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Siben Kumar Mondal v. Hindusthan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. And Another
Structured Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner sought a writ of mandamus (or in the nature of mandamus) directing the respondents to show cause why the petitioner should not be awarded a retail outlet dealership at Santipur adjacent to National Highway 34 in Nadia District.
Respondent No. 1 issued an advertisement on 26-12-1985 inviting applications for appointment as a dealer under "C" Category at Santipur. The petitioner applied and attended an interview before the Oil Selection Board in response to letters dated 13-4-1988 and 1-5-1988. The petitioner contends that his name was initially empanelled and later struck off, that members of the Oil Selection Board indicated at interview that he would be given the dealership, and that on advice of a Sales Officer he purchased 50 decimals of land adjacent to NH 34.
The respondents state that the Oil Selection Board considered all applicants in accordance with law and awarded the dealership to Sri Gobinda Gopal Pal after scrutiny; the Board was the final authority. The petitioner filed a supplementary affidavit and sought addition of Gobinda Gopal Pal as a party; that addition was allowed. The petitioner challenged the legality/validity of the dealership granted to Gobinda Gopal Pal.
The respondents produced partial records. The records show marks awarded to several candidates (Gobinda Gopal Pal 58; Animesh Chatterjee 54; Dinesh Chandra Mondal and Nirmal Kumar Mondal 51 each; and many other candidates with marks 41 or above). The petitioner alleged errors in marks computation and contended that some marking criteria (e.g., "general assessment and extra-curricular activities" and "full time working dealer") were irrelevant or not stated in the advertisement.
The writ application was contested on multiple grounds by respondents, including a preliminary objection about lack of an amendment application, the finality of the Oil Selection Board's decision, and that the petitioner had not properly pleaded facts to establish promissory estoppel. The respondents also relied on a revenue authority's order that found a bargadar claim (relating to land possession) to be concocted and directed correction of revenue records.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the petitioner is entitled to issuance of a writ of mandamus directing the respondents to show cause and ultimately awarding him the retail outlet dealership at Santipur.
- Whether the decision-making process of the Oil Selection Board was arbitrary, irrational or tainted by consideration of irrelevant factors (specifically whether marks awarded for "full time working dealer" and "general assessment & extra-curricular activities" were relevant and permissible).
- Whether the doctrine of promissory estoppel applies on the petitioner’s pleaded facts (i.e., whether the Board promised the petitioner the dealership and whether the petitioner pleaded and proved foundational facts for promissory estoppel).
- Whether equitable considerations (the conduct of the petitioner, intervening acts and investments by the selected candidate, delay) should preclude judicial interference under Article 226 despite any procedural defects.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments
- The petitioner asserted that he had been initially empanelled and later struck off without proper consideration.
- He alleged that members of the Oil Selection Board indicated at the interview that he would be given the dealership and relied on promissory estoppel.
- The petitioner claimed a marks computation/error issue — he contended his marks should be 41 instead of 31 (arguing the records show a mistake in aggregation).
- He argued that certain marking heads (full-time working dealer; general assessment & extra-curricular activities) were irrelevant because the advertisement did not state that extra-curricular activities would be considered.
- The petitioner challenged the legality/validity of the dealership granted to Gobinda Gopal Pal and raised a land-possession issue (alleging the land for the petrol pump was in possession of a bargadar).
Respondents' Arguments
- The Oil Selection Board considered all applicants as per established policy and procedure and correctly awarded the dealership to Gobinda Gopal Pal after document scrutiny; the Board is the final authority in selection.
- A preliminary objection: the petitioner had not moved to amend the writ petition to seek the relief now urged, and therefore relief should be disallowed.
- That the writ petition was framed largely on promissory estoppel, but the petitioner had not pleaded foundational facts or annexed evidence required to sustain that doctrine.
- Records and result-sheets, field inspection reports and other verifications were maintained; the selection process included interview, paneling, field investigation and review.
- Respondents relied on a revenue authority order that the bargadar claim was concocted; the selected candidate had obtained licences, invested substantial sums and significant time had elapsed (selection in 1988, matter pending about six years), so cancellation would cause irreparable injury and equity favours the selected candidate.
