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Bibek Raychaudhuri & Ors. v. Virama Enterprises Private Limited

Calcutta High Court
Mar 30, 2007
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Opinion (S.P. Talukdar, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioners sought quashing of criminal proceedings (Case No. C-6736 of 2003) by way of an application under section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The underlying complaint was lodged by Mr. Amal Kumar Sanyal as authorised representative of M/s Virama Enterprises Private Limited alleging commission of an offence under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act in respect of cheque No. 133968 dated 30.09.2003 for Rs. 15,12,000 drawn on United Bank of India, Calcutta Branch in favour of the complainant.

The complaint alleged that the cheques in question formed part of three post-dated account-payee cheques delivered by the erstwhile management of M/s Otto India Limited to the complainant on 27.10.2000 (cheque numbers and amounts are set out in the complaint). The present petitioners became directors of M/s Otto India Limited on 14.11.2002 and resigned at various dates in 2003 (Petitioners 1 and 2 on 14.06.2003; Petitioner 3 on 05.08.2003; Petitioner 4 on 26.09.2003). It is recorded in the petitioners' pleadings that they were non-executive, rotational directors who did not handle day-to-day affairs of the company.

The opposite party sent a demand notice dated 16.10.2003 for payment within 15 days for the dishonoured cheque. The petitioners responded denying responsibility and asked that the notice be recalled, but the complainant proceeded to file the criminal complaint under section 138. The Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta, after taking cognizance, transferred the matter to the 11th Metropolitan Magistrate. The learned trial court examined witnesses for the complainant and, being prima facie satisfied, by order dated 24.11.2003 directed issuance of process upon the petitioners. The petitioners were directed to appear on 23.12.2003.

The petitioners filed the present applications under section 482 praying for quashing of the proceedings; a separate but similar application by another accused gave rise to C.R.R. No. 419 of 2004. Both matters were heard together.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the criminal proceedings under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act should be quashed under section 482 CrPC on the ground that the petitioners were not directors or persons in charge or responsible for the company's day-to-day business at the relevant time and therefore could not be prosecuted.
  2. Whether the complaint petition contained sufficient and specific averments of fact to enable the Magistrate to take cognizance and issue process against the petitioners (i.e., whether a prima facie case was made out at the stage of issuance of process).
  3. To what extent a High Court, in exercise of its power under section 482 CrPC, may look into documents (such as Form 32 or affidavits) or otherwise examine disputed factual matters bearing on whether an accused had resigned prior to the alleged offence, without thereby improperly encroaching on the trial process.
  4. Whether continuation of the criminal proceeding would amount to an abuse of the process of the Court.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments (as advanced by Mr. Sibdas Banerjee and Mr. Nandy)

  • The petitioners were not in charge of, nor responsible for, the conduct of the company's business at the relevant time and therefore could not be roped into prosecution under section 138.
  • There is a distinction between investigation and court proceedings; the word "cognizance" requires application of judicial mind and the magistrate must ascertain precisely who was responsible before issuing process.
  • A notice sent in a personal capacity is not a valid notice for the purposes of section 138 (submission by Mr. Nandy).
  • If resignations (e.g. by Form 32 or certified copies) show the petitioners had ceased to be directors prior to issuance/presentation of the cheque, that evidence should be accepted to relieve them of trial (reliance placed on Lachhman P. Udhani and other authorities).
  • Reliance on authorities (including S. M. S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd., Sabitha Ramamurthy, and Saroj Kumar Poddar) to emphasize that vicarious or derivative liability of a director must be founded on specific allegations of how the director was responsible for company affairs and that a complaint must contain sufficient particulars to form a prima facie opinion of vicarious liability.

Opposite Party's Arguments (as advanced by Mr. Bagchi)

