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Universal Paper Mills, Ltd., And Others v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner And Others

Calcutta High Court
Jul 3, 2001
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Factual and Procedural Background

The petition challenged demand notices issued by Provident Fund authorities requiring petitioner No.1 and its Director to pay Rs. 65,56,417 as employer's contribution under the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (the EPF Act). The notices threatened coercive measures including actions under Ss. 8-B to 8-G of the EPF Act and attachment of the petitioner's bank account. The petitioner asserted it was a "sick company" within the meaning of S. 3(1)(o) of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 (SICA) and relied on provisions (including S. 22(1) and S. 32) of SICA to contend that proceedings for recovery or attachment could not proceed without BIFR/Board consent. The petitioner also asserted that a rehabilitation scheme was pending before the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR).

The respondents maintained that attachment under S. 8-B(a) of the EPF Act was legal, that the petition was not maintainable because the petitioner had statutory remedies under S. 71 of the EPF Act which were not pursued, and that judicial authority supported recovery of provident fund dues despite a company's sick status. The court considered the BIFR order declaring the company sick, noted that no sanctioned rehabilitation scheme had been placed on record or approved by BIFR, observed that the petitioner had not availed statutory remedies under the EPF Act, and proceeded to adjudicate on applicability of SICA's protective provisions to employer statutory liabilities under the EPF Act.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether S. 22(1) of the SICA Act operates to bar or suspend proceedings (including coercive measures and attachment) for recovery of employer's provident fund dues under the Employees' Provident Funds Act, 1952, in respect of a company declared sick by BIFR.
  2. Whether the SICA Act, being a later special statute with non-obstante clauses, prevails over the EPF Act so as to prevent coercive recovery of statutory provident fund dues from a sick industrial company.
  3. Whether the petitioner was required to exhaust specific statutory remedies under the EPF Act (including appeal under S. 71) before invoking the writ jurisdiction of this Court, and whether failure to do so affects maintainability of the writ petition.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The petitioner-company is a "sick company" within S. 3(1)(o) of SICA and protections under S. 22(1), S. 2(1) and S. 32 of SICA apply, preventing proceedings for winding up, execution, distress or similar actions without BIFR/Board consent.
  • SICA and its non-obstante clauses should prevail over the Employees' Provident Funds Act because both are special statutes and SICA was enacted later; therefore recovery or coercive measures under the EPF Act should be stayed.
  • The respondent failed to consider the petitioner's representation dated 15 November 2000 and ignored that the employees' share had been paid (the implication being that the employer's share was disputed or to be governed by SICA protections).
  • The petitioners relied on judicial authorities interpreting S. 22(1) broadly to bar even recovery of statutory dues and to treat threatening notices as coercive action (cases cited included Maharashtra Tubes Ltd. v. SIIC, M.V. Damodaran, Tata Davy Ltd., Reliance Ispat Industries and others).
  • An unreported Division Bench decision and other authorities were cited to support the proposition that S. 22(1) acts as a statutory interdict against realisation of provident fund dues while a company is under BIFR consideration or scheme implementation.

