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Eastern Coalfields Ltd. v. Indradeo Yadav & Ors.
Concise Analytical Summary of the Judgment
Factual and Procedural Background
The writ petitioner (respondent No. 1 in the appeal), Shri Indradeo Yadav, was dismissed by Eastern Coalfields Ltd. for unauthorized absence of about three months. He challenged his dismissal by filing W.P. No. 1356 of 1997. The Single Judge of this High Court allowed the writ petition by judgment dated 13 September 2003, setting aside the dismissal and directing notional reinstatement with full wages and retiral benefits.
The appellant (Eastern Coalfields Ltd.) raised a preliminary objection to jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, arguing that the entire cause of action arose outside the territorial limits of the Calcutta High Court. The Single Judge overruled that objection, holding that clause (2) of Article 226 permitted the petitioner to choose the forum and that both the Jharkhand High Court (where the cause of action arose) and the Calcutta High Court (where the appellant's head office/registered office was situated) could have jurisdiction. Eastern Coalfields Ltd. appealed this conclusion.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Calcutta High Court had territorial jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to entertain a writ petition when the entire cause of action arose outside its territorial limits.
- Whether the presence of the respondent company's registered office or seat of governance within the territorial jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court (clause (1) of Article 226) suffices to confer jurisdiction as an alternative to the cause-of-action test (clause (2) of Article 226).
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments (Mr. Alok Banerjee)
- The Calcutta High Court lacked jurisdiction because the entire cause of action had arisen outside its territorial limits.
- Relied on State of Rajasthan v. Swaika Properties (AIR 1985 SC 1289) to contend that mere service of a notice within the High Court's territory was insufficient to constitute part of the cause of action for jurisdiction under Article 226.
- Relied on Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu (1994 (4) SCC 711) to argue that the mere fact of a registered office in Calcutta was not enough; the petitioner must show that at least part of the cause of action arose within the High Court's territorial jurisdiction.
- Also relied on Union of India v. Adani Exports Ltd. (AIR 2002 SC 126) and supportive Division Bench authority (Gopal Chandra Mondal) holding that cause of action is decisive in territorial jurisdiction under Article 226.
- Submitted that the Single Judge's view was contrary to the Supreme Court authorities and therefore the Single Judge's judgment should be set aside.
Respondent's Arguments (Mr. Partha Dutta)
- Contended that the Supreme Court decisions relied upon concerned primarily clause (2) of Article 226 (cause-of-action test) and placed emphasis on whether any part of the cause of action arose within the High Court's territory.
- Argued that Article 226 also contains clause (1) (relating to the seat of Government) and that either clause (1) or clause (2) could independently confer jurisdiction depending on the facts.
- Submitted that the appellant's seat of governance/registered office was within the Calcutta High Court's territorial jurisdiction, which gave the Calcutta High Court jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition.
- Relied on Division Bench decisions of this Court (including Gopal Chandra Mondal, Eastern Coalfields Ltd. v. Khagen Bouri, Ram Brich Muchi v. Coal India Ltd., and Madan Lal Jain v. Union of India) that supported the view that a registered office/seat of governance within the High Court's territory could confer jurisdiction even when cause of action arose elsewhere.
