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Mobesher Hossain Mondal & Ors. v. Sekhar Chatterjee & Ors.

Calcutta High Court

Jun 26, 2007

Judgment

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Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal challenges a common judgment and order dated 26 September 2005 of the Hon'ble First Court. That judgment dismissed W.P. No. 18196(W) of 2005 (filed by the present appellant) and allowed W.P. No. 15787(W) of 2005 (filed by private respondent No. 4 / Mr. Sekhar Chatterjee). The appellant had challenged a resolution dated 7 July 2005 of the Regional Transport Authority (RTA), Burdwan and the offer letter issued in relation to an application made by private respondent No. 4 (initially dated 25 July 2005; earlier offer dated 28 March 2005 was also in issue). The dispute centrally involved an application in Form No. 1 (for a permanent stage carriage permit) and whether non-disclosure of particulars (specifically, the number of permits held) by the private respondent was a material suppression warranting rejection or cancellation of the offer/permit.

The Hon'ble First Court held that the appellant (a rival operator) lacked locus standi to oppose grant of a new permit, treated omissions in Form No. 1 as procedural/curable irregularities, set aside the RTA's cancellation dated 7 July 2005 (which had cancelled an earlier order of 28 March 2005), and directed that a fresh offer letter on the basis of an application with prescribed fee be treated as adequate for regularization. The present appeal assails those conclusions.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether an existing operator (rival operator) has locus standi to challenge grant of a new permit to another applicant.
Whether non-furnishing or non-disclosure of particulars (number of permits held) in Form No. 1 is a substantive defect amounting to suppression of material facts that requires rejection/cancellation of an offer letter, or whether it is a procedural irregularity that can be cured.
Whether the First Court exceeded its jurisdiction by quashing the RTA's resolution of 7 July 2005 and by directing that a fresh application/offer letter be treated as regularization of the defect (including whether the court could mould relief in these circumstances).
Whether the revival/extension of an earlier offer letter (or treating a later offer as regularization of an earlier defect) is permissible in view of the statutory validity/expiry provisions of the offer letter.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

The appellant challenged the RTA resolution of 7 July 2005 and the subsequent offer letter dated 25 July 2005 (and related proceedings). He contended that private respondent No. 4 did not disclose in Form No. 1 the number of permits he held, contrary to the requirements of the West Bengal Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 (citing Rule 114 and Rule 123 in the opinion).
Non-furnishing of particulars in Form No. 1 was argued to be a substantive defect (not merely procedural), requiring rejection of the application when the applicant fails to furnish prescribed papers and documents. The appellant asserted the private respondent falsely stated he was not holding any permit although he admittedly was holding other permits on the date of filing.
The appellant argued that once an offer letter is issued on merits, the alleged falsehood cannot be corrected by mere amendment; the First Court erred in treating the omission as procedurally curable.
The appellant contended the First Court exceeded its jurisdiction by quashing the RTA's decision of 7 July 2005, because the writ petition by private respondent No. 4 did not seek quashing of that cancellation nor pray for grant of permit under the 25 July 2005 offer letter.
The appellant also argued that treating a fresh offer letter (or deeming it to pre-date for regularization) and reviving the earlier offer letter would be contrary to the statutory validity limits of offer letters (valid for one month, extendable up to six months in exceptional circumstances), and that the revival or extension granted by the First Court was dehors the statutory scheme.
The appellant relied on several authorities to support his positions and argued some precedents relied on by the other side were inapplicable.

Private Respondent (Mr. Sekhar Chatterjee) / Respondent No. 4

The private respondent argued that the appellant and other rival operators had no legal right under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 to object to the issuance of a new permit because they were rival operators with no locus under the Act to block issuance.
After amendment of Section 71 (effective 14 November 1994), the restriction of holding five permits by an individual had been waived; thus disclosure/non-disclosure of other permits in the application could, at most, amount to an irregularity and not an illegality.
The private respondent placed a vehicle on 16 June 2005 and thereafter presented a fresh application (with prescribed fees) following an RTA decision; the RTA issued a fresh offer letter on 25 July 2005 (Memo No. 6038(131)/MV). The fees were accepted on 29 July 2005, although issuance of the permanent permit was initially withheld due to objections.
The private respondent contended the permit was subsequently issued (on 7 November 2005) and remained valid; he had been plying the vehicle on the route and the appeal should be dismissed with costs.

