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Metallurgical And Engineering Consultant (India), Ltd. v. Jayanta Kumar Sihha Roy And Others
Structured Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The writ-petitioners were employed on contract as data processing operators in the modernization project of Durgapur Steel Plant. In 1994 they, together with others, filed C.O No. 20095 (W) of 1994 seeking permanent absorption; on 16 September 1994 a Single Judge directed a status quo order which continued during pendency.
On 14 October 1995, while the writ petition was pending, the petitioners entered the chamber of the General Manager (Modernisation), Sri V. Shankaranan, and allegedly committed serious misconduct: they confined him in the room, exposed their private parts, removed and threw an ashtray, broke glass shutters of a shelf, and prevented him (a heart patient) from taking medicines and others from rescuing him. An F.I.R. was lodged and criminal proceedings were instituted as C.R No. 970 of 1995; that criminal case resulted in acquittal because the complainant (the General Manager) was not available, having since retired.
Chargesheets were issued on 9 November 1995 and the petitioners were suspended on 20 October 1995. The petitioners challenged suspension by filing W.P No. 16288 (W) of 1998. They also filed W.P No. 1220 (W) of 1999 seeking quashing of disciplinary proceedings and a stay; the Single Judge granted liberty to the management to proceed with inquiry but directed that no final order be passed without leave of the Court.
The earlier writ petition (C.O No. 20095 (W) of 1994) was heard and dismissed on 24 June 1999 by Justice Sri Ajay Nath Ray, who directed recovery of sums paid to the petitioners during the stay. The petitioners appealed (MAT No. 2169 of 1999); that appeal was dismissed. Pursuant to the dismissal, the respondents retrenched the petitioners effective 25 June 1999.
W.P Nos. 16288 (W) of 1998 and 1220 (W) of 1999 were heard analogously by a Single Judge who concluded that suspension was unwarranted because the services had been terminated and there was no purpose in continuing disciplinary proceedings; the Single Judge quashed the suspension, allowed both writ petitions, and directed respondents to pay the difference between subsistence allowance and full pay with interest at 12% and awarded costs of Rs. 5,000. The respondents (appellants in the appeals before the Court) challenged that order.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, in view of the departmental inquiry having been conducted and completed with a finding of guilt against the writ-petitioners, the Single Judge's order directing payment of the difference between subsistence allowance and regular pay (with interest and costs) could be sustained.
- Whether the continuation or effect of the departmental inquiry and resultant findings could be disregarded on the ground that the employer-employee relationship had ended (i.e., whether a disciplinary inquiry could be treated as incapable of proceeding or being acted upon because of termination), as the Single Judge treated the inquiry as having no purpose after termination.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The writ-petitioners were purely temporary/contract appointees and had no right to continued posts except as permitted by the Court's interim stay; their appointments expired with the project.
- While allowed to continue under the interim order, the writ-petitioners committed serious acts of indiscipline—confining and assaulting the General Manager and committing indecent exposure—leading to a criminal case and departmental inquiry.
- The criminal complaint could not be proved before the criminal court because the complainant had retired and was unavailable, resulting in acquittal; however, the departmental inquiry continued and was concluded on 30 December 1998, finding the petitioners guilty.
- Given the inquiry's guilty findings, the Single Judge's order directing payment of the difference between subsistence allowance and full pay with interest and costs was not sustainable.
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the writ-petitioners' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded by reference to the record and to the departmental inquiry report, which had been concluded on 30 December 1998 and was produced to the court at the hearing; a copy was handed to counsel for the writ-petitioners. The appellate bench focused on the timing and effect of the inquiry findings relative to the period during which the petitioners continued in post under the Court's interim order.
Key points of the court's step-by-step analysis:
- The petitioners had been permitted to continue in employment solely by virtue of the interim order in C.O No. 20095 (W) of 1994; that interim protection lasted until the writ petition was dismissed on 24 June 1999, after which their services were terminated effective 25 June 1999.
- While under the interim order they committed the misconduct that gave rise both to criminal proceedings and to departmental disciplinary proceedings; although the criminal case resulted in acquittal for want of the complainant, the departmental inquiry was independent and concluded with a finding of guilt.
- The Single Judge had treated the disciplinary proceedings as having no purpose after termination and quashed suspension; the appellate court held that this approach overlooked that the petitioners were in fact in service under the Court's order until 25 June 1999, and that the inquiry had been completed on 30 December 1998 while they remained in service under that order.
- Because the departmental inquiry had established guilt, the petitioners could not claim the benefit of the difference between subsistence allowance and regular pay. The court emphasized that the petitioners had abused the interim protection granted by the Court by committing serious misconduct and thus were not entitled to sympathetic consideration or restoration of pay differential.
