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Fort William Industries Limited v. Usha Beltron Limited
Factual and Procedural Background
Usha Beltron Limited (the petitioning creditor) filed a petition for winding up Fort William Industries Ltd. (the company) under the Companies Act, 1956. The petitioning creditor alleged outstanding dues from the company amounting to Rs. 1,90,38,971.65 (inclusive of principal and interest up to a Debit Note dated 29.08.2000), based on sales of wire rods under various orders and agreed prices.
The winding up petition (Company Petition No. 516 of 2000) was instituted in November 2000. Directions for filing affidavits were given on or about 13 November 2000, but the company delayed filing affidavits despite extensions. In February 2001 the company filed Company Application (C.A.) 78 of 2001 seeking dismissal and/or stay of the winding up petition on the ground that proceedings before the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR) under the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 (SICA) precluded the winding up.
The company asserted that it had been declared a sick industrial company by the BIFR (case No. 107 of 1987; declaration dated 18 November 1987), that a revival scheme (and a later modified scheme) had been prepared and sanctioned by the BIFR, and that subsequent modifications had been sought. The petitioning creditor contended that its claim was not included in the original or modified BIFR schemes and that C.A. 78 of 2001 was filed and used solely to delay the winding up proceedings.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the present winding up petition can proceed or should be stayed because of the pendency of proceedings before the BIFR under SICA.
- Whether section 22 of SICA bars the winding up proceedings in respect of the petitioning creditor's dues when those dues are not included in the scheme sanctioned by the BIFR.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioning Creditor's Arguments (Mr. Mukherjee)
- The company used dilatory tactics in filing affidavits and in obtaining repeated adjournments; C.A. 78 of 2001 was filed to delay the winding up petition.
- The petitioning creditor's claim is not covered by the original or modified BIFR schemes; supplementary affidavit (Form A material) filed by the company does not list Usha Beltron among sundry creditors or in the column for suits/winding up petitions.
- Relying on Deputy Commercial Tax Officer v. Korromandal Pharmaceuticals (AIR 1997 SC 2027), the bar under section 22 of SICA applies only to dues included in the sanctioned scheme; proceedings in respect of other dues are not barred.
- Supported by case law (Korromondal, Sirmor Sudburg, Vibgyar Ink Chem, Pranami Press, Taulis Pharma) that where claims are outside the sanctioned scheme, section 22 does not preclude recovery or winding up action.
Company's Arguments
- The pendency of proceedings before the BIFR and the existence of a (original/modified/ongoing) scheme mean the winding up petition cannot proceed; BIFR proceedings take precedence under SICA.
- Counsel contended Korromondal should be confined to its facts (sales tax collected as public money/trustee situation) and not applied generally; section 22's broad language aims to prevent impediment to scheme implementation irrespective of whether debts are pre- or post-scheme.
- Argued that allowing winding up could frustrate the scheme, and that a pending modification/new scheme before BIFR (citing explanation to section 16(3) of SICA) keeps the matter within BIFR jurisdiction.
- Relied on Tata Davy Ltd. v. State of Orissa (AIR 1998 SC 2928), and on Supreme Court authorities Real Value (AIR 1998 SC 2064) and Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Gurnam Kaur (1989 (1) SCC 101), to support narrower application of Korromondal or to emphasize careful scrutiny of section 22.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Deputy Commercial Tax Officer v. Korromandal Pharmaceuticals, AIR 1997 SC 2027 | Held that the bar under section 22 of SICA applies only to liabilities that are reckoned or included in the sanctioned scheme; the bar is to prevent impediment to implementation of the scheme, not to suspend all proceedings irrespective of inclusion in the scheme. | The Court treated Korromondal as the controlling authority on the scope of section 22 and followed its ratio. The Court dismissed C.A. 78 of 2001 relying on this principle because the petitioning creditor's dues were not included in the sanctioned scheme. |
| Sirmor Sudburg Auto Ltd v. Kuldip Singh Lamba, 91 Company Cases 727 | Held that mere pendency of proceedings before BIFR is not sufficient to attract section 22; the dues must be included in the sanctioned scheme to attract the bar. | The petitioner relied on this decision to support the proposition that pendency at BIFR does not automatically stay winding up proceedings when the creditor's claim is not covered. The Court treated this case as supportive of Korromondal's principle. |
| Vibgyar Ink Chem (Pvt.) Ltd v. Safe Pack Polymers Ltd, AIR 1999 Andhra Pradesh 45 | Where the scheme framed by the Board has no reference to a creditor's claim, that claim is an independent transaction outside the scheme and not within the ambit of section 22(1). | The Court cited this decision as reinforcing the position that claims not considered by BIFR and not included in the scheme are not protected by section 22; the petitioner relied upon this case. |
