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Grindlays Bank P.L.C And Another v. Union Of India And Others
Structured Summary of the Opinion delivered by Pratap Kumar Ray, J.
Factual and Procedural Background
The writ petition was filed by Grindlays Bank and two of its officers challenging Memorandum No. T-4/1/SU/81(SCN) dated June 11, 1981, issued by the Special Director, Enforcement Directorate under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (FERA), 1947. The memorandum directed the petitioners to show cause why adjudication should not be initiated under section 23(1)(a) of FERA, 1947 (corresponding broadly to section 51 of FERA, 1973) for alleged contravention of section 10(1)(a) of FERA, 1947 by delaying repatriation of Rs. 15,02,351 determined on reassessment by income-tax authorities.
Procedurally, rule was issued and an ex parte interim injunction was granted on August 10, 1984, initially until September 15, 1984, and subsequently extended to continue until further orders by order dated September 18, 1984. Respondent No. 3 (Reserve Bank of India) filed an affidavit-in-opposition; respondents Nos. 1 and 2 (Union of India and the Special Director of Enforcement) filed no affidavit. The petitioners filed an affidavit-in-reply.
The factual matrix: the petitioner-bank (a London-headquartered bank with an India branch) allocated head office/general charges to branches worldwide under a formula accepted by income‑tax authorities and the Reserve Bank of India (RBI). Remittances following that formula took place until accounting year ending December 31, 1964. Reassessments under the Income-tax Act (section 148) resulted in disallowances aggregated to Rs. 15,02,351 (sums disallowed for assessment years 1949–50 to 1965–66). The Income-tax Department refunded amounts to the bank, which were credited to the bank's taxation reserve account. RBI wrote on December 28, 1974, advising repatriation; the bank communicated with its head office and debited the stated amount to its head office account on January 21, 1975. The impugned memorandum nevertheless treated the delay as measured from the finality of reassessment in 1967 and alleged contravention for a delay of about seven years.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether this writ court should entertain interference at the stage when only a show-cause memorandum has been issued and adjudication proceedings have not reached finality (i.e., maintainability of writ at the show-cause / pre-adjudication stage).
- How section 10 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947 (in particular section 10(1)(a) and section 10(2)) should be interpreted vis-à-vis section 23(1)(a) (penalty provision) — specifically, whether delay simpliciter in repatriation under section 10(1)(a) independently attracts penal consequences under section 23(1)(a), or whether a direction under section 10(2) from the Reserve Bank of India must first be issued and disobeyed before penal proceedings under section 23 may be invoked.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioners' (Grindlays Bank and its officers) Arguments
- The impugned memorandum (show-cause) is without jurisdiction because there was no contravention of section 10(1)(a) of FERA, 1947 on the specific facts: the head-office expense allocation formula had been accepted earlier by income-tax authorities and RBI and remittances had been made accordingly.
- Even after reassessment disallowances, the bank acted on RBI's direction; thus any time-counting for delay should start from RBI's communication, not from the 1967 reassessment finality.
- Before initiating adjudication proceedings, the authority should have reached subjective satisfaction (a quasi-judicial prerequisite) after considering the petitioners' reply; failure to do so violated principles of natural justice.
- Actions that were lawful when done cannot be retrospectively converted into unlawful acts by a subsequent change in the formula used by authorities; therefore, the bank should not be penalized for conduct that was previously sanctioned.
Respondent No. 3 (Reserve Bank of India) Arguments
- RBI's affidavit asserted that the amount had in fact been repatriated by debiting the head office account on January 21, 1975.
- RBI relied on its lodged affidavit for those facts and did not dispute the chronology that resulted in repatriation on that date.
Respondents Nos. 1 & 2 (Union of India and Special Director, Enforcement) Arguments
- Counsel for the respondents asserted that there was contravention of section 10(1)(a) due to an approximately seven-year delay between the 1967 finalisation of reassessment and the 1975 repatriation; that delay attracts penal consequences under section 23(1)(a) of FERA, 1947.
- They argued the writ petition was premature because the petitioners challenged the memorandum at the show-cause stage before adjudication had concluded.
