- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Saraswat Trading Agency v. Union Of India .
Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal arises from a judgment dated 4th February 2000, which allowed the Union of India's application concerning an arbitral award dated 25th August 1993 passed by H.K. Padhee, a former Railway employee. The award favored the appellant and included three monetary items totaling approximately Rs. 27.73 lakh: two sums relating to revision of casual labour wages for specified periods and interest at 18% per annum.
Following the award, railway officers perceived the award amount as excessive and attempted to negotiate a settlement with the appellant. Initial negotiations on 4th October 1993 saw the appellant unwilling to reduce claims except for a 2% rebate if full payment was made by 26th October 1993. However, by 6th October 1993, an agreement was reached whereby the respondent would pay Rs. 17,07,973/- (with Rs. 1,87,905/- already paid), to be paid by 14th October 1993, in full and final settlement of the award, relinquishing other claims.
The respondent failed to pay the agreed sum within the stipulated time but instead issued a cheque for Rs. 16,56,734/- on 13th October 1993, which was encashed by the appellant. The appellant objected to deductions made for income tax and cess, which were not part of the award or agreement. The award was filed in court in 1993 but remained inactive until 1996 when notice was issued to the respondent under Section 14(2).
The Union of India sought to set aside the award on the basis of compromise and payment in terms of the settlement. The lower court found that the award was satisfied by accord and satisfaction and modified the award to the extent of the settlement. The appellant contested this, alleging coercion and unequal bargaining power, and argued the absence of a specific provision under the Arbitration Act, 1940, for compromise prior to setting aside an award.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the compromise agreement dated 6th October 1993 constituted a valid accord and satisfaction discharging the arbitral award.
- Whether the payment of a lesser sum (Rs. 16,56,734/-) than the agreed amount (Rs. 17,07,973/-) constituted full satisfaction of the award.
- Whether the absence of express provisions in the Arbitration Act, 1940, precludes the parties from compromising an arbitral award before it is set aside by the court.
- Whether the appellant was coerced into the settlement due to unequal bargaining power.
- The legal effect of time stipulation in performance of the compromise agreement and the possibility of extension of time by the court.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The appellant alleged coercion and unequal bargaining power, contending that the settlement was forced upon them.
- They argued that under the Arbitration Act, 1940, no specific provision allowed for compromise before setting aside an award, thus the award should have been pronounced and decreed notwithstanding the settlement.
- The appellant challenged the deductions made by the respondent for income tax and cess, which were not contemplated in the award or the settlement.
Respondent's Arguments
- The respondent contended that the award was satisfied by accord and satisfaction through the compromise agreement dated 6th October 1993.
- They relied on the minutes of the meeting and payment made as evidence of settlement.
- They argued that the law of accord and satisfaction under Indian Contract Act, 1872, supports accepting a lesser sum in full discharge of a larger debt.
- They cited the Supreme Court decision in Prince of Berar and other precedents to support the validity of the compromise.
- Respondent also contended that the court has jurisdiction to extend time for payment as per the case of Smt. Periyakkal.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Central Inland Water Transport (1986) 3 SCC 156; AIR 1986 SC 1571 | Unequal bargaining power and coercion in settlements. | The court was not persuaded by the appellant's coercion argument despite reliance on this case. |
| Prafulla Chandra AIR 1946 Cal 427 | Validity of compromise agreements in arbitration context. | Used to argue that compromise is possible though no express provision in Arbitration Act, 1940. |
| Munshi Ram AIR 1962 SC 903 | Judicial recognition of compromise agreements in arbitration. | Supported the view that courts give due weight to solemn agreements between parties. |
| D & C Builders v. Rees (1965) 3 All ER 837 | English law on accord and satisfaction, especially regarding lesser sums. | Distinguished English law from Indian law, noting Indian law allows acceptance of lesser sum. |
| Prince of Berar AIR 1963 SC 250 | Indian law on accord and satisfaction codified in Section 63 Indian Contract Act. | Held accord and satisfaction is a question of fact; acceptance of lesser sum can discharge larger debt. |
| Day v. McLea (1889) 22 QBD 610 | Mere encashment of cheque for lesser sum not conclusive proof of accord and satisfaction. | Applied to caution that mere payment and acceptance does not discharge full debt without accord. |
| Smt. Periyakkal AIR 1983 SC 428 | Court's jurisdiction to extend time for performance of contractual obligations. | Discussed in context of whether time for payment in accord and satisfaction could be extended. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court analyzed the validity of the alleged accord and satisfaction arising from the compromise agreement dated 6th October 1993. It acknowledged the principle under Indian law, codified in Section 63 of the Indian Contract Act, that a promisee may accept a lesser sum in full satisfaction of a larger debt.
