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The State Of West Bengal v. Nebulal Shaw
Structured Summary of the Opinion (R. Bhattacharyya, J. & S.K. Mookherjee, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
The opinion concerns an application by the prosecuting agency seeking cancellation of bail granted to the accused (named Nebulal in the opinion). The prosecuting agency had repeatedly challenged an impugned bail order: the High Court had earlier rejected bail applications by different Benches, but ultimately a Division Bench admitted the accused to bail subject to conditions. The matter reached the apex Court, which transmitted the case to be considered "in accordance with law." There were two relevant orders of the trial court: an order dated 13.3.96 rejecting bail (before commitment) and a later order dated 28.3.96 (after commitment) by the learned Sessions Judge granting bail. The prosecuting agency contended that no new or material circumstances arose between 13.3.96 and 28.3.96 to justify enlargement on bail, and thus sought cancellation.
Substantive facts recorded in the opinion: the victim suffered a brutal assault and died; the petitioner (accused) was closely associated with a co-accused and was alleged to have been involved in the machination resulting in the victim's ignoble death. The offence was described as prima facie grave and horrific in its facts, and earlier materials (including section 161 statements) had informed the earlier rejection of bail.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the bail granted by the Sessions Judge on 28.3.96 should be cancelled on the ground that the court which granted bail did not exercise judicial mind and there were no fresh or substantial circumstances warranting enlargement on bail after a prior rejection on 13.3.96.
- Whether a subordinate court (here, the Sessions Judge) was correct in granting bail when superior courts had earlier rejected bail applications, and whether that conduct breached principles of judicial discipline/comity.
- Whether the High Court (or the court now considering cancellation) may cancel bail that was improperly granted, and what legal tests and principles apply to cancellation of bail (including the relevance of post-bail conduct and the broader tests applicable under sections 437/439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as explained by apex Court authorities).
Arguments of the Parties
Prosecuting Agency / Public Prosecutor
- Challenged the propriety of the bail order dated 28.3.96 on the ground that the enlargement on bail occurred despite overwhelming adverse materials on record and without any new or important circumstances arising between 13.3.96 (rejection) and 28.3.96 (grant).
- Contended that the Session Judge failed to apply judicial mind when admitting the petitioner to bail and that the language used by the Sessions Judge (e.g., observing the petitioner was "remotely" and "may be viably connected with offence") showed inadequate judicial reasoning.
- Relied on a Supreme Court decision (State of Maharashtra v. Captain Buddhikota Subha Rao, AIR 1989 SC 2292) to argue that a subordinate court should not grant bail reversing a superior court's rejection without substantial change of circumstances, invoking principles of judicial discipline, propriety and comity.
Petitioner / Counsel for the Accused (Mr. Dutta)
- Argued that there was a total absence of application of judicial mind in the order that led the Sessions Judge to enlarge the petitioner on bail (i.e., the prosecution's criticism of judicial reasoning was misplaced because the Sessions Judge had considered the matter).
- Asserted that the petitioner had clean conduct after being bailed out (described as "virgin matter") and that it would be futile for the State to seek cancellation of bail under these circumstances.