Respondents' Arguments

  • Attachment of the bank account under S. 8-B(a) of the EPF Act is lawful and the petition is not maintainable because the petitioner had the statutory remedy of appeal under S. 71 of the EPF Act and did not exhaust that remedy.
  • Judicial authority (including an unreported Bombay High Court judgment in Palliwolf Ltd. v. RPC and the Supreme Court's rejection of the Special Leave Petition against that decision) supports the view that S. 22(1) of SICA does not bar recovery of provident fund dues.
  • The EPF Act is a social welfare statute; amendments made in 1988 demonstrate legislative awareness of SICA and provide for treatment of sick industrial companies (e.g., S. 14-B as amended), undermining the contention that SICA prevails to the exclusion of recovery powers in the EPF Act.
  • Other authorities (including Vikram Poddar and the Supreme Court in Deputy Commercial Tax Officer v. Corromondal Pharmaceuticals) support the proposition that S. 22 cannot be used to shield dishonesty or allow indefinite withholding of statutory dues; prosecution/remedies exist where defaults occur.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Maharashtra Tubes, Ltd. v. S.I.I.C. of Maharashtra ((1993) 2 SCC 144) Interpretation that the phrase "proceeding for distress or the like" in S. 22(1) may be broadly construed to include non-judicial coercive proceedings. The precedent was cited by petitioners to argue broad protection under S. 22; the Court noted this authority but concluded S. 22 cannot shelter statutory liabilities such as employer provident fund dues in the present facts.
M.V. Damodaran v. Registrar of Co-operative Societies ((1999) 95 Comp. Case 116) Authority for proposition that S. 22(1) bars recovery of certain amounts from a company declared sick. Cited by petitioners for a broad reading of S. 22; the Court recorded the reliance but rejected the broader application to statutory provident fund dues in this case.
Uram Panchayat v. Shree Vallabh Glass Works ((1990) 2 SCC 440 : AIR 1990 S.C. 1017) Judicial interpretation relevant to restrictions under SICA (as cited by petitioners). The opinion records the citation in support of petitioners' submissions; the Court did not accept that S. 22 provided shelter for provident fund liabilities here.
IFCI v. Maharashtra Steel Ltd. ((1989) Comp. Cases 124) Authority cited by petitioners on interpretation/application of SICA protections. The opinion notes reliance by petitioners; the Court distinguished such authority from the question of statutory provident fund dues and rejected S. 22 protection for those dues in the present facts.
Comet Filaments (I) Ltd. v. Pradeshiya Industrial and Investment Corporation of Uttar Pradesh Ltd. ((1993) 16 Comp. Cases 28 (Cal.)) Cited by petitioners to support broad interpretation of SICA protections. Cited in petitioners' list of authorities; the Court did not treat it as displacing the EPF Act's recovery powers in this case.
Himalaya Rubber Products v. BIFR Referenced as authority interpreting SICA protections (specific citation not provided in opinion). This information was not available in the provided opinion.
Tata Davy Ltd. v. State of Orissa (1997 (7) JT 216) Held that arrears of sales tax could not be recovered from a sick industry by coercive process (cited by petitioners). Cited by petitioners to argue coercive recovery is barred; the Court considered the line of authority but relied on narrower Supreme Court guidance in Corromondal to deny S. 22 protection for provident fund dues.
Reliance Ispat Industries ((1993) 77 Comp Cases 381) Noted for holding that a notice containing a threat can amount to coercive action. Cited by petitioners to characterise respondent's notice as coercive; the Court did not accept that characterization as sufficient to bar recovery of statutory dues under the EPF Act.
Union of India v. Krishna Mills Ltd. (81 Comp Cases 150 (Raj)) Held SICA, as a later special statute with non-obstante clauses, would prevail over general provisions of the Companies Act. Cited by petitioners to argue SICA's priority; the Court considered this but found legislative amendments to the EPF Act (1988) showed Parliament's awareness of SICA and did not accept a general supremacy of SICA over EPF Act for statutory dues.
Bkoruka Steel Ltd. v. Fairgrowth Financial Services Ltd. ((1997) 89 Comp Cases 547) Authority for the proposition that, between two special statutes with non-obstante clauses, the later statute may prevail. Cited by petitioners; the Court observed legislative action on EPF Act after SICA and did not apply this precedent to prevent recovery of provident fund dues in the facts at hand.
Regional Provident Fund Commissioner v. Nuddea Industries Ltd. (Unreported; APOL 80 of 1999, GA 469 of 1999, W.P. No. 2137 of 1998) Unreported Division Bench decision relied on by petitioners to support the interdictive effect of S. 22 on PF recovery. The opinion records the reliance; the Court did not follow the reasoning to the extent claimed by petitioners and rejected S. 22 protection for employer statutory liabilities here.
Poysha Industrial Company Ltd. v. Union of India (1995 (1) L.L.N 85) Single Judge set aside an order under S. 14-B of the EPF Act in view of S. 22(1) of SICA, referring matter back for reconsideration. Cited by petitioners to support S. 22's applicability; the Court noted the decision but found on the record before it that S. 22 did not protect the petitioners' failure to pay statutory employer contributions.
Kusum Engineering Co. Ltd. v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, West Bengal (Appeal No. 591 of 1990) Held the Provident Funds Act is social welfare legislation and its enforcement should not be suspended in a manner that defeats labour welfare. Cited by respondents to support recovery powers under the EPF Act; the Court relied on the social welfare nature of the EPF Act and legislative amendments to reject S. 22 protection for the petitioner.
Vikram Poddar v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioners (2001 (2) L.L.N 748) Held that mere reference to BIFR does not prevent recovery of provident fund dues. Cited by respondents in support of lawful recovery; the Court treated this as authority consistent with its conclusion that S. 22 did not bar recovery of employer PF dues here.
Deputy Commercial Tax Officer v. Corromondal Pharmaceuticals ((1997) 10 SCC 649 : AIR 1997 S.C. 2027) Supreme Court held S. 22(1) applies only to dues recognised or included in a sanctioned scheme; amounts collected for revenue after the date of a sanctioned scheme cannot be covered by S. 22 so as to allow indefinite withholding. The Court relied on this Supreme Court authority as a key precedent to hold that S. 22 cannot be used as a shelter for statutory provident fund liabilities not included in any sanctioned BIFR scheme; this decisively influenced the Court's rejection of the petition.
Inderjit C. Parekh v. B.K. Bhatt (1974 (1) L.L.N 322) Cited for the proposition that defaulters in statutory payments may be prosecuted under relevant schemes/provisions. Relied upon by respondents to demonstrate existence of sanctions/remedies for defaults; the Court noted this as part of the legal framework allowing recovery and enforcement against defaulters.
Palliwolf Ltd. v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner (W.P. No. 1688 of 2000; unreported Bombay High Court) Bombay High Court held S. 22(1) of SICA was not of assistance to the petitioner in relation to provident fund payments; Supreme Court rejected the Special Leave Petition against that decision. Relied upon by respondents to show that higher courts have upheld the position that S. 22 does not bar recovery of PF dues; the opinion records this as supporting the respondent's stance and as persuasive to its conclusion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded in the following sequence, based only on the material in the opinion:

  1. The Court noted the factual finding by BIFR that the petitioner-company is a "sick" company under S. 3(1)(o) of SICA and that BIFR had appointed a special Director and directed submission of a rehabilitation scheme. However, the Court observed that no sanctioned or approved rehabilitation scheme had been placed on record or shown to have been accepted by BIFR.
  2. The Court recorded that the petitioner had not produced documents showing any subsequent orders or filings before the Court or BIFR and that, in the Court's view, relevant facts and subsequent orders had been omitted or suppressed by the petitioners.
  3. The Court emphasized that the EPF Act itself provides specific statutory remedies (including a right of appeal under S. 71) to challenge demand notices and that the petitioner had not availed itself of those statutorily provided remedies; the Court considered this failure significant as to maintainability in writ jurisdiction.
  4. The Court examined the comparative statutory scheme and legislative history: although SICA is a later Act (1985), the EPF Act was subsequently amended in 1988 (Act 33 of 1988) with explicit awareness of SICA. The Court read this amendment as evidence that Parliament contemplated interaction between the statutes and did not intend to render the EPF Act powerless vis-à-vis sick companies except as explicitly provided (e.g., S. 14-B as amended applies when a scheme sanctioned by BIFR provides otherwise).
  5. The Court addressed the core contention on S. 22(1) of SICA. After considering authorities on both sides, it relied heavily on the Supreme Court decision in Deputy Commercial Tax Officer v. Corromondal Pharmaceuticals, which held that S. 22(1) can only apply to dues recognised or included in a sanctioned BIFR scheme and cannot be construed so broadly as to permit a sick industrial unit to collect amounts legitimately belonging to revenue and then withhold them indefinitely.
  6. Applying that principle, the Court concluded that S. 22(1) cannot be interpreted to provide a shelter for the petitioners in respect of statutory liabilities such as employer contributions under the EPF Act which were not part of any sanctioned rehabilitation scheme. The Court held that allowing S. 22 to operate so broadly would be unfair, unreasonable and contrary to the purposes of statutes like the EPF Act, which are social welfare legislation directed to protecting employee benefits.
  7. Because the petitioner had neither shown an approved BIFR-sanctioned scheme covering the dues nor availed the statutory remedies under the EPF Act, and because the legislative amendment to the EPF Act demonstrated parliamentary cognisance of SICA, the Court refused to allow SICA to preclude enforcement of statutory PF liabilities in the present circumstances.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The petition is rejected. Application rejected.

Implications and immediate consequences:

  • The writ petition challenging the demand notices and attachment was dismissed; there is no order as to costs.
  • The Court held that S. 22(1) of the SICA Act does not afford the petitioners protection from recovery of employer statutory liabilities under the Employees' Provident Funds Act in the facts of this case (notably where no sanctioned BIFR scheme that recognises or includes the dues was before the Court and where statutory remedies under the EPF Act were not exhausted).
  • The decision's direct effect is to permit the respondent authorities to proceed with enforcement measures provided under the EPF Act (subject to whatever remedies are available under that Act), and it rejects the contention that SICA automatically bars such recovery in all cases involving sick companies.
  • The opinion does not purport to lay down a novel general principle beyond applying existing authorities (including the Supreme Court's guidance in Corromondal) to the facts; it therefore does not announce a new, broad precedent displacing prior law, but applies established law to deny the petitioners the relief sought.
Show all summary ...

