Alexandras Dryron S.A v. Owners And Parties Interested In The Vessel M.V Prapti .

1. In an action in rem, in an admiralty matter, it was of course open to a plaintiff to seek to recover its alleged dues in respect to one vessel by causing another vessel to be arrested which either belonged to the same owner or a beneficial owner or one having control and possession of the arrested vessel. If both the vessels were owned by the same person, it was unlikely that the matter would come before the Courts. When the plaintiffs however, sought to establish and rely on beneficial ownership, or control and possession of the arrested vessel, intricate questions of interpretation, erudite deliberations by the Courts, public common law, provisions contained in international conventions and indeed the facts and circumstances of the case would become necessary to be considered, to decide the contentions of the parties. The exercise no doubt would, and in the instant case did, necessitate counsels for the parties, to resist the temptation of going on a pleasure cruise on the vast, and I dare say, very interesting expanse of the laws of admiralty both Indian and foreign, and restrict themselves to clarify, distinguish and apply only those portions of the laws which were relevant, according to them, for the purpose of adjudication of the disputes at hand. I believe, it would be prudent to start at the very begining and consider the facts of the case.

2. Alexandras Dryron S.A as the owner of a vessel “M.V TIRGU NEAMT” let and Arabian Express Line Ltd. as the charterers hired the vessel, for a voyage from the port at Bombay Kandla-range to the port in the Eastern Mediterranian Blacksea area, and the terms and conditions were stipulated in the charter-party agreement dated October 24, 1996. Disputes and differences arose between the parties in respect to moneys alleged to be payable by the charterers to Alexandras Dryron S.A, on account of freight, Sues-canal Toli, demurrage due to breach of charter-party, laytime, loss and damages by reason of over-time, and in accordance with an arbitration-agreement contained in the charter-party it instituted in London, arbitration proceedings against “Arabian Express Line Limited, to be referred to as the charterers hereafter. Thereafter, Alexandras Dryron S.A, referred to hereafter as “the plaintiff”, instituted an admiralty suit, in rem, in this Court against the, “Owners & Parties Interested in the Vessel “M.V PRAPTI”, being Admiralty Suit No. 18 of 1997, on similar cause of action as in the arbitration proceedings, and had also claimed similar reliefs. In this suit the plaintiff made an interlocutory application and by an ex parte-order dated August 22, 1997, made by the Hon'ble Judge taking interlocutory matters, the vessel “M.V PRAPTI”, then berthed in the port of Vishakhapatnam in the State of Andhra Pradesh, was placed under arrest “for a period of ten days from date or until further orders of this Court whichever is earlier”. The Hon'ble Judge was “prima facie satisfied” as to the correctness of the claim of the plaintiff/petitioner.” The matter did not appear in the Cause List on the returnable date, and counsel on behalf of Eleanora Shipping Co. Ltd., the owner of “M.V PRAPTI”, hereinafter referred to as “the owner”, mentioned the matter and prayed for variation of the order. The Hon'ble Judge upon hearing counsel for the owner, was not inclined to vary the order, though leave was granted to make, and an application was made on behalf of the owner on August 28, 1997 for dismissal of the suit and the plaint be taken off the file. Parties agreed, that upon completion of the filing of affidavits the two applications ought to be heard analogously and the Court gave directions accordingly. The matter was thereafter released by the Hon'ble Judge, and His Lordship The Hon'ble Acting Chief Justice assigned the matters to be heard by this Court. The matters were heard analogously on September 18, 22, and 23, 1997.

3. In the course of the hearing of the applications, a further application was sought to be moved on behalf of one, Rastrya Ispat Nigam Limited, a Government company whose goods had been loaded on “M.V PRAPTI”, the vessel under arrest. It was submitted by counsel for the petitioner that pending the hearing of the two applications, presently being heard by the Court, his client, though not a party to the disputes in the two applications suffered and would continue to suffer irreparable loss and damages. He prayed that his client would deposit a sum of Rs. 1 crore by way of securing the claim of the plaintiff and the vessel may be permitted to sail to Bedi Bander in the State of Gujarat, and there unload the petitioner's cargo, and the vessel would continue to be under arrest both throughout the voyage and thereafter. Except for Eleanora Shipping Company Limited, the owner of the vessel, none of the other parties objected to the making of an order in terms of the prayer made by the petitioner. Since it was clear that hearing of the two applications would continue and the petitioner was a Government Company, I was of the view that public money would be wasted if the vessel was not allowed to carry the cargo, already loaded, to the port of Bedi Bander, and since the petitioner would deposit the sum of Rs. 1 crore which would in effect secure the claim of the plaintiff if any, none of the parties would suffer any prejudice or injustice of any manner, and for those reasons an interim order was made in that application, on September 18, 1997 to the effect that upon deposit of a sum of Rs. 1 crore by Rastrya Ispat Nigam Limited with the joint-receivers, being two advocates-on-record for the petitioner and the plaintiff, the vessel would, under arrest, sail out of Vishakhapatnam and to the port of Bedi Bander in the State of Gujarat and unload the cargo belonging to the petitioner and thereafter the vessel would continue to remain in Bedi Bander under arrest until further orders of this Court. At the instance of the parties directions were given for filing of affidavits.

