  • On that basis, Mr. Banerjee sought to set aside the modified interim order passed by the Single Judge.

Respondent's Arguments (Mr. Bose)

  • The respondent had made out a strong prima facie case in support of interim relief.
  • There was no illegality in the Single Judge's exercise of discretion in passing the interim order to protect the respondent's interest.
  • Because the Single Judge exercised discretion in favour of the respondent and the main application remained to be decided on affidavits, the appellate court should not interfere with that discretion.
  • Mr. Bose therefore prayed for dismissal of the appeal.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Raman Tech & Process Eng. Co. v. Solanki Traders, (2008) 2 SCC 302 The observations emphasize that Order 38 Rule 5 CPC (attachment before judgment) is a drastic power to be used sparingly; it should not be exercised mechanically; it is not intended to convert an unsecured debt into a secured debt; a plaintiff must show a bona fide prima facie claim and satisfy the court that the defendant is about to remove or dispose of property with intention to obstruct or delay execution of any decree. The court quoted these observations and held that the principles in Raman Tech apply to applications under Section 9(ii) of the Arbitration Act. The court concluded the learned Single Judge ignored these principles when passing an interim order in the nature of attachment before award.
Premraj Mundra v. Md. Maneck Gazi & Ors. (citation not fully reproduced in the opinion) Cited as a source for a clear summary of the principles relating to grant of attachment before judgment under Order 38 Rule 5 CPC. The court referred to this authority (by reference in Raman Tech) as articulating the relevant principles applicable to attachment before judgment, which ought to guide a court dealing with Section 9(ii) applications.
Manjunath Anandappa Urf Shivappa Hansi v. Tammanasa & others, AIR 2003 S.C. 1391 Sets out the appellate principle that an appellate court should interfere with a discretionary order only when that order is "clearly wrong" rather than merely "not right"; delineates the limits of appellate interference with discretionary judicial orders. The court applied this standard to conclude that interference was justified because the impugned interim order was "clearly wrong" in its application of the principles governing attachment before judgment.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded by examining the scope of Section 9(ii) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. It observed that Section 9(ii) confers powers on the court that are similar to those found in Section 94 read with Orders 38–40 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and that the court dealing with an application under Section 9(ii) should be guided by the same principles applicable to applications under Orders 38–40 CPC.

Applying that framework to the facts before it, the court noted that the dispute between the parties arose from an alleged breach of an agreement for the supply of goods for export, and that the respondent's principal remedy, if its allegations were correct, would be a claim for damages (an unquantified monetary claim). Given that context, the court held that the learned Single Judge erred in issuing an order requiring a deposit of a bank guarantee (and threatening attachment of immovable property) on a prima facie finding of merit without any finding that the appellant was transferring or alienating property to avoid payment or defraud creditors.

The court relied on the Supreme Court's observations in Raman Tech (and the authorities summarized therein) to emphasize that attachment before judgment is an extraordinary power and should be exercised only where the plaintiff shows a bona fide prima facie claim and satisfies the court that the defendant is about to remove or dispose of property with the intent to defeat or delay execution of any decree. The court observed that those principles "squarely apply" to Section 9(ii) applications and that the Single Judge "totally ignored" them.

The court further noted the established appellate principle from Manjunath Anandappa that appellate interference with an exercise of discretion is warranted when the trial judge has clearly gone wrong in applying the governing principles. Applying that standard, the court concluded that the impugned order was clearly wrong because it granted relief in the nature of attachment before award without the requisite factual foundation in the application.

The court clarified that its decision was based solely on the materials that were placed before the Single Judge as on the date of hearing of the application; it expressly stated that it did not take into consideration any defence of the appellant or any subsequent events while disposing of the appeal.

Holding and Implications

DISPOSED OF: The appeal was allowed and the impugned order dated 5 October 2010 (which modified the earlier ad interim injunction and directed either export or provision of a bank guarantee, with attachment in default) was set aside.