Table of Precedents Cited
The opinion cites statutory provisions extensively but does not cite any judicial precedents (case law).
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court framed the dispute centrally as a question of statutory interpretation: the relationship between section 10 (duty of persons entitled to receive foreign exchange) and section 23 (penalty and procedure) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947 — and the corresponding provisions in the 1973 Act (section 16 and section 51/52 references were noted for context).
The court set out the text of section 10 (both subsections) and section 23 and proceeded through the following analytical steps, reflecting the opinion's structure and reasoning:
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Statutory structure and starting point:
- Section 10(1)(a) prohibits actions that have the effect of delaying receipt of foreign exchange by a person entitled to receive it. Section 10(2) empowers the Reserve Bank of India to issue directions "for the purpose of securing the receipt of the foreign exchange" where section 10(1) is not complied with.
- Section 23(1)(a) prescribes penal consequences (adjudicatory penalty up to three times the value of foreign exchange or Rs. 5,000) for contraventions of the provisions of section 10.
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Logical and harmonious construction:
- The court held that it would be inconsistent and legally improper to treat section 10(1)(a) as an independent trigger for penal proceedings under section 23(1)(a) without regard to section 10(2).
- If section 10(1)(a) alone attracted penal consequences, the same act (delay) could give rise both to direct penalty under section 23 and to penalty arising from non-compliance with an RBI direction under section 10(2), resulting in double consequences for a single cause of action — an outcome the court considered impermissible.
- Therefore a harmonious construction requires that penal consequences under section 23 flow from a combined reading of section 10(1) and 10(2): i.e., an actionable violation that attracts penalty under section 23 arises after the RBI issues a direction under section 10(2) and that direction is not complied with.
-
Temporal point for "cause of action":
- The court held that the cause of action for penal proceedings under section 23, insofar as it stems from allegations of delayed repatriation, is to be measured from the date when an RBI direction under section 10(2) is issued and communicated to the party, not from the earlier date when income-tax reassessment became final (1967) in this case.
- Applied to the facts: RBI's letter dated December 28, 1974 (communicated to the bank prior to January 3, 1975) constituted the operative direction; therefore, any delay for purposes of section 23 should be counted from that communication.
-
Penal-statutory interpretation and mens rea:
- The court emphasized that FERA (both the 1947 Act and the 1973 Act) is penal in character and must be strictly construed. In cases of ambiguity, benefit goes to the accused.
- The court found the petitioners lacked mens rea: their conduct (remitting under a formula accepted by income-tax authorities and RBI, then repatriating promptly after RBI's direction) did not reveal the culpable mental element required to fasten criminal/penal liability.
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Application to facts and relief:
- Because RBI had exercised its section 10(2) power and the petitioners repatriated the sums upon instruction, the adjudicating authority was not entitled to treat the delay as an independent ground (dating from 1967) to initiate penal adjudication under section 23(1)(a).
- Consequently, the impugned memorandum dated June 11, 1981 (show-cause) and the subsequent order dated June 22, 1984 (under rule 3(1) of the Adjudicating Proceeding and Appeal Rules, 1974) were legally untenable on the statutory interpretation given and were set aside and quashed.
Holding and Implications
Holding (core ruling): The writ petition is allowed: the impugned memorandum dated June 11, 1981 (show-cause) and the impugned order dated June 22, 1984 under rule 3(1) are set aside and quashed.
Immediate consequences:
- The adjudication memorandum and the subsequent order founded on the alleged delay measured from 1967 are quashed.
- The petitioners therefore obtain the relief sought in the writ: the pre‑adjudication show-cause notice and related order have been invalidated on the statutory interpretation and facts.
- The petition to stay the judgment (made on behalf of the Reserve Bank of India) was heard and refused.
Broader implications:
The opinion grounds its decision on statutory construction of section 10 (sub‑sections (1) and (2)) read with section 23 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947, and on principles applicable to penal statutes (strict construction and benefit to the accused). The judgment provides an interpretation on when penal proceedings under section 23 may be triggered in relation to delays in repatriation — namely, that penal consequences follow non‑compliance with an RBI direction under section 10(2) rather than from delay simpliciter counted from an earlier event. The opinion does not expressly state that it is laying down a binding precedent beyond the case before the Court.