- Maintained that the co-ordinate jurisdiction of courts cannot be ignored (i.e., lower courts may entertain bail applications), though the opinion records the Court's refusal to endorse the submission that a court cannot entertain bail after a superior court's rejection in all circumstances.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| State Of Maharashtra v. Captain Buddhikota Subha Rao, AIR 1989 SC 2292 | Judicial discipline, propriety and comity: subordinate courts should exercise restraint in granting bail that reverses prior orders of superior courts without substantial change in facts; convention that a subsequent application be placed before the same Judge who disposed of earlier applications to avoid abuse and inconsistency. | The court cited this decision to support the prosecuting agency's contention that the Sessions Judge ought not to have granted bail in the face of earlier rejections by superior courts and that the grant showed lack of judicial discipline and firmness. The Court relied on these principles to find infirmity in the Sessions Judge's order dated 28.3.96. |
| Delhi Administration v. Sanjay Gandhi, AIR 1978 SC 961 | Clarifies the grounds for cancellation of bail: often interpreted to mean cancellation only where supervening circumstances arise, but also holding that courts under s.439(2) may cancel bail that was improperly granted. | Justice Mookherjee used this decision to show that cancellation of bail is not limited to post-bail misconduct; a bail order that is improperly granted can be reviewed and cancelled by the High Court under its powers. The decision was relied upon to justify cancellation when bail was granted improperly. |
| Gurcharan Singh v. State (Delhi Administration), AIR (same volume) p. 179 | Summarised overriding considerations relevant to grant or cancellation of bail (applicable to ss. 437(1) and 439(1)/(2)): (i) nature and gravity of offence; (ii) position/status of accused relative to victim and witnesses; (iii) likelihood of flight; (iv) likelihood of repeating offence or jeopardising life; (v) likelihood of tampering with witnesses; (vi) history of case and investigation; (vii) other relevant variable factors. | The court (Justice Mookherjee) applied these tests to the present facts and earlier findings of courts, concluding it was within jurisdiction to reverse the Sessions Judge's grant of bail and to cancel it because the grant was improper in light of these factors and earlier rejections of bail. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court's reasoning proceeds in a stepwise fashion, grounded in (a) the record materials and prior orders, (b) established legal parameters for cancellation of bail, and (c) application of apex Court precedent.
1. Parameters for cancellation: The opinion sets out illustrative circumstances that may justify cancellation of bail (paras (a)–(f) in the text). These include tampering with evidence, commission of similar or heinous offences during bail, absconding, grave law-and-order consequences, incorrect exercise of judicial power by the lower court, and misuse of bail privilege (including danger to the accused's life). The Court emphasises that this is not an exhaustive list but provides guiding factors.
2. Comparison of the two orders: The Court examined the earlier order dated 13.3.96 (which rejected bail) and the subsequent order dated 28.3.96 (which granted bail). The Court found that the record and the accompanying materials (including witness statements under s.161 CrPC and related circumstances) had earlier impressed the trial court to refuse bail. The later order, however, showed words and conclusions (notably "remotely" and "may be viably connected with offence") that the Court found indicative of an inadequate application of judicial mind. The Court described the two orders as irreconcilable and creating a "gulf."
3. Absence of new circumstances: The Court found no material change in the factual or evidentiary position between the two orders that could justify reversal of the earlier refusal. The conduct of co-accused and facts relevant to fair trial, present at the time of the earlier rejection, remained and were not overcome by fresh evidence or circumstances.
4. Judicial discipline/comity: Invoking the principle, through the cited Supreme Court authority (State of Maharashtra v. Captain Buddhikota Subha Rao), the Court emphasised that a subordinate court should not lightly grant bail in a manner that undermines consistency and judicial discipline when superior courts had recently rejected bail without substantial change of circumstances.
5. High Court's power to cancel improperly granted bail: Justice Mookherjee supplemented the bench's reasoning by clarifying the proper interpretation of Delhi Administration v. Sanjay Gandhi. Although that decision is often said to restrict cancellation to post-bail conduct, a careful reading permits cancellation where bail was improperly granted. He also invoked Gurcharan Singh to set out the tests (nature/gravity, position/status, flight risk, repetition of offences, tampering, investigation history, and other factors) applicable in determining bail and cancellation.
6. Application to this case: Applying these tests and considering the earlier rejections and the prima facie gravity of the offence (a brutal assault leading to death), the Court concluded the Sessions Judge's grant of bail was improper. The language used by the Sessions Judge and the absence of any fresh, material circumstance led the Court to accept the Public Prosecutor's contentions and reject the petitioner's arguments.
7. Procedural outcome: The Court therefore set aside the Sessions Judge's order dated 28.3.96, allowed the prayer for cancellation of bail, and directed the petitioner to surrender to custody forthwith. The Court refused a stay on its order and directed that, if an urgent certified copy of the order is applied for, the Criminal Section should deliver it before the X-mas holidays.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
THE BAIL GRANTED ON 28.3.96 IS CANCELLED. The impugned order granting bail to the petitioner was set aside, and the petitioner was directed to surrender to custody forthwith. The application for cancellation of bail was allowed and the matter disposed of.
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: The accused who had been enlarged on bail by the Sessions Judge must surrender to custody immediately as directed by the Court; the prosecution's prayer for cancellation of bail was allowed.