1. This is an application challenging the demand notices issued by the respondent authorities calling upon the petitioner No. 1 and its Director to make payment of a sum of Rs. 65,56,417 on account of employer's contribution under the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 Thereinafter referred to as the said Act) and threatening to proceed against them under the provisions of Ss. 8-B to 8-G of the said Act and further the threat of attachment in respect of bank account of the petitioner No. 1.

2. The petitioner has challenged the said notice inter alia on the ground that the petitioner No. 1 is a sick company within the meaning of S. 3(1)(o) of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as SICA Act) and further according to the petitioner, under S. 2(1) of the said SICA Act, 1985, when an inquiry under S. 17 is under preparation or consideration or a sanctioned scheme is under implementation or where an appeal under S. 25 relating to an industrial company is pending, then, notwithstanding anything contained in the Companies Act, 1956, or any other law or the Memorandum and Articles of Association of the industrial company or any other instrument having effect under the said Act or other law, no proceedings for the winding up of the industrial company or for execution, distress or like against any of the property of the industrial company or for the appointment of a Receiver in respect thereof shall lie or be proceeded with further except with the consent of the Board or, as the case may be the appellate authority. The petitioner is also bound to get direction under S. 32 of the said SICA Act.

3. It further contended that since the Employees' Provident Funds Act does not contain any non obstante clause and the SICA Act and the said Act are both special statutes and since SICA Act came into force later than that of the Provident Funds Act, in that case, it has been contended that the said Act must prevail over the same.

4. The ground for challenging the said notice and the attachment that the respondent failed to consider the representation made by the petitioner company vide letter, dated 15 November, 2000, and furthermore, the respondent did not consider that the petitioner has paid the entire Employees' contribution and nothing was due and payable. Therefore, the respondents cannot have authority to take coercive measure against the petitioners including the issuance of the said notice attaching the bank account. The entire business of the petitioner has come to standstill and further the scheme which has been placed by the petitioner before the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (hereinafter referred to as BIFR) and the same is still pending. Therefore, actions taken by the respondents against the petitioners are wrongful.

5. Sri Saha, appearing on behalf of the petitioners, drew my attention to the said section and further contended that in the case of Maharashtra Tubes, Ltd. v. S.I.I.C of Maharashtra reported in (1993) 2 SCC 144 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the meaning of the expression, “Proceeding for distress or the like” in S. 22(1) has to be broadly construed so as not to confine it to “legal proceedings” and accordingly such proceedings are not restricted to proceedings before a Court or Tribunal and even a proceeding by a State Financial Corporation under ST 29 of the State Financial Corporation Act is not permissible. In M.V Damodaran v. Registrar of Co-operative Societies reported in (1999) 95 Comp. Case 116, the company had deducted amounts from Employees' wages for paying over to the Co-operative Credit Society but failed to do so according to the understanding. It was held that S. 22(1) bars recovery of such money from the company.

6. He also submitted that S. 22(1) has been judicially interpreted by Courts as imposing a restriction on even the recovery of statutory dues. In support of such submission he relied upon the judgments reported in (1990) 2 SCC 440 : AIR. 1990 S.C 1017, Uram Panchayat v. Shree Vallabh Glass Works, [A.I.R 1988 All. 170], IFCI v. Maharashtra Steel, Ltd., (1989) Comp. Cases 124, Comet Filaments (I), Ltd. v. Pradeshiya Industrial and Investment Corporation of Uttar Pradesh, Ltd., (1993) 16 Comp. Cases 28 (Cal.), Himalaya Rubber Products v. BIFR. In a decision reported in 1997 (7) JT 216, Tata Davy Ltd. v. State of Orissa, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that arrears of sales tax cannot be recovered from a sick industry by coercive process. In a case of “Reliance Ispat Industries” reported in (1993) 77 Comp Cases 381 it has been held that even a notice containing a threat amounts to a coercive action.

7. He further contended that with reference to non obstante clause contained in S. 22(1) and the non obstante provisions of S. 32, it has been held in Union or India v. Krishna Mills, Ltd. reported in 81 Comp Cases 150 (Raj) that the effect of the same is that whatever may be the other law or its effect, no proceeding against the property of a sick company would lie or be proceeded with. In the said case it was held that the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 being a special statute in relation to sick Industrial Companies and a later statute, it will prevail over the general provisions of the Companies Act, 1956, and the non obstante clauses in Ss. 22 and 32 will prevail as against the non obstante clause in S. 529-A of the Companies Act.