This summary is confined to and derived exclusively from the text of the provided opinion. No information not present in the opinion has been added.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Pratap Kumar Ray, J.:— In the instant writ application the writ petitioners namely the Grindlays Bank and its two officers have assailed Memorandum No. T-4/1/SU/81(SCN), dated June 11, 1981, issued by the Special Director, Enforcement Directorate (Foreign Exchange Regulation Act), Government of India, whereby the writ petitioners were directed to show cause as to why the adjudication under section 23D of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947, hereinafter for brevity referred to as the FERA, 1947, for violation of section 10(1)(a) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947, due to delay to repatriate the sum of Rs. 15,02,351 as determined by the income-tax authorities on reassessment of the earlier assessment as made finally relating to the assessment years 1949-50 to 1959-60 and the decision of holding “adjudication proceeding” as contemplated under section 51 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973, issued by the competent authority being dissatisfied with the reply of said memorandum.
2. Rule issued and interim order of injunction in terms of prayer (f) was passed ex parte on August 10, 1984, by A.K Sengupta J. till September 15, 1984, upon granting leave to the respondents to apply for variation, vacating the interim order. However, after the expiry of such interim order, by order dated September 18, 1984, A.K Sengupta J. allowed the interim order as earlier passed to continue until further orders. In view of such, the entire proceeding has been kept pending. The affidavit-in-opposition, has been filed by respondent No. 3, the Reserve Bank of India, but no affidavit-in-opposition has been filed by respondents Nos. 1 and 2 namely the Union of India and the Special Director of Enforcement under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act. Affidavit-in-reply has been filed by the writ petitioners. The facts of the writ petition are to this effect. The writ petitioner-bank is running the business of banking all over the world having its head office at London. There are different branches in idifferent countries including the one here in India. On account of head office expenses at London, the decision was reached by the banking authorities to distribute such expenses to the different banks situated all over the world on proportionate basis as per the formula:
Territorial management expenses Head office general charges
Total Global management expenses
3. The terms of such formula, were accepted as reasonable by a subsequent decision relating to the assessment year 1969-70 by the income-tax appellate authority as well as by the Reserve Bank of India. The Reserve Bank of India allowed the remittance of proportionate head office expenses allocated to India for each and every accounting year and the petitioner accordingly remitted the same. The concerned notice of adjudication proceeding relates to the accounting years from 1948-64. On the basis of the said formula as accepted, the last remittance was allowed in the accounting year ended December 31, 1964. Such head office expenses allocated to India covering those periods were accordingly charged to the profit and loss account of the Indian business of the writ petitioner-bank and claimed in the income-tax computations as deductible expenses.
4. The income-tax authorities did not raise any objection for such remittance. But for the first time, the income-tax authorities wanted a detailed break down of head office expenses in relation to the accounting year 1959, corresponding to the assessment year 1960-61. For the first time, the Income-tax Officer disallowed a sum of Rs. 3,28,366 representing contributions to unrecognised provident fund, pension fund and on contribution to charities and donation relating to the head office expenditure. In appeal, such disallowance was reduced to Rs. 86,728 only. In view of such disallowance resorting to a changed formula from the earlier year as accepted, the assessments for the assessment years 1949-50 and 1959-60 were reopened under section 148 of the Income-tax Act on diverse dates in the year 1965-66.
5. By order dated March 25, 1966, the Income-tax Officer disallowed a portion of head office expenses on account of pension, provident fund and charity, etc., which had been previously allowed relating to those assessment years. An appeal was preferred and the Appellate Assistant Commissioner by the decision dated April 1, 1967, reduced such disallowances in respect of each of the years in question between February 27, 1966, and March 30, 1966, in respect of the assessment years 1960-61 and 1965-66. The Income-tax Officer disallowed a portion of the amounts claimed as deductable expenses on account of proportionate head office expenses allocated to India on the same principle. On appeal, however, such amount was reduced in respect of each year concerned by the Appellate Authority. The Income-tax Officer gave effect to the orders passed by the Appellate Authority i.e, Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax, as arose relating to the reassessment years 1949-50 to 1959-60 and the assessment relating to the assessment years 1960-61 to 1965-66, by his orders dated May 10, 1967 and July 6, 1967, respectively.
