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Dwarika Prasad Bajpai v. Kedar Prasad Bajpai And Another
Factual and Procedural Background
The plaintiff instituted Title Suit No. 973 of 1990 in the City Civil Court at Calcutta seeking, inter alia, a declaration that a conveyance of the suit property from defendant No. 2 to defendant No. 1 was invalid, void and/or voidable and not binding on the plaintiff. The plaint alleged that defendant No. 2 executed an agreement for sale dated March 9, 1978 with the plaintiff and defendant No. 1, accepting Rs. 5,001 as earnest money, and that the plaintiff and defendant No. 1 had earlier instituted Title Suit No. 504 of 1985 for specific performance against defendant No. 2 (which was dismissed for default without the plaintiff’s knowledge). Subsequently, defendant No. 2 executed a registered conveyance in favour of defendant No. 1 dated March 30, 1990. The defendants contested the suit.
Procedurally, on September 5, 2001 the plaintiff's advocate served on defendant No. 1 a notice under Section 66 of the Evidence Act requiring production of the original agreement dated March 9, 1978 at the trial on September 7, 2001. The original document was not produced at trial by defendant No. 1. While testifying, the plaintiff produced a photocopy of the agreement and on March 11, 2002 filed an application under Section 65 of the Evidence Act seeking acceptance of the photocopy as secondary evidence. Defendant No. 1 objected, contending that the original was lost or misplaced (allegedly reported to the police) and that the photocopy was impermissible as secondary evidence. The learned trial Judge, by order No. 116 dated July 30, 2002, rejected the plaintiff's application. Aggrieved, the plaintiff filed the present application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India challenging that order.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, under Section 65 of the Evidence Act, a photocopy (photostat copy) of an original document may be admitted as secondary evidence where the original is not produced by the person alleged to have had possession, despite service of notice under Section 66.
- Whether the learned trial Judge erred in refusing the plaintiff leave to tender the photocopy of the agreement dated March 9, 1978 as secondary evidence given the factual findings that the original existed and was in defendant No. 1's possession after execution, and that defendant No. 1 failed to produce the original or substantiate the asserted police complaint.
Arguments of the Parties
Applicant / Plaintiff (supporting counsel)
- Submitted that the trial Judge should have permitted the photocopy of the March 9, 1978 agreement to be admitted under Section 65 because defendant No. 1 failed to produce the original despite being served with notice under Section 66.
- Cited precedents in support: Nawab Singh v. Inderjit Kaur (AIR 1999 SC 1668), Mst. Bibi Aisha v. Bihar Subai Sunni Majlis Avaqaf (AIR 1969 SC 253), and Muthu Venkatarama Reddiar v. Vardaraja Rounder (AIR 1971 Madras 471).
Opposite Party No. 1 (respondent / defending counsel)
- Contended that the photocopy could not be accepted as secondary evidence.
- Argued that the plaintiff was attempting to tender inadmissible secondary evidence and relied on precedents: Ashok Dulichand v. Madhavlal Dube (AIR 1975 SC 1748), Kabita Bose v. Timir Baran Haldar ((1992) 96 Cal WN 529), and State of West Bengal v. Arun Kumar Basu (1993 (2) Cal LT (HC) 56).