| Pranami Press v. Vinedale Distilleries Ltd., 1998 (1) Company Law Journal 276 | Held that if a sick company incurs debts subsequent to the scheme framed by BIFR, no permission of BIFR is required to take action for recovery of such debts. | The decision was cited in support of the petitioner’s argument that post‑scheme debts are outside the ban under section 22; the Court treated it as consistent with Korromondal. |
| Taulis Pharma Ltd. v. Bengal Immunity Ltd. (Division Bench, unreported) | Explained and followed the ratio in Korromondal, expressly rejecting the contention that Korromondal be confined only to sales tax or State revenue collected by a company as trustee. | The Court regarded this Division Bench decision of the same High Court as binding and persuasive; it relied on Taulis Pharma to refuse to accept the company's attempt to limit Korromondal. That ruling influenced the dismissal of C.A. 78 of 2001. |
| Tata Davy Limited v. State of Orissa, AIR 1998 SC 2928 | Held (on its facts) that arrears of sales tax prior to sanction of the scheme could not be recovered from the company without the consent of the Board. | The company relied on Tata Davy; the Court distinguished Tata Davy on its facts (there the arrears related to years prior to sanction). The Court found Tata Davy factually different and did not apply it to favor the company. |
| Real Value (AIR 1998 SC 2064) and Municipal Corporation Of Delhi v. Gurnam Kaur, 1989 (1) SCC 101 | Real Value: relied on by company counsel as supporting the position regarding pending schemes; Gurnam Kaur: cited for propositions about non‑ratio observations and the doctrine of subsilentio. | Both were cited by the company's counsel to challenge the broad application of Korromondal. The Court noted these authorities were relied upon but ultimately followed the binding Supreme Court ratio in Korromondal as explained by the Division Bench in Taulis Pharma. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded by first setting out the factual matrix: the petition for winding up, the admitted amount claimed by the petitioning creditor, the company's delay in filing affidavits and the filing of C.A. 78 of 2001 seeking dismissal/stay based on pendency before the BIFR and the existence of a BIFR‑sanctioned (and modified) scheme.
The Court examined documentary material filed by the company (a supplementary affidavit containing parts of Form A as required under SICA regulations). That material showed that the petitioning creditor's name (Usha Beltron) did not appear in the lists of sundry creditors and that earlier winding up petitions or suits were listed in other instances but not with respect to Usha Beltron. From these facts the Court accepted the petitioning creditor's factual proposition that its claim was not included within the original or modified scheme.
On the legal question, the Court considered the competing authorities. The petitioning creditor's primary legal submission was that Korromondal establishes that section 22's bar operates only in respect of dues included in the sanctioned scheme and not in respect of other creditors' claims. The Court treated Korromondal as establishing the underlying principle and noted that several High Court decisions (Sirmor Sudburg, Vibgyar Ink Chem, Pranami Press and Taulis Pharma) followed or applied the same principle to similar facts.
The company's counsel attempted to distinguish Korromondal on the ground that it concerned sales tax (a public trust/revenue) and argued for a broader application of section 22 to avoid frustrating a sanctioned or pending scheme. The company also relied on Tata Davy and other authorities to support its narrower reading of Korromondal and a broader protective scope for section 22.
The Court rejected the company's attempt to confine Korromondal to its facts. It relied on the Division Bench (Taulis Pharma) of the same High Court, which had expressly refused to limit Korromondal to sales tax situations. The Court found Tata Davy distinguishable on its facts because Tata Davy concerned arrears that were prior to sanctioning of the scheme, whereas in the present case the petitioning creditor's dues related to a period much after sanction of the scheme and were admittedly not included within the scheme.
On this basis, applying the principle that section 22's embargo protects only those liabilities included in the sanctioned scheme (and exists to prevent impediment to implementation of that scheme), the Court concluded that no bar existed to the winding up petition in respect of the petitioning creditor's claim which was outside the scheme.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Court dismissed Company Application 78 of 2001. The winding up petition may proceed; the company petition (to which affidavit has already been filed) was directed to be posted before the appropriate Bench on 3 December 2001. There was no order as to costs. The order concludes with a direction to the department to issue a xerox certified copy of the judgment if applied for.
