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Gautam Ranjan Basu And Others v. Smt. Shanta Mukherjee And Another

Calcutta High Court
Sep 20, 1994
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Factual and Procedural Background

The revision arises from an order dated 17-12-1993 in T.R. No. 231/93 (Complaint Case No. 1080/93) of the Judicial Magistrate, 10th Court, Alipore, 24 Pgs. (S). Originally, Shri Ashok Mukherjee was the tenant of the entire ground floor at No. 33, Regent Park, Calcutta. After his death, his daughter Smt. Monika Bhattacharyya (the complainant) and wife Smt. Shanta Mukherjee became tenants. On 24 June 1993 the accused allegedly trespassed into the tenancy and assaulted and insulted the complainant; the complainant's mother was also assaulted when she tried to rescue her. The complainant Monika Bhattacharyya lodged a complaint (filed 29-6-93), which was registered as T.R. Case No. 231/93 and cognizance was taken by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate and transferred to the Judicial Magistrate, 10th Court. The learned Magistrate examined witnesses and issued process.

On 23-8-93 the accused Nos. 1 and 2 applied under Section 205 CrPC to dispense with personal attendance; that prayer was refused. The complainant was absent on earlier dates. The complainant died on 16-9-93. Thereafter her mother, Smt. Shanta Mukherjee (also a victim), applied to be substituted for the deceased complainant and to be permitted to conduct the prosecution. The learned Magistrate allowed substitution and permitted the mother to conduct the case under Section 302 CrPC by order dated 17-12-93. The accused petitioners challenged that order by revision, which is the subject of this opinion.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the death of the original complainant entitles the accused to an order of acquittal under sub-section (1) of Section 256 CrPC (i.e., whether the proceedings must be terminated/acquittal entered when the complainant dies and does not appear).
  2. Whether, upon the death of a complainant, a Magistrate may permit substitution and allow another person to conduct the prosecution under Section 302 CrPC (and related provisions), or whether Section 302 is controlled by sub-section (1) of Section 256 CrPC.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Accused Petitioners') Arguments

  • Counsel Mr. Dipak Kumar Sengupta argued that upon the demise of the original complainant the accused are entitled to acquittal under sub-section (1) of Section 256 CrPC.
  • He contended that Section 302 CrPC is controlled by sub-section (1) of Section 256 CrPC and thus substitution or continuance is not permissible when the complainant has died.
  • He relied on Subbanna Hegde v. Dyavappa Gowda (1980 Cri LJ 1405, Karnataka HC) for the proposition that when the complainant whose statement was recorded under Section 200 dies before appearance, no other person can be deemed a complainant and the Magistrate must acquit under Section 256.
  • He also relied on Nanjlal Samanta v. Rabin Ghosh (1964 (1) Cr LJ 186 : AIR 1964 Cal 64) for a similar view that the person examined under Section 200 is the complainant and no other person (including legal heirs) can present the complaint or continue prosecution in that capacity.
  • Jagannath Ghosh & Ors. v. Pasupati Nath Ghosh (1993 Cr LR (Cal) 131) was also cited (by the petitioners) and was noted, but that decision had considered the Karnataka and Calcutta decisions and addressed substitution under other sections.