  • The petitioners' challenge at this stage is premature and anxiety of the petitioners is unfounded, because the learned trial court, being prima facie satisfied, had the power and duty to proceed with trial.
  • The law does not permit the Magistrate to take a different stand; once prima facie satisfaction exists, trial should be permitted to run its course and evidence be led.
  • Affidavits and documents (such as Form 32) annexed to a quashing petition cannot be treated as evidence; it is a serious error to terminate prosecution at inception by deciding merits on the basis of such documents (reliance on State of Bihar v. P. P. Sharma and State of M.P. v. Awadh Kishore Gupta).
  • If allegations in the complaint and the evidence collected support commission of the offence, there is no scope for quashing; the trial must be allowed to reach its logical conclusion.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
J TH Zwart & Ors. vs. Indrani Mukherjee, 1990 C. Cr. LR (Cal) 1 To take cognizance a magistrate needs basic facts and circumstances supporting the allegation; mere bare allegation is not sufficient to enable cognizance. Cited to support the proposition that a complaint must set out basic facts on which the allegation rests so a magistrate can apply judicial mind before issuing process.
Lachhman P. Udhani & Ors. vs. M/s. Redington (India) Ltd., 2006 (3) Crimes 731 Where a certified copy of Form 32 is filed to show resignation prior to issuance of cheque, challenge may be treated as innocuous and court can relieve director from trial. Referred to by petitioners (Mr. Nandy) to argue that proof of resignation by Form 32 should relieve directors from trial at threshold.
S. M. S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. vs. Neeta Bhalla & Anr., 2005 (8) SCC 89 Liability depends on the role played in the affairs of the company and not merely on designation; complaint must disclose necessary facts making a person liable. Relied upon by petitioners to stress that liability must be shown by conduct, not merely by office held; court considered this principle when assessing sufficiency of complaint averments.
Sabitha Ramamurthy & Anr. vs. R. B. S. Channabasavardhya, 2006 (7) Supreme 168 Complainant must make statements on oath regarding how the offence was committed and how accused are responsible; strict compliance required before vicarious liability is imposed. Cited by petitioners to support the need for clear factual statements; court noted this authority while evaluating whether complainant had made specific allegations.
State of Haryana & Ors. vs. Bhajan Lal & Ors., AIR 1992 SC 604 High Court power under Article 226 or section 482 CrPC to prevent abuse of process should be exercised sparingly and only in rare cases. Referred to as the guiding principle on the limited scope of interference by the High Court under section 482.
Delhi Development Authority vs. Rajinder Sharma, JT 2001 (5) SC 572 Supports the proposition that trial should ordinarily proceed to test allegations. Invoked by the opposite party to urge that trial must be allowed to conclude and not prematurely terminated.
State of Bihar & Anr. vs. P. P. Sharma, IAS & Anr., 1992 SCC (Cri) 192 It is a serious error to end prosecution at inception by going into merits on the basis of affidavits/documents which are not yet proved; such documents cannot be treated as evidence for quashing. Cited by the opposite party to resist reliance on documentary annexures (e.g., Form 32) when deciding a quashing petition.
Sreekant Bangur vs. State of West Bengal & Anr., 2000 C. Cr. LR (Cal.) 363 Whether a person was a director can be determined at trial by evidence; quashing before trial is not appropriate in such disputes of fact. Cited by the Court (and for the opposite party) to support the view that factual disputes over directorship are to be resolved at trial.
K. P. G. Nair vs. M/s. Jindal Menthol India Ltd., 2000 Cr. LJ 1213 Question whether petitioner had resigned as director before issuance of offending cheques is a disputed question of fact. Used to reinforce that resignation claims raise factual issues unsuitable for resolution on a quashing petition.
Raj Lakshmi Mills vs. Shakti Bhakoo, 2002 (8) SCC 236 At summoning stage, when evidence is yet to be led, High Court cannot assume facts and hold that respondent was not responsible for conduct of the business. Invoked by the opposite party and considered by the Court to caution against making factual findings at the quashing stage.
State of Punjab vs. Kasturi Lal & Ors., JT 2004 (6) SC 137 Exercise of power under section 482 CrPC should be the exception; persons in charge or responsible to the company at the time of contravention may be prosecuted. Cited to emphasize limited scope of quashing and the proposition that those in charge at the relevant time can be prosecuted.
N. Chandrasekhar & Ors. vs. M/s. Allwyn, Hyderabad & Ors., 1999 Cr. LJ 4630 If allegations and material support the allegation of commission of offence, there is no scope for quashing. Referred to by the opposite party to contend that where prima facie case exists quashing is inappropriate.
State of M.P. vs. Awadh Kishore Gupta & Ors., 2004 SCC (Cri) 353 High Court should not look into materials whose acceptability is essentially a matter for trial; annexures to section 482 petitions cannot be treated as evidence without testing. Cited by the Court and opposite party to support the proposition that documentary annexures are not a substitute for trial evidence.
Bharat Kumar Modi & Ors. vs. M/s. Pennar Peterson Securities Ltd. & Ors., 1999 Cr. LJ 3803 Documents like Form 32 indicating non-directorship at relevant time must be proved at trial. Cited to show that resignation evidence requires proof at trial and cannot be determinative on a quashing petition.
Saroj Kumar Poddar vs. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr., 2007 (1) Supreme 239 To make a director vicariously liable, the complaint must make specific allegations as to how the director was responsible for company affairs; absence of such averments may preclude summons. Considered by the Court; the Court compared the present complaint’s specific averments to the standard set in this case and held the present complaint to be distinguishable from Poddar.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court framed the central task as deciding whether continuation of the criminal proceeding would amount to an abuse of the process of Court and whether the complaint disclosed sufficient material to justify the learned Magistrate taking cognizance and issuing process.