- Maintained that the Single Judge correctly held that the writ petition was properly filed having regard to the place of business/registered office of the respondents.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| State of Rajasthan v. Swaika Properties (AIR 1985 SC 1289) | Held that mere service of a notice within the territorial jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court would not be sufficient to constitute a part of the cause of action to bring the action within the jurisdiction under Article 226. | The appellant relied on this case to argue lack of jurisdiction; the Court acknowledged the principle but treated the circumstances as distinguishable when considering the interaction of clauses (1) and (2) of Article 226. |
| Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu (1994 (4) SCC 711) | Reiterated that to confer jurisdiction on the High Court, at least a part of the cause of action must have arisen within its territorial jurisdiction; emphasized clause (2) in that context. | The appellant relied on this authority; the Court noted the emphasis on cause of action in Supreme Court cases but concluded those cases addressed different circumstances (primarily Article 226(2)), so they did not preclude jurisdiction where clause (1) conditions were met. |
| Union of India v. Adani Exports Ltd. (AIR 2002 SC 126) | Referenced as a later Supreme Court decision following the same principles about territorial jurisdiction under Article 226. | Cited by the appellant in support of the cause-of-action principle; the Court considered it among Supreme Court authorities but found no conflict with Division Bench authorities that considered clause (1) issues. |
| General Manager, Mugma Area, Eastern Coalfields Ltd. v. Gopal Chandra Mondal (F.M.A No. 581 of 1999) | Division Bench held that cause of action is decisive in determining whether a High Court had territorial jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition. | Relied upon by the appellant; the Court noted this Division Bench view but treated it as one set of authorities addressing cause-of-action issues rather than seat-of-government issues. |
| Madan Lal Jain v. Union of India (W.P. No. 2629 of 1998; unreported decision dated 31 March 1999) | Held that if either of the conditions contained in clauses (1) and (2) of Article 226 is satisfied, the concerned High Court would have jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition. | Used by the respondent to support the proposition that clause (1) alone can confer jurisdiction; the Court treated this as persuasive within the matrix of Division Bench decisions. |
| Eastern Coalfields Ltd. v. Khagen Bouri (A.P.O No. 66 of 2000) | Division Bench held that because the registered office of the appellant company was within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court and the dismissal was approved by an officer in the registered office, the Calcutta High Court had territorial jurisdiction. | Cited by the respondent and considered by the Court as part of a series of Division Bench decisions supporting jurisdiction based on seat/registered office. |
| Ram Brich Muchi v. Coal India Ltd. (A.P.O.T No. 343 of 2002) | Division Bench, after noting Supreme Court authorities, found those cases dealt with Article 226(2) and not Article 226(1); affirmed jurisdiction where registered office/seat of governance warranted it. | The Court cited this decision as part of the body of Division Bench authorities that reconcile Supreme Court decisions with the proposition that clause (1) may independently confer jurisdiction. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court undertook a comparative analysis of two sets of authorities: (a) Supreme Court decisions emphasizing the cause-of-action test under clause (2) of Article 226 (for example, Swaika Properties, ONGC and Adani Exports), and (b) Division Bench decisions of this High Court that had considered both clause (1) and clause (2) and in some instances found jurisdiction where the seat of governance/registered office was within the High Court's territory (for example, Gopal Chandra Mondal, Khagen Bouri, Ram Brich Muchi, Madan Lal Jain).
The Court found that the two sets of cases are not in irreconcilable conflict. It explained that the Supreme Court authorities placed emphasis on the cause-of-action principle because the circumstances before the Supreme Court primarily involved Article 226(2). In contrast, several cases before this Court involved issues under both clauses (1) and (2) of Article 226. The Court therefore treated the Supreme Court decisions as addressing a different factual and legal canvas (where clause (2) was the operative provision).
The Court noted that clause (2) is in addition to clause (1) and conferred wider jurisdiction where the cause of action (in whole or in part) arises within the High Court's territorial limits. Separately, clause (1) (relating to the seat of Government) may also operate to confer jurisdiction when the seat of governance/registered office of the respondent is within the High Court's territory.
Applying that framework to the facts of the case, the Court observed that the registered office of Eastern Coalfields Ltd. was within the territorial jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court. On that basis the Court concluded that the Calcutta High Court had jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition, notwithstanding that the cause of action had arisen outside its territorial limits.
The Court also recorded that the merits of the case were not seriously argued before the Division Bench; having satisfied itself on jurisdictional grounds, the Court declined to interfere with the Single Judge's substantive decision.
Holding and Implications
Core Holding: APPEAL DISMISSED.
The direct, operative effect of the decision is that the Single Judge's order allowing W.P. No. 1356 of 1997 is upheld: the Calcutta High Court had territorial jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition because the registered office (seat of governance) of Eastern Coalfields Ltd. fell within its territorial limits.
Implications: The Court clarified that (a) Supreme Court precedents emphasizing the cause-of-action test under Article 226(2) address circumstances where clause (2) is the operative provision, and (b) clause (1) and clause (2) of Article 226 operate conjunctively in the sense that either may confer jurisdiction depending on the facts. The judgment treated the Division Bench authorities of this Court as addressing situations where clause (1) (seat of Government/registered office) justified jurisdiction and concluded there was no inconsistency with the Supreme Court authorities when properly contextualized.
The Court made no order as to costs and directed parties to act on a signed copy of the operative portion of the judgment. Asit Kumar Bisi, J. concurred.
Altamas Kabir, J.:— The writ petitioner/respondent No. 1 in the appeal was dismissed from service of the appellant company on the ground of unauthorized absence for a period of about three months. Challenging the said order dismissing him from service, the respondent No. 1 filed a writ petition, being W.P No. 1356 of 1997, which was allowed by the learned Single Judge by his judgment and order dated 13th September, 2003.
