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All Bengal Excise Licensees' Association & Ors. v. The State Of West Bengal & Ors.

Calcutta High Court
Aug 29, 2006
Judgment
Subsequent
References
CaseIQ
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CITATION CODES
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CASE NO.

W.P No. 2248 of 2004 and C.C No. 62 of 2005

JUDGES

Pranab Kumar Chattopadhyay, J.

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Summary of Judgment — Contempt Petition arising from W.P. No. 2248 of 2004

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an application under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 filed by petitioners alleging deliberate and wilful violation of interim orders passed by the single-judge Bench on 4th January, 2005 and extended on 19th January, 2005 and 28th January, 2005 in W.P. No. 2248 of 2004. The single-judge interim order (4.1.2005) permitted the authorities to process licence applications but restrained final selection and the holding of any lottery for selection of excise shops without specific leave of the court; that order was continued on 19.1.2005 and further directions for affidavits were given on 28.1.2005 with the interim order continuing until further orders.

Two Division Benches of the High Court in separate proceedings passed orders on 15th March, 2005 and 18th March, 2005 dealing with related excise licence issues: the 15th March order (North 24-Parganas licensees' appeal) dismissed an appeal and vacated an earlier interim order (subject to licenses granted during pendency being subject to final decision), and the 18th March order in a PIL made clear that licences granted in accordance with the Bengal Excise Act and Rules and not in terms of a specified Circular would be subject to further orders.

After these Division Bench orders, the respondent authorities published an advertisement and conducted a lottery in North 24-Parganas for final selection of excise shops. Petitioners alleged this was in wilful violation of the single-judge interim orders and filed the contempt petition. The respondent authorities (alleged contemnors) explained that they acted under the impression that the Division Bench orders permitted them to proceed. The single-judge Bench ultimately considered whether there was wilful disobedience of the interim order and whether the contempt petition was maintainable.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the alleged contemnors wilfully and deliberately violated the interim order of the single-judge Bench dated 4th January, 2005 (and extended on 19th and 28th January, 2005) by issuing advertisements and holding a lottery for final selection of excise shops.
  2. Whether a misunderstanding or genuine doubt about the effect of subsequent Division Bench orders (15th March, 2005 and 18th March, 2005) could negate the requisite mens rea (wilfulness) for contempt.
  3. Whether the contempt petition as filed was maintainable, having regard to preliminary objections raised about the petitioner association's status (company), verification of the petition, and locus/competence to maintain the contempt petition.
  4. Whether the applicable standard and burden of proof (criminal standard — beyond reasonable doubt) for contempt proceedings was satisfied by the petitioners.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The single-judge interim order dated 4th January, 2005 (and its extensions) expressly prohibited holding any lottery for final selection of excise shops without further order; the respondents deliberately and wilfully violated that order by advertising and holding a lottery for North 24-Parganas.
  • The Division Bench orders of 15th and 18th March, 2005 were in separate proceedings unrelated to W.P. No. 2248 of 2004 and did not vary or supersede the single-judge's interim order; the respondents should have appreciated this and not acted on a misunderstanding.
  • When an order is subsisting and valid, it must be obeyed; non-compliance during the operative period attracts contempt (relying on authorities including Ravi S. Naik v. Union of India).
  • If there is violation, status quo ante must be restored; the petitioners cited cases supporting restoration and strict compliance.

Alleged Contemnors' (Respondents') Arguments

  • The lotteries in North 24-Parganas were held pursuant to and in compliance with the Division Bench order dated 15th March, 2005, on the understanding that the Government was entitled to hold the lottery in view of that Division Bench order; a similar understanding arose from the 18th March, 2005 order in another proceeding.
  • The respondents committed a mistake in interpreting the Division Bench orders and did not intend to wilfully violate the single-judge interim order; any error was unintentional and amounted to a misunderstanding of judicial orders rather than deliberate contempt.
  • The publications and lottery were confined to North 24-Parganas (and not other districts), which the respondents say indicates the absence of any wilful intent to disobey the single-judge order.

