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Mulchand Rampuria v. Income-Tax Officer And Another
Summary of Judgment delivered by Pinaki Chandra Ghose, J.
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner is the sole executor of the estate of Sundar Devi Rampuria (deceased, will dated May 6, 1964; probate granted). The petitioner is also assessed regularly in his personal capacity as an individual. For the assessment year 1989-90 the petitioner filed a return as sole executor. The Income-tax Officer (respondent No.1) issued a notice dated May 24, 1993 under section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and initiated reassessment proceedings under section 147 for assessment year 1989-90.
The Assessing Officer recorded reasons indicating a belief that income had escaped assessment relating to a share-trading loss of Rs. 99,250. The Assessing Officer took the view that the executor had no power to carry on business and that the petitioner carried on share-dealing business in his personal capacity; accordingly, the estate should not be adjusted for the personal business loss. For assessment year 1990-91 the Assessing Officer had earlier rejected a claim for share-dealing loss (Rs. 1,09,540); that rejection was overturned by the first appellate authority which allowed the appeal and held the Assessing Officer was not justified in disallowing the loss.
The petitioner challenged the section 148 notice and the reassessment proceedings, contending that the conditions precedent to the assumption of jurisdiction were not satisfied and that the notice was invalid and without jurisdiction. The petition sought quashing of the notice and related proceedings. The matter was heard and a judgment delivered dismissing the petition.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the notice dated May 24, 1993 issued under section 148 (and consequent proceedings under section 147) was invalid for want of satisfaction of conditions precedent required for reopening an assessment.
- Whether the Assessing Officer had recorded valid reasons (a "reason to believe") that income chargeable to tax had escaped assessment for the relevant assessment year.
- Whether a change of opinion or an error discovered on reconsideration of the same material justified reopening of assessment under section 147.
- Whether the notice was invalid because it was served upon the petitioner in his individual name without describing his status as executor, and if such a defect was curable under section 292B of the Act.
- Whether communication of the reasons recorded under section 148 to the assessee is a precondition to the validity of the notice.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments
- The section 148 notice and the reassessment proceedings are invalid because the conditions precedent for assumption of jurisdiction under section 147/148 were not satisfied.
- The Assessing Officer's recorded reasons show he merely formed a view that the executor could not carry on business and that the petitioner carried on the share-dealing business in his personal capacity; therefore the reopening was without jurisdiction.
- Assessment for 1990-91 had been completed and, on appeal, the appellate authority allowed the petitioner’s claim for share-dealing loss — hence further assessment is not permissible in law.
- The reopening was based on a change of opinion or on reconsideration of the same material; such change of opinion and reconsideration do not justify reopening under section 147.
- The notice was served only in the petitioner's individual name without describing his capacity as executor, rendering it invalid and not curable under section 292B.
- Relied on multiple authorities (including V.M. Raghavalu Naidu and Sons; Asit Kumar Ghose; Administrator-General of West Bengal v. CIT; Ganga Saran; ITO v. British Paints; ITO v. Nawab Mir Barkat Ali Khan Bahadur; ITO v. Lahhmani Mewal Das; Indian and Eastern Newspaper Society v. CIT; Indian Oil Corporation v. ITO; Allahabad Bank v. CIT; CIT v. Bhanji Lavji; and others) to support the above propositions.
Respondent's Arguments
- The impugned notice under section 148 is valid: both conditions precedent required for proceeding under section 147 were satisfied — (a) Assessing Officer had reason to believe income had escaped assessment; and (b) the assessee had failed to fully and truly disclose material facts.
- Reasons for issuance of the notice were recorded in the file (abstract of file annexed) and disclosed in the affidavit-in-opposition; there is no necessity to communicate those reasons to the assessee prior to issuance of the notice.
- Any mistake in description of the petitioner is curable by virtue of section 292B (which came into force on October 1, 1975) provided the notice is in substance and effect in conformity with the Act.
- No intimation under section 143(1)(a) or communication of an assessment order was required where no prima facie adjustment, demand or assessment order arose from the assessment process.