The Court analysed the parties' rival contentions in the context of settled principles governing the exercise of the High Court's power under section 482 CrPC. The Court reiterated that:

  • Section 482 recognizes the High Court's power to prevent abuse of process and to secure ends of justice, but such power must be exercised sparingly and not in a manner that renders other provisions of the Code redundant (citing Bhajan Lal and similar authorities).
  • The High Court should not ordinarily go into the merits of the prosecution or treat affidavits and documentary annexures as substitute for evidence that is to be tested at trial (citing State of Bihar v. P. P. Sharma; State of M.P. v. Awadh Kishore Gupta).
  • Determination of disputed factual questions, such as whether the petitioners had resigned as directors before issuance or presentation of the cheque, is ordinarily a matter for trial and not for resolution on a quashing petition (citing Sreekant Bangur, K.P.G. Nair, Bharat Kumar Modi, etc.).

The Court then turned to the complaint itself. It noted that paragraph 4 of the complaint specifically alleged that all accused were in charge of, and responsible to, the company for its day-to-day business at the time of the alleged offence. Paragraph 16 (reproduced in the judgment) contained more detailed allegations: it denied the accuracy of certain replies from accused, stated that accused No.6 acknowledged receipt of the demand notice and forwarded it to accused No.2 for necessary action, and asserted that when the cheque was issued, presented and dishonoured each of the accused had due notice and knowledge and that the offence was committed with common consent, connivance or attributable to neglect on each accused's part.

Having considered the authorities cited by both parties (including authorities requiring specific averments for vicarious liability and authorities cautioning against premature inquiry into documents), the Court found the present complaint to be materially different from cases where complaints contained no specific averments linking an individual director to the conduct of company affairs. In the present case the Court held that the complaint contained categorical and specific allegations against the petitioners which could not properly be resolved without leading and testing evidence at trial.

The Court therefore concluded that there was not such vagueness or insufficiency in the complaint as to justify interference under section 482 at the present stage. It emphasized that documentary annexures (e.g., Form 32) could not be treated as conclusive at this stage and that the trial court was justified in proceeding on the basis of the prima facie material before it.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The applications (C.R.R. No. 2720 of 2003 and C.R.R. No. 419 of 2004) are dismissed.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The criminal proceedings in Case No. C-6736 of 2003 under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, as directed by the learned Magistrate, shall continue; the petitioners are not granted quashing relief under section 482 at this stage.
  • On precedent and procedure: The Court reaffirmed that quashing under section 482 is an exceptional remedy; disputed factual questions (for example, whether a director resigned before the relevant time) and documentary proofs such as Form 32 are matters to be examined and proved at trial and not to be determinative on a pre-trial quashing application. The judgment does not purport to lay down a new legal rule but applies established authorities to the facts of the case.

End of summary — content strictly confined to material contained in the provided opinion.

Show all summary ...

S.P. TALUKDAR, J.

(1) THE petitioners by filing an application under section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code sought to quash the proceedings of case No. C-6736 of 2003 under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The backdrop of the present case may briefly be stated as follows: mr. Amal Kumar Sanyal, as the authorised representative of M/s. Virama enterprises Private Limited, lodged a complaint before the Chief metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta, alleging commission of offence punishable under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act by the petitioners. The said complaint was registered as Case No. C-6736 of 2003. It was alleged in the said complaint that a cheque bearing No. 133968 dated 30. 9. 2003 was drawn on United Bank of India, Calcutta Branch for an amount of Rs. 15,12,000/- in favour of the opposite party/company against the dues. The o. P. through its Advocate by letter dated 16. 10. 2003 requested the petitioners to make payment of the aforesaid amount but no payment was made.