Advocate General's Preliminary Objections and Submissions

  • Maintainability objections: the contempt application was filed by an association claiming to be a company; the verification was by a person described as General Secretary though a company cannot have a General Secretary and verification must be by a principal officer as defined under the Companies Act, 1956.
  • Submission that the Association lacked competence/locus to present the contempt petition because in an earlier order the Division Bench had held an association of excise licensees lacked locus standi in a related matter.
  • On the merits, the Advocate General accepted that there was disobedience of the single-judge order but contended the disobedience was not wilful; he relied on authorities to submit that both disobedience and wilfulness must be proved, and that a genuine misunderstanding negates wilfulness.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court (as stated in the opinion)
Khushro S. Gandhi v. N.A. Guzder, AIR 1970 SC 1468 at 1471 Cited by petitioners to support the contention that a Division Bench cannot vary a specific order passed by the single-judge in an independent proceeding. The court noted the citation but later held that the decisions relied upon by petitioners (including this) were not applicable to the facts of the present case.
Dibakar Naskar v. Rotary Village Co-operative Multipurpose Society Ltd., 82 CWN Page 44 Cited by petitioners in support of the contention regarding non-variation of the single-judge's order by other proceedings. The court recorded the citation but found the authorities cited by petitioners not applicable in the present facts.
T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka, AIR 1995 SC 1938 (Paras 8–10) Cited by petitioners for the proposition that no litigant can take shelter in misunderstanding to defeat operation of a subsisting interim order. The court observed the citation but ultimately held that the decisions cited by petitioners were not applicable given the respondents' confusion caused by separate Division Bench orders.
Anil Ratan Sarkar v. Hirak Ghosh, (2002) 4 SCC 21 Relied upon by both sides in different contexts: petitioners used it among authorities against misunderstanding; respondents/AG cited it on interpretation issues. The case was cited repeatedly; the court recorded the citation but did not treat it as dispositive and held the respondents were entitled to the benefit of doubt under the circumstances.
Hadkinson v. Hadkinson, 1952 (2) All ER 567 (page 569) Cited by petitioners to support the submission that in case of doubt parties should seek clarification from the court rather than acting on their own interpretation. The court noted the principle but, on the facts, concluded the respondents' belief arising from Division Bench orders gave rise to a reasonable doubt as to wilfulness.
Bagga v. Saleh, AIR 1915 PC 106 Cited by petitioners on the need to seek clarification and not act on uncertainty about operative orders. Recorded in the opinion; the court nonetheless concluded the respondents were confused by other orders and entitled to benefit of doubt.
Ravi S. Naik v. Union of India, AIR 1994 SC 1558 (Paras 44–48) Cited by petitioners for the proposition that a subsisting order must be obeyed and violation during its currency attracts contempt. The court acknowledged the citation but, given its finding of reasonable confusion, did not hold the respondents guilty of wilful contempt.
Century Hour Mills Ltd. v. S. Suppiah, AIR 1975 Madras 270 Cited by petitioners in support of restoring status quo where an order has been violated. Not applied to find contempt; the court observed the citation but dismissed the contempt petition on grounds of lack of wilfulness.
Vidya Charon Shukla v. Tamil Nadu Olympic Association, AIR 1991 Madras 323 Cited in relation to restoration of status quo where orders have been violated. Cited by petitioners; the court did not impose consequences on respondents because it found no wilful disobedience.
All India Regional Rural Bank Officers Federation v. Government of India, (2002) 3 SCC 554 Cited by the Advocate General for the proposition that both disobedience and wilfulness must be proved to establish contempt. The court recorded the reliance and treated the standard of proof (wilfulness to be proved) as relevant in concluding the contempt was not established beyond reasonable doubt.
Sadhu Singh v. R.S. Verma, (2002) 10 SCC 582 Cited for the proposition that contempt is not the proper remedy to resolve controversies of interpretation of judgments. The court relied on this principle to find that where confusion exists about interpretation of orders, contempt should not be invoked; it supported dismissal of the petition.
S.K. Saha v. Gokul Chandra Dhara, 1987 (1) CHN 446 Cited by the Advocate General in support of the submission that an unintentional mistake or genuine doubt about interpretation negates contempt. The court recorded the citation and treated it as supportive of the proposition that respondents were entitled to the benefit of doubt.
Welfare Association of Absorbed Central Government Employees in Public Enterprises v. Arvind Verma, (1999) 9 SCC 58 Cited for the specific observation that where there is genuine doubt in construing and giving effect to a judgment, there is no contempt. The court relied on this authority (explicitly referenced) to conclude that a genuine doubt about interpretation precludes a finding of wilful contempt.
Mrityunjoy Das v. Sayed Hasibur Rahaman, (2001) 3 SCC 739 Cited for the principle that powers under the Contempt of Courts Act should be exercised with care, and that the burden and standard of proof in contempt proceedings is beyond reasonable doubt. The court quoted and applied the principles from this decision to require proof of wilful disobedience beyond reasonable doubt and to give the respondents the benefit of any reasonable doubt.
Re Bramblevale Ltd. (Lord Denning's observations, English authority) Quoted (via Mrityunjoy Das) to explain that contempt being quasi‑criminal requires proof beyond reasonable doubt and that doubt should benefit the accused. Used (through the Supreme Court's quotation in Mrityunjoy Das) to emphasize the standard of proof required and to support dismissal where reasonable doubt exists.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in a stepwise analysis:

  1. A factual determination: the court accepted that an interim order of the single-judge dated 4th January, 2005 (continued on 19th and 28th January) restrained the respondents from holding any lottery for final selection of excise shops without further orders, and that an advertisement was published and a lottery was in fact held for District North 24-Parganas — therefore, there was disobedience of the specific direction (paras 2–6; 26, 63).
  2. Assessing wilfulness and mental element: the court then examined whether the disobedience was wilful and deliberate. It considered the fact that two Division Benches had passed separate orders on 15th March and 18th March, 2005 in other proceedings dealing with similar issues and that the alleged contemnors reasonably believed, on the basis of those Division Bench orders, that they were entitled to proceed in respect of licences in North 24-Parganas (paras 5, 6, 21, 23, 56–57, 64).
  3. Applicable legal standard: the court applied the legal standard that contempt proceedings are quasi‑criminal in nature and must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, relying on Mrityunjoy Das and the quotation of Lord Denning (para 58–61). It also relied on authorities (Welfare Association; Sadhu Singh) stating that genuine doubt in construing judgments negates contempt (paras 61–62).
  4. Allocation of benefit of doubt: given that the Division Bench orders dealt with similar subject-matter in different proceedings and could reasonably have led to a misconception that the single-judge's order was no longer operative for the district in question, the court concluded the alleged contemnors had a reasonable basis for their belief and were confused about the implications and consequences of the single-judge's prohibitory order (paras 21, 56–57, 64–66).
  5. Application of authorities cited by petitioners: the court noted the authorities cited by petitioners for the proposition that misunderstandings cannot be used to avoid compliance, but held that those authorities were not applicable to the specific facts because the alleged contemnors were confused by the two Division Bench orders (paras 11–13, 30).
  6. Maintainability objections: the court recorded preliminary objections raised by the Advocate General regarding the petitioner association's status, verification, and locus to institute the contempt petition (paras 41–46). The court found these objections not devoid of merit but did not proceed to take steps on them once it concluded there was no wilful disobedience (para 68).
  7. Apology: the alleged contemnors tendered unqualified apologies in affidavits; the court recorded this but said it was not inclined to examine the apology in view of its finding on wilfulness (para 69).