- Relied on authorities including Ganga Saran; Sri Krishna Pvt. Ltd. v. ITO; Indo-Aden Salt Manufacturing and Trading Co. P. Ltd.; Ajantha Industries v. CBDT; Gulabrai Hanumanbux; Devarajan; Mahadeo Biscuits; and Raymond Woollen Mills Ltd. v. ITO, among others, to support the contentions that reasons were recorded, need not be communicated, and that the court's role at this stage is limited to seeing whether there was prima facie material for reopening.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| V.M Raghavalu Naidu and Sons v. CIT/CEPT, [1950] 18 ITR 787 (Mad) | Cited by petitioner to support the proposition that the executor has rights to continue certain business activities left by the deceased. | The court noted the citation as part of petitioner’s submissions but did not base its final order on this case; it is recorded as relied upon by the petitioner. |
| Asit Kumar Ghose v. CAIT, [1952] 22 ITR 177 (Cal) | Cited by petitioner in support of executor's rights vis-à-vis business of the deceased. | Cited in the petitioner's argument; the court did not expressly adopt this case in its reasoning for dismissing the petition. |
| Administrator-General of West Bengal for the Estate of Raja P.N Tagore v. CIT, [1965] 56 ITR 34 (SC) | Cited by petitioner regarding rights of executor/estate to carry on business. | Not specifically applied by the court in its analysis; recorded as cited by petitioner. |
| Ganga Saran and Sons P. Ltd. v. ITO, [1981] 130 ITR 1 (SC) | Cited by both parties on questions relating to the validity of reopening and the need for a rational connection/relevant bearing for formation of belief to reopen. | Noted by the court as among important authorities on reopening; the court observed the principle that reopening must have relevant material, but emphasized that sufficiency is not to be tested at this stage. |
| ITO v. British Paints India Ltd., [1979] 118 ITR 878 (Cal) | Cited by petitioner to support the requirement that reopening must have rational connection with formation of belief. | Recorded as relied upon by petitioner; the court did not expressly base its order on this authority but acknowledged the submission. |
| ITO v. Nawab Mir Barkat Ali Khan Bahadur, [1974] 97 ITR 239 (SC) | Cited by petitioner on the proposition that reopening must be based on relevant material/rational connection. | Cited in submissions; the court's ultimate conclusion did not turn on accepting or rejecting this authority specifically. |
| ITO v. Lahhmani Mewal Das, [1976] 103 ITR 437 (SC) | Cited by petitioner (and also referenced later) for the proposition that error discovered on reconsideration of same material does not permit reopening. | Noted in the opinion as a cited authority for the petitioner's proposition; the court observed the general rule but applied the standard that sufficiency of material is not to be tested at this stage. |
| Indian and Eastern Newspaper Society v. CIT, [1979] 119 ITR 996 (SC) | Cited by petitioner for the principle that an error discovered on reconsideration of the same material does not give power to reopen. | Recorded as cited by petitioner; the court did not rely on it to grant relief and instead followed the approach of examining whether reasons were recorded and prima facie material existed. |
| Indian Oil Corporation v. ITO, [1986] 159 ITR 956 (SC) | Cited by petitioner concerning limits on reopening based on the same material and on change of opinion. | Noted as relied upon by petitioner; the court nonetheless dismissed the petition after finding recorded reasons and prima facie material before the Assessing Officer. |
| Allahabad Bank v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax, [1993] 199 ITR 664 (Cal) | Cited by petitioner to support the proposition that a change of opinion is not permissible for reopening under section 147. | Recorded as petitioner’s authority; the court applied the narrower standard that it need only see whether prima facie material existed and that sufficiency is not to be tested at this stage. |
| CIT v. Bhanji Lavji, [1971] 79 ITR 582 (SC) | Cited by petitioner for the proposition that change of opinion will not justify reopening. | Not specifically applied in the court’s ultimate conclusion; noted as part of petitioner’s submissions. |
| CIT v. Gujarat Ginning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd., [1994] 205 ITR 40 (Guj) | Cited by petitioner on the change-of-opinion principle. | Cited in submissions; the court proceeded to assess only whether there was recorded prima facie material and reasons recorded in the file. |
| Shyam Sundar Bajaj v. ITO, [1973] 89 ITR 317 (Cal) | Cited by petitioner in support of the contention that a notice served in the wrong capacity may be invalid. | Recorded as relied upon by petitioner; the court concluded the defect (if any) was curable under section 292B where the notice is in substance and effect in conformity with the Act. |
| Sewlal Daga v. CIT, [1965] 55 ITR 406 (Cal) | Cited by petitioner on the validity of notices and capacity in which notices are served. | Not adopted as a basis to quash the notice; the court considered section 292B and found the notice in substance valid for present purposes. |
| Rama Devi Agarwalla v. CIT, [1979] 117 ITR 256 (Cal) | Cited by petitioner regarding formal defects in notices and service. | Recorded as part of petitioner’s argument; the court held the notice to be valid in substance and effect and did not quash it for the pleaded defects. |