(2) ON receipt of the said petition of complaint, learned Chief Metropolitan magistrate, Calcutta after taking cognizance of the offence transferred the case to the learned 11th Court of Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta. The learned Transferee Court after examining the witnesses, by order dated 24. 11. 2003 being prima facie satisfied, directed issuance of process upon the present petitioners. In terms of an agreement entered into by and between the O. P. and M/s. Otto India Limited, the latter under cover of a letter dated 27. 10. 2000 handed over to the O. P. three post-dated account payee cheques all drawn on the U. B. I. Calcutta Branch. The said cheques were no. 133966 dated 30. 9. 2001 for an amount of Rs. 12,83,310/- No. 133967 dated 30. 9. 2002 for an amount of Rs. 15,59,250/- and No. 133968 dated 30. 9. 2003 for Rs. 15,12,000/- only. The said post-dated cheques were handed over on 27. 10. 2000 by the erstwhile management of M/s. Otto India Limited. The petitioners joined as Directors of the said M/s. Otto India Ltd. on 14. 11. 2002. Petitioner Nos. 1 and 2 resigned from the Board of Directors of company on 14. 06. 2003 and No. 3 resigned on 05. 08. 2003 and, thereafter, petitioner No. 4 also resigned from the Board on 26. 09. 2003. Thus, at the time of handing over of the said post-dated cheques to the O. P. , the present petitioners were not in the Board of Directors. They also ceased to be directors when the cause of action for dishonour of the cheques arose in the month October, 2003. The present petitioners were non-executive rotational Directors only attending the periodic Board Meetings of the company during their short tenure of their office between the period 14. 11. 2002 to 26. 09. 2003. They were never looking after the day-to-day affairs of running of the business of the company, during the tenure of their office.

(3) OPPOSITE party sent a notice dated 16. 10. 2003 for dishonour of the cheque dated 30. 9. 2003 for Rs. 15,12,000/- and demand was made for payment of the said amount within 15 days of receipt of the said notice. The present petitioners duly replied to the same thereby intimating that the present petitioners were not in charge of or responsible for the conduct of the business of the company at the relevant time. The petitioners called upon the Advocate of the O. P. to recall, rescind, withdraw or cancel the impugned notice dated 16. 10. 2003 but instead of doing the same, the said O. P. lodged the petition of complaint under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

(4) SUBSEQUENTLY, the authorised representative of M/s. Virama enterprises Private Limited lodged a complaint before the learned Chief metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta, under section 138 of the n. i. act and the same was registered as Case No. C-6736.

(5) IN the said petition it was alleged that a cheque bearing No. 133968 dated 30. 9. 2003 for Rs. 15,12,ooo/- was drawn on United Bank of India, calcutta Branch in favour of the O. P. /company by the petitioners against the dues. By Advocates letter dated 16. 10. 2003 the petitioners were to make payment of the aforesaid amount. The same having not been paid, the petitioners committed an offence punishable under section 138 of the N. I. Act. Learned C. M. M. , Calcutta, after taking cognizance of the offence transferred the case to the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, 11th Court, calcutta for enquiring and/or trial.

(6) LEARNED Trial Court on receipt of the same examined witnesses on behalf of the O. P. Being satisfied about existence of prima facie case, learned court by order dated 24. 11. 2003 directed issuance of process. The present petitioners were directed to appear before the learned Court on 23. 12. 2003.

(7) THE petitioners being not Directors at the time of issuance of the cheque or at the time of accrual of cause of action, the proceeding against them is liable to be quashed.

(8) IN such circumstances, the said application was filed under section 482 of the Criminal Proceedure Code praying for quashing of the proceeding.

(9) SIMILAR application praying for quashing of the proceeding was also filed by the petitioners/accused persons namely, Mr. S. K. Nanda thereby giving rise to C. R. R. No. 419 of 2004.

(10) NATURALLY, both the matters were heard at a time. Mr. Sibdas Banerjee, appearing as learned Counsel for the petitioners, submitted that the petitioners were not involved with the functioning of the concerned organisation at the relevant time and, as such, they could not be roped ia he submitted that there is clear difference in the matter of investigation of an offence and proceeding with a matter before a Court. Mr. Banerjee submitted that the word "cognizance" presupposes application of judicial mind for the purpose of proceeding further. While applying mind, the learned court could not just shut its eyes and close the doors of its mind and was under legal obligation to ascertain who exactly were responsible for the alleged dishonour of the cheque under reference.