6. In pursuance of such revised orders, the sum of Rs. 9,82,342 relating to the assessment years 1949-50 to 1959-60 and a sum of Rs. 5,20,007 relating to the assessment years 1960-61 to 1965-66 being in total Rs. 15,02,351 was disallowed. It is a portion of head office expenses as was earlier allowed not only by the income-tax authorities following the formula as was prevalent earlier but which had the permission of the Reserve Bank of India relating to remittance of the said amount.
7. However, as a result of such income-tax proceedings by way of reassessment, on the basis of the changed formula by disallowing the head office expenses on account of provident fund, pension fund and charities, etc., as earlier mentioned, refund was made by the Income-tax Department and the same was credited by the writ petitioner to its taxation reserve account. However, the writ petitioner did not take steps to repatriate those amounts from the head office at London but subsequently the Reserve Bank of India by a letter dated December 28, 1974, made advice to repatriate those amounts from the head office. Such letter of the Reserve Bank of India was on the basis of information given by the income-tax authorities relating to the years 1948 to 1964. The writ petitioner-bank made a reply to the letter of the Reserve Bank of India by the communication dated January 3, 1975, informing that a decision was awaited from the head office at London on that issue. However, on January 21, 1975, the said amount of Rs. 15,02,351 was debited to the account of the head office maintained at Calcutta, and the communication was made to the Reserve Bank of India on January 20, 1975, to this effect that the said amount would be debited on January 21, 1975. But despite such, the impugned memorandum dated June 11, 1981, was served upon the writ petitioners only on the reason that the writ petitioners delayed to repatriate the amount though the said amount was disallowed long back in the year 1967 by final reassessment order in pursuance of the appeal as filed by the bank in question to the appellate authority of income-tax.
8. By the impugned memorandum, violation of rule 10(1)(a) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947, has been taken as a ground, for show-cause notice on the said facts. The petitioner had shown cause of the notice being the memorandum dated June 11, 1981, on giving details of the facts as happened, pointing out, inter alia, that there was no violation of the said section 10(1)(a) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947. However, the Special Director of Enforcement formed an opinion on perusal of the said cause as shown that it was a fit case to issue show-cause notice for issue of adjudication proceeding under section 51 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973, being section 23(d) of the repealed Act, Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947.
9. Hence, challenging both the aforesaid memorandum as well as the decision to show cause as to why adjudication proceeding would not be initiated, the present writ application has been filed. It is submitted by the learned advocate for the petitioners that in view of the special facts of the case, there was no violation of section 10(1)(a) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947, and accordingly the impugned memorandum is without jurisdiction. Further, it is contended that before coming to a decision as to why adjudicating proceedings should not be commenced, a decision by the authority exercising quasi-judicial function, there ought to have been subjective satisfaction on the points as taken in the reply of the impugned memorandum on June 11, 1981. But in the instant case, no such satisfaction was reached but a show-cause notice has been issued, which is in violation of the principles of natural justice. It is further contended that once permission was granted by the Reserve Bank of India upon a proper clearance of the income-tax authorities relating to remittance of expenditure on account of head office expenses in pursuance of a decision as was acceptable by the concerned respondents, for change of such formula by a subsequent decision in the year 1976, by reassessment of the income-tax, it cannot saddle the writ petitioners with the liability for violation of the provision as alleged.
10. It is further contended that any act which was lawful when done, cannot be said as unlawful by a subsequent decision on the changed formula of distribution of head office expenses of London of the concerned bank. It is contended that when the earlier formula of distribution of head office expenses of London was changed, there was no delay to repatriate the same after the Reserve Bank of India advised such, as immediately on issuance of such letter, the amount has been debited to the account of head office maintained at Calcutta, on January 21, 1975.