| Sri Krishna Pvt. Ltd. v. ITO, [1996] 221 ITR 538 (SC) | Cited by respondent to support the proposition that the Assessing Officer may validly form reason to believe and issue notice when material exists. | Noted by the court; the court found that reasons were recorded and that the department had prima facie material for reopening, so it declined to interfere. |
| Indo-Aden Salt Manufacturing & Trading Co. P. Ltd. v. CIT, [1986] 159 ITR 624 (SC) | Cited by respondent on validity of formation of opinion and reopening procedure. | Recorded as respondent’s authority; the court found the Assessing Officer had recorded reasons and thus did not interfere. |
| Ajantha Industries v. CBDT, [1976] 102 ITR 281 (SC) | Cited by respondent for the proposition that there is no necessity of communicating the reasons recorded under section 148 to the assessee. | The court accepted that communication of the reasons is not necessary and relied on the submitted record showing the reasons were recorded; accordingly, the court upheld the notice's validity on that point. |
| Gulabrai Hanumanbux v. WTO/ITO, [1989] 178 ITR 519 (Gauhati) | Cited by respondent in support of the view that communication of reasons is not necessary and formation of opinion need not be communicated. | The court accepted the respondent’s contention that reasons need not be communicated and pointed to the affidavit/file showing reasons were recorded; the case was relied upon to support non-interference. |
| Devarajan v. Tamil Nadu Farmers Service Co-operative Federation, [1981] 131 ITR 506 (Mad) | Cited by respondent in relation to the curative effect of section 292B on defects in notices (i.e., mistake/description). | The court observed that after enactment of section 292B, notices are not invalid merely for certain mistakes; this precedent formed part of the respondent's reliance though the court's order rests on the record showing valid reasons were recorded. |
| Mahadeo Biscuits and Confectionery Works v. CIT, [1987] 166 ITR 411 (MP) | Cited by respondent for the proposition that mistakes in notices can be curable under section 292B. | Recorded as respondent's authority; the court applied the statutory principle that a notice in substance and effect conforming to the Act is not invalidated by such mistakes. |
| Raymond Woollen Mills Ltd. v. ITO, [1999] 236 ITR 34 (SC) | Cited by respondent (and expressly relied on by the court) for the proposition that the court's function at the stage of challenge to a section 148 notice is to see whether there was prima facie material on which the Department could reopen the case; the court should not test the sufficiency or correctness of the material. | The court expressly applied this authority: it concluded that reasons were recorded and that the court's role was limited to seeing prima facie material existed; therefore the court declined to go into sufficiency/correctness and refused to interfere with the notice. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court began by reproducing section 148 of the Income-tax Act and emphasized that a notice under section 148 is a condition precedent to any assessment, reassessment or recomputation under section 147. The court observed that a section 148 notice would be invalid where it failed to specify the correct assessment year, was unsigned, was issued to a dead person, or was issued to an assessee in an incorrect capacity (for example, to an individual when the correct status was a Hindu undivided family). The court noted, however, that section 292B (in force from October 1, 1975) provides that no notice shall be deemed invalid merely by reason of certain mistakes if the notice is in substance and effect in conformity with the Act.
Factually, the court examined the record and the affidavit-in-opposition. The court found that reasons for issuance of the notice had been recorded in the file and that those reasons were disclosed in the affidavit-in-opposition. The court accepted the respondent’s contention (supported by Ajantha Industries and Gulabrai Hanumanbux) that there is no necessity to communicate the recorded reasons to the assessee prior to issuing the section 148 notice.
The court applied the standard from Raymond Woollen Mills Ltd. v. ITO: at the interlocutory stage when a challenge is made to a notice under section 148, the court’s role is to ascertain whether there was prima facie material upon which the Department could form a reason to reopen the case; the court should not go into the sufficiency or correctness of the material. Using that standard, the court concluded that the Assessing Officer had recorded reasons on the file and that there was prima facie material to justify issuing the notice. The court therefore declined to examine or adjudicate the sufficiency or correctness of the material relied upon by the department.
On the contention that the notice was served in the petitioner’s individual name without describing his capacity as executor, the court referred to the statutory effect of section 292B and held that a mistake of description does not invalidate a notice if the notice is in substance and effect in conformity with the Act. The court accepted the respondent's submission that the notice was in substance valid and did not warrant interference.