- Legal consequence regarding precedent and principle: The Court emphasised that the decision rested on established principles and precedents of the Supreme Court concerning judicial discipline and the circumstances under which bail may be cancelled. The bench proceeded on the basis of well-settled apex Court principles (as expressly stated in the order), and applied the tests laid down by earlier decisions to the record before it.
- No novel legal doctrine was announced; rather, the Court applied established tests and precedent to conclude that a bail order improperly granted may be cancelled and that a court should exercise judicial restraint and assure consistency when a superior court has recently rejected bail without substantial change in circumstances.
Disposition note from the opinion: "The application is, accordingly, disposed of." The Court also refused an application for stay of its order, confirming immediate effect.
Prepared from the text of the provided opinion delivered by R. Bhattacharyya, J. and S.K. Mookherjee, J. All content in this summary is drawn exclusively from that opinion and does not add or infer facts or law beyond the text.
R. Bhattacharyya, J.:—The taste of the pudding is in the eating. The propriety of a judicial order or the judgment is, therefore, to be tested in the light of the law and fact. It is the judicial seal which makes an order or judgment sacrosanct. Following from the above concept, the application of judicial mind is the pole star to determine its objectivity.
2. The prosecuting agency has widely challenged the impugned order of bail granted to Nebulal which suffered rejections by the High Court from time to time by different Benches. Ultimately, Nebulal was admitted to bail by the Division Bench on certain conditions & that pushed the prosecuting agency to the apex Court where it challenged the viability of bail. The apex Court, upon hearing the parties, transmitted the case for consideration of bail in accordance with law. The learned Public Prosecutor became very much sore over the granting of bail dated 28.3.96 In the context, the prayer for cancellation of bail has been lit up by the prosecuting agency on the ground that the enlargement of the petitioner on bail in the face of overwhelming materials is short of law. The rejection of prayer for bail on 13.3.96 before commitment and enlarging the petitioner on bail after commitment at an interval of fortnight on 28.3.96, according to the prosecuting agency, does not constitute any new and important circumstances which could pave the way for the petitioner to be enlarged on bail. The reflection of judicial mind is conspicuously silent while admitting the petitioner to bail. The above has led to a judicial conflagration.
3. The prayer has been studiously opposed by the learned Counsel Mr. Dutta for the petitioner on the count that there was total absence of application of judicial mind which is glaring from the order that prevailed upon the learned Session Judge to enlarge the petitioner on bail. The conduct of the petitioner is/was virgin atter he was bailed out. In the premise, it is a futile exercise of the state to pray for cancellation of bail.
4. Reverting back to examine the potentiality of the claim, we find at the first glance for the manifestation of the materials on record that the case epitomises, fluster and fury. The victim suffered an ignoble death for the machination of the petitioner who was the friend, philosopher and guide of the co-accused. Victim was done to death when he became the target of brutal add assault and made him to succumb to injuries. The commission of the offence appears to be prima facie a horrible horror, for which, words are absent for its description. Without attaching any premium to the fatality of the occurrence, the impugned order has to be considered in the perspective of the well established and well defined guidelines provided by many courts of our country amongst which the apex Court is one, although there may be a few other factions which may flavour the judicial mind for consideration of bail. They are catalogued below:—
(a) When the accused was found tampering with the evidence during the investigation or during the trial.
(b) When the person on bail commits similar offence or any heinous offence during the period of bail.
(c) When the accused has absconded and trial of the case gets detailed on the account.
(d) When the offence so committed by the accused, that had created serious law and order problem in the society and accused had become a hazard on the peaceful living of the people.
(e) If the High Courts finds that the Lower Court granting bail has exercised its judicial power wrongly.
(f) If the High Courts or Session Courts find that the accused has misused the privilege of bail and if the life of the accused itself being danger.
5. The above constitutes the parameters for cancellation of bail, although an exhaustive list cannot be detailed as the circumstances vary from case to case. We are only concerned, if the learned court has exercised the judicial wisdom in enlarging the petitioner on bail.