Respondent's (Opposite Party No. 1) Arguments

  • Counsel Mr. Sekhar Bose contended Section 302 CrPC is not controlled by sub-section (1) of Section 256 CrPC and that Section 256(1) permits judicial discretion (for example to adjourn) when the complainant is absent; that discretion can encompass absence due to death as contemplated by Section 256(2).
  • He argued Section 302 authorizes a Magistrate to permit the prosecution to be conducted by any person (other than a police officer below Inspector) and Section 302(2) allows such persons to conduct prosecution personally or by a pleader; thus substitution by the mother was proper.
  • He relied on Jagannath Ghosh (supra) to show that death of the complainant does not ipso facto terminate proceedings and that substitution under the relevant provision (referred to as Section 495 in the judgment but identified as Section 302 CrPC) is permissible.
  • He also cited Supreme Court authority Ashwin Nanubhai Vyas v. State of Maharashtra (AIR 1967 SC 983 : 1967 Cri LJ 943) to show that Chapter XVIII contains no provision for acquittal or discharge of accused for failure of the complainant to attend and that in some contexts magistrates should proceed despite complainant's absence (though the court noted this authority related more to committal proceedings than to the present issue).
  • He relied on Hirak Kumar Ghosh v. Jitendra Mansata ((1978) 82 CWN 309) for the proposition that substitution of a complainant is permissible under Section 302 CrPC and that the High Court in proper cases may allow substitution under its inherent powers (Section 482).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court in this Opinion
Subbanna Hegde v. Dyavappa Gowda (1980 Cri LJ 1405, Karnataka High Court) Held that where the complainant whose sworn statement was recorded under Section 200 CrPC dies before appearance, no other person can be deemed the complainant; thus when the complainant does not appear due to death the Magistrate's alternative is acquittal under Section 256 CrPC. The Court recorded that this decision was relied upon by the petitioners; it considered that view but did not adopt an absolute rule of termination on death and instead placed weight on authorities and statutory amendments permitting judicial discretion and substitution in appropriate cases.
Nanjlal Samanta v. Rabin Ghosh (1964 (1) Cr LJ 186 : AIR 1964 Cal 64) Held that "complainant" refers to the person examined under Section 200; no other person however interested can be deemed a complainant; if complainant dies before presentation of appeal, only the State Government may present appeal under Section 417(1). The Court noted this decision as relied on by petitioners but treated it alongside other decisions; the Court did not accept that this decision compels ipso facto termination and emphasized judicial discretion under Section 256(2) and Section 302.
Jagannath Ghosh & Ors. v. Pasupati Nath Ghosh (1993 Cr LR (Cal) 131) Held that the death of the complainant does not ipso facto terminate proceedings; the Magistrate is authorised to exercise power to substitute another person or prosecution agency to conduct the criminal case; mere death does not require dismissal or acquittal under Sections 247 or 259 CrPC. The Court relied on this decision as supportive of the view that substitution is permissible and that proceedings need not be terminated upon death; the opinion noted that this decision considered the Karnataka and Calcutta earlier decisions.
Ashwin Nanubhai Vyas v. State of Maharashtra (AIR 1967 SC 983 : 1967 Cri LJ 943) Noted that there is no provision in the Criminal Procedure Code (Chapter XVIII) for acquittal or discharge of accused due to failure of complainant to attend; Magistrate should proceed with committal enquiry although complainant is absent (context: committal proceedings). The Court observed this Supreme Court decision was cited by the respondent but remarked it had limited bearing since it dealt with committal enquiry rather than the precise substitution issue before the Court.
Hirak Kumar Ghosh v. Jitendra Mansata ((1978) 82 CWN 309) Held that substitution of complainant is permissible under Section 302 CrPC; a criminal case filed by a person not actually aggrieved may nevertheless see substitution when the original complainant is dead or unable to attend; High Court's inherent powers under Section 482 may also permit substitution in proper cases. The Court treated this decision as supportive of the authority of a Magistrate to allow substitution under Section 302 and as reinforcing the availability of judicial discretion to permit continuance by another complainant.
Pasthumma v. Mohammad (1986 2 SCC 585 : AIR 1986 SC 1436) Held that the High Court in revision is not justified in substituting its own view for that of the learned Magistrate on a question of fact; satisfaction of the Magistrate based on facts should not be displaced by the revisional court. The Court applied this precedent as a central constraint on the revisional challenge: because the learned Magistrate's decision to permit substitution was based on his factual satisfaction, the High Court in revision would not substitute its own factual view and therefore should not overturn the Magistrate's order absent a valid basis.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court reviewed the statutory provisions and the judicial authorities cited by both sides. It identified a divergence of views in single-Bench decisions of the High Court and in other authorities: some decisions (and the petitioners' argument) supported an outcome that the proceedings must terminate or the accused be acquitted when the complainant dies, while other decisions (and the respondents' argument) supported judicial discretion to permit substitution and continuance of prosecution.

The Court examined the legislative history and noted the Law Commission's observation that it is impracticable to enumerate all situations that may arise on absence or death of a complainant; the Law Commission recommended leaving such decisions to judicial discretion and equating death and absence, which led to incorporation of sub-section (2) in Section 256 CrPC. On that basis the Court concluded that Parliament intended to leave the question to the Magistrate's judicial discretion in appropriate circumstances.

The Court held that where a Magistrate is satisfied from the records and surrounding circumstances that substitution should be permitted upon the death of the original complainant, the Magistrate has the authority to grant such substitution (noting Section 302 CrPC and related provisions). The Court emphasised that this satisfaction is subjective and must be derived from facts and materials on the record.

The Court further applied the principle from Pasthumma v. Mohammad that in revisional jurisdiction the High Court should not substitute its own view for that of the learned Magistrate on questions of fact. Given that the Magistrate's decision to allow substitution was based on a factual satisfaction drawn from the record, the Court in revision should not displace that factual finding.

Balancing the authorities and statutory context, the Court concluded that discretion rests with the Magistrate to permit substitution and that the revisional court could not justifiably overturn the Magistrate's factual satisfaction in this case.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The revisional application is dismissed and the petition is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.