- Authorities and precedent support that the Court should not lightly interfere with selection decisions unless the decision-making process falls within parameters of judicial review (e.g., arbitrariness, abuse of power, breach of natural justice, etc.).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Delhi Transport Corporation v. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress, AIR 1991 SC 101 | Need to minimise arbitrary use of power; public rights should not be left to whims of individuals; rule of law preferred over unfettered discretion. | Cited to emphasize the requirement that state authorities exercise power by rule and not whim and to show the scope of judicial review when arbitrariness is alleged. |
| In re The Special Courts Bill, 1978, AIR 1979 SC 478 | Observed constitutional infirmities in appointment provisions; commentary on judicial independence and the "pleasure" doctrine (not strictly binding as it was a reference). | Referred to for its persuasive observations about the limits of discretion and the weight of Supreme Court observations even when rendered in a reference under Article 143. |
| Ramji Dayawala & Sons (P) Ltd. v. Invest Import, AIR 1981 SC 2085 | Discretion of a court or authority must be "sound discretion guided by law", not arbitrary, vague or fanciful (quoting Lord Mansfield). | Applied to reinforce that decisions must be governed by rule and not humour; supports principle that discretion must be legal and regular. |
| Y. Srinivasa Rao v. J. Veeraiah, (1992) 3 SCC 63 : AIR 1993 SC 929 | Caution against leaving matters to whims where interview is sole criterion without guidelines; such unbridled power may violate Article 14. | Distinguished: the Court held this precedent inapplicable because the Oil Selection Board here considered multiple factors beyond the interview (field reports, finances, etc.). |
| Gurdeep Singh v. State of J. & K., AIR 1993 SC 2638 | Prohibition on introducing eligibility criteria after the cut-off date or selection process to benefit a single candidate; objectionable "show me the man, I will show you the rule" conduct. | Used to note that if criteria not in advertisement, retrospective introduction is impermissible; Court observed extra-curricular activities were not stipulated and thus were not correctly taken into account. |
| Shri Sitaram Sugar Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 1277 | Repository of power acts ultra vires when acting in excess, abusing power, acting for inadmissible purposes or on irrelevant grounds; acts open to challenge if arbitrary or unreasonable. | Cited to state the general proposition that administrative acts are subject to challenge if arbitrary or on irrelevant grounds; court acknowledged principle but found petitioner not entitled to relief on equities. |
| Regional Manager v. Pawan Kumar Dubey, AIR 1976 SC 1766 | Ratio decidendi depends on the rule deduced by applying law to facts; additional or different facts can make a world of difference between two cases. | Invoked to stress that decisions are fact-sensitive and that differences in facts may distinguish precedent; court distinguished cited authorities on facts. |
| Bharat Singh v. State of Haryana, (1988) 4 SCC 534 : AIR 1988 SC 2181 | When a point of law depends on facts, the party must plead and prove such facts in the writ petition or counter-affidavit and annex evidence; writ petitions require facts and supporting evidence. | Cited and applied to hold that the petitioner failed to plead/produce foundational facts and evidence necessary to sustain promissory estoppel; hence that point could not be accepted. |
| Chinmoy Sarkar v. Md. Shaniat Hossain, AIR 1990 Cal 412 | Relied upon by respondents for the proposition that selection decisions carry finality and courts should not interfere lightly. | Invoked by respondents as supporting their preliminary objection that the Board's decision is final and the writ should not be granted absent proper amendment or pleaded grounds. |
| Rohtas Industries Ltd. v. S.D. Agarwal, AIR 1969 SC 707 | Discretion is to be exercised according to rules of reason and justice, not private opinion; decisions should not be arbitrary, vague or fanciful (quoting Susannah Sharp v. Wakefield). | Cited to underline that statutory or administrative discretion must conform to reason and justice; court used it to reinforce principle limiting arbitrary discretion. |
| Munindra Kumar v. Rajiv Govil, AIR 1991 SC 1607 | In modulating relief, the conduct and equities of successful candidates are relevant; court may refrain from quashing selections where selected persons have joined posts and suffered prejudice. | Applied by this Court to hold that equities (respondent's investments, licences, elapsed time) weigh against upsetting the selection and to refuse to apply petitioner's cited ratio. |
| Tata Cellular v. Union of India, (1994) 4 JT (SC) 532 : 1994 AIR SCW 3344 | Enumerated grounds for judicial review: whether authority exceeded powers; error of law; breach of natural justice; decision no reasonable tribunal would reach; abuse of power. | Recalled by the Court to summarise recognized parameters of judicial review which must be satisfied before interference with administrative selections. |
| G.B. Mahejar v. Jalgaon Municipality, (1991) 3 SCC 91 : AIR 1991 SC 1153 | Requirement of a public law element between parties for the Court to exercise judicial review. | Referenced to note that public law element must be present for Art. 226 jurisdiction to be engaged. |
| Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India, AIR 1979 SC 1628 | Illustrates that the Court may refuse discretionary relief even where an illegality has occurred, based on the particular equities and circumstances. | Cited for the proposition that the Court "does not exercise its jurisdiction only because it is lawful to do so" and in support of refusing relief on equities here. |
| R. v. Wilkes (1770) 98 ER 327; Susannah Sharp v. Wakefield (1891) AC 173; Padfield v. Minister of Agriculture (1968) 1 All ER 694; Roncarelli v. Duplessis (1959) SCR 121 | Historical/common-law statements concerning the nature of discretion: discretion must be guided by law, reason, justice and good faith; it cannot be arbitrary or for improper purposes. | These authorities were cited (directly or through other precedents) to support the general legal propositions about lawful exercise of discretion and its limits. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court reviewed both the documentary record produced by respondents and the pleadings/affidavits. Only part of the selection records were produced; from those partial records the Court extracted the marks awarded to a number of candidates and noted that many candidates obtained marks equal to or higher than the petitioner (e.g., Gobinda Gopal Pal 58; other candidates 54, 51, and many 41 or above).