Having found that reasons were recorded, that the Assessing Officer had authority to issue the notice, and that the court's role at this stage was limited to a prima facie inquiry (not a full merits review), the court concluded there was no ground to quash the section 148 notice or to interfere with the reassessment proceedings at that interlocutory stage.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The petition is rejected — this application must fail and is hereby dismissed.
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: The section 148 notice dated May 24, 1993 and the reassessment proceedings under section 147 were held to be valid in form and substance for the purposes of the interlocutory challenge; the petitioner’s application to quash the notice was dismissed and the petitioner is required to comply with the notice and proceed before the assessing authorities.
- Scope of judicial review at this stage: The court reaffirmed that when a notice under section 148 is challenged, the court's role is limited to determining whether there was prima facie material on which the Department could form a reason to reopen; the sufficiency or correctness of the material is not to be gone into at this stage (following Raymond Woollen Mills Ltd.).
- No broader precedent announced: The decision applies the existing statutory framework and precedents to the facts of the case; the court did not purport to lay down any novel legal principle beyond applying established authorities concerning recorded reasons, the curative effect of section 292B, and the limited scope of interim judicial inquiry into section 148 notices.
This summary is confined to the facts, arguments, authorities and reasoning expressly contained in the provided opinion. No facts or conclusions beyond those set out in the judgment have been added.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Pinaki Chandra Ghose, J.:— The petitioner has challenged a notice dated May 24, 1993, issued by the Income-tax Officer, respondent No. 1 herein, under section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as “the said Act”), and the reassessment proceedings under section 147 of the said Act for the assessment year 1989-90 and all proceedings relating thereto and thereunder on the ground that the conditions precedent for the assumption of jurisdiction have not been satisfied and as such notice and assessment proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction.
2. The facts of the case briefly are as follows:
The writ petitioner is the sole executor to the estate of Sundar Devi Rampuria who died on October 28, 1975, leaving a registered will dated May 6, 1964 (hereinafter referred to as “the said deceased”). A probate of the said will has been granted to the petitioner. According to the petitioner, apart from the status of the said executor to the estate of the said deceased, the petitioner is also regularly assessed separately with his own income in the status of an “individual”.
3. The petitioner duly filed a return for the assessment year 1989-90 as sole executor. The petitioner has further contended before this court that the reasons recorded by respondent No. 1 annexed to the affidavit-in-opposition filed in this proceedings show that the Assessing Officer has reason to believe that the income has escaped assessment in respect of the share trading loss of Rs. 99,250 for the said year. It further appears from the said affidavit that the executor has no power to carry out any business and he has a right only to execute the estate in terms of the will. It has also been stated that the petitioner carried on a business in his personal capacity and not as an estate. The estate is not responsible for the loss incurred by the petitioner in respect of the business. Accordingly, the respondents did not allow the petitioner to set off the business loss from the income of the estate. According to the petitioner, the assessment for the assessment year 1990-91 was completed under section 143(3) of the said Act rejecting the claim of loss on share dealing business, amounting to Rs. 1,09,540. The appeal preferred by the petitioner was allowed by the first appellate authority and the appellate authority held that the Assessing Officer was not justified in not allowing the loss suffered in the business of share dealing while computing the total income.
4. Accordingly, it is submitted that further assessment is not permissible in law and the impugned notice under section 148 of the said Act is invalid, baseless and which is liable to be quashed.
5. The contention of the petitioner that the assessment year 1990-91 was duly completed by the Assessing Officer under section 143 rejecting the claim of the petitioner to adjust the loss amounting to Rs. 1,09,540 in respect of the share dealing business. An appeal was duly preferred by the petitioner before the first appellate authority which was duly allowed by the said authority whereby the appellate authority held that the disallowing of the loss from the computation of the total income was not justified by the Assessing Officer.
6. In these circumstances, the learned advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner contended that further assessment is not permissible under the law and, therefore, the impugned notice under section 148 of the said Act is invalid and is liable to be quashed. He further relied upon the judgments reported in V.M Raghavalu Naidu and Sons v. CIT/CEPT, [1950] 18 ITR 787 (Mad); Asit Kumar Ghose v. CAIT, [1952] 22 ITR 177 (Cal) and Administrator-General of West Bengal for the Estate of Raja P.N Tagore v. CIT, [1965] 56 ITR 34 (SC), and contended that the petitioner has a right to continue the share dealing business left by the said deceased.