Holding and Implications

Holding: The contempt petition was dismissed. The court explicitly held that although the respondents disobeyed the single-judge interim order by publishing an advertisement and holding a lottery, the disobedience was not shown to be wilful and deliberate beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore, contempt was not established (paras 26, 29, 66, 70).

Direct consequences on the parties: The contempt petition "fails" and is dismissed without any order as to costs. All parties are directed to act on a xerox-signed copy of the judgment and order on the usual undertaking (paras 70–71).

Implications beyond the parties: The opinion applies established principles (including the requirement that contempt be proved beyond reasonable doubt and that genuine doubt as to interpretation negates wilfulness). The judgment did not purport to create or announce novel legal principles; it resolved the petition on the particular facts by applying existing authorities and the standard of proof for contempt.

Show all summary ...

JUDGMENT

Pranab Kumar Chattopadhyay, J.—This application under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 has been filed by the petitioners alleging deliberate and wilful violation of the solenm passed by this Bench on 4th January, 2005, 19th January, 2005 and 28th January, 2005 in the writ petition being W.P No. 2248 of 2004.

2. The aforesaid writ petition was moved upon notice to the respondents on 4th January, 2005 when the following order was passed by this Bench:

“The Court: Let this matter be listed before the regular Bench one week after the Christmas vacation.

In the meantime, let there be an interim order only to the effect that the respondent authorities herein will be at liberty to process the applications in respect of grant of licence for excise shops but no final selection in respect of such shops shall be made without obtaining specific leave of this Court.

I also make it clear that the respondent authorities will also not hold any lottery for the purpose of final selection of the aforesaid excise shops in question without obtaining further orders from this Court.

All parties are to act on a xerox signed copy of this dictated order on the usual undertaking.”

3. Thereafter, the aforesaid writ petition again appeared before this Bench on 19th January, 2005 when on the prayer of the learned Advocate for the respondents, hearing of the writ petition was adjourned till 28th January, 2005 and the interim order already passed in the matter was directed to continue until further orders.

4. On 28th January, 2005 when the matter was again taken up for hearing the learned advocate for the respondents prayed for a direction for filing affidavits in the matter. Accordingly, this Bench passed further order on 28th January, 2005 to the following effect:

The Court: The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State respondents wants to file affidavits in the matter. Accordingly, liberty is granted to the respondents to file affidavit-in-opposition within a week from date. Affidavit-in-reply, if any, is to be filed within a week thereafter.

Let this matter be listed two weeks hence.

The interim order already passed in this matter will continue until further orders.

All parties are to act on a xerox signed copy of this dictated order on the usual undertaking.”

5. In two other matters Division Bench of this Hon'ble Court had to deal with the issues relating to excise licences under the Bengal Excise Act and Rules. The appeal preferred by the North 24-Parganas Excise Licensees' Association was disposed of by the Division Bench presided over by Hon'ble Justice Bhaskar Bhattacharya on 15th March, 2005 as hereunder:

“We thus dismiss the appeal.

The interim order passed by another Division Bench of this Court earlier and extended by this Bench during the pendency of this Appeal before us stands vacated.

However, if any license is granted during the pendency of the Writ Application, those licenses will be subject to the final decision of the Writ Application.

We further make it clear that observations made herein as regards the prima facie case of the writ petitioners are all tentative for the purpose of disposal of the injunction and those will not be binding upon the learned Trial Judge, when the Writ Application will be finally heard on the basis of the Affidavit of the parties.”

6. Another Division Bench of this Hon'ble Court consisting of their Lordships, the Hon'ble Justice Asok Kumar Ganguly and the Hon'ble Justice Tapan Kumar Dutt while entertaining a Public Interest Litigation passed an order on 18th March, 2005 to the following effect:

“In the meantime if any Excise Licence is actually granted in accordance with the Bengal Excise Act and Rules, it is made clear that such licence cannot be granted in terms of the Circular dated 20.01.2004 issued by the Excise Commissioner, Government of West Bengal vide Notification No. 23-30/03-04/8869(20)E and in any event such licence will abide by the further order to be passed on this writ petition and the mere fact that licence granted will not enable the alleged grantee to any equity in their favour.”