- Asserted that the original document was lost or misplaced and had been reported to the police (an allegation the defendant advanced but did not substantiate with documentation at the trial level).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Nawab Singh v. Inderjit Kaur, AIR 1999 SC 1668 | Held that the trial court was not justified in rejecting a prayer to produce a copy (secondary evidence) without affording opportunity to adduce secondary evidence. | The Court relied on this decision to support the proposition that rejection of an application to adduce secondary evidence without affording an opportunity was unjustified; it supported allowing the photocopy when the original was not produced after notice. |
| Mst. Bibi Aisha v. Bihar Subai Sunni Majlis Avaqaf, AIR 1969 SC 253 | Quoted with approval the observations of Wilson, J. that in cases falling under clauses (a) and (c) of Section 65 any secondary evidence is admissible. | The Court relied on this authority (and the Wilson, J. observation it approved) to interpret Section 65 expansively and to justify reception of secondary evidence in the present facts. |
| Wilson, J. — Collision between the “Ava” and the “Brenhilda”, (1880) ILR 5 Calcutta 568 | Observation: where a case falls under clauses (a) or (c) of Section 65, any secondary evidence is admissible and that rule is not controlled by clause (f). | The Court cited these observations (as approved in Mst. Bibi Aisha) to support the view that Section 65 permits secondary evidence in cases like the present. |
| Muthu Venkatarama Reddiar v. Vardaraja Rounder, AIR 1971 Madras 471 | The opinion records the decision was cited by the plaintiff's counsel; the specific rule or principle drawn from it is not detailed in the provided text. | The opinion notes the citation but does not specify how this decision was applied or the precise principle relied upon from it in the court's discussion. |
| Ashok Dulichand v. Madhavlal Dube, AIR 1975 SC 1748 | Authority where a photostat copy of a hand-written leaflet was rejected because there was no explanation when or in what circumstances it was made nor in whose possession the original lay. | The Court distinguished this decision on its facts, observing that in the present case the existence of the original agreement and its prior possession by defendant No. 1 were admitted and the defendant failed to substantiate his claim of loss. |
| Kabita Bose v. Timir Baran Haldar, (1992) 96 Cal WN 529 | Authority relied on by respondent; in that case there was no evidence of any person who had seen the original document from which the photostat was taken. | The Court treated this decision as distinguishable because, unlike that case, there was evidence here as to the existence of the original agreement and that it had been in defendant No. 1's possession. |
| State of West Bengal v. Arun Kumar Basu, 1993 (2) Cal LT (HC) 56 | Authority relied on by respondent; in that case there was no evidence of any person who had seen the original document from which the photocopy was taken. | The Court found this decision distinguishable for the same reason as Kabita Bose: in the present matter the existence and prior possession of the original were not in dispute and defendant failed to prove loss. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court began its analysis by setting out Section 65 of the Evidence Act and noting the distinctions drawn within its clauses. It examined authorities, particularly the observation of Wilson, J. (1880 ILR 5 Calcutta 568) — approved in Mst. Bibi Aisha — that where a case falls under clauses (a) or (c) of Section 65 any secondary evidence is admissible, even if the case also falls under clause (f).
The Court read Section 65 to mean that to enable a party to tender a copy of a document it is sufficient to show that the original is not in that party's possession and, so far as that party is concerned, that the original is lost. The Court recited the relevant factual findings reached by the trial Judge: it was admitted that the sale agreement dated March 9, 1978 existed; that the original was in defendant No. 1's custody immediately after execution; that the plaintiff served notice under Section 66 and defendant No. 1 did not produce the original; and that defendant No. 1 asserted loss and a police complaint but failed to produce any documentary proof of such a police report.
On those findings, and having regard to the wide language of Section 65, the Court concluded that the plaintiff was entitled to tender the photocopy as secondary evidence. The Court distinguished the authorities cited by the respondent (for example Ashok Dulichand, Kabita Bose, and State of West Bengal v. Arun Kumar Basu) on their facts — those decisions involved situations where the photocopy's provenance was unexplained or no witness had seen the original — circumstances absent in the present case.
The Court expressly limited its determination to admissibility under Section 65 and did not address the relevancy or the probative value of the photocopy (i.e., it did not decide how much weight the document should be given at trial).
Holding and Implications
Holding: The application by the plaintiff under Section 65 was allowed and the impugned order of the trial Judge (Order No. 116 dated July 30, 2002) was set aside. The plaintiff was granted liberty to tender the photocopy (photostat) of the agreement for sale dated March 9, 1978 in the trial court.
Application allowed.
The Court clarified that it had not considered the relevancy or probative value of the photocopy at this stage. The direct consequence is that the plaintiff may now tender the photocopy in evidence at the trial; the Court did not make an order as to costs. The opinion does not announce any broader change in law beyond applying Section 65 and the cited precedents to the facts of this case.
1. This is an application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India (‘the said application’ in short) against order No. 116 dated July 30, 2002 passed by the learned Judge, Thirteen Bench, City Civil Court at Calcutta in Title Suit No. 973 of 1990.