However, the court emphasized that mere acceptance or encashment of a cheque for a lesser sum is insufficient to establish accord and satisfaction without clear agreement that the lesser sum discharges the entire debt, as supported by precedents such as Day v. McLea.
On the facts, the court found that the parties agreed to a payment of Rs. 17,07,973/- by 14th October 1993 in full settlement, but the respondent paid only Rs. 16,56,734/-, deducting income tax and cess, which were not part of the agreement or award. The court held that this shortfall, though relatively small, was material and the time for payment had expired, precluding any extension.
The court rejected the appellant's argument of coercion, noting the appellant had the option to refuse the settlement and litigate. It also dismissed the appellant's contention regarding the absence of provisions under the Arbitration Act, 1940, for compromise before setting aside an award, stating that courts can evolve procedures to give effect to such agreements.
Further, the court applied principles from Sections 47 and 54 of the Indian Contract Act to emphasize that strict performance of the promisor's obligation is required in accord and satisfaction agreements involving time-bound payments, and failure to perform precludes claiming reciprocal performance.
Consequently, the court held that the payment made was not in accordance with the accord and satisfaction, and thus the award remained enforceable in full except for the sum already paid.
Holding and Implications
The court's final decision was to ALLOW THE APPEAL, set aside the judgment and order of the lower court, and dismiss the Union of India's application to set aside the arbitral award on the basis of the alleged compromise.
The direct effect is that the arbitral award dated 25th August 1993 remains enforceable except for the amount of Rs. 16,56,734/- already paid by the respondent. Interest at 12% per annum is to be calculated on the balance amount from the date of judgment. The appellant is entitled to proceed to obtain a decree upon the award and enforce it according to law.
No broader precedent was established beyond affirming the necessity of strict adherence to agreed terms in accord and satisfaction and the invalidity of partial payments without full accord.
1. This is an appeal from a judgment and order dated the 4th of February, 2000 whereby the application of the Union of India was allowed in respect of an award passed by one H.K Padhee, an erstwhile Railway employee, the award being dated 25th of August, 1993. The award went in favour of the appellant before us and three items were awarded, of the respective amounts of approximately Rs. 3.13 lakh, 18.96 lakh and 5.64 lakh. The first two amounts were by way of revision of casual labour for the respective periods of February, 1987 to April, 1988 and May, 1988 to January, 1989. The third item was on the head of interest @ 18% per annum.
2. The records show that the feeling amongst the railway officers was that the ward was on the upward side. They sought to negotiate with the appellant, so as to persuade them to accept a lesser sum in satisfaction.
3. The minutes of 4-10-1993 show that the appellant was not agreeable to give up any of the claims under the award, except that they would allow a 2% rebate if the full payments were to be by 26-10-1993.
4. Then something happened in the course of 48 hours, which made the appellant take a radically different stand. Even on 5-10-1993 the appellant had written a letter objecting to giving up its claims.
5. The minutes of 6-10-1993 are relied upon heavily by the respondent before us. The basics of the agreement reached in this meeting are as follows:—
(i) As against the second item of the award, the respondent would pay Rs. 17,07,973/-, the appellant having already received Rs. 1,87,905/-.
(ii) The appellant would be paid latest by 14-10-1993.
(iii) The appellant agreed to accept the said sum of Rs. 17,07,973/- in full and final settlement, giving up other claims under the first and the third items of the award.
6. A pay order for the said sum of Rs. 17,07,973/- was prepared in the Department but it was not handed over to the appellant within the said time.
7. Instead, a cheque for Rs. 16,56,734/- drawn on the Reserve Bank of India was given to the appellant on 13-10-1993. It was encashed.
8. The receipt granted by the appellant was in the following terms:—
“RECEIVED from South Eastern Railway vide cheque No. 055237 dated 13-10-1993 on the Reserve Bank of India, Calcutta, for Rs. 16,56,734/- against item 1(II) of the Award dated 25-8-1993 published by the Sole Arbitrator Shri H.K Padhee CFIM-II/GRC in connection with Goods and parcels handing work at it wards and group of Stations continued up to 2-8-1991”
9. The respondent explained that certain deductions were made by them from the agreed sum of Rs. 17,00,000/- and odd and those are Rs. 34,159/- on account of income tax and Rs. 17,080/- on account of cess. The latter sum has sometimes been described as conservancy charges.