The Court applied established principles of judicial review and pleading law. Citing Bharat Singh, the Court emphasised that where a legal point depends on facts (for example, promissory estoppel), the petitioner must plead and annex evidence to the writ petition or affidavit. The Court found that the petitioner had not established foundational factual evidence to sustain promissory estoppel and thus the promissory estoppel claim could not be accepted.
The Court considered the petitioner's contention that marks were miscalculated and that irrelevant criteria were applied. It acknowledged that certain marking heads (such as "full time working dealer" and "general assessment & extra-curricular activities") appeared to be irrelevant or not stipulated in the advertisement. However, the Court declined to decide the relevance issue finally because of the petitioner's conduct and other equities.
Critically, the Court relied on a revenue authority's order which found that a bargadar claim (alleging land cultivation by Ajit Kumar Ghosh) was concocted and that the bargadar had admitted putting an L.T.I. on blank papers at the instance of an unsuccessful applicant. The Court regarded that finding as coming from a competent authority and observed that the petitioner had not approached the Court with "clean hands" in that respect.
The Court applied equitable considerations and remedial principles from the cited precedents (including Munindra Kumar and Ramana Dayaram Shetty). It noted that the successful candidate (respondent No.6) had obtained licences, made substantial investment, and that selection had occurred in 1988 with litigation pending for about six years; canceling the dealership at this stage would cause irreparable injury to the selected candidate. The Court observed that even if extra-curricular marks were disregarded, the selected candidate would still have more marks than the petitioner on the record before it (illustrating the petitioner's inability to obtain relief on a purely numerical re-computation).
Taking into account (a) lack of pleadings/evidence for promissory estoppel, (b) partial record and the marks actually shown, (c) the revenue finding concerning the bargadar claim, (d) the equities in favour of the selected candidate (licences, investments, long delay), and (e) the general legal principle that administrative discretion must be exercised lawfully but that courts may decline relief on equitable grounds, the Court concluded that judicial interference under Article 226 was not appropriate in the case before it.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Court dismissed the application. The core ruling may be stated as: DISMISSED.
Direct consequences for the parties:
- The petitioner is not granted the writ relief sought (i.e., no mandamus to award the Santipur retail outlet dealership to the petitioner).
- The dealership awarded to the selected candidate (Gobinda Gopal Pal / respondent No.6) remains undisturbed by this order.
- The Court recorded "no order as to costs."
Broader implications:
- The Court reiterated established principles of judicial review (arbitrariness/irrelevant considerations justify interference) but emphasized that such principles must be applied in the context of factual pleadings, proof, and equitable considerations.
- The opinion did not announce or create a new legal precedent; rather it applied existing authorities and equity principles to the facts, and refused relief principally on pleading deficiency, conduct of the petitioner, and intervening equities favouring the selected candidate.
Application dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. (Final line of the opinion: "Application dismissed.")
1. In this application the petitioner has, inter alia, prayed for issuance of a writ of or in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents to show cause as to why the petitioner should not be awarded retail out let dealership at Santipur adjacent to the National Highway 34 in the District of Nadia.
2. The fact of the matter is as follows:
Pursuant to the advertisement issued by the respondent No. 1 on 26-12-1985 inviting application from the intending persons for being appointed as dealer under ‘C’ Category at Santipur in the District of Nadia, the petitioner along with others submitted an application for the dealership. The petitioner was asked to appear before the Oil Selection Board for interview by the respondent No. 1 in terms of letters dated 13th April, 1988 and 1st May, 1988 which he complied with. However, the name of the petitioner was hot empanelled by the Board of the said dealer ship. The petitioner filed a representation before the Chairman of the respondent No. 1. The petitioner has contended that initially his name was empanelled but for some reasons the same had been struck off. The petitioner has further contended that on the advice of the Sales Officer of respondents No. 1 he had purchased 50 decimals of land adjacent to the National Highway No. 34. He also contended that at the interview the members of the Oil Selection Board informed him that he would be given the said dealership. The petitioner has further contended that the respondents decided to issue dealership in the name of some person who was not the resident of Santipur in the District of Nadia.
3. The petitioner has filed a supplementary affidavit stating that the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 awarded the dealership in question to Gobinda Gopal Pal. An application for addition of said Gobinda Gopal Pal was filed by the petitioner which was allowed by an order dated 7-2-1988. The petitioner in the aforementioned supplementary affidavit, therefore, inter alia, questioned the legality/validity of the dealership granted to the aforementioned Gobinda Gopal Pal.