8. He also submitted that where there are two special statutes which contain non obstante clauses, the later statute must prevail. In support of such submission he relied upon ajudgment reported in (1997) 89 Comp Cases 547, Bkoruka Steel, Ltd. v. Fairgrowth Financial Services, Ltd.

9. He further contended that S. 22(1) amounts to statutory interdict to the realisation of provident fund dues and that by reason of the same no steps can be taken to realise such dues by taking recourse to oppressive measures. In support of such contention he relied upon an unreported judgment of the Division Bench of this Hon'ble Court in APOL 80 of 1999, GA 469 of 1999, W.P No. 2137 of 1998 (Regional Provident Fund Commissioner v. Nuddea Industries, Ltd.)

10. He also submitted that in the case of Poysha Industrial Company, Ltd. v. Union of India reported in 1995 (1) L.L.N 85, a learned Single Judge of this Hon'ble Court was pleased to set aside the impugned order passed under S. 14-B of the Employees' Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 in view of the provisions of S. 22(1) of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 and to refer the matter back to the appropriate authority for a fresh decision upon considering the said provision.

11. He further contended that the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952, being a Social Welfare legislation, no construction of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985, can be given effect to which takes away or suspends the right of the provident fund authorities from realising the provident fund dues and damages. In support of such contention he relied upon an unreported Division Bench Judgment of this Hon'ble Court reported in Appeal No. 591 of 1990, Matter No. 2254 of 1990 (Kusum Engineering Company, Ltd. v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, West Bengal.) Accordingly, he submitted that this application should be allowed.

12. Sri Binoy Mishra, learned advocate, appearing on behalf of the respondent submitted that there is nothing illegal in the attachment of bank account under S. 8-B(a) of the said Act. He further contended that the petition is not maintainable as the order passed under S. 7-A of the said Act and petitioner has a right of appeal under S. 71 of the said Act. The petitioner did not take any steps or exhausted the said remedy which has been given under the said statute. Accordingly he submitted that this application should be dismissed.

13. He further contended that the Bombay High Court in an unreported judgment reported in W.P No. 1688 of 2000 (Palliwolf, Ltd. v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner) that S. 22(1) of SICA Act, 1985, is of no assistance to the petitioner having regard to the nature of payments required to be made by way of provident fund and other contributions under the said Act.

14. It is further contended that the appeal was preferred from the said judgment and the Hon'ble Supreme Court was pleased to reject the said Special Leave Petition. Accordingly, he submitted that the said judgment has been upheld by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and thereby the view taken by the Bombay High Court has been approved by the Hon'ble Supreme Court on the said point.

15. He further submitted that the judgment delivered by the Hon'ble Division Bench of this High Court in Appeal No. 591 of 1990 (Kusum Engineering Company, Ltd. v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner), the Hon'ble Division Bench held that it is a statutory liability and the Provident Funds Act is a piece of social welfare legislation enacted for the purpose of welfare of the labourers. If the industry is to run the labour welfare legislation has to be given effect to and that construction of the said Act could be given which takes away or suspends the right of the provident fund authorities from realising the Provident Fund dues and/or damages.

16. He further contended that in the judgment reported in 2001 (2) L.L.N 748 (Vikram Poddar v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioners) the Hon'ble High Court held that merely because the company is a sick company and it has been referred to BIFR is not an impediment in recovering the dues of provident fund. He also relied upon a judgment reported in (1997) 10 SCC 649 : AIR. 1997 S.C 2027 (Deputy Commercial Tax Officer v. Corromondal Pharmaceuticals) and submitted that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that S. 22 was not meant to freed dishonesty nor can it be so operated as to encourage unfair practice. The amount due to revenue and/or statutory liability cannot be withheld indefinitely and unreasonably and it is against the spirit of the statute.

17. He further submitted that if there is any default in paying the amount under the said Act the defaulters are liable to be prosecuted under Para. 76(a) of the scheme. In support of such contention he relied upon a judgment reported in 1974 (1) L.L.N 322 (Inderjit C. Parekh v. B.K Bhatt). In the facts and circumstances of this case this application should be dismissed.

