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Appropriate Authority Of Income-Tax And Others v. Vysya Bank Ltd. And Another

Calcutta High Court
Feb 3, 2000
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Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal was directed against the judgment and order of the learned single judge dated 24 December 1997 (the impugned judgment). The impugned judgment had set aside orders of purchase passed by the Appropriate Authority under section 269UD of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on the ground that no reasonable opportunity was given to the vendor and the vendee and there were several discrepancies in the acquisition proceedings.

The facts before this court concern two agreements by which Delite Housing Corporation (the vendor / respondent No. 2) agreed to sell 16 flats under construction to the Vysya Bank Ltd. (the purchaser) — agreements dated 21 April 1994 and 27 May 1994. Form No. 37-1 was filed for issue of "no objection certificate" as required by Chapter XXC. The Appropriate Authority nevertheless passed orders of purchase under section 269UD (dated 29 July 1994 and 28 September 1994) in respect of the two agreements; those orders were set aside by the learned single judge.

Procedurally, the appeal had been listed several times and no one appeared for the Appropriate Authority (the appellant). The respondents were represented and heard. When the appeal was admitted, respondent No. 7 (the vendor) was permitted to file a cross-objection claiming interest for the period during which possession had been taken but consideration remained unpaid.

On the factual matrix of payments: under each agreement the bank paid 25% at or before execution, approximately 70% on possession, and 5% at completion of conveyance. The bank had paid roughly 95% of the consideration under each agreement on taking possession; only the 5% balance (payable on conveyance and conditioned on issuance of the no objection certificate) remained unpaid. The court had earlier directed (order dated 29 June 1998) that this remaining 5% be payable at the time of conveyance depending on the outcome of the appeals, with interest on that balance.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the orders of purchase passed by the Appropriate Authority under section 269UD(1) of the Income-tax Act were vitiated by failure to give a reasonable opportunity to the vendor and vendee (i.e., procedural fairness in acquisition under section 269UD).
  2. Whether, and if so at what rate and for what period, the vendor is entitled to interest on unpaid consideration where possession of the property has been taken (or handed over under court order) but the purchase consideration has not been paid because of acquisition proceedings under Chapter XXC.
  3. Whether the Appropriate Authority loses jurisdiction to pass an order of purchase after expiry of the statutory periods of limitation provided by the first and second provisos to section 269UD, given that section 5 of the Limitation Act was not made applicable to that provision (i.e., the effect of limitation on the authority's jurisdiction).

Arguments of the Parties

Appropriate Authority / Appellant

  • No counsel appeared for the Appropriate Authority or the Government at the hearing before this court; accordingly, no oral arguments were advanced on their behalf at this stage.

Vysya Bank (Purchaser)

  • Submitted that there was an agreement and the purchaser (Vysya Bank Ltd.) had paid the consideration as per the agreement; about 95% of the price had been paid on receipt of possession and only the remaining 5% was payable at completion of conveyance.
  • Submitted that, by the terms of the agreement, interest on the 5% balance would be payable by the bank when the conveyance is completed; thus, the bank maintained that interest on the remaining balance would be governed by the agreement.

Vendor (Respondent No. 7 / Delite Housing Corporation)

  • Claimed entitlement to interest for the period during which possession was taken but the consideration could not be paid due to acquisition proceedings.
  • Relied on precedents (Rajalakshmi Narayanan; Appropriate Authority v. Smt. Sudha Patil) and argued for payment of interest, and sought allowance of expenses incurred on maintenance while possession was affected by acquisition and court orders.