State / RTA (Respondent) Arguments

The State/RTA explained that following objections by rival operators the RTA resolved (on 7 July 2005) that respondent No. 4 had suppressed the number of permits and cancelled the earlier offer letter, but granted liberty to apply afresh in Form No. 1.
Respondent No. 4 filed a fresh application on 11 July 2005 with requisite fees; RTA then decided to issue a conditional offer letter (23 July 2005) and a subsequent memo of 25 July 2005. The RTA's office accepted fees on 29 July 2005 but withheld final issuance due to objections.
The RTA later (through the Chairman's affidavit) stated that an enquiry was being conducted concerning alleged fabrication of a memo/offer letter (the Chairman denied signing an offer letter bearing Memo No. 5038(131)/MV dated 25 July 2005 and indicated an enquiry as to whether office staff were involved in fabrication).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Ramankutty Guptan v. Avara, 1994 (2) SCC 642 : AIR 1994 SC 1699	Mentioned by appellant; argued by appellant that this decision has no application to the facts of the present case.	The court recorded the appellant's submission that this precedent was not applicable; the opinion does not show the court relying on this decision to decide the appeal.
Kulwant Kaur v. Gurdial Singh Mann, 2001 (4) SCC 262 : AIR 2001 SC 1273	Cited (by appellant) to show that technicalities should not prevent the High Court from adopting a justice-oriented approach; appellant invoked it positively while also arguing some decisions were inapplicable.	The court noted the appellant's reference to this authority but did not base its judgment primarily on it; the court's reasoning emphasized statutory interpretation and factual findings instead.
Kedarnath v. Mohanlal Kesarwari, 2002 (2) SCC 16 : AIR 2002 SC 582	Mentioned by appellant as a precedent which, appellant said, had no application to the present facts.	The court recorded that the appellant relied on (or distinguished) this authority; the opinion does not indicate the court applied this precedent to reach its decision.
K.P. Ganguly v. University of Lucknow, AIR 1984 SC 186	Cited by appellant to support the proposition that moulding relief is not permissible where no factual foundation exists in the pleadings.	The court noted the appellant's reliance on this authority as part of the submission that the First Court exceeded its jurisdiction; the court did not accept the appellant's submission and did not strike down the moulding of relief in this case.
Ramrao v. All India Backward Classes Employees Welfare Association, AIR 2004 SC 1459	Cited alongside K.P. Ganguly by appellant for the principle that moulding relief is impermissible without factual pleadings.	The court considered the appellant's reliance on this authority but concluded that moulding relief was acceptable on the facts and circumstances before it; the court did not find First Court's relief impermissible.
Mithileshgarg v. Union of India, AIR 1992 SC 443	Cited by respondent to support the proposition that a rival operator/objector lacks locus standi to challenge issuance of a permit.	The court expressly followed this decision on the question of locus standi and rejected the appellant's contention on that ground.
Sanjit Chakraborty v. State Of West Bengal & Ors., (2004) 1 WBLR 293	Cited by respondent in support of the contention that the rival operator/appellant lacked locus standi.	The court noted the respondent's reliance on this authority in support of the locus standi argument; the court accepted the locus standi contention against the appellant (consistent with Mithileshgarg).
Doly Ghosh v. Kumud Chandra Ghosh, (2004) 2 WBLR (Cal) 657	Cited by respondent to support the proposition that the Court can mould relief.	The court observed the respondent's reliance on this authority and held that it had the power to mould relief in the facts and circumstances of the case.
Deputy Transport Commissioner & Secretary v. M.B. Kishore, (2005) 11 SCC 541	Cited by respondent as authority for the Court's ability to mould relief / justice‑oriented approaches in administrative matters.	The opinion records the citation and indicates the court accepted that it had power to mould relief; the court did not disturb the First Court's relief on that basis.
Commissioner of Endowments v. Vittal Rao, (2005) 4 SCC 120 : AIR 2005 SC 454	Cited by respondent in support of moulding relief and equitable remedies by the Court.	The court noted this authority in the context of submissions on moulding relief; the court found that moulding of relief was permissible in the circumstances before it.
A.N. Pathak v. Secretary to the Government, Ministry of Defence, 1987 Supp SCC 763 : AIR 1987 SC 716	Cited by respondent among authorities supporting the proposition that courts can mould relief.	The court noted the citation; the opinion indicates the court accepted its ability to mould relief and therefore did not find fault with the First Court's relief on that ground.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The appellate bench examined the records and materials placed before it and proceeded as follows:

The court first addressed the allegation of suppression of material facts by private respondent No. 4 (non-disclosure of number of permits in Form No. 1). After reviewing the statutory context and the records, the court observed that after amendment of the Act (reference in the opinion to amendment of Section 71 effective 14 November 1994) there was no statutory bar to a permit-holder obtaining more than one permit. Consequently the court concluded that omission to disclose number of permits could not be treated as suppression of material facts vis-à-vis the authorities or the Court.
The court noted the procedural history before the RTA: following objections, the RTA cancelled an offer letter on 7 July 2005 but granted liberty to the applicant (private respondent No. 4) to apply afresh in Form No. 1. Private respondent No. 4 filed a fresh application with the prescribed fee on 11 July 2005; the RTA considered the application and decided to issue a conditional offer letter on 23 July 2005, and thereafter issued a fresh offer letter (memo dated 25 July 2005). Fees were accepted on 29 July 2005, although final issuance awaited resolution of objections.
On these facts, the court held that the omission was at most an irregularity and not a substantive suppression justifying cancellation or denial. Because the RTA had offered the applicant an opportunity to apply afresh and had issued conditional/fresh offer letters following filing with fees, the court found no irregularity or illegality in the First Court's view that a fresh application and conditional offer could regularize the defect.
The court also considered the locus standi issue: applying the principle in Mithileshgarg v. Union of India (AIR 1992 SC 443) and related authority, the court agreed that the appellant—being a rival operator and objector—could not overcome the bar on locus to challenge grant of the permit. The court therefore rejected the appellant's locus standi contention.
The court accepted that it had the power to mould relief in appropriate circumstances. It found no basis to interfere with the First Court's decision which had moulded relief (including setting aside the RTA's cancellation and deeming the fresh application/offer suitable for regularization). The appellate bench therefore found no merit in disturbing the First Court's order on the grounds raised.
Finally, on the question of alleged fabrication of the memo dated 25 July 2005 (the Chairman's affidavit denying signature and an enquiry pending), the court recorded the factual state of the enquiry but its analysis and final conclusions focused on the statutory interpretation of disclosure obligations and the procedural history (liberty to apply afresh, filing of fresh application, issuance of conditional offer, later issuance of permit).

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The court's dispositive ruling was to dismiss the appeal. In the words of the opinion: the appeal is dismissed.

The court also modified one procedural element of the First Court's order: it set aside that part of the First Court's order which had awarded costs of Rs. 5,000 in favour of the respondent; that cost award was removed on the prayer of appellant's counsel.

Implications:

Direct effect on the parties: The First Court's decision allowing the writ petition of private respondent No. 4 and dismissing the appellant's writ petition was upheld; the appellant's challenge failed and the private respondent's entitlement to a permit (following the RTA's process and ultimate issuance of permit on 7 November 2005, valid till 28 July 2010 as stated in the record) was not disturbed by this appellate court.
The appellate court accepted that omissions in Form No. 1 regarding number of permits were not, in the present statutory context, suppression of material facts justifying cancellation; such omissions were treated as procedural irregularities susceptible to cure by fresh application and issuance of conditional offer letter.
No new legal precedent was announced by this appellate decision beyond application of established principles: (a) rival operators/objectors generally lack locus standi to challenge permits (following Mithileshgarg), and (b) courts possess power to mould relief in proper circumstances. The opinion limited itself to applying those principles to the facts before it.

Order accordingly.

Show all summary ...

1. This instant appeal has been preferred against a common judgment and order dated 26th September, 2005 passed by the Hon'ble First Court dismissing the writ petition filed by the appellant being W.P No. 18196(W) of 2005 and allowing the writ petition being W.P No. 15787(W) of 2005.

2. The facts of those writ petitions briefly are as follows:

The present appellant filed the writ petition challenging the resolution dated 7th July, 2005 in connection with an application filed by the private respondent No. 4 in Form No. 1 along with the prescribed fees. In connection to the said application the Authority issued an offer letter. The writ petitioner/appellant herein challenged the validity of the said other offer letter issued by the Chairman, Regional Transport Authority, Burdwan vide Memo No. 5038(131)/MV, dated 25th July, 2005.