7. He further relied upon the judgments reported in Ganga Saran and Sons P. Ltd. v. ITO, [1981] 130 ITR 1 (SC); ITO v. British Paints India Ltd., [1979] 118 ITR 878 (Cal); ITO v. Nawab Mir Barkat Ali Khan Bahadur, [1974] 97 ITR 239 (SC) and ITO v. Lahhmani Mewal Das, [1976] 103 ITR 437 (SC) and submitted that reopening of an assessment must have a rational connection or relevant bearing on the formation of the belief. He further contended that there must be a reason to believe that there has been an escapement of income for a particular assessment year.
8. He further contended that the Assessing Officer could not form any valid reason to believe in the instant case and therefore, notice which has been issued by the Assessing Officer is bad and the same is liable to be quashed. He further relied upon Indian and Eastern Newspaper Society v. CIT, [1979] 119 ITR 996 (SC); Indian Oil Corporation v. ITO, [1986] 159 ITR 956 (SC) and ITO v. Lahhmani Mewal Das, [1976] 103 ITR 437 (SC) and submitted that an error discovered on a reconsideration of the same material does not give power to the Income-tax Officer to reopen or to make assessment for the escaped income.
9. He further submitted that the change of opinion is not permissible in a proceeding under section 147 of the said Act. In support of his submission, he relied upon the judgments reported in Allahabad Bank v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax, [1993] 199 ITR 664 (Cal); CIT v. Bhanji Lavji, [1971] 79 ITR 582 (SC) and CIT v. Gujarat Ginning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd., [1994] 205 ITR 40 (Guj).
10. He further contended that the service of the notice is a condition precedent for initiation of the proceedings under section 147 of the said Act. According to him, if no notice is issued or if the notice is issued, it can be shown that the same is invalid in that case. Steps taken thereunder should be treated as illegal. He further submitted that the notice served upon the petitioner only in his individual name without describing the capacity and the status of the petitioner as such executor. Accordingly, he submitted that the same should be quashed as the same is not curable by virtue of the provisions of section 292B. He further placed reliance on the judgments reported in Shyam Sundar Bajaj v. ITO, [1973] 89 ITR 317 (Cal); Sewlal Daga v. CIT, [1965] 55 ITR 406 (Cal) and Rama Devi Agarwalla v. CIT, [1979] 117 ITR 256 (Cal).
11. The learned advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent contended that the impugned notice is valid in all respects. Both the conditions precedent are fulfilled, i.e,
(a) the Assessing Officer has reason to believe that by reason of the omission or failure on the part of assessee income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment for the relevant assessment year;
(b) the assessee has failed to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment for the said year.
12. In support of such contention, he relied upon the judgments reported in Ganga Saran and Sons P. Ltd. v. ITO, [1981] 130 ITR 1 (SC); Sri Krishna Pvt. Ltd. v. ITO, [1996] 221 ITR 538 (SC) and Indo-Aden Salt Manufacturing and Trading Co. P. Ltd. v. CIT, [1986] 159 ITR 624 (SC).
13. He further submitted that the condition precedent under section 148 of the said Act duly satisfied as it would be evident from the abstract of file forming annexure A to the affidavit-in-opposition. Reasons duly recorded in the file. There is no necessity of communicating the reasons of notice under section 148 of the said Act. In support of such submission, he relied upon the judgments reported in Ajantha Industries v. CBDT, [1976] 102 ITR 281 (SC) and Gulabrai Hanumanbux v. WTO/ITO, [1989] 178 ITR 519 (Gauhati).
14. He also contended that both the notice as well as service is valid and any mistake in the description of the petitioner does not invalidate the same. Section 292B of the said Act was introduced with effect on and from October 1, 1975. In support of such contention, he relied upon the judgments reported in I. Devarajan v. Tamil Nadu Farmers Service Co-operative Federation, [1981] 131 ITR 506 (Mad) and Mahadeo Biscuits and Confectionery Works v. CIT, [1987] 166 ITR 411 (MP).
15. He further submitted that the contention of the petitioner with regard to the absence of intimation under section 143(1)(a) and non-communication of the order of assessment is untenable in the facts of the case. No intimation or order is required to be issued/passed in a case where there is no prima facie adjustment or demand arising out of an assessment. The requirement of an intimation could arise only when there is proposal for adjustment and communication of an order if there is a demand and in the instant case facts are otherwise. It cannot be alleged that in the absence of an intimation or demand the assessment is pending.