Other notable procedural request

  • On behalf of respondent No. 1, counsel Dr. Pal prayed that the matter be remitted to the Appropriate Authority to give a fresh opportunity to the vendor and vendee; this prayer was rejected as discussed in the opinion.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Rajalakshmi Narayanan v. Margaret Kathleen Gandhi, [1993] 201 ITR 681 (SC) General principle that where a seller is unable to get the purchase price because of an order of purchase under section 269UD and stays by courts, interest at an appropriate rate may be payable to the seller; illustrations awarding interest (15% in one eventuality, 20% in another) and emphasizing case-specific determination. The court cited the observations to support the view that interest may be payable to a vendor where delay in payment is due to acquisition proceedings and that the rate and period depend on facts and equity; these principles informed the court's decision to award interest to respondent No. 7.
C.B. Gautam v. Union of India, [1993] 199 ITR 530 (SC) Authority that when payment is delayed due to acquisition proceedings under Chapter XX-C, interest should be paid to the seller; in that case the Supreme Court awarded interest at 9%. The court relied on this decision as a precedent establishing that interest can be awarded for delayed payment caused by acquisition proceedings; it formed part of the legal background justifying an award of interest here.
Dwarkanath Chatterjee v. Union of India, [1995] 213 ITR 470 Held that the periods of limitation in the first and second provisos to section 269UD create a legislative embargo on the Appropriate Authority to pass an order of purchase after expiry; section 5 of the Limitation Act was not held applicable to revive jurisdiction. The court cited this decision to reject the prayer to remit the matter to the Appropriate Authority to give a fresh opportunity, concluding that the Appropriate Authority loses jurisdiction after the statutory period expires.
Appropriate Authority v. Smt. Sudha Patil, [1999] 235 ITR 118 (SC) An instance where the Supreme Court directed payment of interest at 15% per annum to the seller on delayed payment when the delay was not attributable to the seller. The court relied on this authority among others in determining that interest should be paid to the vendor in the present case and to guide its assessment of an appropriate rate.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded by first considering the procedural irregularity found by the learned single judge: that no reasonable opportunity had been given to the vendor and vendee in the acquisition proceedings under section 269UD(1). The learned single judge had set aside the Appropriate Authority's purchase orders on that ground and had relied on C.B. Gautam. This court found no merit in the appeal against that finding, in part because no representative appeared for the Appropriate Authority to defend the orders and because of the procedural deficiencies highlighted by the single judge.

The court addressed the remittal request that had been made before the single judge (to remit the matter to the Appropriate Authority for fresh opportunity). That request had been rejected at the single judge level relying on the decision in Dwarkanath Chatterjee which holds that the first and second provisos to section 269UD fix limitation periods that create an embargo on the Appropriate Authority's power after expiry and that section 5 of the Limitation Act does not apply to revive jurisdiction. The present court accepted that approach and did not remit the matter for reconsideration by the Appropriate Authority.

Turning to the cross-objection by respondent No. 7 (the vendor) claiming interest, the court examined the contractual payment schedule in the two agreements and the actual payments made. The bank had paid approximately 95% of the consideration upon taking possession; only the contractual balance of about 5% remained payable on completion of conveyances, which could not be executed because no "no objection certificate" had been issued by the Appropriate Authority. Possession had been taken and, at times, had been under control of the Appropriate Authority or impacted by court orders. The vendor had not objected to the acquisition; it lodged a reply stating it had sold the flats to the bank. The vendor also incurred maintenance expenses while possession issues persisted; those expenses were allowed to the vendor.

The court reviewed relevant Supreme Court authorities (Rajalakshmi Narayanan; C.B. Gautam; Smt. Sudha Patil) which establish that where payment is delayed because of acquisition proceedings, interest may be payable to the seller and that the rate and period depend on the facts and equity of each case. Applying those principles to the present facts — specifically the amount left unpaid because of acquisition proceedings and the period during which the vendor was deprived of the purchase price — the court concluded that equity required an award of interest to respondent No. 7.

Concretely, the court calculated the unpaid sum attributable to acquisition proceedings as Rs. 29,32,697 and awarded interest on that amount at the rate of 12% per annum for the period 1 October 1994 to 22 July 1998. As to the remaining contractual 5% payable only on completion of conveyance, the court noted there was a contractual provision obliging the purchaser (the bank) to pay interest on that balance when conveyance is executed; the court left that contractual arrangement to operate.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court's final decision was to dismiss the appeal and to allow the cross-appeal of respondent No. 7 in part.