- On that factual and legal basis the court concluded that the Single Judge's order awarding salary differences, interest and costs could not be sustained and therefore set aside the order and dismissed the writ petitions.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The appeals were allowed; the order of the learned Single Judge dated 26 February 2001 was set aside, and both writ petitions (W.P No. 16288 (W) of 1998 and W.P No. 1220 (W) of 1999) were dismissed with no order as to costs. The court thereby reversed the Single Judge's direction to pay the difference between subsistence allowance and full pay (with 12% interest) and the costs of Rs. 5,000.
Implications and direct effects:
- The departmental inquiry report, which had concluded on 30 December 1998 finding the petitioners guilty, was held to preclude an award of the pay differential the Single Judge had ordered.
- The petitioners' continuation in service was attributable solely to the interim order in the earlier writ petition; their misconduct while so continued meant they could not claim the benefit of full pay in lieu of subsistence allowance.
- The court expressly criticized the petitioners' conduct and declined to extend equitable relief in their favour given the guilty findings in the departmental inquiry.
- The opinion does not state or purport to lay down a novel legal principle or broader precedent; it resolves the dispute on the specific facts and procedural history presented and sets aside the Single Judge's order as unsustainable in those circumstances.
Bench: Ashok Kumar Mathur, C.J. (author of opinion) and Ashim Kumar Banerjee, J. (agreeing). Final lines in the opinion record: "Appeal allowed." and "Writs dismissed."
Ashok Kumar Mathur, C.J:— Both these appeals arise out of a common order, dated February 26, 2001, passed by the Learned Single Judge in W.P No. 1220 (W) of 1999 which was heard analogously with W.P No. 16288 (W) of 1998, therefore they are disposed of by a common order.
2. The brief facts which are necessary for disposal of both these appeals are that the writ-petitioners were employed on contract basis for modernization of Durgapur Steel Plant. In 1994 the writ-petitioners along with others filed a writ petition being C.O No. 20095 (W) of 1994 praying for permanent absorption. On September 16, 1994 the learned Single Judge directed an order of status quo. During pendency of this writ petition on October 14, 1995 all these writ-petitioners entered into the chamber of Sri V. Shankaranan, General Manager (Modernisation), Durgapur, and misbehaved with him. He was kept in confinement in the room and the writ-petitioners exhibited their private parts by opening the trousers. The ash tray was removed from the table and thrown violently and the glass shutters of the shelf were broken. He was also prevented from taking medicines as he was a heart patient and they prevented other persons to come to the rescue of the General Manager. Against these wrongful activities of the writ-petitioners an F.I.R was lodged and a criminal case being C.R No. 970 of 1995 was launched. However, this criminal case resulted in acquittal of the writ-petitioners as the complainant himself was not available as he had since retired. During the pendency of the said writ petition on November 9, 1995 chargesheets were also issued against these writ-petitioners for their misconduct and they were placed under suspension on October 20, 1995. The writ-petitioners challenged the order of suspension by filing another writ petition being W.P No. 16288 (W) of 1998. The writ-petitioners also filed another writ petition being W.P No. 1220 (W) of 1999 for quashing the disciplinary proceeding and stay of proceeding, but learned Single Judge granted liberty to the management to proceed with the inquiry but final order was directed not to be passed without leave of the Court. During the pendency of these two writ petitions, the earlier writ petition being C.O No. 20095 (W) of 1994 came up for hearing before the Learned Single Judge. The said writ petition was dismissed by Justice Sri Ajay Nath Ray on June 24, 1999 granting liberty to the respondents to recover all the sums paid to these writ-petitioners. The writ-petitioners preferred an appeal against that order (MAT No. 2169 of 1999). The said appeal was also dismissed. In pursuance of the order passed by the Learned Single Judge in C.O No. 20095 (W) of 1994, the respondents retrenched these writ-petitioners from service with effect from June 25, 1999. The writ petitions being W.P No. 16288 (W) of 1998 and W.P No. 1220 (W) of 1999 came up before the learned Single Judge and the same was heard analogously. The learned Single Judge observed that the suspension of the writ-petitioners were unwarranted as the services of the writ-petitioners were terminated and there was no purpose for continuing the disciplinary proceeding as the relation between the petitioners and the respondents had come to an end with the termination of their service and he quashed the suspension order. The Learned Single Judge allowed both the writ petitions and directed the respondents to pay to the writ-petitioners the difference of subsistence allowance and full pay along with interest at the rate of 12 per cent and awarded cost of Rs. 5000 Aggrieved against this order both these appeals have been preferred by the appellant.
3. The first and foremost question is that what is the position of the petitioners. The petitioners were appointed on contract basis as data processing operator in the modernization project of Durgapur Steel Plant. These writ-petitioners were employed in this modernization project. After completion of the modernization project the services of these petitioners were sought to be terminated with the efflux of time as the appointment of the petitioners were on contract basis. Therefore, after expiry of the contract period their services were to be terminated but somehow they filed a writ petition [C.O No. 20095 (W) of 1994] and obtained a stay order and that stay order continued till the writ petition was dismissed on June 24, 1999. At the time of dismissal of the writ petition the learned Single Judge directed that all monies drawn by these writ-petitioners during the continuation of the stay order should be recovered from these writ-petitioners as they had no right to the post. Aggrieved against this order they preferred an appeal. The Appellate Court in its order directed that the monies already drawn by these writ-petitioners should not be recovered. However, that appeal subsequently stood dismissed.