Implications and direct consequences:

  • The bench found that, on the basis of the averments contained in the application for interim relief as it stood before the Single Judge, no case was made out for directing attachment before award.
  • The Single Judge is free to hear and dispose of the application under Section 9 of the Act in accordance with law after taking into consideration the affidavits to be filed by the parties.
  • The appellate court's decision was founded solely on the materials before the Single Judge at the time of the hearing; no later events or the appellant's defence were considered in reaching the decision.
  • There was no order as to costs in the appeal.

Dr. Sambuddha Chakrabarti, J. agreed with the judgment as recorded in the opinion.

Show all summary ...

Bhaskar Bhattacharya, J.:— This appeal is at the instance of a respondent in a proceeding under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and is directed against an order dated October 05, 2010 passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court by which His Lordship modified the earlier ad interim order of injunction passed by His Lordship dated October 01, 2010 and passed a fresh interim order directing the present appellant to export to the respondent the contracted quantity of 40,000 Metric tonnes of iron by 15th October, 2010 from any Port without prejudice to the rights and contentions with further condition that if such goods cannot be so exported within the stipulated time, the appellant should furnish security by way of bank guarantee of the value of 20% of the sale price of US Dollar 4,864,000 at the conversion rate on the date of issue of the bank guarantee in favour of and to the satisfaction of the Registrar, Original Side. In default of furnishing such security, the Court proceeded, all immovable properties of the appellant would be attached.

The learned Single Judge also passed direction for filing affidavit by the appellant by 18th November, 2010.

Being dissatisfied, the appellant has come up with the present appeal.

Mr. Banerjee, the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant, at the very outset, has taken a pure question of law in support of this appeal.

According to Mr. Banerjee, the allegations of the respondent being based on breach of an agreement to supply iron by way of export, its claim was really one for damages of unquantified amount. According to Mr. Banerjee, in such a case, a Court, by way of interim measure, cannot pass any direction which is in the nature of attachment before passing of award unless specific allegation is made in the application for interim relief that the appellant had started transferring or had already taken step to transfer his assets for defrauding his creditors or for avoiding payment of the awarded amount that may be passed against him. Mr. Banerjee, therefore, prays for setting aside the modified interim order passed by the learned Single Judge in the impugned order on that ground alone.

Mr. Bose, the learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent, on the other hand, has opposed the aforesaid contention advanced by Mr. Banerjee and has contended that his client having made a strong prima facie case, there was no illegality on the part of the learned Single Judge in passing the aforesaid order to protect the interest of his client. According to Mr. Bose, the learned Single Judge having exercised discretion in favour of his client by way interim measure and the main application being yet to be decided on merit on affidavit, this court should not interfere with the discretion exercised by the learned Single Judge Mr. Bose, therefore, prays for dismissal of the present appeal.

Therefore, the only question that arises for determination in this appeal is whether on the basis of the averments made in the application under Section 9 of the Act, the learned Single Judge was justified in passing the interim order, which is an order in the nature of attachment before judgment.

In order to appreciate the question involved, it would be profitable to refer to the provisions contained in Section 9 of the Act, which is quoted below:-

9. Interim measures, etc. by Court. - A party may, before or during arbitral proceedings or at any time after the making of the arbitral award but before it is enforced in accordance with Section 36, apply to a Court:-

(i) for the appointment of a guardian for a minor or a person of unsound mind for the purposes of arbitral proceedings; or

(ii) for an interim measure of protection in respect of any of the following matters, namely:-

(a) the preservation, interim custody or sale of any goods which are the subject-matter of the arbitration agreement;

(b) securing the amount in dispute in the arbitration;

(c) the detention, preservation or inspection of any property or thing which is the subject-matter of the dispute in arbitration, or as to which any question may arise therein and authorising for any of the aforesaid purposes any person to enter upon any land or building in the possession of any party, or authorising any samples to be taken or any observation to be made, or experiment to be tried, which may be necessary or expedient for the purpose of obtaining full information or evidence;

(d) interim injunction or the appointment of a receiver;

(e) such other interim measure of protection as may appear to the Court to be just and convenient,

and the Court shall have the same power for making orders as it has for the purpose of, and in relation to, any proceedings before it.