11. It is contended by the learned advocate of the Reserve Bank of India, respondent No. 3 relying on the affidavit filed by the Reserve Bank of India to this effect that after the decision of the income-tax authorities, in the year 1967, the amount has been repatriated by way of debiting the same to the account of the head office maintained at Calcutta on January 21, 1975.
12. The learned advocate of the respondent, the Reserve Bank of India simply relied upon its affidavits to that effect. The learned advocate appearing for respondents Nos. 1 and 2 has submitted vehemently against this writ petition, without affirming any affidavit. It is contended by the learned advocate that there is violation of section 10(1)(a) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947, in view of the long delay to deposit the amount when already a final decision was reached by reassessment of the assessments of the relevant years long back in the year 1967. It is contended that since 1967, the writ petitioner had the liability to repatriate the amount and they had done it by way of debiting the same in the account of the head office at Calcutta, only on January 21, 1975. So, there was a delay of about seven years and more and hence, the provision of section 10(1)(a) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947, is squarely applicable. It is further contended that challenging the memorandum, in the show cause stage, when simply a notice has been issued as to why adjudication proceedings should not be initiated, the writ petitioner has come up to this court. Accordingly the writ petition is not maintainable being premature.
13. Considering the rival contentions of the parties, the only point for decision is as to whether this writ court will interfere with the matter at this stage when admittedly adjudication proceeding's have not reached finality and no penalty has been imposed. Furthermore, this court is not unmindful of the other provisions of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947, now on repeal, the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973, whereby and wherein there is an Appellate Board under section 52 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973, and the order passed by the Adjudicating Officer under section 51 of the said Act is appealable. Normally, it is settled by different legal proposition that the writ court would not interfere when the matter is premature and will not stop any adjudicating proceeding or statutory enquiry, which is at the investigation stage. But in the instant case there is a basic legal infirmity as to be revealed from interpretation of section 10 itself of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947, now section 16 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973, which would justify the writ as maintainable. The entire lis now on the pivotal ring of interpretation of section 10 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947, qua the right of initiation of adjudicating proceedings under section 23 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947, now renumbered with some change as section 51 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973. For appreciation relevant sections are quoted. section 10 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947, reads as follows:
“Duty of persons entitled to receive foreign exchange— (1) No person who has a right to receive any foreign exchange or to receive from a person resident outside India a payment in rupees shall, except with the general or special permission of the Reserve Bank, do or refrain from doing anything or take or refrain from taking any action which has the effect of securing:
(a) that the receipt by him of the whole or part of that foreign exchange or payment is delayed, or
(b) that the foreign exchange or payment ceases in whole or in part to be receivable by him.
(2) Where a person has failed to comply with the requirements of sub-section (1) in relation to any foreign exchange or payment in rupees, the Reserve Bank may give to him such directions as appear to be expedient for the purpose of securing the receipt of the foreign exchange or payment as the case may be.”
14. section 23 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947, reads as follows:
“Penalty and procedure— (1) If any person contravenes the provisions of section 4, section 5, section 9, section 10, sub-section (2) of section 12, section 17, section 18A or section 18B or of any rule, direction or order made thereunder he shall:
(a) be liable to such penalty not exceeding three times the value of the foreign exchange in respect of which the contravention has taken place, or five thousand rupees, whichever is more, as may be adjudged by the. Director of Enforcement in the manner hereinafter provided, or
(b) upon conviction by a court, be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years, or with both.”
15. There is no change of section 10 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947 in the new Act I the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973, whereby the section has been only numbered as 16. The basis of the memorandum impugned in this writ application is the violation of section 10(1)(a) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947, on the ground that there was delay of more than seven years in repatriating the foreign exchange. The final grounds for such issuance of the memorandum in some paragraphs are as follows:
“And whereas it appears from the said revised orders passed by the said Income-tax Officer on May 10, 1967, that disallowance of a sum of Rs. 9,82,342 in aggregate in respect of the assessment years 1949-50 to 1959-60 was sustained in appeals in addition to further disallowance of a sum of Rs. 5,20,009 in aggregate in respect of the assessment years 1960-61 to 1965-66, as per the revised orders passed by the said Income-tax Officer on July 6, 1967, resulting in a total disallowance of Rs. 15,02,351 out of head office expenses alleged to have been incurred by the London head office of the said bank which was shown wrongly to be attributable to the functioning of the said bank in India during the relevant period.