2. Apart from the merits of the order challenged in the writ petition, a preliminary objection was raised on behalf of the appellant as to whether this Court had jurisdiction to entertain the writ application in view of the fact that the entire cause of action for the writ petition had arisen beyond the territorial limits of this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. Considering the preliminary objection first the learned Single Judge held that having regard to the provisions of clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution of a could approach the High Court in its writ jurisdiction (i) if the respondent against whom a relief is sought for has its place of business within the territorial limits of the concerned High Court and (ii) if the cause of action arose partly or wholly at a place within the territorial limits of the concerned High Court. Holding that clause (2) of Article 226 enabled the petitioner to choose the forum, the learned Single Judge was of the view that both the Jharkhand High Court, within whose territorial jurisdiction the cause of action had arisen and the Calcutta High Court, where the Head Office of the appellant company was situated, would have jurisdiction to entertain the writ application.
3. On such consideration the learned Single Judge overruled the preliminary objection taken on behalf of the appellant herein with regard to jurisdiction, and, upon holding in favour of the writ petitioner on merits set aside the order dismissing the writ petitioner from service with a direction that he be notionally reinstated in service with full wages from the date of his dismissal till the date of his having attained superannuation. The learned Single Judge also directed that the writ petitioner would be deemed to have been in service and would, therefore, be entitled to be paid all retiral benefits.
4. This appeal has been taken on behalf of Eastern Coalfields Ltd. against the views expressed by the learned Single Judge and the ultimate conclusion arrived at on an interpretation of the provisions of Article 226 of the Constitution in respect of a matter where the cause of action had fully arisen outside the territorial jurisdiction of this High Court.
5. Appearing in support of the appeal, Mr. Alok Banerjee, learned Advocate, submitted that similar questions had arisen for determination before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Rajasthan v. Swaika Properties, reported in AIR 1985 SC page 1289, wherein it was held that mere service of a notice within the territorial jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court would not be sufficient to constitute a part of the cause of action to bring the action within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. Mr. Banerjee submitted that a similar question relating to invocation of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution by the Calcutta High Court also fell for consideration of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu, reported in 1994 (4) SCC 711. Mr. Banerjee submitted that in the said case a question had arisen as to whether the mere fact that the petitioner company had its registered office at Calcutta would be sufficient to vest jurisdiction on the Calcutta High Court to entertain an action under Article 226 of the Constitution. It was urged that in the said case the Hon'ble Supreme Court had observed as follows:
“on a plain reading of the aforesaid two cases of Article 226 of the Constitution it becomes clear that a High Court can exercise the power to issue directions, orders or writs for the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution or for any other purpose if the cause of action, wholly or any part had arisen within the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction notwithstanding that the seat of the Government or authority or the residence of the person against whom the direction, order or writ is issued is not within the said territories. In order to confer jurisdiction on the High Court of Calcutta, NICCO must show that at least a part of the cause of action had arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of that Court.”
6. Mr. Banerjee submitted that it would be evident from the views expressed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the said two cases that unless a part of the cause of action arose within the territorial jurisdiction of a High Court, such High Court cannot entertain a writ application under Article 226 of the Constitution as had been done in the instant case. Mr. Banerjee submitted that the entire cause of action in this case had arisen outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court and this Court did not, therefore, have the jurisdiction to entertain the writ application which had been filed by the writ petitioner, Shri Indradeo Yadav.
7. Mr. Banerjee submitted that in entertaining the writ application the learned Single Judge had acted in a manner contrary to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the two aforesaid cases and the judgment and order passed on the writ application filed by Shri Yadav was, therefore, liable to be set aside.
8. Mr. Banerjee submitted that following the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid cases and also in a later decision in Union of India v. Adani Exports Ltd., AIR 2002 SC 126, a Division Bench of this Court had in F.M.A No. 581 of 1999 (General Manager, Mugma Area, Eastern Coalfields Ltd. v. Gopal Chandra Mondal) held that cause of action is decisive in determining whether a High Court had territorial jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition.