Direct consequences for the parties:

  • The orders of the Appropriate Authority under section 269UD were not sustained on appeal; the procedural defects identified by the learned single judge were accepted by this court.
  • The vendor (respondent No. 7) is entitled to interest at the rate of 12% per annum from 1 October 1994 to 22 July 1998 on the sum of Rs. 29,32,697, that amount having remained unpaid because of acquisition proceedings.
  • The contractual balance of about 5% remains payable on completion of conveyance; the purchaser (Vysya Bank) is obliged under the agreement to pay interest on that balance when the conveyance deed is executed, and the court's earlier direction of 29 June 1998 concerning payment at conveyance with interest was noted.
  • Expenses incurred by the vendor for maintenance during the period in which possession was affected were allowed to the vendor.

Broader implications: The court applied established Supreme Court authority confirming that interest may be payable to sellers deprived of sale proceeds due to acquisition proceedings under section 269UD and that the rate and period of interest depend on the facts and equitable considerations of each case. The opinion does not purport to lay down a novel general rule beyond the application of those authorities to the facts at hand; accordingly, the decision operates to resolve the rights between the present parties as described above.

Show all summary ...

Y.R Meena, J.:— This appeal has been directed against the judgment and order of the learned single judge dated December 24, 1997. (Vysya Bank Ltd. v. Appropriate Authority of Income-tax, [1998] 233 ITR 560). The appeal was listed several times. None appeared for the appropriate authority.

2. Heard learned counsel for the respondents. Perused the impugned judgment. The learned single judge has set aside the order of the appropriate authority on the ground that no reasonable opportunity has been given to the vendor and vendee and there are several discrepancies in the proceeding ‘before acquisition of the property, in terms of section 269UD(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The learned single judge has specifically emphasised on the decision in the case of C.B Gautam v. Union of India, [1993] 199 ITR 530 (SC). During the course of the argument before the learned single judge, learned counsel Dr. Pal on behalf of respondent No. 1 also prayed that the matter be remitted to the appropriate authority to give fresh opportunity to the vendor and vendee. This prayer of Dr. Pal was also rejected following the judgment of this court in the case of Dwarkanath Chatterjee v. Union of India, [1995] 213 ITR 470, taking the view that the period of limitation to pass an order of purchase of any immovable property as provided for in the first and second proviso to the said section create an embargo on the appropriate authority, by the Legislature, to pass an order for purchase under the said section after the expiry of the period of limitation and section 5 of the Limitation Act not having been made applicable to the aforesaid provision of the Act, the appropriate authority loses its jurisdiction to exercise its power under the said section after the expiry of the aforesaid period. The appeal was listed several times but none appeared for the appropriate authority/appellant. Considering the finding of the learned single judge that no reasonable opportunity has been given for the acquisition of the property as required under section 269UD, we find no merit in the appeal.

3. When the appeal was admitted respondent No. 7 was allowed to file cross-objection, regarding his claim of interest required to be paid for the period, possession has been taken but consideration has not been paid to the vendor. Learned counsel for the vendor placed reliance on the decision in the case of Rajalakshmi Narayanan v. Margaret Kathleen Gandhi, [1993] 201 ITR 681 (SC) and the decision in the case of Appropriate Authority v. Smt. Sudha Patil, [1999] 235 ITR 118 (SC).

4. Learned counsel for the Vysya Bank, Shri Bajoria, submits that there was an agreement and the purchaser bank, i.e, the Vysya Bank Ltd. has paid the consideration as per agreement. Therefore, only five per cent, is now left to be paid. Under the agreement that will be paid at the time of completion of conveyance and on that amount, the interest is payable under the agreement itself, by the bank. None appeared for the authority or Government.