Implications:
- Direct effect: The immediate effect of the decision is to permit the winding up petition filed by Usha Beltron Limited to continue because the creditor's claims are not included in the BIFR‑sanctioned scheme; the company application to stay/dismiss the winding up is dismissed.
- On precedent and wider law: The Court followed the Supreme Court ratio in Korromondal Pharmaceuticals and the Division Bench explanation in Taulis Pharma, applying the principle that section 22 of SICA bars execution or similar proceedings only insofar as liabilities are included within a sanctioned scheme. The opinion does not purport to create a new precedent but affirms the application of existing authorities to the facts at hand.
Order: "Application dismissed." (As recorded in the judgment.)
A.K Ganguly, J.:— A petition for winding up was filed by Usha Beltron Limited, a company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956 for winding up of Fort William Industries Ltd. hereinafter called the said company.
2. In the said winding up petition, the petitioning creditor has alleged that its outstanding dues from the said company are to the extent of Rs. 1,90,38,971.65p. The said amount is inclusive of the principal and the claim for payment of interest upto Debit Note dated 29.08.2000 The case of the petitioning creditor is that on the basis of diverse orders placed by the said company, the petitioning creditor from time to time sold the high/low carbon wire rods of diverse specifications at rates and prices agreed upon.
3. The above winding up proceeding was instituted in the Hon'ble Court by the petitioning creditor in the month of November 2000.
4. On or about 13th November 2000 directions were given by the learned judge on that winding up petition for filing of affidavits. But affidavits were not filed by the said company initially and then despite extension of time. In the month of February, 2001 the company filed an application numbered as C.A 78 of 2001 in which the company prayed for dismissal and/or the stay of the company petition No. 516 of 2000 in view of the provisions of Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provision), Act, 1985 (hereinafter called SICA).
5. The grievance of the petitioning creditor is that the said petition namely C.A 78 of 2001 was filed by the said company only for the purpose of delaying the hearing of the winding up proceeding and they have made a further grievance of the fact that even though the said application being C.A 78 of 2001 was filed, the same was not moved and repeated adjournments were obtained.
6. It is obviously clear from the facts stated above that in the instant case, the company had taken dilatory tactics in the matter of filing affidavits to the winding up petition.
However, the Court heard the C.A 78 of 2001 in which the said company has taken the stand that in view of the pendency of the proceedings before the BIFR the instant winding up petition cannot proceed. In C.A 78 of 2001 it has been stated by the said company that a reference was made of the case of the company in accordance with the provisions of SICA to the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (hereinafter referred to as the BIFR) for taking of ameliorative steps for the revival of the said company. It is the case of the company that such reference was registered as case No. 107 of 1987 before the BIFR and it has been further stated that by an order dated 18th November, 1987, the BIFR declared the said company to be a sick industrial company within the meaning of section 3(1) clause (o) of SICA.
7. It has also been stated that a substantial revival scheme of the said company was also prepared but the same could not be implemented in view of the inordinate time taken by State Bank of India to release the requisite fund. There has been subsequently a division in the family of Bangur who are the promoters of the said company. It has also been stated that on 13th November 1991 in a meeting held by the BIFR, for the purpose of reviewing the implementation of the scheme, the BIFR, after hearing the submission of the concerned parties, were placed to direct the amendment of the scheme. Subsequently, in a meeting convened by the BIFR on 5th January 1995 a modified scheme of revival of the applicant company based on one time settlement was drawn up and sanctioned by BIFR.
8. It also appears that in respect of certain orders passed by BIFR, the said company filed writ petition before this Hon'ble Court.
9. However one thing appears clear that the claim of the petitioning creditor is not covered either under the original or the modified scheme. It has also been admitted that on 25.02.2000 application was made by the company for further modification of the scheme. Even that scheme does not cover the claim of the petitioning creditor. The question, in the background of these facts, is whether the present winding up petition can proceed or should be stayed?