7. Subsequently, an application was filed before this Court on behalf of the respondent authorities for vacating the interim order passed earlier by this Bench in W.P No. 2248 of 2005 and Hon'ble Justice Jayanta Kumar Biswas by the order dated 26th July, 2005 vacated the interim order granted earlier by this Bench.

8. It has been specifically submitted on behalf of the petitioners that the interim order passed earlier by this Bench on 4th January, 2005 in the writ petition being W.P No. 2248 of 2005 was neither challenged before the Division Bench of this Hon'ble Court nor the same was the subject matter of challenge and/or considered by the Hon'ble Division Bench at any point of time. According to the petitioners, the Division Bench of this Hon'ble Court passed the aforesaid orders on 15th March, 2005 and 18th March, 2005 in two separate proceedings which were in no way related and/or connected with the writ petition being W.P No. 2248 of 2005 filed by the petitioners herein.

9. In the aforesaid circumstances, the learned advocate of the petitioners submits that the alleged contemnors herein have wilfully and deliberately violated the specific order passed earlier by this Bench on 4th January, 2005 and extended subsequently on 19th January, 2005 and 28th January, 2005 by issuing advertisement in the newspaper for holding lottery for the purpose of final selection of excise shops in question. The learned Counsel of the petitioners further submits that pursuant to the said advertisement respondent authorities held a lottery for final selection of the excise shops and thus violated the solemn order passed earlier by this Bench.

10. The alleged contemnors herein, however, submitted that lotteries in respect of the district 24-Parganas (North) were held in compliance with the order passed by the Hon'ble Division Bench on 15th March, 2005 on the understanding that by virtue of the said order of the Hon'ble Division Bench, the Government was entitled to hold the said lottery. The alleged contemnors also submitted before this Court that a mistake was committed by them in interpreting the aforesaid, order dated 15th March, 2005 passed by the Hon'ble Division Bench and the other subsequent order dated 18th March, 2005 passed by the other Division Bench in a separate proceeding. However, it has been specifically submitted before this Bench that the said alleged contemnors had never intended to violate the order passed, by this Hon'ble Court in any manner whatsoever and steps were taken by the alleged contemnors regarding publication of the advertisement in the newspaper for holding the lottery in order to finally select the candidates for issuing licenses for country and foreign liquor “off shops” in the District of North 24-Parganas in view of the order passed by the Division Bench of this Hon'ble Court on 15th March, 2005.

11. Mr. Saktinath Mukherjee, learned senior counsel of the petitioners submits that the alleged contemnors being highly placed government officials should have appreciated that the Division Bench order passed on 15th March, 2005 and/or 18th March, 2005 cannot vary the specific order passed by this Bench in an independent proceeding and not related with the subject matter of dispute raised before the Division Bench. Mr. Mukherjee referred to and relied upon the following decisions in support of his aforesaid contentions:

1. AIR 1970 SC 1468 at 1471 (Khushro S. Gandhi v. N.A Guzder)

2. 82 CWN Page 44 (Dibakar Naskar v. Rotary Village Co-operative Multipurpose Society Ltd.)