4. The respondents in their affidavit-in-opposition categorically stated that the Oil Selection Board had considered the cases of all applicants in accordance with law and having found that Sri Gobinda Gopal Pal was the suitable candidate thought it fit to award the said dealership to him. According to the respondents Gobinda Gopal Pal was awarded the dealership by the Oil Selection Board upon scrutinising all the documents in respect whereof it was the final authority.
5. Mr. Dipak Kundu, learned Counsel for the petitioner, however, drew my attention to the statements made in paragraph 6 of the affidavit in opposition filed by the respondent No. 2 for the purpose of showing that it would appear therefrom that he had been awarded on the following marks:—
Personality, business ability, salesmanship (Max. 30) Finance and Facilities (Max. 20) Full time working dealer (Max. 30) Genl. assessment & extra curricular activities (Max. 20) Total Chairman 10 16 7 8 31 Member 10 16 7 8 31
Total marks therefore obtained by the petitioner is as under:
31 — 31 = 62 — 2 = 31 marks, [or 31 + 31 = 62 ÷ 2 = 31 marks]
6. According to the petitioner the addition of marks awarded to the petitioner under different heads would show that the petitioner should have awarded 41 marks in place of 31 marks and as the same was evidently a mistake. The petitioner, therefore, contended that the case of the petitioner appears to have been not considered in its proper perspective.
7. Mr. Kundu appearing on behalf of the petitioner further submitted that from the affidavit-in-opposition filed by respondents themselves it would appear that marks have been allotted with regard to the full time working dealership and general assessment and extra curricular activities which are wholly irrelevant and not germane for the purpose of grant of dealership. It was pointed out that in the advertisement issued by the respondents nothing has been stated that the extra curricular activities of the candidates shall also be taken into consideration for the said purpose. The learned Counsel further submitted that the petitioner also could have produced certificates to show his participation in extra curricular activities. Mr. Kundu submitted that although this Court is not concerned with the merit of the decision arrived at by the Oil Selection Board but is concerned only with the decision making process, this Court may in proper cases interfere with such decision if it is held that such a decision had been arrived at without following any norms and/or if the discretion exercised by the Board is arbitrary.
8. The learned Counsel in support of his aforementioned contention relies on.
AIR 1991 SC 101 (Delhi Transport Corporation v. D.T.C Mazdoor Congress); AIR 1979 SC 478 (In re The Spepcial Courts Bill, 1978); AIR 1981 SC 2085 (Ramji Dayawala & Sons (P) Ltd. v. Invest Import); (1992) 3 SCC 63 : (AIR 1993 SC 929), (Y. Srinivasa Rao v. J. Veeraiah); AIR 1993 SC 2638 (Gurdeep Singh v. State of J. & K.); AIR 1990 SC 1277 (Shri Sitaram Sugar Co. Ltd. v. Union of India); AIR 1976 SC 1766 (The Regional Manager v. Pawan Kr. Dubey).
9. The learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, however, raised a preliminary objection to the effect that as the petitioner has not filed an application for amendment of the writ petition, no relief can be granted to him. It was submitted that in any event the decision of the Oil Selection Board is final and binding on the parties and this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India would not interfere therewith.
10. Reliance in this connection has been placed upon Chinmoy Sarkar v. Md. Shaniat Hossain reported in AIR 1990 Cal 412.
11. It was further submitted that from a perusal of the writ application it would appear that the writ application had been filed only on the ground of promissory estoppel. It has been contended that even in the supplementary affidavit the points urged before me had not been taken but it was stated therein that the land where petrol pump was to be situated did not belong to the respondent and the same had been in possession of a Bargadar. In this connection my attention has been drawn to the certified copy of an order passed by a revenue authority. It has been urged that the Oil Selection Board being an impartial party must be held to have adopted a fair procedure inasmuch as they had maintained a result-sheet and also considered other relevant matters including field inspection report etc.
12. In this case the concerned respondents were directed to produce the records, unfortunately, however, only a part record has been produced.
13. It cannot be ascertained from the said records as to what marks were obtained by the other candidates under different heads.
14. From the affidavit-in-opposition filed by the respondent No. 1 it appears that several factors have taken into consideration for grant of retail outlet dealership in petroleum products. After the submission of applications by the interested persons, the same are sent to the Oil Selection Board who after scrutinizing the documents fixed an interview of the candidates. Upon inteviewing all the eligible candidates a panel of three persons is prepared which is then sent to the respondent No. 1 for conducting field investigation and submission of a report thereof to the Board. The Sales Officer of the respondent No. 1 conducted an enquiry and made verification of the documents and submitted a report to the respondent No. 2 for its review, and whereafter final decision for selecting the eligible candidates is taken.
15. It is further stated in the affidavit-in-opposition:
“I further stay that the selection and appointment to the dealership was awarded to the candidate selected by Oil Selection Board (E) after due consideration of eligibility criteria and terms and conditions indicated in the advertisement and in accordance with the established policy and procedures of dealership selection.”