18. After considering the facts and circumstances of this case and the order passed by the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction in respect of the Petitioner No. 1 where the BIFR has specifically held that the company is sick under S. 3(1)(o) of the SICA Act, 1985 appointed a special Director of the company to safeguard its financial and other interest. It further appears that the Bench acceded to the request made on behalf of the petitioner to submit a rehabilitation scheme for the unit within 60 days. Such order was passed by the BIFR on 9 February, 1990. There is no whisper has been made in the petition that the BIFR has accepted the scheme or any scheme has been filed by the petitioner No. 1 for its rehabilitation before the BIFR. It further appears that the scheme has not been approved or sanctioned by the BIFR. It further appears that the scheme was not annexed to the petition nor placed before this Court. But it appears from the statements made in the petition that the bank and the operating agency deviated from one time settlement before the BIFR and the company filed a revisional application before this Court, but no documents have been produced before this Court to that extent. In my opinion, those facts ought to have been brought before this Court and the subsequent orders if passed in the matter should have been brought on record which in my opinion purposefully has been suppressed by the petitioners from this Court. It further appears that there is a provision under the said Act challenging the demand notice issued by the petitioner before the said authorities. The petitioner did not take any step in the said matter nor filed any appeal. The statute has given power to the petitioner to challenge the same under S. 71 of the said Act. The petitioner purposefully did not avail of the said chance and has come before this Court. Accordingly, in my opinion the Writ Court should not interfere in the matter when a specific right has been given to the petitioners under the said statute. It is further to be noted here that the petitioner has specifically submitted that they have paid the Employees' share but suppressed the facts that the amount to be paid to the Provident Fund Commissioner, being an employer share in respect of such provident fund.

19. I further cannot accept the contention raised before me by Sri Saha that the SICA Act must prevail over the Provident Fund Act, 1952. It is a fact that the SICA Act came into operation in the year 1985 but it is also to be noted that the Employees' Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952, was amended by the Act, 33 of 1988. Such amendment of 1988 expressly notices the position of the SICA Act of 1985, and therefore, it cannot be said that the said SICA Act must prevail over the Employees' Provident Funds Act. Section 14-B of the said Act was amended taking into consideration of an establishment which is a sick industrial company and in respect of which a scheme for rehabilitation has been sanctioned by the BIFR under the provisions of SICA Act, 1985 subject to the terms and conditions of the scheme. Therefore, the amendment of the said Employees' Provident Funds Act, 1952, was enacted by the Act, 33 of 1988 and the Legislators were conscious of the existence of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985. Therefore, in no way it can be said as sought to be contended before me that the SICA Act, 1985, must prevail over the Provident Funds Act, 1952.

20. Apart from that the further question arose whether a sick industrial company can claim the benefit of the provisions of S. 22 in respect of the dues payable towards provident fund under the Employees' Provident Funds Act, 1952. It further appears from the records that the matter was placed before BIFR in the year 1990. The amount was to be paid by the petitioner-company being the contributions of the employer which have not been paid by the employer and the same have been unlawfully retained by the employer.

21. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in Deputy Commercial Tax Officer v. Corromondal Pharmaceuticals reported in (1997) 10 SCC 649 : A.I.R 1997 S.C 2027 that S. 22(1) of the Act can apply only to “such dues recognised or included in the sanctioned scheme and the amounts which have been collected by the sick industrial company on account of sales tax, etc., after the date of the sanctioned scheme legitimately belonging to the revenue, cannot be and could not have been intended to be covered within S. 22 of the Act. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has specifically held that any other construction will be unreasonable and unfair and will lead to a state of affairs enabling the sick industrial unit to collect amounts due to the revenue and withhold it indefinitely and unreasonably. Such a construction which is unfair, unreasonable and against spirit of the statute in a business sense, should be avoided.

22. After considering the judgments cited before me I do not have any hesitation to hold that the company has no right to take shelter under S. 22 in respect of statutory liabilities and the employees are entitled to have their statutory benefits under the Employees' Provident Funds Act and thereby any default on the part of the employer under the said Act cannot attract the said section or can get away taking an advantage out of the said section and accordingly, in my opinion the purpose and object of S. 22 cannot be interpreted in a manner to give a shelter to the petitioners against the orders passed by the respondent authorities.

23. Accordingly, I am of the view that S. 22(1) of the SICA Act, 1985, would not be any assistance to the petitioner in the facts and circumstances of this case having regard to the nature of the payments required: by way of Provident Fund and other contributions under the said Act and I do not find any substance in this application and the same is rejected. However, there will be no order as to costs.

Application rejected.