6. It is noteworthy that the things were in ferment across the line of the defence claim for bail for the prima facie adverse materials on record which, according to the learned trial court highly answered against the claim for bail. It is manifest from the order sheet of 13.3.96 that the statements of the witnesses record u/s. 161 of the Cr. PC and other associated materials plus attending circumstances, in fact, imprinted on the mind of the court to reject the prayer for bail.
7. But it is preposterous to find from the order impugned dated 28.3.96 that the court took a soft view of the case of the defence for bail and admitted him on certain conditions. But the learned court made an observation that the petitioner “remotely” and “may be viably connected with offence”. This view of the learned court does not find favour with law.
8. It is needless to repeat that circumstances did not occur any considerable change in the earlier application for bail which, however, rejected by the same learned court. There is no nexus in between the first order dated 13.3.96 and the last order dated 28.3.96 The above two orders, in our view, an irreconsilable and has raised a gulf. To adjudge the viability of the order impugned, we are constrained to look back the order of 13.3.96
9. We do not express in the least that the petitioner is not entitled to bail but we leave on record that the circumstances listed above could not afford to release him on bail. The impugned order according to us must starrd to the test of exercise of judicial power. The employment of the words “remotely” and “may be viably connected” explodes the application of judicial mind in admitting the petitioner to bail considered with the earlier order dated 13.3.96 In the state of materials, it bears no profile.
10. Further, the reprehensible conduct of the other accused enlarged on bail and the fair trial were also available when the prayer for bail was rejected by the learned Session Judge and, therefore, there could be no new ground available on record to enlarge him on bail.
11. There is another important factor which should not be over-looked or ignored for the bail being accorded to the petitioner. The question arises in this way.
12. It is towering from the annexures where the superior court rejected the prayer for bail of the accused. The bail granted by the superior court fell for decision of the apex Court which rejected the prayer for bail with a direction to dispose of the same in accordance with law. We never indicate in our order that the accused is not entitled to bail. But when the bail has been granted by the learned Session Judge, the superior court is to consider that justice should be meted out to both parties.
13. It is a governing factor warranting the meticulous judicial exercise in its judicial wisdom. The order was hit or affected by infirmities when complained of it is the duty of the High Court in the interest of Justice to interfere with the order impugned in granting the bail. This is one aspect of the matter and we in our judicial wisdom cannot agree with the order passed by the learned Session Judge who accorded the prayer for bail and by the reason of his own observations, if we hark back, it, however, fell to conform to the legal elements blended with facts.
14. The learned Public Prosecutor has cited a decision of the Supreme Court to fuel his claim for cancellation of bail where the apex Court in State Of Maharashtra v. Captain Buddhikota Subha Rao . AIR 1989 SC 2292 made costic remark about the granting of bail by a court of sub-ordinate jurisdiction when rejected by superior court. Accordingly, he has contended that there was infraction of law, rules and convention when the learned Session Judge assumed jurisdiction to consider the prayer for bail, although the learned Session Judge had notice that the bail was cancelled by the superior court. For better appreciation, we quote below the observations of the apex Court:—
“The order granting bail was not proper and liable to be set aside. Judicial discipline, propriety and comity demanded that the order granting bail should not have been passed reversing all earlier orders including the one rendered by the single Judge of the same High Court only a couple of days before, in the absence of any substantial change in the fact situation. In such cases it is necessary to act with restraint and circumspection so that the process of the Court is not abused by a litigant and an impression does not gain ground that the litigant has either successfully avoided one Judge or selected another to secure an order which had hitherto eluded him. In such a situation the proper course, is to direct that the matter be placed before the same Judge who disposed of the earlier applications. Such a practice or convention would prevent abuse of the process of court inasmuch as it will prevent an impression being created that a litigant is avoiding or selecting a court to secure an order to his liking. Such a practice would also discourage the filing of successive bail applications without change of circumstances. Such a practice if adopted would be condusive to judicial discipline and would also save the Court's time as a Judge familiar with the facts would be able to dispose or the subsequent application with despatch. It will also result in consistency.”
15. He has oddly argued that granting of bail ignoring the rejection of bail by the High Court goes against all the canons of the judicial discipline. The Session Judge, according to him, cannot sit on the order of the High Court. It has resulted in a legal catastrophe both overtly and covertly.