4. It was contended on behalf of the owners, that since the vessel was berthed in the port of Vishakhapatnam this Court had no jurisdiction to try or entertain this application because this Court had admiralty jurisdiction over vessel lying within the jurisdiction of the Admiralty Court at Calcutta, and reliance was placed on the decision reported in AIR 1923 Rangoon 163. It was submitted by counsel appearing for the owners, that though the admiralty laws of England were applicable to Indian Courts, none of the English enactments which came into operation since the enactment of the Indian Independence Act, 1947 would be applicable in India, and in support of his submissions he cited and relied on AIR 1993 SC 1014. As regards admiralty jurisdiction the last Act of the English Parliament before the Indian Independence Act 1947, was the English Administration of Justice Act, 1928, he contended, and therefore the admiralty jurisdiction of the High Courts in India by reason of the Supreme Court-judgment was limited to the last English enactment in 1928. The concept of arrest of a I ‘sister ship’ according to him was for the first time introduced in England in Section 3(4) of The Administration of Justice Act 1956 and therefore not applicable in India, and he relied on an unreported judgment of this Court dated May 9, 1996 in Appeal No. 85 of 1995 (Essar Oil v. Owners & Parties Interested in the Barge Pegh). In its decision, it was argued on behalf of the owners, the Court of Appeal had interpreted the judgment of the Supreme Court, mentioned above, and had specifically held that the Brussels Convention did not apply in India, and relying on the decision reported in AIR 1971 SC 1 it was also submitted that Brussels Convention would not apply in India also because India was not a signatory to it. Relying heavily on the unreported judgment of the Court of Appeal of this Court it was submitted, that the above judgment of the Supreme Court did not in any manner change the position of Admiralty Laws in India. The arbitration proceedings commenced in London were prior to the institution of the suit in rem before this Court, and that the averments and the prayers in the plaint made it quite clear that the intention of the plaintiff was simply to secure the claim made in the arbitration, contended counsel for the owners, and that the suit was liable to be stayed on that ground, and once again he relied on the decision in the unreported judgment of this Court mentioned above, that the Indian Courts had no jurisdiction to arrest a ship to secure an award which may be made in a pending arbitration and that on those grounds this Court had no jurisdiction to direct the owners to furnish security which would in effect secure the claim of the plaintiff in the arbitration, pending in London. Consideration would however, not be the same, according to him, if no arbitration proceedings were pending as was the case in the decision reported in 1984 (1) Lloyd's Law Report 235. He argued, that even if this Court did have the jurisdiction to entertain an admiralty action on the basis of manager, disponent-owner, or beneficial owner, the pre-conditions for such an action to be entertained by the Court did not exist in the present facts or circumstances. He relied on Thomas on Maritime Liens; Vol. 14 and the decision reported in 1977 (1) Lloyds Law Report 536, and contended, that it was essential for the plaintiff to prove that at the time when the cause of action arose, the owner, charterer or one in possession or control, of the vessel in connection with which the claim was made, would be liable on the claim in an action in personam; and that at the time when the action was brought, the categories of persons mentioned earlier, must beneficially own the vessel in respect to which the claim arose or a sister ship, to the extent of all the shares in the vessels. He argued, that a person having sufficient control and possession of a vessel could be termed to be a beneficial owner, and he further relied on Thomas on Maritime Liens, Vol. 14 and the decision reported in 1978 (1) Lloyd's Law Report, 184 and submitted that the burden fell on the plaintiff to prove that the defendant was the beneficial owner of the arrested ship. He relied on the decision reported in 1981 (2) Lloyd's Law Report 153 and 1978 (1) Lloyds Law Report, 184 in support of his submission that the bare allegations made by the plaintiff in its pleadings before this Court were not sufficient to prove that “M.V PRAPTI” was beneficially owned by Arabian Express Line Ltd. In particular, he contended that the judgment in 1977 (1) Lloyd's Law Report 536 was emphatic, that managers and operators cannot be said to be in control and possession of a vessel, though the House of Lords had reversed the judgment on other grounds. He also argued that the allegations of beneficial ownership contained in the affidavit of arrest were affirmed for and on behalf of the plaintiff as information received from Sandersons & Horgans and that such verifications were not admissible in evidence and he relied on the decision reported in AIR 1970 SC 652 : (1970 Lab IC 566).