4. At present we are concerned with the departmental inquiry and suspension. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that these writ-petitioners were appointed purely on temporary basis and they had no right to any post. However, because of the stay order passed by this Court these writ-petitioners were allowed to continue and during pendency of the writ petition these writ-petitioners committed serious acts of indiscipline and wrongly confined the General Manager, assaulted him and made all kind of indecent exposure before him and they prevented others from coming to the rescue of the General Manager for which a criminal case was launched and departmental inquiry was initiated. It was submitted that because the General Manager was the complainant and as he retired he could not be produced before the Judicial Magistrate and no evidence could be laid down. Due to non-apperance of the complainant the complaint was dismissed and these writ-petitioners were all acquitted. But by that their departmental inquiry could not be closed down and the departmental inquiry continued as per orders of the Court and the Court observed that authorities may complete and conclude the inquiry and no final order should be passed without leave of the Court. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that because of the injunction order granted by the Court, final order could not be passed but the inquiry was concluded on December 30, 1998 wherein all these persons had been found guilty. Learned counsel for the appellant produced before us the inquiry report, a copy whereof was handed over to the learned counsel for the writ petitioners. Now the question before us is whether in the changed circumstances where in the departmental inquiry these writ-petitioners had been found guilty, the order passed by the Learned Single Judge granting difference of subsistence allowance and the regular pay with interest and costs can be sustained or not.
5. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and upon perusal of records we are of the opinion that the order of the learned Single Judge cannot be sustained for the simple reason that the departmental inquiry was conducted and completed wherein these writ-petitioners were found guilty, therefore, they are not entitled to any difference of subsistence allowance and regular salary which would have been made available to them. We cannot lose sight of the fact that these writ-petitioners were allowed to continue in view of the order of this Court and during the course of the interim order passed by this Court they misbehaved with the General Manager resulting in launching of a criminal proceeding as well as departmental inquiry. Now the departmental inquiry had been concluded but the same could not be acted upon because of the stay order passed by this Court. When the matter was brought before us the inquiry report was produced and copy of the same was handed over to the learned counsel for these writ-petitioners. In the departmental proceeding the writ-petitioners were found guilty. The incumbents cannot claim any benefit of difference of subsistence allowance and regular salary in the changed circumstances. It is unfortunate that these incumbents misbehaved with the General Manager knowing fully well that they were continuing in the post under the orders of this Court and they have abused the process of Court by misconducting themselves. They took law in their hand and misbehaved with the General Manager and assaulted him, that kind of conduct on their part cannot be countenanced. Learned Single Judge had dilated at great length and found that the relation of master and servant had come to end therefore the departmental inquiry could not be proceeded and that the learned counsel for the appellant has failed to point out any provision where departmental inquiry could be continued after termination of service of an incumbent. All these questions are irrelevant in the present case. All these persons whose services were terminated, continued under the orders of the Court passed in C.O No. 20095 (W) of 1994 and they continued in service till June 25, 1999 when their services were terminated because of the dismissal of the writ petition on 24 June, 1999 by Justice Sri Ajoy Nath Ray. Therefore, till June 1999, these persons were in service under orders of the Court and the departmental inquiry was concluded on December 30, 1998. Therefore, after termination of service these incumbents were very much in service under the orders of this Court and the relation of writ-petitioners continued with the management as master and servant, therefore, this question posed by the learned Single Judge to the learned counsel for the appellant that whether departmental inquiry could continue after the relation of master and servant ceased had no relevance in view of these facts. The departmental inquiry was concluded on December 30, 1998 but that could not be acted upon because of the orders of the Court. Since the writ-petitioners were found guilty in the departmental inquiry it was not possible to give them difference of subsistence allowance and regular pay. Had the departmental inquiry resulted in exoneration of these writ-petitioners then that question of granting the difference of pay could have arisen. But in the present case Court cannot come to the rescue of such irresponsible workmen, when the Court had given them a benevolent consideration and granted interim order against their termination and that order continued for good five years and still they went on making serious acts of indiscipline by misbehaving with the General Manager. This kind of conduct on the part of the writ-petitioners does not deserve any sympathetic consideration of this Court.
6. We are of the opinion that the view taken by the learned Single Judge in the facts and circumstances of this case cannot be sustained. We set aside the order passed by the learned Single Judge and dismiss both the writ petitions with no order as to costs.
7. Ashim Kumar Banerjee, J.:— I agree.
8. Appeal allowed.
9. Writs dismissed.
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