16. From the records produced before me it appears that Sri Gobinda Gopal Pal obtained 58 marks, Sri Animesh Chatterjee obtained 54 marks and Sri Dinesh Chandra Mondal and Sri Nirmal Kumar Mondal together obtained 51 marks each. A panel, was, therefore, prepared consisting of the aforementioned four persons. From the records it further appears that one Sri Madhu Sudan Pramanik obtained 47 marks, Sri Prankrishna Debnath obtained 48 marks, Sri Ranjit Kumar Mondal obtained 48 marks, Sri Niranjan Debnath obtained 47 marks, Sri Amit Kumar Salia obtained 41 marks, Sri Ashis Kumar Dey obtained 42 marks, Sri Prakash Chandra Sarkar and Sri Prosenjit Roy together obtained 45 marks each, Sri Anil Kumar Ghosh obtained 46 marks, Sri Subhas Ranjan Das and Sri Biplab Ranjan Das together obtained 43 marks each.
17. It is, therefore, clear that apart from the empanelled candidates a large number of other candidates had also obtained 41 marks or above.
18. The petitioner in this application has not stated the foundational facts for invoking the doctrine of promissory estoppel, nor the said principle is attracted in this case. It is not, therefore, possible to accept the contentions of the petitioner that the members of the Oil Selection Board had promised that the dealership would be given to him. Keeping in view of the fact that a large number of persons obtained higher marks than the petitioner, it is not possible to accept the contention of the petitioner.
19. In Bharat Singh v. State of Haryana reported in (1988) 4 SCC 534 : (AIR 1988 SC 2181) the Supreme Court states the law thus (at p. 2186 of AIR).—
“In our opinion, when a point which is ostensibly a point a law is required to be substantiated by facts, the party raising the point, if he is the writ petitioner, must plead and prove such facts by evidence which must appear from the writ petition and if he is the respondent, from the counter-affidavit. If the facts are not pleaded or the evidence in support of such facts is not annexed to the writ petition or to the counter-affidavit, as the case may be, the court will not entertain the point. In this context it will not be out of place of point out that in this regard that there is a distinction between a pleading under the Code of Civil Procedure and a writ petition or a counter-affidavit. While in a pleading, that is, a plaint or a written statement, the facts and not evidence are required to be pleaded, in a writ petition or in the counter-affidavit not only the facts but also the evidence in proof of such facts have to be pleaded and annexed to it.”
20. It appears that the petitioner had raised another contention in the supplementary affidavit questioning the eligibility of the respondent No. 6 to be appointed as a retail outlet dealer on the ground that the land possessed by the respondent No. 6 was in possession of a bargadar, Ajit Kumar Ghosh. The said respondent in his affidavit-in-opposition has annexed a copy of the order dated 27-6-1989 passed by judicial Land Revenue Officer, Santipur which is to the following effect—
“Heard Shri Ajit Kumar Ghosh. He stated that he has never Cultivated the land in question. The land was being cultivated by Robi Ghosh his elder brother. He also states that he did not file any petition to R.O's Office. He admitted putting his L.T.I on a few blank papers as directed by one Shri Shiben Mondal, s/o. Manindra Nath Mondal of village Gobindapur. He also admits lodging F.I.R to P.S also insisted on by the said Shiben Mondal.
It transpires that Shri Shiben Mondal was one of the unsuccessful applicants for HSD retail out let at Shanitpur as advertised by Hindusthan Petroleum Company. The appellant was selected for the retail out let.
Above facts suggest that Ajit Kumar Ghosh was never a cultivator of the suit land. It was concoction by some interested person to foil the chance of the appellant to start a HSD out let at the suit plot.
I do hereby allow the appeal and direct the R.O to correct his records by deleting the name of Amit Kumar Ghosh as ‘Bargadar’ against the suit land.”
21. The writ petitioner in his reply has no doubt denied the said fact but this Court while considering the said question cannot ignore the aforementioned finding of a competent court of law.
22. Submission of Mr. Kundu to the effect that the members of the Oil Selection Board while considering the matter have taken into consideration irrelevant matters may now be considered. It appears that marks were allotted under the following heads:
(a) Personality, business ability, salesmanship — 30 marks.
(b) Finance and Facilities — 20 marks.
(c) Full time working dealer — 30 marks; and
(d) General Assessment and extra-curricular activities — 20 marks.
23. Mr. Kundu submitted that the awarding of marks with regard to the full time working is irrelevant. The contention of the learned Counsel may have some substance but it is not necessary for this Court as at present advised to pronounce any judgment in this case.
24. I decline to consider in this case as to whether ‘general assessment’ of a candidate and ‘extra curricular activities’ are relevant for the purpose of this application or not, as I am of the considered view that in view of the conduct of the petitioner, he is not entitled to any equitable relief from this Court.