5. In his submissions made on behalf of the plaintiff, counsel relied on Sections 2(2), 2(3) and proviso (a) of The Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act 1890, and submitted that this Court had been declared to be one of the three Colonial Courts of Admiralty by the Colonial Courts of Admiralty (India) Act, 1891, giving the three Courts at Bombay, Calcutta and Madras, jurisdiction over vessels lying anywhere within the territorial waters of India. Reliance was placed on the decision reported in an unreported judgment of the Bombay High Court, dated December 4, 1995, (Marine Engineers (India) v. Owners and Parties Interested in The Vessel “INNOVATIVE-I”) and it was submitted that the Courts including this Court have accordingly exercised and are continuing to exercise admiralty jurisdiction, to adjudicate disputes concerning vessels berthed anywhere in the territorial waters of the country. It was contended on behalf of the plaintiff, that the owner had admitted in its petition that the charterers were the managers of the arrested vessel and showed from certificates being annexures “A” and “B” to its petition that there were no common directors or share-holders, though the names of the directors of Eleanora Shipping Company Limited were not disclosed. According to counsel for the plaintiff, the owner had furnished the names of the share-holders and the secretary of company, though deliberately and with intent had refrained from furnishing the shareholding pattern of Kalori, the holder of 999 shares out of a total of 1000 subscribed shares of the company, yet undoubtedly the factum in that respect was within the special knowledge of the owner. He strongly contended that in those circumstances, the owners were under an obligation to disclose the share-holding pattern of Kalori and the names of the directors of Eleanora Shipping Company Limited, in compliance with Section 106 of the Evidence Act, 1872 and in the event of non-compliance the Court was bound to presume as under Section 114(g) of the Act. He argued, that one Nocholas Papoutsakis, a Greek Lawyer who was present in Court during the hearing on September 18, 1997 was one of the directors of Eleanora Shipping Company Limited and was also a share-holder of Kalori. It was sbmitted with great stress, that in its affidavit-in-opposition the plaintiff had named the directors of both the charterers and the owners and it remained uncontroverted by the owners in its affidavit-in-reply. He relied on the decisions reported in 1982 (2) Lloyds Law Report 255 and 1978 (1) Lloyds Law Report 184 and submitted, that the Court would lift the corporate veil to ascertain who in fact were the directors or the owners or the charterers and share-holder-pattern of the companies. This instant suit argued counsel for the plaintiff was an action against the charterer for non-payment of charter-hire in respect of the vessel owned by the plaintiff, against any other vessel of which the charterer might be the beneficial owner or in possession, control or management, and this action was certainly not a sistership action, and in support of the proposition of law he relied on 1971 (1) Lloyd's Law Report 145. (Andrea Ursula), 1982 (1) Lloyd's Law Reports 225 Span Terza), 1982 (2) Lloyd's Law Report 532 (The Sartum, Hongkong), 1978 (1) Lloyds Law Report 311 (The Permina 108 Singapore and 1987 (2) Lloyds Law Report 164 (Jalmatsya). He contended, that the decision reported in AIR 1993 SC 1014 had made it abundantly clear that jurisdiction of the Courts were not frozen as of Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act 1890, and also recognised the importance and binding nature of various international conventions and principles of international law recognised and adopted by such conventions, and therefore in the absence of specific statutory provisions Courts were at liberty to take note of such conventions as the Brussels Conventions in keeping with the statutes in that respect. He submitted that colonial courts of admiralty were bound and obliged as the English Courts, to have recourse to international law and comity of nations. The plaintiff was entitled to commence arbitration proceedings in London, submitted counsel, and obtain an order of arrest in respect to a vessel owned or beneficially owned managed, in possession or controlled by the person against whom the plaintiff had a claim by way of security for the award which may be made in the pending arbitration. He relied on the decisions reported in 1993 (1) Lloyd's Law Report 101 (The Bazias ‘3’) where it had been laid down in clear and succint terms that the principle was a principle of common law and therefore according to him, the Indian Courts were free to resort to common law. With regard to the verification of the affidavit of arrest, it was submitted on behalf of the plaintiff, that reliance placed on the records of its advocates was a normal practice in admiralty matters since foreign parties have their affidavits affirmed by their constituted attorney, who often rely on the records of their principals, and it was pointed out that in the verification of the petition filed on behalf of the owners, the capacity in which the deponent had verified was not disclosed and no submission was made by counsel for the owners in that respect, and therefore, it was submitted, that one living in a glass house could ill afford to throw stones.