(11) LEARNED Counsel, Mr. Nandy, going a step further submitted that notice was sent in personal capacity and as such, it could not be said to be valid notice. He, in fact, echoed the voice of Mr. Banerjee while categorically submitting that the petitioner was not in service on the date of alleged commission of the offence.

(12) IN response to this, Mr. Bagchi, as learned Counsel for the opposite party, submitted that anxiety of the petitioners is premature. He emphatically submitted that after learned Court was prima facie satisfied, it had no option but to proceed with the matter. Mr. Bagchi further submitted that law does not permit the learned Magistrate to take any stand different from what had been done.

(13) ATTENTION of the Court was drawn to the allegations made in the petition of complaint which was filed before the learned Court. The relevant paragraph of the said petition of complaint may be reproduced as follows:

"the accused No. 2 is the Chairman of the accused No. 1 company. The accused persons No. 2 to 5 are the Directors of the accused No. 1 company. The accused person No. 6 is the company Secretary and General Manager (Finance) of the accused No. 1 company. The accused Nos. 7 to 12 were the principal officers of the accused No. 1 company at the time of commission of the offence. The accused Nos. 13 and 14 were the signatories of the said cheques and the said cheques were signed and issued upon the specific direction and with the knowledge, consent and connivance of the other accused persons. All the accused persons at the time of commission of the alleged offence were in charge of, and responsible to, the accused No. 1 company for its day-to-day business."

(14) AFTER giving due regard to the submission made by learned Counsel for the parties and the materials on record, it appears that this Court in response to the two revisional applications, as referred to earlier, is required to decide whether continuation of this criminal proceeding under reference will amount to abuse of process of Court.

(15) LEARNED Counsel for the parties in response to their respective contention relied upon various decisions including a few of the Hon'ble Apex court.

(16) MR. S. Banerjee, learned Counsel for the petitioners (in C. R. R. No. 2720/2003)submitted that a Magistrate may take cognizance of an offence under section 190 (1) (c) of the Code upon receiving a complaint of fact which constitute such offence. This essentially means that the basic fact and materials on which the allegation is founded are required to be stated.

(17) IN the case of J TH ZWART and Ors. vs. Indrani Mukherjee, 1990 c. Cr. LR (Cal) 1, the learned Division Bench of this Court held that

"to be a complaint under section 2 (d) of the Code only an allegation of the sort that somebody has committed the murder of 'a' is sufficient. But to enable a magistrate to take cognizance of such a complaint, such allegation would be not sufficient; and the basic fact and circumstances on the basis of which the above allegation are being made are required to be stated."

(18) MR. Nandy, as learned Counsel for the petitioner (in C. R. R. No. 419/04)referred to the decision in the case of Lachhman P. Udhani and Ors. vs. M/s. Redington (India) Ltd,. 2006 (3) Crimes 731 in support of his contention that in a case where a certified copy of form 32 is filed by the accused to show that he had resigned from the post of Director prior to the issuance of cheque an challenge thereto is innocuous, Court has to accept it and relieve director from ordeal of trial.

(19) ATTENTION of the Court was drawn to the decision in the case of S. MS. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. vs. Neeta Bhalla and Anr. , reported in 2005 (8) SCC 89.

(20) IT was contended by Mr. Banerjee that the fact that a Magistrate has the power to reject a complaint at the threshold suggests that the complaint should make out a case for issue of process. In the case of S. M. S. Pharmaceutical Ltd. (supra), it was observed that

"liability depends on the role plays in the affairs of a company and not on designation or status. If being a director or manager or secretary was enough to cast criminal liability, the section would have said so. Instead of 'every person' the section would have said 'every director, manager or secretary in a company is liable' etc. The legislature is aware that it is a case of criminal liability which means serious consequences so far as the person sought to be made liable is concerned. Therefore, only persons who can be said to be connected with the commission of a crime at the relevant time have been subjected to action."

(21) IT was further held that

"the conclusion is inevitable that the liability arises on account of conduct, act or omission on the part of a person and not merely on account of holding of office or a position in a company. Therefore, in order to bring a case within section 141 of the Act the complaint must disclose the necessary facts which make a person liable."