25. However, I may state that the power of this Court in terms of Article 226 of the Constitution of India can be exercised even in the matter of grant of a contract or distribution of a largess by a State, if the same come within the parameters of judicial review.
26. It is now a trite law that the authority which is a ‘State’ within the meaning of Art. 12 of the Constitution of India must act fairly and/Or reasonably even in such matters. If an action on the part of State while granting Contract is arbitrary, irrational or unfair, the Court may exercise its jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India.
27. In Delhi Transport Corporation v. D.T.C Mazdoor Congress reported in AIR 1991 SC 101 the Supreme Court observed (at p. 173 of AIR):—
“There is need to minimise the scope of the arbitrary use of power in all walks of life. It is inadvisable to depend on the good sense of the individuals, however high-placed they may be. It is all the more improper and undesirable to expose the precious rights like the rights of life, liberty and property to the vagaries of the individual whims and fancies. It is trite to say that invidivuals are not and do not become wise because they occupy high seats of power, and good sense, circumspection and fairness does not go with the posts however, high they may be. There is only a complaisant presumption that those who occupy high posts have a high sense of responsibility. The presumption is neither legal nor rational. History does not support it and reality does not warrant it. In particular, in a society pledged to uphold the rule of law, it would be both unwise and impolitic to leave any aspect of its life to be governed by discretion when it can conveniently and easily be covered by the rule of law.”
28. However, in that case the Supreme Court was considering the question as to whether Regulation 9(b) of the Delhi Road Transport Authority (Provisions of Appointment and Service), Regulation was hit by Art. 14 of the Constitution and Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act or not.
29. In re The Special Courts Bill, 1978 reported in AIR 1979 SC 478 the Supreme Court while considering the reference made to it by the President of India in terms of Art. 143(1) of the Constitution of India, relating to constitutionality of the Special. Courts Bill, 1978 observed (at p. 517 of AIR):—
“The second infirmity from which the procedural part of the Bill suffers is that by Cl. 7, Special Courts are to be presided over either by a sitting Judge of a High Court or by a person who has held office as Judge of a High Court to be nominated by the Central Government in consultation with the Chief Justice of India. The provision for the appointment of a sitting High Court Judge as a Judge of the Special Court is open to no exception. In so far as the alternate source is concerned, we entertain the highest respect for retired Judges of High Courts and we are anxious that nothing said by us in our judgment should be construed as casting any aspersion on them as a class. Some of them have distinguished themselves as lawyers once again, some as members of administrative tribunals, and many of them are in demand in important walks of life, Unquestionably they occupy a position of honour and respect in society. But one cannot shut one's eyes to the constitutional position that whereas by Art. 217 a sitting Judge of a High Court enjoys security of tenure until he attains a particular age, the retired Judge will hold his office as a Judge of the Special Court during the pleasure of the Government. The pleasure doctrine is subversive of judicial independence.”
30. Although the said decision having been rendered in a reference made under Article 138 of the Constitution of India and thus is not a binding precedent within the meaning of Article 141 thereof, the observations of the Supreme Court carry great weight.
31. This Court may not interfere with the selection of a dealer only because the Oil Selection Board is presided over by a retired High Court Judge. The concept of extent of power of judicial review of this Court in such matters is well known. If a case comes within the parameters of the judicial review as propounded by the Supreme Court from time to time, there cannot be any doubt that this Court in a proper case may exercise its jurisdiction.
32. In Ramji Dayawala & Sons (P) Ltd. v. Invest Import reported in AIR 1981 SC 2085, the Supreme Court while considering the discretion of a Court which may be exercised under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act observed (at p. 2095 of AIR):—
“Discretion”, said Lord Mansfield in R. v. Wilkes, ((1770) 98 ER 327), ‘when applied to a Court of justice, means sound discretion guided by law. It must be governed by rule, not by humour, it must not be arbitrary, vague, and fanciful, but legal and regular (see Craies on Statute Law, 6th Edn., p. 273).”
33. No exception can be taken to the aforementioned proposition of law.
34. In Y. Srinivasa Rao v. J. Veeraiah, reported in (1992) 3 SCC 63 : (AIR 1993 SC 929) the Apex Court held (at p. 930 of AIR):—
“The impugned appointment was made by the authority after holding an interview and it is the case of the appellant that the Revenue Division Officer merely enquired from him about his bio data without putting any further question by which the merits could have been judged. On that sole basis the shop was allotted to the respondent. Considering the criteria, as mentioned in the advertisement, the Collector accepted the claim of the appellant; pointing out that the appellant, was a better condidate from every angle. The High Court has quashed his judgment by condemning it as perverse but without indicating any reason for such a view.”