12. Mr. Mukherjee further submits that no litigant can indulge in a kind of misunderstanding in respect of a subsisting interim order as has been done in the instant case. Mr. Mukherjee also submits that it is not open to the alleged contemnors to defeat the operation of an order passed by this Bench and deny the benefit of it to the petitioners on the plea of misunderstanding. Mr. Mukherjee relied on the following decisions in this regard:

1. AIR 1995 SC 1938 (T.M.A Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka) (Paras 8, 9 & 10)

2. (2002) 4 SCC 21 (Anil Raton Sarkar v. Hirak Ghosh)

13. The learned counsel of the petitioners submits that the alleged contemnors could very much approach this Court in order to dispel the confusion and/or misunderstanding allegedly created by the aforesaid two orders passed by the Division Bench of this Hon'ble Court specially when the main writ petition was pending before this Court for final adjudication and the said alleged contemnors should not have taken up the burden upon themselves to interpret the various orders passed by this Court. Mr. Mukherjee, learned senior counsel, further submits that in case of any doubt regarding existence and/or operation of any order passed by this Court, the parties should approach the concerned Court for necessary clarification. Mr. Mukherjee relied upon the following decisions in support of his aforesaid contentions:

1. 1952 (2) All ER page 567 at page 569 (Hadkinson v. Hadkinson)

2. AIR 1915 PC 106 (Bagga v. Saleh)

14. The learned advocate of the petitioners also submits that although the interim order passed earlier by this Bench on 4th January, 2005 was vacated by the subsequent order of this Court but the said order was required to be obeyed while the same was subsisting and valid. The learned advocate of the petitioners specifically submits that during the period when the order was in force, the same was required to be complied with and violation thereof will land the concerned person/persons in contempt. The decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Ravi S. Naik v.Union of India, reported in AIR 1994 SC 1558 (Paras 44 to 48) has been referred to and relied upon by the learned counsel of the petitioners in this regard.

15. It has further been submitted on behalf of the learned counsel of the petitioners that when a step has been taken by the alleged contemnors in violation of the earlier order passed by this Bench, status quo ante is required to be restored. Mr. Mukherjee, learned counsel of the petitioners referred to and relied upon the following decisions in support of the aforesaid contentions:

1. AIR 1975 Madras 270 (Century Hour Mills Ltd. v. S. Suppiah)

2. AIR 1991 Madras 323 (Vidya Charon Shukla v.Tamil Nadu Olympic Association)

16. The learned Advocate General appearing for the alleged contemnors submits that there is a violation of the order passed earlier by this Bench on 4th January, 2005 but the said violation is not wilful violation as the contemnor wrongly understood the implications of the orders passed by this Bench on 4th January, 2005 and extended subsequently on 19th January, 2005 & 28th January, 2005 and also by the Division Bench on 15th March, 2005 and 18th March, 2005 in two other different proceedings. The learned Advocate General further submits that in order to hold a person guilty of contempt of Court, two things have to be proved. Firstly, disobedience of the order passed by the Court and secondly such disobedience must be wilful. The learned Advocate General also submits that in the instant case there is no wilful violation and therefore, this contempt application should be dismissed. The learned Advocate General relied on the following decisions in support of his aforesaid contentions:

1. (2002) 3 SCC 554 (All India Regional Rural Bank Officers Federation v. Government of India)

2. (2002) 4 SCC 21 (Anil Ratan Sarkar v. Hirak Ghosh)

3. (2002) 10 SCC 582 (Sadhu Singh v. R.S Verma)

17. The learned Advocate General also raised a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the present contempt application on the following grounds:

1. The contempt application has been filed by the Association, which claims to be a company within the meaning of the Companies Act, 1956.

2. In the verification portion, the petition appears to have been verified by a person allegedly claiming to be General Secretary. A company within the meaning of the Companies Act, 1956 cannot have a General Secretary and in any event, the verification in respect of a company has to be a Principal Officer of the company as defined under the Companies Act.

3. The person verifying the petition is not a Principal Officer of the company and thus, has no authority to affirm the instant contempt application.

4. In the writ petition No. 2252 of 2004. All Bengal Excise Licensees' Association was a party respondent. The order passed by the Hon'ble Division Bench of High Court at Calcutta was equally binding on them as well.