(22) ON behalf of the petitioners, reference was also made to the Apex court decision in the case of Sabitha Ramamurthy and Anr. vs. R. B. S. Channabasavardhya, reported in 2006 (7) Supreme 168, in support of the contention that what is required is a clear statement of fact so as to enable the Court to arrive at a prima facie opinion that the accused are vicariously liable. It was submitted that before a person can be made vicariously liable, strict compliance of the statutory requirements would be insisted.

(23) THE Apex Court in the said case observed as follows:

"in terms of section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the complainant is bound to make statements on oath as to how the offence has been committed and how the accused persons are responsible therefor. In the event, ultimately, the prosecution is found to be frivolous or otherwise mala fide, the Court may direct registration of case against the complainant for mala fide prosecution of the accused. The accused would also be entitled to file a suit for damages. The relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure are required to be construed from the aforementioned point of view."

(24) IN course of submission, reference was also made to the decision in the case of State of Haryana and Ors. vs. Bhajan Lal and Ors. , reported in AIR 1992 SC 604. The Apex Court in the said case dealt with the High Court's power under Article 226 or under section 482 of the Code of Criminal procedure to interfere in proceedings relating to cognizable offences to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It was specifically observed that such power can be exercised sparingly and that too, in the rarest of rare cases.

(25) MR. Bagchi, as learned Counsel for the opposite party, submitted that the trial of the case must be allowed to proceed and reach its logical conclusion. He referred to the decision in the case of Delhi Development authority vs. Rajinder Sharma, as reported in JT 2001 (5) SC 572.

(26) RELYING upon the decision in the case of State of Bihar and Anr. vs. P. P. Sharma, IAS and Anr. , reported in 1992 SCC (Cri) 192, it was submitted by Mr. Bagchi that there could be no scope for treating affidavits or documents as sought to have been relied upon by the petitioners/accused persons as evidence. In the said case the Apex Court observed that it would be a serious error in putting an end to the prosecution at its inception by going into merits in a pre-trial on consideration of the affidavits and documents which, unless proved to be true and reliable in regular trial, cannot form the basis of any decision regarding commission of offence.

(27) IN the case of Sreekant Bangur vs. State of West Bengal and Anr. , reported in 2000 C. Cr. LR (Cal.) 363, the Single Bench of this Court held that whether a person was a director of a company or not can be determined at the time of trial by taking evidence. Before entering appearance in the case and raising the issue before the learned Trial Court, approaching this court with a prayer for quashing of the proceeding was not appreciated. Similarly, in the case of K. P. G. Nair vs. M/s. Jindal Menthol India Ltd. , reported in 2000 Cr. LJ 1213, it was held that question whether or not petitioner had resigned as director before issuance of offending cheques is a disputed question of fact.

(28) MR. Bagchi further referred to the decision in the case of Raj Lakshmi mills vs. Shakti Bhakoo, reported in 2002 (8) SCC 236 in support of his contention that at the stage of summoning when evidence was yet to be led by the parties, the High Court could not on an assumption of facts come to a finding of fact that the respondent was not responsible for the conduct of the business.

(29) ATTENTION of the Court was drawn to the decision in the case of State of Punjab vs. Kasturi Lal and Ors. , reported in JT 2004 (6) SC 137, wherein it was held that exercise of power under section 482 of the code should be the exception and not the rule. The Apex Court observed that

"in respect of contraventions by a company, besides the company itself every person who was in charge of, and was responsible to, the company for the conduct of the business at the time when the contravention was committed and any director, manager or secretary or other officer of the company with whose consent or connivance or because of whose neglect, the offence has been committed could be prosecuted and punished."

(30) IT was the categorical assertion of the learned Counsel for the opposite party that if the allegations made in the complaint and evidence collected support the allegation of commission of offence, there can be no scope for quashing (Ref: N. Chandrasekhar and Ors. vs. M/s. Allwyn, Hyderabad and ors. , 1999 Cr. LJ 4630).

(31) IN the case of State of M. P. vs. Awadh Kishore Gupta and Ors. , reported in 2004 SCC (Cri) 353, the Apex Court observed that it was impermissible for High Court to look into materials, the acceptability of which was essentially a matter for trial. It was further held that the annexures to the petitions under section 482 of Cr. PC cannot be termed as evidence without being tested and proved.

(32) THIS Court's attention was also invited to the decision in the case of bharat Kumar Modi and Ors. vs. M/s. Pennar Peterson Securities Ltd. and ors. , reported in 1999 Cr. LJ 3803, in support of the stand that documents like Form 32 indicating that the petitioners were not directors at the relevant time are to be proved in trial.