10. Mr. Mukherjee, the learned counsel for the petitioning creditor has submitted that the Company Application 78 of 2001 is wholly misconceived and should be dismissed. The learned counsel submitted that the admitted position factually is that the claim of the petitioning creditor in the winding up petition is outside the purview of the original scheme as well as the modified scheme for the alleged revival of the company. The learned counsel further submitted that even from the supplementary affidavit which has been filed in this case it does not appear that the dues of the petitioning creditor are included in the said scheme. The learned counsel has invited the attention of the Court to the said supplementary affidavit affirmed on behalf of the said company on 12th September 2001, pursuant to the leave of this Court. The learned counsel has drawn the attention of this Court to page 13 of the said supplementary affidavit. The said document is nothing but part of form-A which is statutory form mentioned in Regulation 19, framed under SICA. Under the said form, the company, which is being declared sick, is to furnish information to the BIFR. From the said form, it appears that there is column 11 in that form where the company has to declare whether any legal action has already been initiated by any creditor. It has also been mentioned that if any such action is initiated the copy of all suits or winding up petitions and Court Orders should be furnished. Against the said column the said company has already mentioned the winding up petition filed against the said company by Usha Martin Industries Limited and Tata Iron & Steel Company Ltd. Attention of the Court was also drawn to page 19 where there is column 26 which shows the names of sundry creditors. The name of Usha Beltron, the petitioning creditor is not there. Again from page 36 of the said affidavit it appears that against the column of sundry creditors, the documents which were filed by the said company did not contain the name of Usha Beltron, petitioning creditor.
11. Therefore, according to the petitioner the claims in the present winding up petition are nowhere included within the revival scheme allegedly prepared by BIFR.
12. After making those factual submissions, the learned counsel referred to a decision in the case of Deputy Commercial Tax Officer v. Korromandal Pharmaceuticals, reported in AIR 1997 SC 2027.
13. The learned counsel relying on the said decision submitted that the bar contemplated under section 22 will apply only to such dues which are reckoned or included within the sanctioned scheme for rehabilitation and the learned counsel submitted that the proceedings are not bared in respect of other dues. The facts in Karramondal Pharmaceuticals are that the company, Karromondal, is an assessee to sales tax under the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1957. It was assessed for the assessment years 1992–93 by order dated 3.1.1994 and for the year 1993–94 by order passed in 1995. The Sales Tax authorities initiated action under section 17 of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act for recovery of the said dues. Then appeals were preferred from the assessment orders and the appellate authority granted a conditional order of stay to pay the tax assessed in installments. Even then, there was default. For the aforesaid two years, the arrears of sales tax dues from the petitioner-company are stated to be Rs. 9,53,833. The assessment orders for the said years were passed on 3.1.1994 and in 1995 and long before that the scheme was sanctioned by the BIFR on 19.11.1990
14. On those facts, the learned judges held in para 7 that even though the scheme for rehabilitation of the company is under implementation, it cannot be disputed that the arrears of sales tax relate to the period which is much after the period when the sanction was sanctioned and it was submitted on behalf of the revenue that the legal bar under section 22 of the SICA could only be in respect of sales tax dues included in the scheme. The learned judges hearing the rival contentions of the parties in Karramondal (supra) in para 10 of the judgment gave the finding that the plea put forward by the revenue is reasonable and should be accepted. The learned judges further held in para 10 as follows :
“Under the statute, the BIFR is to consider in what way various preventive or remedial measures should be afforded to a sick industrial company. In that behalf, BIFR is enabled to frame an appropriate scheme. To enable the BIFR to do so, certain preliminaries are required to be followed. It starts with the preference to be made by the Board of Directors of the sick company. The BIFR is directed to make appropriate inquiry as provided in sections 16 and 17 of the Act. At the conclusion of the inquiry, after notice and opportunity afforded to various persons including the creditors, the BIFR is to prepare a scheme which shall come into force on such date as it may specify in that behalf.”
15. The learned judges further explained the rational behind section 22 as follows in para 10 of the judgment and which I quote below :
“Any steps for execution, distress or the like against the properties of the industrial company or other similar steps should not be pursued which will cause delay or impediment in the implementation of the sanctioned scheme. In order to safeguard such state of affairs, an embargo or bar is placed under section 22 of the Act against any step for execution, distress or the like or other similar proceedings against the company without the consent of the Board or, as the case may be, the appellate authority. The language of section 22 of the Act is certainly wide. But, in the totality of the circumstances, the safeguard is only against the impediment that is likely to be caused in the implementation of the scheme. If that be so, only the liability or amounts covered by the scheme will be taken, in by section 22 of the Act. So we are of the view that though the language of section 22 of the Act is of wide important regarding suspension of legal proceedings from the moment an inquiry is started, till after the implementation of the scheme or the disposal of an appeal under section 25 of the Act, it will be reasonable to hold that the bar or embargo envisaged in section 22(1) of the Act can apply only to such of those dues reckoned or included in the sanctioned scheme.”