6. Perhaps it was not a pleasure-cruise on the vast and often uncharted expanse of admiralty laws, but indeed several interesting and pertinent points of both admiralty and common law, for the purpose of adjudicating the differences among the parties, were dealt with the counsels for the parties, assiduously and with erudition. The plaintiff's application was one, where an interim order was sought that would protect the alleged claim of the plaintiff till the disposal of the suit. The prayers in the application made on behalf of Eleanora Shipping Company Ltd. on the other hand were for dismissal of the suit. Therefore, it would in my view, be quite necessary to consider the facts and the relevant laws applicable in close consonance with the submissions made on behalf of the parties.

7. Primarily it would be my endeavour to see if this Court at all had the jurisdiction to entertain this matter, since the arrested vessel was lying in the port of Vishakhapatnam, admittedly outside the territorial waters of this Court. In other words, whether this Court was empowered in the circumstances to arrest a vessel which was berthed outside the jurisdiction of its territorial waters. Should my findings be in the negative, of course the matter would rest there as far as this Court was concerned. It would not be necessary for me to consider the matter any further. If however, I should find in the affirmative, then it would surely be necessary to consider whether the vessel “M.V PRAPTI” was beneficially owned, managed, in possessioin or control of Arabian Express Line Ltd. the charterers.

8. The objection as to verification, sought to be raised by counsel for the owners, appeared to me to have been raised merely in the passing, so was I am afraid the counter allegation, that the capacity in which the deponent had verified the petition filed on behalf of the owner had not been disclosed. Of course, two wrongs did not make a right. After all, these were admiralty matters where foreign nationals were concerned and how important was it really, to the bearing of the disputes among the parties whether reliance was or was not placed on verification made on the basis of records in the custody of the advocates on record, of if a deponent otherwise duly authorised did or did not indicate in the verification as to how the deponent was connected with the party. I am inclined to hold, that such issues were irrelevant and immaterial for the purpose of deciding the disputes between the parties. The submission of counsel for the plaintiff that those living in a glass house could ill afford to throw stones, particularly appealed to me.

9. I shall now deal with the owner's prayer for stay of the suit on ground that the plaintiff had commenced arbitration proceedings in London. Arbitration proceedings admittedly had been commenced by the plaintiff and were pending in London against the charters, and not against the owners. There could, in my view, therefore be no reason for the proceedings to be considered as parallel proceedings. The plaintiff was seeking to recover its dues from the charterer, and as it was entitled to it had taken recourse to arbitration proceedings in London in that respect. On the basis, that the vessel “M.V PRAPTI”, then berthed in the port of Vishakhapatnam, was beneficially owned, managed, in possession and control of the charterers, the plaintiff had then instituted on admiralty suit in this Court, with the clear intention of realising its alleged dues. The plaintiff was surely entitled in law to secure its claim by causing the vessel to be arrested and ultimately sold if so found on the disposal of the suit. In the process, if the claim in the arbitration became secured also, that could surely not be a ground for rejecting the plaintiff's prayer in this application. There was in fact no question of arresting a sister-ship. It was not the case of the plaintiff that “M.V PRAPTI” was any sister of a vessel in respect to which the claim of the plaintiff had arisen. The introduction of the fiction of ‘sister-ship’, I would tend to believe was a red-herring. Quite unwarranted, and caught unaware could create utter confusion. In the decision reported in 1993 (1) Lloyd's Law Reports 101, the English Court of Appeal had considered similar facts, where during the pendency of arbitration claiming unpaid hire charges and damages, the plaintiff had issued proceedings in rem against the vessels in order to obtain security for their claim in pending arbitration, and the Court was not inclined to release the arrested vessels and had observed, that the vessels would, “only be released on the provision of sufficient security to cover the amount of the claim plus interest and costs on the basis of the plaintiffs' reasonably arguable best case’. In the decision reported in 1987 (2) Lloyd's Law Reports 164, the English Courts further decided, that, “if an arbitration had been commenced and if the claimants in the arbitration had not obtained security for any possible award they could quite properly issue a writ in rem if they knew that a ship belonging to the respondents in the arbitration was coming within the jurisdiction and they might arrest that ship in order to obtain security:” This principle of allowing a claimant in an arbitration to secre the claim by issuing a writ in rem was of course, a principle based on common law procedure. Their Lordships in their decision, reported in AIR 1993 SC 1014, it must be remembered, had observed, “Procedure is but a handmaiden of justice and the cause of justice can never be allowed to be thwarted by any procedural technicalities.” “For those reasons, I would tend to find that the plaintiff had not resorted to any abuse of the process of the Court by instituting the admiralty suit in this Court to secure its claim made in the pending arbitration, already commenced in London.