It further observed (at p. 931 of AIR):—
“So far the interview fixed as the sole criterion in the present case according to the impugned judgment is concerned, the same in absence of a guideline leaves the matter to the whims of the individual officer holding the interview. The exercise of such unbridled power, will be clearly violative of Article 14. The policy referred to by the State Counsel as contained in one of the Government orders and relied upon before us in support of the impugned judgment, therefore, must hold to be unconstitutional:”
35. The said decision, however, has no application to the facts of the present case inasmuch as noticed hereinbefore the Oil Selection Board has not only taken into consideration the marks obtained by the candidates at the interview but also various other considerations including the field reports, their financial position, and other relevant factors.
36. However, as indicated hereinbefore, the Oil Selection Board took into consideration at least some irrelevant factors.
37. In Gurdeep Singh v. State of J. & K., reported in AIR 1993 SC 2638, the Supreme Court while considering the matter relating to the reservation of seats for admission to MBBS course held (at pp. 2639-40 of AIR):—
“When this selection was challenged before the High Court, the High Court understood the contention of the appellant to amount to a plea that the mountaineering, by itself, was not an activity eligible to be recognised as a sporting activity. That was not the real question. The question was not that ‘mountaineering’—had it been in the original list of approved sports — was not eligible to be called a legitimate sporting activity. The real question was rather that such a sport not having been included in the list of approved sports at the cut-off date when the applications were invited and on the basis of which candidates responded could not later be introduced to provide, eligibility retrospectively to a single candidate. That ‘mountaineering’ could be such a sport, was not disputed, but what was urged was that after the list of sports for purposes of eligibility under the sports category had been determined and after the selections were made, only in order to accommodate respondent No. 6 a new sporting activity was included and respondent No. 6 chosen on that basis. It is also pointed out that ‘mountaineering’ was included as an approved sporting activity for that year alone, and that it was promptly deleted in the subsequent year. The appellant's contention was that the authorities had clearly acted on the basis: ‘show me the man, I will show you the rule’”.
38. It is true as noticed hereinbefore, that in absence of any stipulation in the advertisement, taking, into, consideration extra curricular activities of the candidate was not correct. The same was wholly irrelevant for the purpose of selection of a candidate for giving retail outlet dealership.
39. However as would be noted hereinafter the petitioner cannot succeed in this writ application only on the aforementioned question.
40. In Shri Sitaram Sugar Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, reported in AIR 1990 SC 1277 the Supreme Court while considering the economic policy of fixation of price of levy sugar observed (Paras 51 and 52):—
“a repository of power acts ultra vires either when he acts in excess of his power in the narrow sense or when he abuses his power by acting in bad faith or for an inadmissible purpose or on irrelevant grounds or without regard to relevant considerations or with gross unreasonableness.
The true position, therefore, is that any act of the repository of power, whether legislative or administrative or quasi-judicial, is open to challenge if it is in conflict with the Constitution or the governing Act or the general principles of the law of the land or it is so arbitrary or unreasonable that no fair minded authority could ever have made it.”
41. No exception can be taken to the aforementioned proposition of law.
42. In Rohtas Industries Ltd. v. S.D Agarwal, reported in AIR 1969 SC 707, the Supreme Court while considering the power of the Central Government under the provisions of Companies Act to investigate into affairs of the Company observed (at p. 716 of AIR):—
“As long back as 1891 the House of Lords was called upon to consider the scope of some of the provisions of the Licensing Act 1872 which gave discretion to the Magistrates in granting certain licenses. The question for decision was as to the nature of the discretion granted. Lord Halsbury L.C speaking for the House observed in Susannah Sharp v. Wakefield, (1891) AC 173 at p. 179:
‘discretion’ means when it is said that something is to be done within the discretion of the authorities that something is to be done according to the rules of reason and justice, not according to private opinion: Rooke's case according to law, and not humour. It is to be not arbitrary, vague and fanciful, but legal and regular.”
43. The Apex Court further cited with approval the decision of House of Lords in Padfield v. Minister of Agriculture Fisheries and Food reported in (1968) 1 All ER 694.
44. The Supreme Court further held (AIR 1969 SC 707 at pp., 718 & 719):—
“In Roncarelli v. Duplessis, (1959) SCR (Can LR) 121 while dealing with the discretionary power of the Quebec Liquor Commission to cancel a liquor licence this is what Ran, J. observed:
‘A decision to deny or cancel such a privilege lies within the ‘discretion’ of the Commission: but that means that decision is to be based upon a weighing of considerations pertinent to the object of the administration.
In public regulation of this sort there is no such thing as absolute and untramelled ‘discretion’ that is that action can be taken on any ground or for any reason that can be suggested to mind of the administrator; no legislative Act can, without express language, be taken to contemplate an unlimited arbitrary power exercisable for any purpose, however, capricious or irrelevant, regardless of the nature or purpose of the statute, Fraud and corruption in the Commission may be mentioned in such statutes but they are always implied as exceptions. ‘Discretion’ necessarily implies good faith in discharging public duty; there is always a perspective within which a statute is intended to operate; and any clear departure from its lines or objects is just as objectionable as fraud or corruption. Could an applicant be refused a permit because he had been born in another province, or because of the colour of his hair? The, ordinary language of the legislature cannot be so distorted’. In particular we would like to emphasize the observation that ‘there is always a perspective within which a statute is intended to operate’.”