[Emphasis added]
16. The learned counsel very strongly relied on the said principles which were laid down by the Apex Court after considering the case law on the point.
17. The learned counsel next relied on a judgment of Delhi High Court in the case of Sirmor Sudburg Auto Ltd v. Kuldip Singh Lamba., reported in 91 Company Cases 727. The learned counsel relied on page 733 of the said report in order to contend that the mere pendency or initiation of proceeding before BIFR is not sufficient to attract the bar of section 22 of SICA. It appears that the learned judge delivering the judgment in Sirmor Sudburg (supra) relied on Korrommondal Pharmaceutical (supra) and held that mere pendency of an enquiry under section 22 of the SICA would not suffice to stay the proceeding unless the dues in respect of which proceedings are initiated are included in the sanctioned scheme. The learned counsel very much relied on the observation made by the learned judge that section 22(1) is not attracted in respect of the dues incurred after the sanctioning of the scheme. Relying on those observations in Sirmor Sudburg (supra) the learned counsel urged that in the instant case admittedly the dues of the petitioning creditor are not included in the sanctioned scheme and therefore, this winding up proceeding should go on.
18. The learned counsel also relied on a decision of the Division Bench judgment of Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Vibgyar Ink Chem (Pvt.) Limited v. Safe Pack Polymers Limited, reported in AIR 1999 Andhra Pradesh 45. In that case also the Court was considering the question of suspension of legal proceedings in view of the provision of section 22 of SICA. The Division Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court relying on the decision of the Apex Court in Korromondol Pharmaceuticals (supra) held when the scheme was being considered without reference to the claim of the petitioner, in that case, it will attract the ban under section 22(1) of SICA. The learned judges of the Division Bench summarized their observations in para 10 as follows :
“The Board has not been able to consider these claims. Obviously the scheme as framed also has no reference to the claim of the petitioner, a creditor. Does that mean and imply the petitioner-creditor shall have to wait until after the fullest implementation of the scheme, in terms of the scheme, as sanctioned by the Board? It is an independent transaction de hors the scheme and obviously cannot thus be covered within the ambit of section 22 of the 1985 Act.”
19. The learned counsel also relied on a judgment in the case of Pranami Press v. Vinedale Distilleries Ltd., reported in 1998(1) Company Law Journal 276. In that case also the question of suspension of winding up proceedings in view of section 22 of SICA came up for consideration. The learned judges considered the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Korromondol Pharmaceuticals (supra) and held that since the sick company incurs debt subsequent to the scheme framed by BIFR for rehabilitation, no permission is required from BIFR for taking action against the company for recovery of the debts.
20. Lastly the learned counsel also relied on a Division Bench judgment of this High Court in the case of Taulis Pharma Ltd. v. Bengal Immunity Ltd.. The said decision also deals with the question of maintainability of the winding up petition in the context of the bar of section 22 of the SICA. It appears that the learned judges of the Division Bench in Taulis Pharma Limited considered the principles in Korromondol (supra) and also the decision of the Delhi High Court in Sirmor Sudburg and the Andhra Pradesh Division Bench judgment in Pranami Press (supra) and also the Division Bench Judgment of Andhra Pradesh High Court in Vibgyar Ink Chem (Pvt.) Limited.
21. The learned judges of the Division Bench observed that the ratio in Korromondol (supra) is clearly to the effect that the bar envisaged under section 22 of SICA covers the state of affairs up to the date of the presentation of the scheme and the learned judges expressly rejected the argument on behalf of the company that the ratio in the case of Korromondol (supra) is confined only to sales tax dues of the state.
22. The learned counsel appearing for the company has however, tried to distinguish the decision in Korromondol by saying that the ratio in the case of Korromondol must be read in the context of sales tax collection by the company. The learned counsel submitted that the sales tax collected by the company does not belong to the company. The company merely collect it as a trustee and it is public money. So the money is not and cannot be included in the scheme. The learned counsel further submitted that on proper reading of section 22 of SICA, it is clear that the status of the sick company is not dependant on whether its debts are post-scheme or pre-scheme. What is relevant is there should be no impediment in the implementation of the scheme for the revival of the sick company.