5. The relevant facts in this regard are that the bank had agreed to purchase from Delite under two agreements, one dated April 21, 1994, and other dated May 27, 1994, 16 flats under construction at premises No. 250, Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose Road, Tollygunge, Calcutta-700 047, for the purpose of providing residential accommodation to its officers who came on transfer for serving at its branches at Calcutta. As required by the provisions of Chapter XXC of the Act, the bank and Delite filed Form No. 37-1 in respect of each of the two agreements for issue of “no objection certificate” for the said transfers. The appropriate authority, however, passed the orders of purchase under section 269UD of the Act in both the cases. The order in respect of the first agreement was passed on July 29, 1994, and that in respect of the second agreement on September 28, 1994, both were set aside by the learned trial judge.

6. The said agreements dated April 21, 1994, and May 27, 1994, in Part 3 of annexure “A” thereto, respectively provided for payment of consideration as under:

Agreement dated April 21, 1994:

0. Rs. 9,96,282.50—at or before the execution of the agreement (25 per cent.).

1. Rs. 27,37,091.00—on or before the date of possession (70 per cent.).

2. Rs. 1,95,506.50—at or before the completion of the conveyance (5 per cent.).

7. The bank had thus to pay only 25 per cent, of the price at or before the execution of the respective agreements which it duly paid. 70 per cent, of the price was payable upon the possession being given and 5 per cent, at the time of conveyance. Since the bank's officers had already arrived at Calcutta on transfer, Delite delivered possession of the flats under the first agreement dated April 21, 1994, to the bank.

8. The bank duly paid a little less than 70 per cent, of the consideration as provided in the said agreement which Delite duly accepted.

9. At the time of filing the first writ petition, the bank had duly paid in terms of the first agreement about 95 per cent, of the total consideration on receiving possession of the flats as aforesaid and only the balance about. 5 per cent, remains to be paid since the same is payable only on execution of the conveyance which cannot be executed till today as “no objection certificate” has not been issued by the appropriate authority.

10. In the case of the second agreement, Delite delivered possession of the flats to the appropriate authority before any order was passed in the writ petition and thereafter received it back from them under the orders of this court and again under an order of this court in this appeal, Delite handed over possession of the flats to the bank, after receiving 70 per cent, of the consideration. Thus, the bank had duly paid 95 per cent, of the consideration in respect of the second agreement also on receiving possession of the flats.

11. The only amount now remaining to be paid by the bank to Delite under the said two agreements is 5 per cent, which is to be paid at the time of execution of conveyances after “no objection certificate” is issued by the appropriate authority. This court by its order dated June 29, 1998 (page 1104 of part II of the paper book in Matter No. 299 of 1998), has also directed for payment of such balance 5 per cent, at the time of execution of the conveyances depending on the result of these appeals, with interest on such balance 5 per cent.

12. This brings us to the question, when possession of the property has been taken by the appropriate authority, or possession has been handed over by the vendor under the order of the court and no consideration has been paid, whether the vendor is entitled for any interest on the outstanding balance of amount for the period till the balance amount is paid? In this regard, we would like to refer to some observations of the apex court.

13. In Rajalaxmi Narayanan's case, [1993] 201 ITR 681 at pages 683, and 684, their Lordships have observed as under:

“We can safely take judicial notice of the fact that the prices of immovable properties, have shot up continuously for the last few years and today the said property, if sold in the open market, would fetch a much larger amount than that for which it was agreed to be sold to respondent No. 1.

Taking into account these circumstances we modify the impugned order and direct that in the event of the aforesaid order of the appropriate authority being upheld, the Government shall pay to the appellant, as the purchase price, the amount stated as the consideration for the sale of the said property in the agreement entered into between the appellant and respondent No. 1 with interest thereon at 15 per cent, per annum. In case the order of the appropriate authority is set aside and the transaction of sale in favour of respondent No. 1 is completed, respondent No. 1 shall pay to the appellant interest on the balance amount payable on account of the purchase price by respondent No. 1 interest at 20 per cent, per annum. The interest in either eventuality will be calculated right from the day the impugned order was made by the Delhi High Court.