(Emphasis supplied by us)

From a plain reading of the provisions contained in Section 9(ii) of the Act, it is clear that the object of the said provisions is similar to those contained in Section 94 read with Orders 38-40 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Therefore, the power conferred upon a Court in any suit or proceedings for passing orders as mentioned in the Supplemental Proceedings indicated in Part-VI of the body of the Code of Civil Procedure has been substantially repeated in Section 9(ii) of the Act by making it clear that in dealing with such an application, the Court shall have the same power as it has for the purpose of or in relation to any proceedings before it. It is, therefore, apparent that while dealing with an application under Section 9(ii) of the Act, the Court should be guided by the same principles, which are required to be followed while disposing of the applications under Orders 38-40 of the Code.

In the case before us, the dispute between the parties being one of breach of agreement for supply of goods for exportation, the remedy of the respondent now lies in getting damages, if its allegations are found to be correct. In our opinion, the learned Single Judge erred in law in passing a direction for deposit of bank guarantee on the appellant merely on a prima facie finding on merit in the absence of any finding that the appellant was either transferring or alienating his property to avoid payment of money that may be awarded against it or that it was threatening or intending to remove or dispose of his properties with a view to defrauding his creditors. At this stage, we may advantageously refer to the following observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Raman Tech & Process Eng. Co. v. Solanki Traders reported in (2008) 2 SCC 302 while considering a case of grant of relief of attachment before judgment:

“5. The power under Order 38 Rule 5 CPC is a drastic and extraordinary power. Such power should not be exercised mechanically or merely for the asking. It should be used sparingly and strictly in accordance with the Rule. The purpose of Order 38 Rule 5 is not to convert an unsecured debt into a secured debt. Any attempt by a plaintiff to utilise the provisions of Order 38 Rule 5 as leverage for coercing the defendant to settle the suit claim should be discouraged. Instances are not wanting where bloated and doubtful claims are realised by unscrupulous plaintiffs by obtaining orders of attachment before judgment and forcing the defendants for out-of-court settlements under threat of attachment.

6. A defendant is not debarred from dealing with his property merely because a suit is filed or about to be filed against him. Shifting of business from one premises to another premises or removal of machinery to another premises by itself is not a ground for granting attachment before judgment. A plaintiff should show, prima facie, that his claim is bona fide and valid and also satisfy the court that the defendant is about to remove or dispose of the whole or part of his property, with the intention of obstructing or delaying the execution of any decree that may be passed against him, before power is exercised under Order 38 Rule 5 CPC. Courts should also keep in view the principles relating to grant of attachment before judgment. (See Premraj Mundra… v. Md. Maneck Gazi & Ors.… for a clear summary of the principles.)”

(Emphasis given by us)

The principles mentioned above squarely apply to the proceedings under Section 9(ii) of the Act and a Court before passing any direction in the nature of attachment before award should follow those principles. The learned Single Judge, as it appears from the order impugned, totally ignored the abovementioned principles.

It is now settled law that if it appears that the learned trial judge, while exercising discretion of passing any interim order, wrongly applied the principles for grant of such discretion or if it is established that such discretion has been unreasonably or capriciously exercised, an Appellate Court should interfere. As pointed out by the Supreme Court in the case of Manjunath Anandappa Urf Shivappa Hansi v. Tammanasa and others reported in AIR 2003 S.C 1391, while hearing an appeal against a discretionary order, “an appellate power interferes not when the order appealed is not right but only when it is clearly wrong. The difference is real, though fine.”

We are of the opinion that the aforesaid observations apply to the case before us where the order impugned is clearly wrong.

We, therefore, set aside the order impugned and dispose of this appeal with the finding that on the basis of averments made in the application for interim relief as it stood before the learned Single Judge, no case was made out for passing an interim order directing attachment before award.

We make it clear that our aforesaid observation is based on the materials which were placed before the learned Single Judge as on the date of hearing of the application and we have not taken into consideration any of the defence of the appellant or subsequent events while disposing of the present appeal.

The appeal is, thus, disposed of. The learned Single Judge is free to dispose of the application under Section 9 of the Act in accordance with law after taking into consideration the affidavits that will be filed by the parties.

In the facts and circumstances, there will be, however, no order as to costs.

Dr. Sambuddha Chakrabarti, J.:— I agree.