10. The award was filed in Court sometime in the year 1993 but it gathered dust for long three years in the Departments of our Court until sometime in or about 1996, notice under S. 14(2) issued to the respondent.
11. The application made by them in the Court below contained amongst others the following prayers:—
“(b) Award dated 25th August, 1993 of the Arbitrator, Mr. H.K Padhee be set aside;
“(c) The Award dated 25th August, 1993 of the Arbitrator, Mr. H.K Padhee be declared to be invalid and/or not existent by reason of compromise/settlement between the parties dated 6th October, 1993 and payment by the petitioner in terms thereof.”
12. In the judgment under appeal a finding has been reached that the award has been satisfied by accord and satisfaction between the parties. It has also been opined in the Court below that the award will stand modified to the extent of settlement made by the parties.
13. The matter was tried on evidence in the Court below. Evidence from the box was, however, given only by the appellant. It is clear from the documents and the oral evidence that, in the year 1993, the appellant had a still operative handling contract with the railways. This had started sometimes in the late 80's and was continued on an annual extension basis. According to the appellant this handling contract was terminated by the railways sometime in or about the years 1995-1996. The appellant has run in the Court below a case of coercion. Mr. Das, appearing for the appellant, has relied on the case of Central Inland Water Transport, reported in (1986) 3 SCC 156 : (AIR 1986 SC 1571) and has drawn to our attention to the unequal bargaining powers of the parties. According to him, settlement was forced upon the appellant.
14. We are not impressed by this argument. The appellant is now fighting the respondent in a Court of law. If the appellant did not want to agree to a lesser sum he could easily have refused and fought the respondent, again, in a Court of law, although on different and separate issues.
15. Mr. Das also submitted to us that the agreement, if any, being reached at a stage prior to the making of an application for setting aside of the award, there existed no specific provision in the Arbitration Act, 1940 to enter a compromise of the parties, and thus the award would have to be pronounced upon, and a decree passed, the settlement notwithstanding.
16. Mr. Das relied upon the case of prafulla Chandra reported at AIR 1946 Cal 427 and the case of Munshi Ram reported in AIR 1962 SC 903 and placed before us the respective judgments of Justice Phani Bhusan Chakravartti and Justice Hidayatullah as their Lordships at the respective times were.
17. We are again not impressed by this argument. Anybody who reads carefully the judgments referred to above, cannot fail to see the eagerness felt by the Judges to give due weight to a solemn agreement reached between the parties. So, if the agreement herein is good, then assuming that no express provision exists in the Arbitration Act of 1940, we would have to evolve a procedure, and a good such procedure would be to pass a decree upon the award with the compromise appended to it. It would be somewhat like a probate with terms of compromise annexed.
18. Even if Mr. Das's point succeeded on this technical issue, it would only put off the day of the real argument, and that day would came in execution proceedings, when the decree upon the award would have to be resisted on the alleged compromise.
19. Look at it as one might, it is the validity or otherwise of the compromise which is decisive of the matter.
20. If there was an accord and satisfaction, then, that is an end of the matter and the appeal must fail.
21. The law of accord and satisfaction is that a person entitled to the performance of a promise might accept, instead of the original promise, something different; this different thing is agreed upon by an accord reached between the promisor and the promisee.
22. Thus accord is a name given to a special agreement which has as its foundation another earlier agreement, sometimes however, the foundation is a debt, otherwise arisen then on an agreement.
23. Satisfaction is the performance of the different promise as per the new agreement of accord and its acceptance by the promisee.
24. If for example, a person has promised to deliver a long red pencil, the promisee might agree after the contract, to take a short blue pencil instead, and in that event the delivery of a short blue pencil and its acceptance will be a discharge of both the original contract and the new contract of accord. The process of accord or satisfaction is permitted both in England and in India. There is, however, at least one important difference in the law of the two countries in this regard, and that is this, that in England the accord to take a lesser sum for a larger sum is not valid, but in India it is. This particular difference has, as it is beginning, a famous dictum of Lord Coke made at the time of James I, that a promisee can take a horse or a hawk or a gown instead of the promisee, but not a lesser sum. The proposition has stuck in England and even in the comparatively recent case of D & C Builders v. Rees reported at (1965) 3 All ER 837, this principle can be seen in its operation.
25. In our country, however, we are not concerned with these niceties of the English law of accord and satisfaction, as the Supreme Court pointed out in the case of the Prince of Berar, reported at AIR 1963 SC 250. The law in our country in this regard is to be found mainly codified in S. 63 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872.