And whereas it appears that the Indian branch of the said bank did or refrained from doing anything, or took or refrained from taking any action which had the effect of securing that the repatriation of Rs. 9,82,342 was delayed for a period of seven years eight months and ten days and repatriation of Rs. 5,20,009 was delayed for a period of seven years six months and fourteen days without the general or special permission of the Reserve Bank of India;
And whereas it appears that by delaying the repatriation of a sum totalling Rs. 15,20,351 the Indian branch of the said battik contravened the provisions of section 10(1)(a) of Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947, and thereby rendered itself liable to be proceeded against under section 23(1)(a) of the said Act.”
16. The adjudicating authority under the Act was not satisfied with the cause as shown wherein a categorical case was made out that as per direction of the Reserve Bank of India, the said amount was repatriated, irrespective of the ground that there was no reason for repatriation.
17. Now the interpretation of section 10 qua section 23 now renumbered as section 51 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973, with reference to the present factual matrix, would decide the issue. Since the matter relates to an alleged cause of action of the year 1967, the relevant provision of the Act as existed on the material time is the deciding factor. At the material time, the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947, was in vogue. Be it noted that the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947, was originally enacted as a temporary measure and it was placed in the statute book by Act 39 of 1957 but there were several amendments and accordingly the outcome was the new Act, the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973. section 51 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973, is corresponding to section 23(1)(a) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947, except for certain changes.
18. Under section 81(3) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973, the alleged violation since prior to the coming into effect of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973, the provisions of the old Act, i.e, the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947, could be invoked by virtue of section 6 of the General Clauses Act.
19. Hence the only issue as already held is interpretation of section 23(1)(a) qua section 10 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947. Section 23 is the’ provision for imposition of penalty as well as procedural law to that effect. Under section 23(1)(a) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947, it is clear that for contravention of the provisions of section 10, two consequences will follow, namely, the penal consequence in the nature of penalty under section 23(1)(a) of the said Act and criminal proceeding under section 23(1)(b) of the said Act. Hence, in adjudicating the matter, entire section 10 to be looked into for the purpose whether on the alleged fact as taken in the memorandum impugned in this writ application, there is any violation of section 10. section 10 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947, has two sub-sections, namely 10(1) and 10(2). There is alleged violation of section 10(1)(a) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947, namely the delay to repatriate the foreign exchange on the factual matrix as narrated. section 10(2) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947, which clearly speaks that in the event of failure to comply with the requirement of sub-section (1) in relation to any foreign exchange, the Reserve Bank of India may issue such direction as would be expedient for the purpose of securing the receipt of foreign exchange or the payment as the case may be.
20. Hence, for non-compliance with section 10(1)(a) of the said Act that is for delay in repatriation of the foreign exchange money, there is a provision to deal with the matter under section 10(2) of the said Act by the Reserve Bank of India. In the instant case, the Reserve Bank of India has dealt with the matter by its communication dated December 28, 1974, appearing at annexure G page 79 of the writ application and whereby as per advice, the present writ petitioner repatriated the amount. Hence, the cause of action of such non-repatriation starts from the date of receipt of such letter as issued by the Reserve Bank of India upon exercise of the power under section 10(2) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947.
21. In the event of any violation of the direction of the Reserve Bank of India under section 10(2) of the said Act, then only a penal provision under section 23 of the said Act would be attracted. This point is clear from the interpretation of the statute itself.