5. The Hon'ble Division Bench in its order dated 15th March, 2005 specifically held that an Association of Excise Licensees has no locus standi to present the writ petition and therefore, the present association is not competent to file and maintain the present contempt application.

18. It has been submitted on behalf of the alleged contemnors that the advertisement for holding lotteries in the district of North 24-Parganas was issued after the Hon'ble Division Bench vacated the interim order by its Judgment and Order dated 15.03.2005 by inter alia holding that there has been no infringement of legal or fundamental rights of the members of the writ petitioners being the Association of the existing license holders. The Hon'ble Division Bench also held that balance of convenience and inconvenience is in favour of refusing injunction and lastly it held that the petitioners would not suffer irreparable loss and injury if injunction is not granted.

19. It is the clear stand of the alleged contemnors that they did not act wilfully or deliberately in violation of the order dated 04.01.2005 The alleged contemnors also stated in their respective affidavit that based on the understanding, no lotteries were held in any other district other than the district of North 24-Parganas. If there was any intention to violate the order dated 04.01.2005 wilfully and deliberately, then publications would not have been restricted to the District of North 24 Parganas only.

20. The learned Advocate General further submits that the alleged contemnors herein committed unintentional mistake in understanding or interpreting the orders passed by the Hon'ble Division Bench as well as this Bench and such unintentional mistake cannot be regarded as an act of contempt as alleged or at all. The learned Advocate General relied upon the following decisions in support of his arguments:

1) 1987 (1) CHN 446 (S.K Saha v. Gokul Chandra Dhara) [Paras 2–4, 8–11]

2) (1999) 9 SCC 58 (Welfare Association of Absorbed Central Government Employees in Public Enterprises v. Arvind Verma)

3) (2001) 3 SCC 739 (Mrityunjoy Das v. Sayed Hasibur Rahaman) [Paras 5–6, 13, 14–18]

4) (2002) 4 SCC 21 (Anil Ratan Sarkar v. Hirak Ghosh) [Para 15]

5) (2002) 10 SCC 582 (Sadhu Singh v. R.S Verma)

6) (2002) 3 SCC 554 (All India Regional Rural Bank Officers Federation v. Government of India) [Paras 1 & 4]

21. It is true that the Division Bench of this Hon'ble Court in two separate proceedings considered the similar and identical issues which were raised in the writ petition filed before this Bench being W.P No. 2248 of 2004 and therefore, the alleged contemnors reasonably believed that the order of injunction granted by this Bench in the writ petition being W.P No. 2248 of 2004 cannot remain operative notwithstanding the aforesaid orders passed by the Hon'ble Division Bench.

22. The alleged contemnors herein, in my opinion, did not understand the implications and/or consequences of a prohibitory order passed in an independent proceeding and by sheer misconception thought that there is no bar to issue excise licenses in view of the aforesaid orders dated 15th March, 2005 and 18th March, 2005 passed by two different Division Benches of this Hon'ble Court. Failure to understand the implications and/or consequences of the order passed by this Bench cannot be construed as an act of contempt.

23. The Supreme Court in the case of Mrityunjoy Das (supra) specifically observed that the powers under the Contempt of Courts Act should be exercised with due care and caution and for larger interest. In the aforesaid decision, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has specifically discussed the burden and standard of proof and quoted the observations of Lord Denning in this regard. The relevant extract from the aforesaid decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court is quoted hereunder:

“14. The other aspect of the matter ought also to be noticed at this juncture, viz., the burden and standard of proof. The common English phrase “he who asserts must prove” has its due application in the matter of proof of the allegations said to be constituting the act of contempt. As regards the “standard of proof, be it noted that a proceeding under the extraordinary jurisdiction of the Court in terms of the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act is quasi-criminal, and as such, the standard of proof required is that of a criminal proceeding and the breach shall have to be established beyond reasonable doubt. The observations of Lord Denning in Bramblevale Ltd. Re, lend support to the aforesaid. Lord Denning in Re Bramblevale stated: (All ER pp. 1063H and 1064B).