10. Admiralty jurisdiction exercised by the High Courts at Bombay, Calcutta and Madras emanate from the provisions of the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act, 1890, and by virtue of Sections 2(2), 2(3), Proviso (a) to the Act, a Colonial Court of Admiralty had been put at par with the English High Courts, as regards the exercise of their admiralty jurisdiction. By the enactment of the Colonial Courts of Admiralty (India) Act, 1891 the three Courts became the only Colonial Courts of Admiralty. Their Lordships in the decision reported in AIR 1993 SC 1014, deliberated, “The power of the Court is plenary and unlimited unless it is expressly or by necessary implication curtailed…….. This power of the Court to render justice must necessarily include the power to make interlocutory orders for arrest and attachment before judgment………. The High Courts in India are superior Courts of record………. They have inherent and plenary powers. Unless expressly or impliedly barred and subject to appellate or discretionary jurisdiction of this Court, the High Courts have unlimited jurisdiction including the jurisdiction to determine their own powers.” As on date such powers are continuing and the three High Courts are exercising unlimitedly admiralty jurisdiction over the coastal waters of India. Those decisions, in which the Courts had in the past adopted the narrow view as regards the admiralty jurisdiction exercisable by the Courts in India their Lordships held, “the High Courts took an unduly restrictive view of Courts' admiralty jurisdiction by limiting it to what was permitted by the Admiralty Court Act, 1861 and the Colonial Courts Act, 1890. This was in our view an unjustified abdication of and self-assumed fetter on competence to render justice”. While it was not incorrect, that India had not adopted the various Brussels Convention of 1926, 1952 or 1967, the provisions of these conventions were derived from international ‘unification’ and development of maritime laws. These were the ‘international common law’ or ‘transnational law’ arising from the general principles of national laws, which in the absence of specific statutory provisions, could, as was observed by their Lordships in the Supreme Court of India, “be adopted and adapted by Courts to supplement and compliment national statutes on the subject. In the absence of a general maritime code these principles aid the Courts in filling up the lacunae in the Merchant Shipping Act and other enactments concerning shipping.” Therefore, there could be little doubt today, that this Court as a Colonial Admiralty Court would be free to exercise powers including that of arrest of vessels lying anywhere within the territorial-waters of the Country. In particular, the provisions of the Brussels Convention 1952 would be relevant to draw analogy for the purpose of deciding both the questions of jurisdiction and arrest. “Where statute is silent, and judicial intervention is required Courts strive to redress grievances according to what is perceived to principles of justice, equity and good conscience”.

11. It was significant that this aspect of the contention by counsel for the plaintiff had not been dealt with at all in the submissions made on behalf of the owners. Though, it was denied by him that the Brussels Convention 1952 had any relevance in any manner in these proceedings, counsel for the owners sought to rely on Article 3(2) of the Convention in support of his contention, that a beneficial owner must be shown to be the owner of all the shares in the arrested vessel. Be that as it may, the decision of the Supreme Court of India, referred to above, was the prevailing law as regards maritime liens in India.