23. The learned counsel further submitted that if in the course of implementation of the scheme the company is wound up then nothing remains for implementation and the scheme is bound to be frustrated. Therefore, the learned counsel invited the Court to read the judgment Korromondol in its proper perspective and wanted the Court to consider the judgment of B.P Jeevan Reddy. Justice B.P Jeevan Reddy, according to the learned counsel, in a concurring judgment has made it clear that section 22 calls for a close scrutiny in order to prevent unfair advantage being taken by certain industrial companies of the wide language used in section 22 of SICA. The learned counsel submitted that the anxiety of the learned judges was to see that dishonesty and unfair practices do not flourish at the cost of public money. In other words, the learned counsel submitted that in the facts of this case, after the winding up proceeding is stayed collection of public revenue will not in any way suffer. But if on the other hand, the winding up proceeding is not stayed, the company is allowed to be wound up and that will be the biggest impediment in the implementation of the scheme. The learned counsel further submitted that the new scheme which has been filed by the petitioning creditor before the BIFR is at the scrutinizing stage and not yet has been finalized. Therefore, in accordance with the explanation to section 16(3) of SICA, this is a pending scheme. The learned counsel also relied on the judgment of Supreme Court in that case of Real Value, reported in AIR 1998 SC 2064. The learned counsel also relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Municipal Corporation Of Delhi v. Gurnam Kaur ., reported in 1989 (1) SCC 101. The learned counsel relied on para 7 of the judgment in Gurnam Kaur for the purpose of contending that pronouncement of law which are not part of the ratio are not authoritative and he also relied on the doctrine of subsilentio as explained in the said judgment by the learned judges in para 11. The learned counsel submitted that the pronouncement of law in Karramondol (supra) must be appreciated in the context of the points which were argued in that case and not on the basis of certain observations made in the said judgment. Therefore, the learned counsel said that the said judgment must operate only against the dues of the revenue which were collected by Karramondol, the company and in respect of which proceedings have been taken. The bar under section 22 of SICA will not be attracted in a case like the present one where public revenue is not involved.
24. This Court finds that there may be some substance in the argument of the learned counsel for the company but it is difficult for this Court to uphold he said submissions in view of the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Korromondol (supra) which has been followed and explained in the unreported Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Taulis Pharma. From the said unreported Division Bench judgment of this Court which is binding on me, it is clear that the learned judges of the Division Bench expressly negatived a similar contention raised on behalf of the company in that case. Those observations made by the learned judges are quoted below :
“We cannot accept the contention of Mr. Bhattacharjee to the effect that the ratio of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Korromandal Pharmaceuticals (supra) must be confined only to the sales tax or State revenue collected by the company from third parties in respect whereof it acts as a trustee.”
25. In order to counteract that position, the learned counsel for the company relied on the subsequent decision of Supreme Court in Tata Davy Limited v. State of Orissa, reported in AIR 1998 SC 2928. The learned counsel submitted that in Tata Davy it has been made clear that the arrears of sales tax cannot be recovered from the company without first seeking the consent of the Board in this behalf. But this Court finds that there are the factual differences in Tata Davy. In Tata Davy arrears of sales tax were in respect of assessment years of 1983–84 and 1984–85 and the company was declared sick on 9th February 1988 within the meaning of SICA and thereafter a reference was made and a scheme was sanctioned by the Board. In the context of those facts, the learned judges held in Tata Davy that the State Government cannot recover from the appellant company arrears of revenue, which were obviously in respect of the assessment years of 1983–84 and 1984–85 and were prior to the date of sanctioning of the scheme, without the sanction of the board. But in the instant case, the position is totally different. Here admittedly the dues of the petitioning creditor relate to a period, which is much after the sanctioning of the scheme. The said dues are not admittedly included within the scheme.
26. In that view, of the matter this Court following the ratio in Korromondol as explained by the Division Bench in Taulis Pharma Limited is of the view that no order can be passed in favour of the company on the Company Application 78 of 2001 and the said application is dismissed. The company petition to which affidavit has already been filed by the company may now to be posted before the appropriate Bench on 3rd of December, 2001. The Company Application 78 of 2001 is thus dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
Department is directed to issue xerox certified copy of this judgment and order expeditiously, if applied for.
Application dismissed
S.B
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