9. Appearing on behalf of the writ petitioner/respondent, Mr. Partha Dutta contended that in both the two cases referred to on behalf of the appellant, Eastern Coalfields Ltd., the Hon'ble Supreme Court had occasion only to consider the effect of clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution in the matter of invoking jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. According to Mr. Dutta, in both the cases the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid stress on the question as to whether any part of the cause of action, either wholly or in part, had arisen within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court. In fact, according to Mr. Dutta in the Oil and Natural Gas Commission case (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court gave more emphasis to the provisions of clause (2) than the provisions of clause (1) of Article 226 of the Constitution, which relates to the seat of Government, for the purpose of determining whether the Calcutta High Court had jurisdiction to entertain the writ application. Mr. Dutta submitted that the question relating to assumption of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution had fallen for decision in several cases and in the majority of such cases it had been held that either clause (1) or clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution could be invoked by the concerned High Court in entertaining a writ application, depending on the facts involved.
10. Mr. Dutta submitted that while it could be said that the cause of action for the writ application had arisen within the territorial limits of the High Court of Jharkhand, the seat of governance of the appellant company was within the territorial jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court, which gave the Calcutta High Court jurisdiction under clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution to entertain the writ petition filed by the writ petitioner/respondent herein.
11. Mr. Dutta contended that while both in the Swaika Properties case (supra), and in the Oil and Natural Gas Commission case (supra) referred to and relied upon by Mr. Banerjee, the emphasis had been on cause of action as envisaged in clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution, the question of jurisdiction under both clause (1) and clause (2) had been considered in several cases by this Court. Mr. Dutta submitted that the said question had fallen for consideration in the case of Madan Lal Jain v. Union of India in W.P No. 2629 of 1998 in the light of the observations made in the Oil and Natural Gas Commission case (supra) and in the unreported decision dated 31st March, 1999, it had been held that if either of the conditions contained in clauses (1) and (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution was satisfied, the concerned High Court would have jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition.
12. Mr. Dutta submitted that the said view had also been taken by a Division Bench of this Court in A.P.O No. 66 of 2000, Eastern Coalfields Ltd. v. Khagen Bouri. In its judgment dated 7 May, 2001, the Division Bench had held that since the registered office of the appellant company was within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court and the order of dismissal of the employee concerned had been approved by an officer sitting in the registered office, the Calcutta High Court had territorial jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition challenging the order of dismissal. It was also noted that the appellate authority's office was situated within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court.
13. Mr. Dutta submitted that the same view had also been taken by another Division Bench of this Court in A.P.O.T No. 343 of 2002 (Ram Brich Muchi v. Coal India Ltd.) after taking note of the views expressed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Swaika Properties case (supra), the Oil and Natural Gas Commission case (supra) and Adani Exports Ltd. case (supra) and after coming to a finding that in the said cases the Hon'ble Supreme Court was dealing with a situation under Article 226(2) of the Constitution and not Article 226(1) of the Constitution.
14. Mr. Dutta urged that the Division Bench had merely followed the same reasoning in Gopal Chandra Mondal's case referred to and relied upon by Mr. Banerjee.
15. Mr. Dutta submitted that the learned Single Judge had quite correctly held that the writ petition had been filed not in relation to cause of action but in relation to the place of business of the respondents which gave the Calcutta High Court jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition.
16. Having regard to the views expressed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Swaika Properties case. Oil and Natural Gas Commission case and in Adani Exports Ltd. case and those expressed by a Division Bench of this Court in Gopal Chandra Mondal's case, we have given a good deal of thought to the question once again raised by Eastern Coalfields Ltd. regarding the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain a writ petition when no part of the cause of action had arisen within its territorial limits.
17. On a critical appreciation of the views expressed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the three cited cases and those expressed by this Court in Ram Brich Muchi's case, Khagen Bouri's case and in Madan Lal Jain's case it is quite clear that there is no conflict between the views expressed in the two sets of cases. In the cases decided by the Hon'ble Supreme Court the emphasis was on cause of action, whereas in the cases before this Court, both cause of action and seat of governance were in issue and were decided accordingly in the wider canvas of both clauses (1) and (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution. The circumstances contemplated in the two sets of cases are different and distinguishable.
18. clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution is in addition to clause (1) and vests the High Court with wider jurisdiction to entertain writ petitions when the cause of action wholly or in part arises within the territorial jurisdiction of such High Court. In the instant case the registered office of the appellant is within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court which gives this Court jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition.
19. Since the merits of the case have not been seriously argued before us and we are of the view that this Court had jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition, we see no reason to interfere with the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge and the appeal is accordingly dismissed.
20. There will, however, be no order as to costs.
21. All parties to act on a signed copy of the operative portion of this judgment on the usual undertakings.
Asit Kumar Bisi, J.:— I agree.
Appeal dismissed.
A.D
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