22. In section 23 of the said Act, a clear provision has been made that for any violation of the provision made in section 10 of the Act, the penal consequence will follow. Since section 10 of the said Act comprising section 10(1) as well as section 10(2), section 10(1)(a) cannot be taken out separately without looking into the provision of section 10(2) of the Act itself, as the same would result in two situations and/or contingency as are contrary to each other. For arguendo, if it is assumed that section 10(1)(a) is independent to section 10(2) of the said Act, then for violation of such that is delay to repatriate the foreign exchange for any period whatsoever it may be, since, the time for such delay as would attract the provision has not been mentioned, would attract on the one hand, a penal provision under section 23(1)(a) of the said Act, which is to be dealt with by the adjudicating authority under the Act and on the other hand for such violation, the Reserve Bank of India would proceed to deal with the matter under section 10(2) of the said Act by passing necessary directions. So, practically for violation of section 10(1)(a) of the said Act, it would result in two consequences for one cause of action, which is contrary to the settled legal concept. In other way, another situation would crop up namely if section 10(1)(a) of the said Act is considered as an independent provision to attract the penal provisions of section 23 of the said Act, a citizen would face a further penal consequence under the said section 23 not only for failure to comply with section 10(1)(a) of the said Act, but also for violation of section 10(2) of the said Act, when such direction as would be passed by the Reserve Bank of India, would be violated. Hence, for one cause of action of delay in terms of section 10(1)(a) of the said Act, a citizen would be penalized twice, one for violation of section 10(1)(a) of the said Act by an “adjudicating proceeding” under section 23 of the said Act and another for non-compliance with the direction for such delay as would be passed under section 10(2) of the said Act by the Reserve Bank of India, by another proceeding under section 23(1)(a) of the said Act. The same is not permissible, hence, the interpretation would be to avoid such consequences by interpreting that the violation of section 10(1) would be completed, when there will be non-compliance with the direction under section 10(2) of the said Act. Unless and until, the entire process namely decision by the Reserve Bank of India under section 10(2) of the said Act is completed, section 10(1)(a) independently cannot attract penal consequence under section 23(1)(a) of the said Act. It is a settled legal position on interpretation of statutes that a harmonious construction of the statute to be made. In the instant case, when section 23 provides the violation of section 10, it means that a cumulative effect of section 10(1)(a) and section 10(2) of the said Act would lead to penalty procedures under section 23 of the said Act. In the instant case, whatever, the delay caused by the writ petitioners, the same was adjudicated upon and decided by the Reserve Bank of India under section 10(2) of the said Act. It is also a statutory provision empowering the Reserve Bank of India to pass necessary direction for securing the receipt of foreign exchange. Hence, the delay of seven years and more as is the only ground in the impugned memorandum upon taking into account, the date of the order of reassessment by the income-tax authority in the year 1967, as the date of cause of action, is not at all a relevant factor for initiation of any adjudicating proceeding. Since the delay simpliciter under section 10(1)(a) of the said Act cannot attract the penal provisions of section 23(1)(a) of the said Act till a decision under section 10(2) of the said Act is reached directing to take steps namely to repatriate the money or do any other things, the cause of action to attract section 23(1)(a) of the Act would be after the direction was passed under section 10(2) of the said Act.
23. Furthermore, the proceeding under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act before the adjudicating authority is in the nature of quasi-criminal and the criminal jurisprudence is squarely applicable, hence, a strict interpretation of the sections under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, is to be made. Since the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947, and on repeal the subsequent Act Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973, is a penal statute, it is settled law that interpretation of the provisions of such penal statutes must be made strictly and in the event of two meanings on interpretation of any section, the benefit will go to the accused persons and/or person charged with such violation as the case may be by way of interpretation of the section as favourable to them. Hence, considering the matter in that angle also, the other phase of interpretation, namely section 10(1)(a) of the said Act is dependent upon. Section 10(2) of the said Act, to be accepted as it benefits the petitioners. In that view of the matter I am of the view that violation of section 10(1)(a) of the Act that is a delay simpliciter will not attract any penal consequence until under section 10(2) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, such delay is considered as a delay by the Reserve Bank of India and necessary direction so made to secure foreign exchange by repatriation of the amount is violated. Hence, considering the matter in this angle also namely the special norms of interpretation of a penal statute, in the instant case, since, there is a decision under section 10(2) of the said Act by the Reserve Bank of India directing to repatriate the amount irrespective of the delay of seven years as alleged from the date of finality of the reassessment as aforesaid, the time of delay to be construed under section 10 of the said Act to attract the provisions of section 23 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947, being a time from the date when such communication was received by the writ petitioner-bank from the Reserve Bank of India, which in this case was some time before January 3, 1975, and after December 28, 1974. In that view of the matter, the memorandum impugned in this petition and subsequent notice under rule 3 is not legally tenable.