2. The plaintiff/petitioner instituted the said suit against the opposite parties, inter alia, for declaration that the conveyance of the suit property by the defendant No. 2 to the defendant No. 1 was invalid, void and/or voidable and not binding upon the plaintiff. It was contended in the plaint that the opposite party No. 2 entered into an agreement for sale of the disputed property with the plaintiff and the defendant No. 1 on March 9, 1978, inter alia, agreeing to convey the suit property in favour of the plaintiff and the defendant No. 1 jointly. The defendant No. 2 accepted Rs. 5,001/- towards the earnest money at the time of execution of the said agreement. The plaintiff and the defendant No. 1 instituted Title Suit No. 504 of 1985 in the City Civil Court at Calcutta, inter alia, for specific performance of the said contract against the defendant No. 2. The defendant No. 1 was allegedly looking after the said case, but the said suit was dismissed for default without the knowledge and consent of the plaintiff. Subsequently, the defendant No. 2 conveyed the suit property in favour of the defendant No. 1 by virtue of a registered conveyance dated March 30, 1990.
3. The defendants are contesting the said suit.
4. On September 5, 2001 the learned advocate for the plaintiff issued a notice to produce document under Section 66 of the Evidence Act, 1872 (‘the said Act’ in short) requiring the defendant No. 1 to produce at the trial of the said suit, on September 7, 2001, the original agreement dated March 9, 1978 executed by and between the defendant No. 2 and the plaintiff and the defendant No. 1. Although the said notice was served on the learned advocate for the defendant No. 1, admittedly, the said original agreement dated March 9, 1978 was not produced at the trial by the defendant No. 1.
5. While deposing as plaintiffs witness No. 1, the plaintiff produced a photocopy of the said original agreement dated March 9, 1978 and, thereafter, filed on March 11, 2002 an application under Section 65 of the said Act for acceptance of the photocopy of the said agreement dated March 9, 1978 in evidence. The defendant No. 1 contested the said application by filing a written objection. It is contended that the said document was not in possession of the said defendant inasmuch as the original document was lost/or misplaced on the way and as such the defendant No. 1 was prevented by sufficient cause to produce the original document. It was, further, contended that the defendant No. 1 lodged complaint in the police station concerned regarding the loss of original document. It was alleged that the plaintiff was trying to produce a photocopy of the said document as second evidence, which was not permissible in the eye of law.
6. The learned trial Judge by the order impugned rejected the said application of the plaintiff holding, inter alia, that photocopy of the said agreement could not be taken into as a secondary evidence.
7. Being aggrieved the plaintiff has come up with this appeal.
8. Mr. Harish Tandon, learned advocate, appearing in support of the said application, cited the decisions in the cases of Nawab Singh v. Inderjit Kaur reported in AIR 1999 SC 1668, Mst. Bibi Aisha v. Bihar Subai Sunni Majlis Avaqaf reported in AIR 1969 SC 253 and Muthu Venkatarama Reddiar v. Vardaraja Rounder reported in AIR 1971 Madras 471 and submitted that the learned trial judge ought to have, in the facts and circumstances of the case, admitted the said photocopy of the agreement for sale dated March 9, 1978 as the defendant failed to produce the document when called upon to do so by the plaintiff.
9. Mr. Shyamal Chakraborty, learned advocate, appearing for the opposite party No. 1, opposed the said application and contended that the photocopy of the said agreement could not be accepted as a secondary evidence and he cited the decisions in the cases of Ashok Dulichand v. Madhavlal Dube reported in AIR 1975 SC 1748, Kabita Bose v. Timir Baran Haldar reported in (1992) 96 Cal WN 529 and State of West Bengal v. Arun Kumar Basu reported in 1993 (2) Cal LT (HC) 56.
10. Section 65 of the said Act runs as under:
“65. Cases in which secondary evidence relating to documents may be given.— Secondary evidence may be given of the existence, condition, or contents of a document in the following cases.—
(a) When the original is shown or appears to be in the possession or power.—
of the person against whom the document is sought to be proved; or
of any person out of reach of, or not subject to, the process of the Court, or of any person legally bound to produce it, and when, after the notice mentioned in Sec. 66, such person does not produce it;
(b) when the existence, condition or contents of the original have been proved to be admitted in writing by the person against whom it is proved or by his representative in interest;
(c) when the original has been destroyed or lost, or when the party offering evidence of its contents cannot, for any other reason not arising from his own default or neglect, produce it in reasonable time;
(d) when the original is of such a nature as not to be easily movable;
(e) when the original is a public document within the meaning of Sec. 74;
(f) when the original is a document of which a certified copy is permitted by this Act, or by any other law in force in India, to be given in evidence;
(g) when the original consist of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot conveniently be examined in Court, and the fact to be proved is the general result of the whole collection.