16. He also contended that the formation of an opinion for the said notice under section 148 is valid in all respects and sufficient materials were on record before the respondent. There is no necessity of communicating the formation of opinion to the petitioner. Reliance is placed on Gulabrai Hanumanbux v. WTO/ITO, [1989] 178 ITR 519 (Gauhati).
17. He further submitted that the judgments relied upon by the petitioner are distinguishable in nature and he further contended that the only question at this stage that the court will find out is whether sufficient materials on record were duly recorded before issuing the said notice under section 148 of the said Act. In support of such contention, he relied upon a judgment reported in Raymond Woollen Mills Ltd. v. ITO, [1999] 236 ITR 34 (SC).
18. After hearing the parties and the submissions made before me I have considered the case of the petitioner and the respondent. At this stage, in my opinion, it would be proper for me to quote section 148 of the said Act which is reproduced hereunder:
“148. Issue of notice where income has escaped assessment.—(1) Before making the assessment, reassessment or recomputation under section 147, the Assessing Officer shall serve on the assessee a notice requiring him to furnish within such period, not being less than thirty days, as may be specified in the notice, a return of his income or the income of any other person in respect of which he is assessable under this Act during the previous year corresponding to the relevant assessment year, in the prescribed form and verified in the prescribed manner and setting forth such other particulars as may be prescribed; and the provisions of this Act shall, so far as may be, apply accordingly as if such return were a return required to be furnished under section 139.
(2) The Assessing Officer shall, before issuing any notice under this section, record his reasons for doing so.”
19. In my opinion the section is very clear in this respect as the section specifically empowers the Assessing Officer that before making the assessment and reassessment or recomputation under section 147, the Assessing Officer shall serve on the assessee a notice requiring him to do so under the said section within such period mentioned therein. A notice under this section is a condition precedent to the validity of any assessment under section 147 of the said Act. The notice would be invalid if it does not specify the correct assessment year or is not signed, or is issued to a dead man or to the assessee as an individual when the correct status of the assessee is that of a Hindu undivided family. This principle has already been settled by the court in several judgments. After the enactment of section 292B which came into force on October 1, 1975, no notice shall be deemed to be invalid merely by reason of any mistake, defect or omission therein if the notice “is in substance and effect in conformity with or according to the intent and purpose of this Act.”
20. It appears from the record and the affidavit filed before this court that the reasons have been disclosed in the said affidavit-in-opposition which has been filed before me. I do not have any hesitation to hold that the Assessing Officer has authority to issue such notice. It further appears that the reasons were duly recorded in the file which appeared in the affidavit-in-opposition and further it has been held by the court that it is not necessary for communication of the reasons for issuance of notice under section 148 of the said Act. Therefore, I do not have any hesitation to accept the contention of the learned advocate appearing on behalf of the respondents. It further appears that the section itself empowers the Assessing Officer to assess and reassess, therefore, there cannot be any reason on the facts of this case that the petitioner should not appear before the said authorities when the notice in my opinion, is valid and has been issued in accordance with the provisions of the said Act. It further appears from the judgment delivered by the Supreme Court reported in Raymond Woollen Mills Ltd. v. ITO, [1999] 236 ITR 34, that the reasons were duly recorded by the Assessing Officer before issuing the notice under section 148 of the said Act. Accordingly, in my opinion, this court will not interfere in the matter at this stage. The apex court has specifically stated in the said judgment of Raymond Woollen Mills Ltd. v. ITO, [1999] 236 ITR 34, that the court can find out whether there was prima facie some material on the basis of which the Department could reopen the case. The sufficiency or correctness of the material is not a thing to be gone into by the court. Accordingly, in my opinion, it is not necessary for me to go into the sufficiency or correctness of the said material. But I have found the respondent authorities duly recorded the reasons before issuing the notice under section 148 of the said Act which is only in my opinion to find out at this stage whether has been done by the authorities. In my opinion, such steps have been taken in this matter properly and there is no reason to interfere therewith by this court. I do not have any hesitation to accept the contention of the respondent that if the notice “is in substance and effect in conformity with or according to the intent and purpose of this Act”, therefore, in my opinion, the said notice is also valid and does not warrant any interference by this court.
21. Accordingly, this application must fail and is hereby dismissed.
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