26. Clearly the English people thought that the law in their country in this regard was archaic and unsatisfactory. But they could do nothing about it in their own country where the legal system is very conservative. But in India they had a free hand. So, the law was changed by enacting S. 63. The said section and the illustration (b) under it are set out below:—
“S. 63. Promisee may dispense with or remit performance of promise - Every promisee may dispense with or remit, wholly or in part, the performance of the promise made to him, or may extend the time for such performance or may accept instead of it any satisfaction which he thinks fit.
(b) A owes B 5,000 rupees. A pays to B and B accepts, in satisfaction of the whole debt, 2000 rupees paid at the time and place at which the 5,000 rupees were payable. The whole debt is discharged.”
27. The Prince of Berar's case (AIR 1963 SC 250) was cited by Mr. Basu appearing for the respondents. He submitted that in that case the Nizam's eldest son had purchased jewellery worth about Rs. 13,00,000 in 1937. It had not been paid for about 12 years. The principal and interest had mounted to Rs. 27,00,000/- when the military operations in Hyderabad were concluded in 1949. The military Governor persuaded the jeweller to agree to take Rs. 20,00,000/- in full satisfaction. They took the said sum in two instalments. They discharged their promissory note in full. But in granting the receipt they made a reservation that they would be free to proceed against Prince of Berar himself personally.
28. When they so proceeded against the prince personally for the balance they failed before the Division Bench in the Bombay High Court and also before the Supreme Court.
29. The Supreme Court has clarified that accord and satisfaction is basically a question of fact in each case. The Court has to find out whether the lesser sum or the different performance has been accepted by the promisee in full satisfaction or not.
30. Before we give our decision on this main point we wish to make it clear, once for all, that the mere encashment of a cheque for a smaller sum given by the debtor to the creditor is not, standing alone, a sufficient proof of accord and satisfaction. The authority in this regard is the case of Day v. McLea reported at (1889) 22 QBD 610. It has been relied upon D & C Builders (1965 (3) All ER 837) (above) and in the Indian Courts also, including in the Prince of Berar's case (AIR 1963 SC 250). Were it otherwise, and were we to hold otherwise, we would be putting in the hands of all debtors a weapon of legal trickery. As a standard practice every debtor would send to the creditor a lesser sum by way of a cheque with appropriate covering documents taking the chance that the cheque might be encashed. If encashed the debtor can then get away without paying the balance sum. The law cannot permit this. Therefore, mere payment and acceptance of a lesser sum without the accord that it will be in extinction of the balance liability, will not be a full satisfaction of the debt.
31. We are convinced here on the facts of the case that the appellant had agreed to take Rs. 17,07,973/-, if paid within 14-10-1993, as full satisfaction of all claims on the award, the aggregate amount under which was nearly Rs. 26,00,000/-.
32. Thus, the accord between the parties as there, for taking the lesser sum for the larger one. However, when the stage of satisfaction came, i.e the payment of the lesser sum agreed to be taken for the larger one, the respondent fortunately or unfortunately slipped up. They did not pay Rs. 17,07,973/-, but they paid instead the sum of Rs. 16,56,734/-.
33. The cheque for the said sum of Rs. 16,56,734/- was no doubt encashed. But that, as we have said, is not determinative of the matter. The deduction from Rs. 17,00,000/- plus to make it Rs. 16,00,000/- plus (both figures being approximate) was made on account of income tax and cess. There is no talk of income tax and cess in the award. There is no talk of income tax and cess in the minutes of 6-10-1993. These deductions for income tax and cess formed a subject matter of a further grievance of the appellant. The appellant's evidence from the box shows this again and again.
34. Therefore, we find that instead of paying Rs. 17,07,973/- within 14-10-1993 for the purpose of discharging the larger debt under the award of nearly Rs. 26,00,000/-, railways paid instead a sum of Rs. 16,56,734/- for achieving the same result. Was this enough?
35. In deciding this issue, we have to look upon the award as if it had already a crystallized into a debt. A decree had not been passed on the award in October, 1993 but parties looked upon the award as a document giving rise to a liability and requiring its satisfaction. Both the parties thought that if things were allowed to rest where those were, if the railway authorities did not seek to challenge the award by handing over their papers to their legal department, the awarded sum would have to be paid. That is why they negotiated in the above manner indicated.