Implications:

  • The immediate effect is that the impugned order of the Magistrate dated 17-12-1993 permitting substitution of the deceased complainant by her mother and allowing the mother to conduct the prosecution under Section 302 CrPC stands upheld by this Court.
  • The accused are not entitled, on the basis of the complainant's death alone, to an automatic acquittal in this case; the Magistrate's discretion to allow substitution remains effective where he is satisfied on the facts on record.
  • The opinion does not purport to lay down a new broad precedent beyond affirming the Magistrate's discretion in the factual circumstances of this case; it emphasises that revisional interference is inappropriate where the Magistrate's factual satisfaction is adequately recorded.

Show all summary ...

1. By this revision the accused petitioners have challenged the order dated 17-12-93 passed in T.R No. 231/93 arising out of complaint Case No. 1080/93 by the Judicial Magistrate, 10th Court, Alipur, 24 Pgs. (S) whereby the learned Magistrate permitted the opposite party No. 1 herein, the mother of the complainant, to conduct the case on demise of original complainant as contemplated under Section 302 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The fact giving rise to this revision is that originally one Shri Ashok Mukherjee, was a tenant in respect of the entire ground floor including Garrage, Out-house, Servant Quarters, Courtyard at No. 33, Regent Park, Calcutta-700040. On the demise of Shri Ashok Mukherjee his daughter and wife Smt. Monika Bhattacharyya and Smt. Shanta Mukherjee became the tenant in respect of the said tenancy. The complainant Smt. Monika Bhattacharyya was residing in that building in the said tenancy along with her mother and in the Out-house of that tenancy a Kindergarten and junior school was there styled under the name of ‘Narmada School’ of which the mother of the complainant, Smt. Shanta Mukherjee, was the proprietor/principal.

2. On 24th June, 1993 the accused persons along with others trespassed in the tenancy of the complainant and her mother and assaulted the complainant and also insulted her. As the mother tried to rescue her the accused No. 3 assaulted her.

3. On this allegation the complainant Monika Bhattacharyya lodged a complaint and the same was registered as T.R Case No. 231/93 in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, 10th Court, 24 Pgs. (S) arising out or complaint Case No. 1080/93. The complaint was filed before the Court of the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Alipore on 29-6-93. The learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate took cognizance on that complaint and transferred the case to the Court of another Judicial Magistrate being the 10th Court of the Judicial Magistrate, Alipore. The said learned Magistrate examined apart from the complainant the other witnesses and directed issuance process.

4. On 23-8-93 the accused persons 1 and 2 made a prayer under Section 205 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for dispensing with the personal attendance and that prayer was refused. The complainant was absent on that date and also absent on 16-8-93. On 30-11 -93 the learned Magistrate was informed that the complainant died on 16-9-93 and thereafter her mother Smt. Shanta Mukherjee made an application for substitution in place of deceased complainant and for permission to conduct the procedure. That prayer was allowed by the learned Magistrate by his impugned order dated 17-12-93.

5. The learned Advocate, Mr. Dipak Kumar Sengupta contended on behalf of the petitioners that upon the demise of the original complainant the accused petitioners are entitled to an order of acquittal under sub-section (1) of Section 256 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. He further contended that Section 302 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is controlled by the provision of sub-section (1) of Section 256 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In support of his contention he placed reliance on a Karnataka High Court decision in the case of Subbanna Hegde v. Dyavappa Gowda, reported in 1980 Cri LJ 1405, where the Karnataka High Court took the view that upon the demise of the complainant whose sworn statement was recorded under Section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, no person can be deemed to be a complainant however interested he may be in the case. Therefore, when summons was issued on the complaint and on the day appointed for the appearance of the accused the complainant does not appear because of his death, the only alternative left to the Magistrate is to acquit the accused in view of the clear and unambiguous provisions of Section 256 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. He also placed reliance on a decision of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Nanjlal Samanta v. Rabin Ghosh, reported in 1964 (1) Cr LJ 186 : (AIR 1964 Cal 64), where the single Judge had held inter alia, that “Complainant” has not been defined in Criminal Procedure Code. But that can only mean the person who was examined as complainant under Section 200. No other person can be deemed to be a complainant however he may be interested in the prosecution of the accused or in the property which is the subject-matter of the alleged offence. If the complainant dies before presentation of the appeal, no other person, not even his legal heirs may have that right. In such a case the right to present an appeal from the order of acquittal shall be only of the State Govt. under Section 417(1). He also placed reliance on another single Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Jagannath Ghosh & Ors. v. Pasupati Nath Ghosh, reported in 1993 Cr LR (Cal) 131. In that decision it has been held that the death of a complainant cannot ipso facto bring about the termination of the criminal proceeding and in that case the Magistrate is authorised to exercise his power under Section 495, Criminal Procedure Code by substituting another person or prosecution agency for conduct of the criminal case. Merely on the death of the complainant, the complaint filed by him cannot be dismissed nor the accused acquitted or discharged under Section 247 or 259, Criminal Procedure Code. The decision of the Karnataka High Court in the case of Subanna Hegde (supra), and the decision of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Nanilal Samanta (supra), have been considered in that decision.