24. Besides such, in the instant case, the writ petitioner had no fault in the matter of remittance of the head office expenses in terms of the prevalent policy as accepted by the income-tax authorities as well as the Reserve Bank of India. The amount was remitted but subsequently when such policy was changed, the repatriation has been completed immediately on direction by the Reserve Bank of India. The very purpose of section 10 of the said Act and adjudication for violation of the said provision by imposing penalty under section 23 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947, a penal consequence to protect the foreign exchange. Since there is a penal consequence, the law has to be construed strictly applying the test of criminal jurisprudence. It is clear from the phraseology of the statute that for violation of section 10 of the said Act on the one hand, penalty can be imposed and on the other hand, criminal liability can be fixed, hence, the entire statute has to be looked into in that angle.
25. Hence, once the Reserve Bank of India has dealt with the matter under section 10(2) of the said Act directing the petitioner to repatriate the money on appreciating the entire issue, namely, that there was no fault on the part of the writ petitioners while remitting the amount to the head office expenses upon permission of the Reserve Bank of India, the cause of action of violation of such would arise upon the cumulative effect of both the sections from the date when such letter was received by the writ petitioner-bank. The writ petitioner on receipt of such letter by his communication dated January 3, 1974, appearing at annexure H of the writ application accordingly took steps.
26. Furthermore, it is settled under the criminal jurisprudence that when a statute prescribed a penal consequence and when there is a scope of statutory enquiry on subjective satisfaction of the matter in question, “mens rea” is also a relevant factor to be looked into. From the fact situation of the case, such “mens rea” is absent, which is a condition precedent to fix any citizen under a criminal liability. The fact clearly leads to the conclusion that as per the accepted decision for repatriation of foreign exchange money on account of head office expenses of the bank, the same was allowed by the Reserve Bank of India, income-tax authorities, etc., and when under the changed situation some portion was disallowed on account of head office expenses by the income-tax authorities, a direction of the Reserve Bank of India to that effect was made to repatriate the amount and repatriation has been done immediately. Hence, there is no “mens rea” to saddle the peti-tioner-bank and its officers with such penal liability under section 23(1)(a) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947, as purportedly intended to by the impugned memorandum of the adjudication proceeding.
27. The writ petitioner-bank sought advice to its head office situated at London, and as soon as it got the telex massage immediately on January 21, 1975, it repatriated the same by debiting the amounts in the Calcutta Branch under head office expenses. By the impugned memorandum the said fact is not disputed about repatriation. In the impugned memo, delay has been counted from the year 1967 when the assessment by the income-tax authorities under reassessment rule reached its finality after completion of the appeal from the original decision. This is clearly a wrong conception of interpretation of section 10 of the said Act. In that view of the matter since the cause of action under section 10 of the said Act in pursuance of the direction under section 10(2) of the said Act of the Reserve Bank of India started when direction was issued to repatriate the foreign exchange by the Reserve Bank of India by letter dated December 28, 1974, as received by the bank authorities some time before January 3, 1975, in my view there is no delay to attract the penal consequence under section 23 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947. In that view of the matter, the show-cause notice in the nature of the memorandum impugned and the initiation of the proceeding on that basis taking into account the delay of seven years or more, is not legally sustainable and accordingly the impugned notice in the form of the memorandum dated June 11, 1981, being annexure A(1) and the impugned order dated June 22, 1984, being annexure C under rule 3(1) of the Adjudicating Proceeding and Appeal Rules, 1974, are hereby set aside and quashed. Hence, the writ application is allowed.
28. The learned advocate on behalf of the Reserve Bank of India prays for stay of the judgment. Heard and prayer is refused.
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