16. It is trite saying that a person when admitted to bail by the High Court could only be committed to custody only by the High Court. Therefore, a person suffered rejection of bail could only agitate his claim to the very court which rejected the prayer for bail. However, the court cannot ignore the co-ordinate jurisdiction in entertaining an application for bail as argued by Mr. Dutta. But we do refrain ourselves from making any comment as Art. 141 of the Constitution is absolutely operative in the judicial field where High Court is no exception. With utmost respect, we must obey the decision of the apex Court.
17. Thus, on consideration of the overwhelming materials on record, we accept the contention of the learned Public Prosecutor of the State & reject the submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner as it bears no force.
18. Having considered the respective submissions, we do not find any merit in the order for bail dated 28.3.96 granted by the learned Session Judge and, accordingly, we allow the prayer for cancellation of bail after setting aside the order impugned. In fine, we direct the petitioner to surrender himself to custody forthwith.
19. The application is, accordingly, disposed of.
(R. Bhattacharyya, J.)
S.K Mookherjee, J.:—I respectfully agree with the well considered view of my learned brother, Bhattacharyya, J. I would only like to express my reasons for such concurrence by way of supplementing the reasons given by him. It is firmly established that rejection of bail upon consideration of an application for bail calls for an approach which must necessarily be different when an application for cancellation of bail is to be considered. The decision of the apex Court in the case of Delhi Administration v. Sanjay Gandhi, reported in AIR 1978 SC 961, is often interpreted to sustain a view that a bail can be cancelled only on availability of restricted grounds as fell for consideration of the apex Court in that case, namely, that supervening circumstances had come into existence for which it would no longer be conducive to a fair trial to allow the accused to retain his freedom during the trial. In other words, it is often thought that the said decision laid down a principle for cancellation of bail by taking into consideration the conduct of the accused person after the bail only and in no other circumstance. A careful reading of the said decision, however, shows that in it was in built a proposition that cancellation of bail involved a review of a decision already made and that it never prevented the courts, in exercise of their powers under s. 439(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, in a case where bail was improperly granted, to cancel the same. To construe the decision otherwise would be militating against the basic concept of justice and would render even a perverse order by which a bail is granted, to remain un-disturbed.
2. Indeed, the aforesaid interpretation of the judgement of the apex Court finds support from the ratio laid down in the case of Gurcharan Singh v. State (Delhi Administration) reported in the same volume of the AIR Supreme Court at page 179. The said decision summarised the over-riding considerations in the matter of grant of bail which are common both in the case of s. 437(1) and s. 439(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure as follows:—
(i) The nature and gravity of the circumstances in which the offence is committed;
(ii) The position and the status of the accused with reference to the victim and the witnesses;
(iii) The likelihood of the accused fleeing from justice;
(iv) The likelihood of the accused repeating the offences of jeopardising his own life being faced with a grim prospect of possible conviction in the case;
(v) The likelihood of tampering with witnesses;
(vi) The history of the case as well as of its investigation;
(vii) Other relevant grounds amenable to variable factors. The apex Court went on to find further that in the new Code under s. 439(2), a High Court might commit a person, released on bail under Chapter XXXIII by any Court including the Court of Session, to custody if it thinks appropriate to do so.
3. Applying the aforesaid tests and taking into consideration the findings made by different Courts at earlier stages or proceedings in rejecting the prayer for bail, which stare at the face, it is, in my view, well within the jurisdiction of this Court to adjudge the propriety of the order of the learned Sessions Judge granting bail, in the present case, to the accused person and, if necessary, to reverse the same. The grounds even by my learned brother amply establish that the grant of bail was itself improper and therefore, he is right in concluding that the bail ought to be cancelled. I have no hesitation to state that the bail has rightly been directed to be cancelled and the accused has been rightly directed to be taken into custody.
4. With the aforesaid observations, the application stands disposed of.
(S.K Mookherjee, J.)
Court: There is a prayer for stay of operation of the judgment and order passed today. But we refuse the same since we have proceeded on the basis of the principles well-settled by the apex Court in the country in directing the cancellation of the bail.
4. If an urgent certified copy of this order is applied for, the Criminal Section is directed to deliver the same before the X-mas holidays.
(S.K Mookherjee, J.)
R. Bhattacharyya, J.
A.N.S
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