12. Somewhere, in the course of his submissions, counsel for the owners had admitted that except for the signature of the charterers, with their official seal appearing under the caption marked ‘Signature (owner)’, in the ‘charter party’ concerning “M.V PRAPTI”, the plaintiff was unable to adduce any evidence to substantiate its allegations that the charterer was in possession and control of ‘M.V PRAPTI’. Involuntarily perhaps but there was no answer whatsoever to this exception by the owners even by way of an explanation. The ‘charter party’ also disclosed, that in its box No. 3, marked “Owners/Place of business (CP. 1)” appeared the following, “Arabian Express Line Ltd., U.K As Managers for Eleanora Snipping Company Limited, Cyprus.” There were no satisfactory explanation in that respect either. In its petition, the owners had asserted with great force that there were no common directors of either Eleanora Shipping Company Ltd. or Arabian Express Line Ltd., yet no such averment would appear to have been made in the affidavit in opposition filed on behalf of the owners to the plaintiff's affidavit of arrest. It was indeed strange, that the owners maintained stoic silence in the face of such serious allegations, that it was with ulterior motive that the vessel was registered in Cyprus; while the majority holding in the vessel-owning company was registered in Liberia, a country widely known for its unwillingness to disclose particulars of companies which were registered in that country. Further/allegations by the plaintiff that the owners and the charterers were one and the same entity or sister-concerns, both owned by Arun Prabhakar Joshi, were sought to be controverted by the owners by producing documents and certificates showing who owned how many shares of the vessel “M.V PRAPTI” and disclosing the name of the Secretary of Eleanora Shipping Company Ltd., but not a single document was produced to disclose the share-holding pattern of either the owners or the majority shareholder, one Kalori, nor the names of the directors. During the course of the hearing of the two applications, the plaintiff produced a certificate dated September 10, 1997, issued by the Registrar of Companies, showing that Arun Prabhakar Joshi was one of the directors of Eleanora Shipping Company Ltd. and there was no denial by the owners. In these circumstances, the factum of shareholding of Kalori would almost certainly be considered to be within the special-knowledge of the owners and therefore in the light of Section 106 of the Evidence Act, 1872, the owners would be under an obligation to disclose such factum and since they have not done so, under Section 114(g) of the Act, I would be constrained to assume adversely to the interest of the owners.

13. In view of the ensuing Puja holidays, I was pressed for time. I would rather consider the decisions cited in this case more fully and in greater depth, though I have no manner of doubt that had I the opportunity to do so my conclusions would not have been any different, of course it was possible I would have expressed myself in greater detail and more elegantly. I would not care to go on record as claiming to have sharp memory, though I am not unaware that as at present the claim of the plaintiff has been secured to the extent of Rs. 1 crore, deposited not by any of the parties with any interest in the vessel “M.V PRAPTI” but in the cargo which had been loaded in the vessel in the port of Vishakhapatnam. Counsel for the petitioner had submitted in clear terms, that his client was under no obligation to furnish any security in these proceedings in which his clients were not even a party, but by reason of the order of arrest, his clients had suffered and continued to suffer loss of enormous sums of money and it was on that ground that it was of utmost expediency that the cargo was carried to Bedi Bander in Gujarat and on that account to ensure that the vessel would sail from Vishakhapatnam to Bedi Bander his clients were agreeable to and did deposit a sum of Rs. 1 crore towards the claim of the plaintiff. It must of course be borne in mind that the deposit was made in an ad-interim order, where the application was pending disposal upon completion of affidavits.

14. The single reason for the arrest of the vessel was that this Court was prima facie satisfied that the plaint in the suit was not entirely without any cause of action and therefore the plaintiff was entitled to have the order of arrest continued till the disposal of the suit by way of security for its claim. To withdraw the order of arrest and allow the vessel to sail away on the basis of the deposit of Rs. 1 crore, in respect to which there was no final order till date, would, as I see it, totally frustrate the reasoning on the basis of which Courts grant security in similar admiralty matters. It was possible that the owners without a care to defend the suit in this Court, would ensure that the vessel did not enter the coastal waters of India and stayed well out of the reach of admiralty Courts in this country. In spite of the suit and all the deliberations of the Courts, the plaintiff would be left literally, high and dry, and the vessel would be scot-free and roaming the high seas with impunity.

15. For those reasons, the application made on behalf of the owners, Eleanora Shipping Company Ltd. is dismissed and they shall pay costs of this application assessed at 100 GM. The ad interim order dated August 22, 1997 made in the plaintiffs application for arrest is confirmed. The vessel “M.V PRAPTI” shall continue to be under arrest and shall so continue to remain in the port of Bedi Bander, State of Gujarat until further orders of this Court, or till the disposal of the suit.

16. Parties to this application, the Marshall, the Port-authorities, Customs-authorities and the Port-police at the port of Bedi Bander, shall act on the operative portion of this judgment.

17. Stay was prayed for and was refused.

Order accordingly.