6. Mr. Sekhar Bose, learned Advocate contended on behalf of the opposite party No. 1 that Section 302 is not controlled by sub-section (1) of Section 256 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. According to him the wording in the sub-section (1) of Section 256 that “unless for some reasons he thinks it proper to adjourn the hearing of the case to some other day” leaves discretion within the learned Magistrate in a summon case to adjourn the case for some reasons. According to Mr. Bose ‘same reason’ may be reason of death as has been mentioned in sub-section (2) of Section 256 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973. Mr. Bose further contended that by referring to sub-section (1) of Section 302 that any Magistrate inquiring into or trying a case may permit the prosecution to be conducted by any person other than a police officer below the rank of Inspector. He also referred to sub-section (2) of Section 302 of Cr. P.C 1973 for the purpose of showing that any person conducting the prosecution may do so personally or by a pleader. In the instant case, upon the demise of the complainant her mother who was also a victim in the incident dated 24th June, 1993, made a prayer for substitution and on her prayer permission was granted. That fact was referred to by Mr. Bose for the purpose of showing the propriety of the impugned order. Mr. Bose by referring to the decision of Jagannath Ghosh (supra) contended that this High Court had the occasion to consider the ratio of the Karnataka High Court's decision in Subbanna Hegde (supra) and the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Nanilal Samanta case (supra) and on such consideration the single Bench of this Court in Jagannath Ghosh case (supra) was held, that death of the complainant cannot ipso facto bring about the termination of the criminal proceeding and in that case the Magistrate is authorised to exercise his power under Section 495 (wrongly quoted) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. According to Mr. Bose the said Section is 302 of the Cr.P.C 1973. He also referred to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Ashwin Nanubhai Vyas v. State Of Maharashtra , reported in AIR 1967 SC 983 : (1967 Cri LJ 943), wherein the Supreme Court, inter alia, has held that there is no provision in the Criminal Procedure Code or Chapter 18 thereof about acquittal or discharge of accused on failure of complainant to attend, which is deliberate departure from Chapters on trials of summons and warrant cases, suggesting that Magistrate should proceed with committal enquiry although complainant is absent. This decision has little bear with the present case because that decision deals with a matter relating to committal enquiry proceeding by the Magistrate. This High Court had the occasion to deal with Section 302 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in the case of Hirak Kumar Ghosh v. Jitendra Mansata, reported in (1978) 82 CWN 309, wherein the single Bench has held, inter alia, that if a criminal case can be filed by a person who is actually not aggrieved there is no reason why the complainant cannot be substituted by another complainant if he is dead or in a case where he is unable to come to Court on account of his old age and illness. This can be allowed by the Magistrate under Section 302 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the High Court further took the view in that case that the High Court in its inherent powers under Section 482 can permit substitution of a complainant in a proper case.

7. Having heard the learned Advocates for the parties and after considering the materials on record I find that two single Benches of this High Court have taken the view that in case of demise of the complainant there cannnot be any ipso facto termination of the proceeding. A discretion has been left-open to the Magistrate to consider all the aspects of the matter and if he finds that there are materials for granting permission to conduct the proceeding by a person by substituting him in place of the deceased complainant, such permission can be granted. The Law Commission observed that “It is impracticable to detail the various situations that may arise and the considerations that may have to be weighed. We think, in the circumstances, that the decision should be left to the judicial discretion of the Court, and, the legal provision need only be that death and absence stand on the same footing. We trust this will in practice, work satisfactorily”. On such recommendation sub-section (2) has been incorporated in Section 256 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. That being the position the Magistrate has every power to allow substitution upon demise of the original complainant if he is satisfied from the surrounding circumstances and materials on record that such permission should be given. That satisfaction is to be subjective satisfaction derived from the records of the case and a satisfaction derived on fact as available on record.

8. On such fact after being satisfied the Magistrate is entitled to take a view. The Supreme Court in the case of Pasthumma v. Mohammad, reported in (1986) 2 SCC 585 : AIR 1986 SC 1436 : (1986 Cri LJ 1070), has held inter alia that the High Court in its revisional jurisdiction was not justified in substituting its own view for that of the learned Magistrate on a question of fact. As the satisfaction for taking view by the learned Magistrate is based on a fact in revision the High Court is not authorised to take a different view on fact substituting the view of the learned Magistrate. That is the ratio laid down in Pasthumma's case (supra).

9. In view of my discussions above, I find no merit, in the revisional application and the same is accordingly dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.

10. Petition dismissed.