45. However, the instant matter stands absolutely on a different footing. The petitioner, as has been noticed hereinbefore, has filed writ application on wrong premises.
46. He may be permitted to urge a new point in its supplementary affidavit and/or in reply to the affidavit-in-opposition, if such point becomes available from the affidavit-in-opposition itself.
47. However, in this case, as noticed hereinbefore, the petitioner had set up a person as a Bargadar against the respondent No. 6, a revenue officer has categorically held that the Bargadar filed an application claiming himself to be Bargadar at the instance of the petitioner. The petitioner, therefore, has not approached this Court with clean hands and thus is disentitled to invoke the equity jurisdiction of this Court.
48. Moreover, the petitioner took part in the interview with full knowledge and thus the petitioner is estopped from questioning the efficacy and/or mode thereof.
49. In Munindra Kumar v. Rajiv Govil, reported in AIR 1991 SC 1607 the Supreme Court, inter alia, held (at p. 1611 of AIR):—
“The next question which arises for consideration is as to what direction would be just and proper in the circumstances of this case. We do not agree with the High Court to quash the entire selection made by the Board for the post of Assistant Engineers (civil). It may be noted that Rajeev Govil, Vivek Aggarwal and Gyanendra Srivastava who remained unsuccessful had filed the writ petitions after taking chance and fully knowing the percentage of marks kept for interview and group discussion. It is no doubt correct that they cannot be estopped from challenging the rule which is arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, but in modulating the relief, their conduct and the equities of those who have been selected are the relevant considerations. The appellants have joined the post on 28th December, 1989 and after completing the training are discharging their duties at different places. It has been submitted on their behalf that some of them had left their earlier jobs and have also become overage. Thus we do hot consider it proper in the interest of justice to set aside the selections of the appellants.”
50. The a forementioned decision of the Supreme Court applies to the fact of the present case also. In this view of the matter it is not possible to apply the ratio of the decision cited by Mr. Kundu.
51. In the Regional Manager v. Pawan Kumar Dubey reported in AIR 1976 SC 1766 the Supreme Court while considering the case of reservation observed (at p. 1769 of AIR):—
“It is the rule deducible from the application of law to the facts and circumstances of a case which contitutes its ratio decidendi and not some conclusion based upon facts which may appear to be similar. One additional or different fact can make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases even when the same principles are applied in each case to similar facts.”
52. Moreover, as indicated hereinbefore, the respondent No. 6 had been awarded 58 marks. Even assuming respondent No. 6 had, been awarded 20 marks under heading of “Extra curricular Activities”, the marks obtained by the said respondent would be 38 if the said marks are not taken into consideration, whereas deducting 8 marks obtained by the petitioner under the same head, the total marks obtained by him would be 33 marks only.
53. In Tata Cellular v. Union Of India. reported in (1994) 4 JT (SC) 532 : (1994 AIR SCW 3344) the Supreme Court upon taking into consideration a large number of decisions laid down the following principles:
1. whether a decision making authority exceeded its powers?
2. committed an error of law
3. committed a breach of the rules of natural justice
4. reached a decision which no reasonable Tribunal would have reached or
5. abused its powers.
54. It is how well known that the fact of the matter must disclose a public law element in between the parties in order to enable the Court to exercise its power of judicial review.
55. Reference in this connection may be made to G.B Mahejar v. Jalgaon Municipality reported in (1991) 3 SCC 91 : (AIR 1991 SC 1153).
56. Moreover, the respondent No. 6 in his affidavit-in-opposition categorically stated that after grant of the said dealership in his favour he has not only obtained licenses from various authorities, he has also invested a huge sum. Moreover the selection was made in the year 1988. The writ application for one reason or the other could not be disposed of for about 6 years. If at this juncture that the dealership of the respondent No. 6 is cancelled he will suffer an irreparable injury. Equity, therefore, is in favour of respondent No. 6.
57. In Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. The International Airport Authority of India reported in AIR 1979 SC 1628 the Supreme Court while considering that the case of the writ petitioner therein was not considered and an illegality had been committed by the International Airport Authority in granting contract of 2nd class contractor refused to exercise its discretionary jusrisdiction.
58. It is now well known that this Court does not exercise its jurisdiction only because it is lawful to do so.
59. Keeping in view of the conduct of the petitioner as also the facts and circumstances of this case, in my opinion, it is not a fit case in which this Court exercises Extraordinary Constitutional Writ Jursidiction in favour of the petitioner.
60. This application is, therefore, dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
Application dismissed.
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