In cases (a), (c) and (d), any secondary evidence of the contents of the document is admissible.
In case (e) or (f), a certified copy of the document, but no other kind of secondary evidence, is admissible.
In case (g), evidence may be given as to the general result of the documents by any person who has examined them, and who is skilled in the examination of such documents.”
11. Wilson, J. in the matter of a Collision between the “Ava” and the “Brenhilda” reported in (1880) ILR 5 Calcutta 568 observed “By S. 65, in cases under Cls. (a) and (c), any secondary evidence is admissible, in cases under Cls. (e) and (f), only a certified copy. The present case falls under (a) or (c), and also under (f). In such a case which rule applies? I think the words, “In cases (a), (c), and (d) any secondary evidence is admissible,” are too clear and too strong to be controlled by anything that follows, and that therefore in this case any secondary evidence might be received.”
12. The Supreme Court of India in Mst. Bibi Aisha, AIR 1969 SC 253 (supra) quoted with approval the said observations of Wilson, J.
13. Supreme Court of India in the case of Nawab Singh, AIR 1999 SC 1668 (supra) held that in the said case the trial Court was not justified in rejecting the prayer of a tenant seeking leave of the Court to produce a copy of the rent note on the ground that the said note sought to be produced was of doubtful veracity. It was, further, held that the rejection of the prayer of the tenant without affording the tenant an opportunity of adducing secondary evidence was unjustified.
14. My reading of the provisions of Section 65 of the said Act is that in order to enable the plaintiff to tender a copy of a document it is enough for the plaintiff to prove that the original is not in his possession and in so far as he is concerned it is lost. Although the learned trial Judge rejected the said application of the plaintiff, but he came to the findings of fact that it was admitted before him that there was existence of a sale agreement dated March 9, 1978 and the original document was lying with the defendant No. 1 immediately after execution. A notice under Section 66 of the said Act was served on the defendant No. 1, but the defendant No. 1 did not produce the original document on the plea the same was lost and/or misplaced and the defendant lodged complaint before the police station. The defendant, however, failed to file any scrap of paper to prove his allegation that he at all reported the loss of the original document in the police station. The language of Section 65 of the said Act is wide enough to enable the plaintiff to use copy of the original document when the original was not produced by the defendant No. 1 in spite of notice under Section 66 of the said Act.
15. The decision cited by Mr. Chakraborty in Ashok Dulichand, AIR 1975 SC 1748 (supra) is distinguishable. In the said case a photostat copy of a hand written leaflet was sought to be produced in evidence and it was not explained when and in what circumstances it was made and in whose possession the original was lying. The decisions in the case of Kabita Bose, 1992 (96) Cal WN 529 (supra) and the State of West Bengal v. Arun Kumar Basu, 1993 (2) Cal LT 56 (supra) are, also, distinguishable inasmuch as in those cases there was no evidence of any person, who has seen the original document from which the photostat copy was taken.
16. In the case in hand, existence of the original sale agreement dated March 9, 1978 is not in dispute. It is, also, an admitted position that after execution of the document the original document was lying with the defendant No. 1, who is the brother of the plaintiff. Admittedly, a notice under Section 66 of the said Act was served on the defendant No. 1, through his learned advocate, but the defendant failed to produce the said original document. Moreover, although the defendant took the stand that the original was lost and/or misplaced on the way and he lodged a complaint in the local police station, but the defendant No. 1 miserably failed to prove that the original document was lost and he at all lodged a complaint with the police.
17. I am of the opinion that it is a fit case in which the learned trial judge ought to have permitted the plaintiff to tender the photostat copy of the said agreement for sale dated March 9, 1978. The said application is, therefore, allowed. Order impugned is, accordingly, set aside and the application filed by the plaintiff under Section 65 of the said Act is allowed and the plaintiff is granted liberty to tender the photostat copy of the said agreement for sale dated March 9, 1978 in the trial Court.
18. I, however, make it clear that I have not gone into the relevancy or probative value of the said document at this stage.
19. I make no order as to costs.
20. Xerox plain copies of this order duly countersigned by the Assistant Registrar (Court) of this Court are to be given to the learned advocates appearing for the parties on their usual undertaking.
Application allowed.
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