We may clarify that whether interest should be paid to the owner of an immovable property who has entered into an agreement to sell the same which cannot be completed by reason of an order of purchase under section 269UD of the Income-tax Act and at what rate, will have to be decided in the facts and circumstances of each case. All that can be observed by way of a general principle is that where such a seller has raised no objection or obstruction either to the purchase of his property by an order under section 269UD or to the completion of the agreement of sale entered into by him but is unable to get the purchase price by reason of the said order and the stay order or orders passed by a court, interest at an appropriate rate can, if equity so requires, be paid to him.”

14. In C.B Gautam's case, [1993] 199 ITR 530 (SC), again their Lordships have considered that when the payment is delayed on account of acquisition proceedings under Chapter XX-C, interest should be paid to the seller and how much the rate of interest and for what period the interest is payable depends upon the facts of that case. In C.B Gautam's case, [1993] 199 ITR 530 (SC), their Lordships have awarded interest at the rate of nine per cent, payable by the Government to the vendor.

15. In the case of Smt. Sudha Patil, [1993] 235 ITR 118, the Supreme Court had directed the payment of interest at the rate of 15 per cent, per annum payable to the seller on delayed payment, in a case when delay was not on account of the seller.

16. As stated above there were two agreements regarding ‘the sale of flats by respondent No. 2-Delite Housing Corporation to the Vysya Bank, as per the agreement particular amount was payable at a particular stage of transfer, say as at the stage of execution of the agreement, then on or before the possession, then five per cent, at the time of completion of the conveyances. The details of the amounts which have been paid read as under:

MAT No. 299 of 1998:

MAT No. 300 of 1998:

The Appropriate Authority of Income-tax, Calcutta

The Vysya Bank Limited

(Dues up to 30-11-1999)

Particulars 1st writ 2nd writ Total Amount due A. Principal due Rs. Rs. Rs. Rs. Consideration receivable 39,10,130.00 39,10,130.00 78,20,260.00 Consideration receivable for one car parking 75,000.00 - 75,000.00 Less: Payment actually received 39,85,130.00 34,96,282.50 39,10,130.00 9,77,532.50 78,95,260.00 44,73,815.00 Less: Payment received on 22-7-1998, in terms of order of court 4,88,847.50 29,32,597.50 34,21,445.00 30,13,937.78 4,07,507.22

17. On the perusal of the aforesaid details major amount was due against this second agreement for a number of years and possession was with the appropriate authority, for some period possession was restored to the respondent No. 1 as per the court order, but the seller could not make use of it, as there was a prohibitory order of the court and even respondent No. 7, had to incur some expenses on maintenance of the premises, those expenses are allowed to the vendor, respondent No. 7.

18. It is also brought to our notice that the seller never objected to the acquisition under section 269UD he simply filed the reply to a notice that it sold the flats to the bank for a consideration shown in the agreement to sale. In our view, this cannot be an obstruction in purchase by the appropriate authority.

19. Considering these facts and circumstances, as referred to above we are of the view that equity requires that respondent No. 7, vendor, is entitled for the interest at the rate of 12 per cent, from the Government, for the period from October 1, 1994 to July 22, 1998, on the amount Rs. 29,32,697 which could not be paid to the vendor, respondent No. 7, on account of acquisition proceedings under section 269UD of the Act. So far the 5 per cent, balance consideration is concerned, which has not been paid and payable only on completion of the conveyance, for that there is already a provision in the agreement and the purchaser bank will pay the interest on that balance amount while the conveyance deed will be executed. Considering the above discussion the appeal is dismissed and the crossappeal of respondent No. 7 is allowed in part as referred to above.

20. G.C DE, J.—I agree.