A contempt of Court is an offence of a criminal character. A man may be sent to prison for it. It must be satisfactorily proved. To use the time-honoured phrase, it must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. It is not proved by showing that, when the man was asked about it, he told lies. There must be some further evidence to incriminate him. Once some evidence is given, then his lies can be thrown into the scale against him. But there must be some other evidence …. Where there are two equally consistent possibilities open to the Court, it is not right to hold that the offence is proved beyond reasonable doubt.”

24. In the case of Welfare Association of Absorbed Central Government Employees in Public Enterprises v. Arvind Verma, reported in (1999) 9 SCC 58, Hon'ble Supreme Court specifically observed that when there is some genuine doubt on the part of the respondents in construing and giving effect to the Judgment, there is no contempt.

25. The Hon'ble Supreme Court also in the case of Sadhu Singh v. R.S Verma, reported in (2002) 10 SCC 582 specifically held that recourse to contempt proceedings is not a proper course to resolve a controversy existing with regard to the interpretation of Judgments.

26. In the light of the aforesaid decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court let me now examine whether the alleged contemnors have committed any contempt of this Court. Undisputedly this Bench on 4th January, 2005 passed an interim order restraining the alleged contemnors from holding any lottery for the purpose of final selection of the excise shops in question without obtaining further order from this Court but the alleged contemnors published an advertisement in the daily newspaper for holding lottery for the purpose of final selection of excise shops in question. Therefore, there is no doubt that the alleged contemnors have disobeyed the specific direction passed earlier by this Bench.

27. The Division Bench of this Hon'ble Court in two different proceedings passed two separate orders on 15th March, 2005 and 18th March, 2005 respectively whereby and whereunder the alleged contemnors herein were permitted to grant excise licenses. The alleged contemnors herein reasonably understood that the orders passed by the Division Bench will have the overriding effect on the order passed by the learned single Judge of this Hon'ble Court and thus committed mistake by not realising the implications of the order passed by this Bench which remained operative at the relevant time.

28. If there is any doubt regarding interpretation and/or understanding of the orders passed by the Courts of law, the alleged contemnors are entitled to have the benefit or advantage of such a doubt, as the act of contempt must be established beyond all reasonable doubt.

29. In the aforesaid circumstances, it cannot be said that the alleged contemnors herein wilfully and deliberately violated the solemn order passed by this Bench on 4th January, 2005. Mere disobedience of an order is not sufficient to hold any one guilty under the Contempt of Courts Act unless such disobedience is deliberate and wilful.

30. Mr. Mukherjee, learned senior counsel of the writ petitioners although cited various decisions in support of his arguments but in the facts of the present case, those decisions are not at all applicable since I have specifically held that the alleged contemnors herein were confused by the two separate orders dated 15th March, 2005 & 18th March, 2005 passed by the Hon'ble Division Bench and could not realise the implication and/or effect of the order passed earlier by this Bench.

31. The learned Advocate General also raised serious other objections regarding maintainability of the present contempt application which have been specifically mentioned hereinbefore. The learned Advocate of the petitioners herein did not deal with the same effectively at the time of hearing of this matter and in my considered opinion; those objections regarding maintainability of the contempt petition are also not devoid of merit. However, as I have already held that the alleged contemnors herein did not wilfully and deliberately disobey the earlier order passed by this Bench, no step can be taken against the said alleged contemnors.

32. Although the alleged contemnors in their respective affidavits have tendered unqualified apology after categorically stating therein that they had no intention to wilfully or deliberately violate the order passed earlier by this Bench but in view of the observations made hereinbefore, I am not inclined to go into the question of apology.

For the aforementioned reasons, this Contempt Petition fails and the same is accordingly dismissed without any order as to costs.

All parties concerned are to act on a xerox signed copy of this Judgment and order on the usual undertaking.

Contempt petition fails
S.B

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