3. In the other writ petition the private respondent No. 4 and the writ petitioner/appellant herein in respect of W.P No. 15787(W) of 2005 challenged the gross inaction on the part of the Authorities to issue permits in terms of the offer letter dated 25th July, 2005 despite the compliance of necessary formalities thereof.

4. The Hon'ble First Court after hearing the parties came to the conclusion that the writ petition filed by the writ petitioner/appellant herein is not maintainable on the ground that the writ petitioner/appellant had no locus standi to oppose the grant of new permit being an existing operator.

5. The Hon'ble First Court further held that Form No. 1 is only a procedural matter and it cannot have any bearing even when the non-disclosure of the number of permits enjoyed by the private respondent were not disclosed by the private respondent No. 4 being the writ petition in W.P No. 15787(W) of 2005 and the same can be a ground to reject the application.

6. According to the Hon'ble First Court, such non-disclosure is only to be treated as a procedural criteria and it cannot encroach upon the substantive right of the writ petitioner being W.P No. 15787(W) of 2005 in this matter and, therefore. His Lordship directed to issue the permit in favour of the private respondent No. 4.writ petitioner in W.P No. 15787(W) of 2005.

7. His Lordship on such ground also set aside the decision taken on 7th July, 2005 by the Regional Transport Authority, Burdwan (hereinafter referred to as “the RTA”) for cancelling the earlier order dated 28th March, 2005 and further a direction was given that a fresh offer letter on the basis of application with prescribed fee should be deemed as pre-date consideration for the purpose of regularization of the defect.

8. It is the case of the writ petitioner/appellant herein that non-furnishing of the particulars in Form No. 1 is not a contract finding in view of the specific provisions of Rule 114 of the West Bengal Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 (hereinafter referred to as “the said Rules”). The Authorities had no other option but to reject the application for permit if the applicant fails to furnish the papers and documents which have not been asked to furnish along with the application.

9. It is further submitted that the Form of application for permanent stage carriage permits is Form No. 1 under Rule 123 of the said Rules and the statement relating to the particulars of stage carriage and contract carriage is required to be given in order to complete the Form and in this case the statement was given by private respondent No. 4.writ petitioner in W.P No. 15787(W) of 2005 that he is not holding any permit, which according to the Learned Advocate appearing in support of this Appeal, is absolutely false because admittedly on the date of filing of the said application, he was holding other permits.

10. He further submitted that there is no restriction of holding any number of permits as per the statute but that does not give any applicant a right to make a false statement at the time of filing the application. Therefore, he submitted that it also cannot be a procedural matter because as soon as the application is considered on merits, offer letter has been issued and question of correction and that amending the same cannot and does not arise and he submitted that the Hon'ble First Court has failed to appreciate the said fact and has wrongly come to such conclusion that it is a procedural error and can be removed.

11. He further pointed out that in the writ petition filed by the private respondent No. 4, the writ petitioner in W.P No. 15787(W) of 2005 did not even challenge the cancellation of the offer letter and therefore, according to him, the Court cannot assume jurisdiction and pass such order even without the writ petitioner made out a case in the writ petition.

12. It is further submitted by him that the decisions reported in 1994 (2) SCC 642 : (AIR 1994 SC 1699) (Ramankutty Guptan v. Avara.), 2001 (4) SCC 262 : (AIR 2001 SC 1273 (Kulwant Kaur v. Gurdial Singh Mann) and 2002 (2) SCC 16 : (AIR 2002 SC 582) (Kedarnath v. Mohanlal Kesarwari) have no application in the facts and circumstances of this case while on the contrary, the decision reported in 2001 (4) SCC 262 : (AIR 2001 SC 1273) (supra) would show that the technicalities alone by itself ought not to permit High Court to decide the issue since justice oriented approach is the call of the day presently.

13. The learned Advocate appearing in support of this appeal further submitted that the findings of the Hon'ble First Court quashing the decision of the RTA for cancellation of the earlier order is bad in law beyond the scope of the writ application. He further submitted that neither the decision relating to the cancellation of the offer letter was challenged by the private respondent No. 4, nor any prayer was made for grant of permit in terms of the offer letter dated 25th July, 2005 in the writ petition so filed by the private respondent No. 4.