(33) THERE is hardly any scope for any dispute or controversy as regards the scope of an application under section 482 of the Code of Criminal procedure. It certainly recognizes the power of this Court to pass an order in order to ensure that there is no abuse of the process of Court. It gives this Court the power to pass an order in order to secure the ends of justice. It also cannot be disputed that the petitioner in an application under section 482 of Cr. PC cannot expect the learned Court to quash a proceeding relying upon the copies of various documents etc. annexed to the application. Such documents can only be properly and effectively scrutinized and tested at the time of trial of a case.

(34) IT is also the settled position of law that this Court in exercise of its power under section 482 of the code cannot really embark upon an enquiry. Such power is never intended to be stretched to an extent which would make other provisions of the Code redundant. The question that next arises as the whether this Court can afford to remain a passive onlooker when it finds that the learned Court of Magistrate while taking cognizance and directing issue of process did not really even consider the merits of the grievance.

(35) AS indicated earlier, the petition of complaint filed before the learned trial Court in this context contained specific allegations. Paragraph 4 of the said complaint reflects the status of the accused while specifically mentioning that all the accused persons at the time of commission of the alleged offence were in charge of, and responsible to, the accused No. 1 company for its day-to-day business.

(36) IT may be submitted that such a casual statement giving the status of the accused persons may not be considered to be sufficient material so as to justify the learned Court for proceeding against all the accused persons. It was claimed on behalf of the petitioners that the exact nature of involvement of the accused persons in the day-to-day running of the business and their specific role in the matter of dishonour of the cheques issued on behalf of the accused No. 1 company does not find proper mention in the petition of complaint. Thus, it was argued that a clear picture was not available before the learned Trial Court.

(37) THE Apex Court in a Division Bench judgment in the case of Saroj kumar Poddar vs. State (NCT of Delhi) and Anr. , reported in 2007 (1) Supreme 239, held that

"with a view to make a Director of a company vicariously liable for the acts of the company, it was obligatory on the part of the complainant to make specific allegations as are required in law. In the case before the learned Bench there was no averment in the complaint petitions as to how and in what manner the appellant was responsible for the conduct of the business of the company or otherwise responsible to it in regard to its functioning."

(38) IN the case under reference, the complainant in paragraph 16 of the petition of complaint made the following specific allegations:

"that the reply received from the accused Nos. 2, 3, 4 and 5 all dated 29th october, 2003 and letter dated 30th October, 2003 received from accused nos. 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 contains incorrect statements. The complainant denies the allegations contained in the said letters and the same are untrue and untenable. The accused person No. 6 after receipt of the aforesaid demand notice, by his letter dated 20. 10. 2003 addressed to the complainant's Advocate M/s. Meharia and Co. , acknowledged the receipt of the demand notice upon the accused No. 1 and himself and further stated that the same have been forwarded to the accused No. 2 for necessary action. The complainant states that at the time when the said cheque was issued and/or when the said cheques remained unpaid and when the said cheque was presented and was dishonoured, each one of the aforesaid accused person has due notice and knowledge of the said cheque and the offence have been committed by the aforesaid accused persons with the common consent or connivance and are in any event attributable to the neglect on the part of each one of the accused persons and each of the accused person is guilty of the offence complained of."

(39) THIS naturally places the present case on a footing different from many others. In the present case, the complainant appears to have taken care of all such aspects and the petition of complaint which was filed before the learned Trial Court, did not leave much scope for confusion and controversy. The categorical and specific allegations made against the petitioners/accused persons in the petition of complaint can only be judged in the context of the evidence to be adduced at the time of trial. The challenge thrown by the complainant can be properly and effectively responded at a subsequent stage, as this Court is not expected to rely solely how on the various documents including form 32 reportedly filed before the Registrar of Companies.

(40) IN such facts and circumstances, this Court is of the view that the manner in which allegations have been made against the present petitioners in the case under reference do not appear to be so vague that it could be suggested that there was no sufficient material before the learned Court for taking cognizance.

(41) HAVING regard to the nature and background of the case under reference, it cannot be said that the present petitioners are entitled to get the benefit of the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Saroj Kumar poddar (supra). The present applications being CRR No. 2720 of 2003 and crr No. 419 of 2004 stand accordingly dismissed. Application dismissed.