36. We are of the opinion that the payment of Rs. 16,56,734/- was not the same as the stipulated payment of Rs. 17,07,973/-. Although the time was adhered to i.e the money was paid within 14-10-1993, yet the sum agreed in the accord was not paid. The balance sum of Rs. 50,000/- and odd, although a small amount comparatively speaking, can never be paid now in accordance with the accord because the time for payment has irretrievably gone by.
37. Mr. Basu argued on the authority of the case of Smt. Periyakkal reported at AIR 1983 SC 428 that the Court would have jurisdiction to extend time even now and allow the railways to make the balance payment to the appellant. They would be agreeable to make the balance payment as directed by the Court and if that is done the justice of the case requires that the railways be relieved from the injustice which would otherwise be brought to bear upon them.
38. In the Supreme Court case we find that the time for payment as agreed by the parties was made an order of Court. The judgment of Justice O. Chinappa Reddy, especially the portion appearing in the left column of page 431 clarifies that because the time had become a part of the order of the Court the Court retained jurisdiction to extend such time. Even when laying down this ratio his Lordship (with respect) was careful to add, that the Court cannot rewrite the contract between the parties.
39. The contract between the parties here was that Rs. 17,07,973/- would be paid within 14-10-93 and in that event the award would not be further enforced. Even if we do not look upon this as a strict example of accord and satisfaction, there being no earlier contract or debt in existence, but only an award, even then we reach the same result. Under Section 47 of the Contract Act the time for performance of a promise on a certain day is that day itself; the section is set out below:—
“S. 47. Time and place for performance of promise, where time is specified and no application to be made. When a promise is to be performed on a certain day, and the promisor has undertaken to perform it without application by the promisee, the promisor may perform it at any time during the usual hours of business on such day and at the place at which the promise ought to be performed”.
40. Accordingly when a promise is to be performed within a certain time it has to be performed on any day before the lapse of that time.
41. Again under Section 54 of the Contract Act a promisor who does not perform his part of the promise cannot claim performance of the reciprocal promise:—
S. 54. Effect of default as to that promise which should be first performed, contract consisting of reciprocal promises. When a contract consists of reciprocal promises, such that one of them cannot be performed, or that its performance cannot be claimed till the other has been performed, and the promisor of the promise last mentioned fails to perform it, such promisor cannot claim the performance of the reciprocal promise, and must make compensation to the other party to the contract for any loss which such other party may sustain by the non-performance of the contract.
Illustration (d). A promises B to sell him one hundred bales of merchandise, to be delivered next day, and B promises A to pay for them within a month. A does not deliver according to his promise. B's promise to pay need not be performed, and A must make compensation.
42. Looked at from this angle, the promisor Union of India has not kept of its promise of payment of Rs. 17,07,973/- within 14-10-93 and therefore, cannot insist upon the reciprocal promise of the appellant that he will not insist upon the whole award being made a decree of Court and fully paid.
43. The essence of these matters is that in situations of accord and satisfaction and similar situations, strict performance of the promisor's obligation is insisted upon by the Courts. After all, a sum of Rs. 26,00,000/- was being given up for Rs. 17,00,000/-. The payment of that sum was also to be made within a certain time. This agreement offered the Union a chance to pay a smaller sum, thereby satisfying their entire liability.
44. It was not open to the Union of India to find out another sum, yet smaller, which suited them, and to pay that sum and yet insist upon full discharge of their liability. A contract of accord and satisfaction is not like a mortgage debt, that the Court retains its power to do equity and extend time so that the debtor is not harshly treated. Here the debtor seeks to drive home an advantage against the creditor. The driving home of such an advantage might not amount to legal coercion. Still it creates a situation where the Court will insist upon strict performance or relegate the parties to their original rights and liabilities.
45. In our opinion, in the facts and circumstances of this case the payment of Rs. 16,50,734/- on 13-10-93 had no more effect than extinguishing the liability of the Union of India pro tan to under the Award.
46. The rest of the Award remains enforceable and the appellant cannot be prevented from obtaining a decree upon the Award and proceeding thereupon in accordance with law.
47. The appeal is, therefore, allowed with costs.
48. The judgment and order passed in the Court below is set aside. The application made by the Union of India there is dismissed.
49. There will be a judgment upon the Award of H.R Padhee dated 25th August, 1993. Interest on judgment as from today at the rate of 12% per annum, but only on the balance sum after deducting Rs. 16,50,734/-.
50. Stay of operation of this order and judgment upon Award is prayed for but such prayer is refused.
51. All parties, the department and all others concerned to act on an authenticated (signed) copy of this judgment.
Appeal allowed.
Alert