14. Therefore, it is submitted that the Hon'ble First Court exceeded its jurisdiction by quashing the part of the resolution dated 7th July, 2005 and he relied upon the decisions reported in AIR 1984 SC 186 (K.P Ganguly v. University of Lucknow) and 2004 AIR SCW 404 : (AIR 2004 SC 1459) (Ramrao v. All India Backward Classes Employees Welfare Association) where the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that moulding relief is not permitted if no factual foundation exist in the pleading of the parties. Admittedly, in the facts and circumstances of this case no pleading has been made for quashing of the said resolution.

15. He further contended that the decision of the Hon'ble First Court that the grant of fresh offer letter on the basis of application with prescribed fee to be deemed as a pre-date consideration for the purpose to regularization of the defect, cannot also be held as good because it would be evident from the records produced before the Court that the portion of the said resolution where the incorporation made “later Sri Sekhar Chatterjee applies afresh in Form No. 1 with payment of prescribed fee. The application is considered and RTA decided to issue conditional offer letter to Sri Chatterjee.” This would show the direction given by the Hon'ble First Court for regularization is without any basis and is not permissible and/or tenable in the eye law.

16. He further submitted that even if the earlier offer letter dated 28th March, 2005 is revived and the grant of permit effected, it is absolutely legal and valid after amending of the Rule 141 of the said Rules. It has been specifically stated that validity of the offer letter is only for a month from the date on which the offer letter has been issued. For exceptional circumstances, it can be extended for a maximum period of six months from the date of issue. Therefore, revival of the said offer letter dated 28th March, 2005 can be revived and/or its validity can be extended for six months from 28th March, 2005, from the date of issue of the offer letter and the order so passed by the Hon'ble First Court on 26th September, 2005.

17. According to the Learned Advocate the extension and/or the revival of the said offer in terms of the said offer dehors the statute since the offer letter has already lapsed its force on 28th April, 2005. He further contended that no case has been made out by the private respondent No. 4 that he has taken steps for the extension of the offer letter and/or has acted on the basis of the offer letter by producing the vehicle as owner thereof within the period of a month. Therefore, it is submitted that the order for revival of the same is wholly contrary to the statutory mandate and thus liable to be quashed.

18. In these circumstances, he submitted that the judgment delivered by the Hon'ble First Court cannot be sustainable in the eye of law and the appeal should be allowed.

19. On the contrary, the private respondent on behalf of Mr. Sekhar Chatterjee submitted that the appellant and others being the rival operators having no legal right under Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 raised an objection to the issuance of new permit on the ground that Mr. Sekhar Chatterjee did not disclose the particulars in the column No. 9, in the application form submitted by him. After the amendment of Section 71 of the Act with effect from 14th November, 1994, the restriction of holding 5 permits by an individual has been waived as such disclosure or non-disclosure of holding other permits in the application form cannot be treated as an illegality but it would be only some irregularity which can be cured.

20. On 7th July, 2005, the RTA upon hearing the objection of the rival operators most illegally and arbitrarily cancelled the offer letter despite the writ petitioner/respondent No. 4 placed a new vehicle on 16th June, 2005. The RTA on that date duly decided to issue the offer letter to the respondent No. 4 on a fresh application be made by him. On and from that date Sri Chatterjee tendered the application with the prescribed fees which was duly approved. The RTA issued fresh offer letter on 25th July, 2005 being Memo No. 6038 (131)/MV for issuance of the permit on the said route.

21. The fees for the permit was accepted by the Office of the respondent after scrutinizing the paper on 29th July, 2005 but withheld issuance of the permit on the objection raised by the writ petitioner/appellant herein and others.

22. The writ petition was also filed by the present appellant which has been dismissed on the ground that the appellant is a rival operator and has no locus standi in filing such writ petition. On 7th November, 2005, the Secretary, RTA issued the permit which remained valid till 28th July, 2010 and it is submitted that, respondent No. 4 has been plying his vehicle bearing No. WB-41B/7014 on the route to render service to the commuters.

23. Two decisions were placed before us that the writ petitioner/appellant herein has no locus standi effect and reliance was placed on two decisions reported in AIR 1992 SC 443, Mithileshgarg v. Union of India and (2004) 1 WBLR 293, Sanjit Chakraborty v. State Of West Bengal & Ors. in support of the contention.

24. It is further contended that the Court can mould the relief and the Learned Advocate appearing on behalf of respondent No. 4 relied upon the decisions reported in (2004) 2 WBLR (Cal) 657, Doly Ghosh v. Kumud Chandra Ghosh; (2005) 11 SCC 541, Deputy Transport Commissioner & Secretary v. M.B Kishore, (2005) 4 SCC 120 : AIR 2005 SC 454, Commissioner of Endowments v. Vittal Rao and 1987 Supp SCC 763 : AIR 1987 SC 716, A.N Pathak v. Secretary to the Government, Ministry of Defence in support of his contention.

25. It is further submitted before us that the RTA has already issued the permanent permit to respondent No. 4 in terms of the offer letter validly granted subject to compliance of all formalities without any infraction of the provisions of law and submitted that the appeal preferred by the rival operators is liable to be dismissed with cost.

26. On the contrary, the Learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the State respondent contended before us that some of the operators including the writ petitioner/appellant herein raised an objection and asked for cancellation of the said offer letter issued to the private respondent on the application filed by him on the ground that the said respondent No. 4 suppressed the material facts in the application form with the sole object to mislead the Authorities.

27. It is further submitted that on 7th July, 2005, the RTA resolved that the respondent No. 4 has suppressed the fact relating to the number of permits in his possession. Accordingly, the offer letter issued in favour of respondent No. 4 was cancelled. However, liberty was granted to apply afresh in Form No. 1. On 11th July, 2005, the said respondent No. 4, Sri Sekhar Chatterjee along with the requisite fees filed an application to the Office of RTA and after the consideration of the said application, RTA decided to issue conditional offer letter to Sri Chatterjee;

28. It is further pointed out that by the Learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the State Authorities that the Chairman, RTA in his affidavit affirmed on 11th November, 2005 made it clear that the Chairman, RTA had not signed the offer letter and denied that the said offer letter to have Memo No. 5038 (131)/MV dated 25th July, 2005 containing the signature of the Chairman bearing dated 27th July, 2005. According to the Learned Advocate, the Memo cannot be prior to the date of signature or initial at the bottom. At present it is submitted that an enquiry is being conducted in order to find out whether anybody of this Office staff is involved in the process of making the fabricated offer letter.

29. We have heard the learned Advocates at length. It appears to us that whether there was any suppression of material facts by the writ petitioner/the respondent No. 4 herein before the Court or before the authorities. We have perused the records and the materials placed before us from which it is clear that it was not mandatory on the part of the applicant and that he is having the permits in his possession and in fact after the amendment of the Act in question, there is no bar of any permit-holders to have more than one permit to become an operator in a particular route.

30. Hence, in our opinion, it cannot be said to be or cannot be deemed to be a suppression of material facts either from the said Authorities or from the Court. Hence, we do not find any substance on such point urged before us on behalf of the appellant. It further appears from the records that the RTA granted liberty to the private respondent No. 4 to apply afresh in Form No. 1 and in fact on 11th July, 2005 the private respondent No. 4 filed the application along with the requisite fees with the Office of the RTA. Thereafter, the application was considered and the RTA decided to issue conditional offer letter to Sri Chatterjee on 23rd July, 2005.

31. Therefore, in our opinion, we do not find there is any reason to interfere with the order since, in our opinion, it cannot be said that there was any irregularity or illegality in respect of the order so passed by the Hon'ble First Court in this matter.

32. On the other hand, we also do not find that there is any substance and/or reasons to interfere with the order so passed by the Hon'ble First Court since, in our opinion, the Court has power to mould the relief in the facts and circumstances of the case.

33. Furthermore, the appellant cannot overcome the hurdle as has been put forward by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that he is not only an objector but he has a rivalry and engaged in the same profession. Hence, in our opinion, on the question of locus standi, we have to follow the said decision of AIR 1992 SC 443 (supra) and have to reject the contention of the appellant on that ground also.

34. For the reasons stated hereinabove, we do not find there is any merit in this appeal. Hence, the appeal is dismissed.

35. Later:

On the prayer made by Mr. Arabindo Chatterjee, Learned Advocate appearing in support of his appeal being MAT No. 4066 of 2005, the cost which was awarded by the Hon'ble First Court being a sum of Rs. 5,000/-, we only set aside that part of the order passed by the Hon'ble First Court.