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In The Matter Of v. Bipadtaran Patra
Factual and Procedural Background
The petition sought a writ of/or in the nature of Mandamus directing respondents to issue a letter of interview as per a list sent by the Employment Exchange under a memo dated 5.10.93, and for directions that the respondents not change or cancel that list. The petitioner held an M.A. in English and had his name sponsored by an Employment Exchange for a vacancy for Assistant Teacher at Dumurtore Bagbadini High School, Bankura. The School authorities did not call him for interview.
An affidavit-in-opposition was filed by the School Secretary (respondent No. 4), stating that the prescribed qualification for appointment was B.A. (Hons.) / M.A. in English preferably with B.T/B.Ed/P.G.B.T. The Employment Officer-in-Charge of the District Employment Exchange had sent a list in which the petitioner appeared at serial No. 18 with stated qualifications B.Sc, M.A. in English and B.Ed. The School contended that, under newly effective recruitment rules, post-graduate candidates could be sponsored only by the National Employment Exchange, making the petitioner (a post-graduate sponsored by the local exchange) ineligible for interview.
The petitioner relied on an interim order of the Court which had allowed him to appear at the interview and contended that non-compliance by the School amounted to contempt. The respondents relied on recruitment rules effective from 20 May 1993 and submitted that the petitioner was not qualified to be interviewed. The writ application and a related contempt matter were heard together and disposed of by this judgment.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the petitioner was entitled to appear at the interview for the post of Assistant Teacher.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments
- Because the petitioner was eligible and his name had been sponsored by the local Employment Exchange, the sponsorship could not be cancelled or withdrawn and the School could not refuse to allow him to appear at the interview.
- The School was bound to comply with an interim order of this Court allowing the petitioner to appear at the interview; non-compliance amounted to gross contempt of Court.
Respondents' Arguments
- Under the Recruitment Rules framed by the Government of West Bengal effective from 20 May 1993, post-graduate candidates could be sponsored only by the National Employment Exchange; the petitioner, having been sponsored by the local exchange, was not qualified to appear at the interview.
- The respondents asserted that no prejudice had been caused to the petitioner given the application of those rules.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| S.R. Tewari v. District Board, Agra, AIR 1964 SC 1680 | The powers of a statutory body are subject to the statute which constituted it; courts can declare an action illegal or ultra vires, even as to employment decisions. | Relied on to support the proposition that statutory bodies (here the School and the Employment Exchange) must act consistently with the statutory recruitment rules and cannot exceed their statutory authority. |
| M. Pentiah v. Muddala Veeramallappa, AIR 1961 SC 1107 | Action of a statutory corporation may be ultra vires; where a statute confers an express power, inconsistent implied powers cannot be read in. Corporations must show affirmative authority to act. | Invoked to reinforce that the Employment Exchange and School cannot act beyond the powers conferred by the recruitment rules and statute. |
| Wenlock (Baroness) v. River Dee Co., (1885) 10 AC 354 | A corporation authorised to do an act subject to conditions is prohibited from doing that act except in accordance with the conferring Act. | Used as authority illustrating the principle that statutory entities must act only within the authority granted by statute. |
| Attorney General v. Fulham Corporation, (1921) 1 Ch.D 440 | A statutory body acted ultra vires where it provided services beyond those authorised by statute (example: providing washing services instead of facilities for customers to wash their own clothes). | Applied as an example supporting the rule that schemes or actions beyond statutory authority are ultra vires. |
| Scotts (P) Ltd. v. The Corporation of Calcutta, 79 CWN 883 | Reiterates the principle that statutory bodies possess only such powers as the statute confers. | Cited by this Court to support the view that the School (a recognised institution discharging public function) is bound by statutory recruitment rules. |
| Maniuddin Bepari v. The Chairman of the Municipal Commissioners, Dacca, 40 CWN 17 | Fundamental principle that a statutory corporation has no power to do anything unless conferred by statute. | Quoted to emphasise that statutory corporations cannot act outside powers given by the statute. |
| Indian Administrative Service (S.C.S.) Association, U.P. v. Union of India, 1993 Supp (1) SCC 730 | Where ambiguity exists, courts can adopt a just, reasonable and sensible construction consistent with legislative intention; courts can strike down defective provisions but cannot substitute words to supply omissions. | Cited to describe the appropriate approach to statutory interpretation and dealing with ambiguous or defective provisions in recruitment rules. |
| State of Punjab v. Balbir Singh, (1994) 3 SCC 299 | Court should consider the real intention of the legislature and the whole scope of the Act when deciding whether a provision is mandatory and the consequences of non-compliance. | Invoked to underline that statutory provisions must be construed in context and with legislative intent in mind when assessing mandatory nature of rules. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court framed the question as whether the petitioner was entitled to appear at the interview. It found that the substantive qualification required for appointment as Assistant Teacher was Graduate or Honours Graduate, whereas the petitioner held a postgraduate degree.
The Court examined the recruitment framework: the Director of School Education had framed appointment rules under powers conferred by specific clauses of Rule 28 of the Rules for Management of Recognised non-Government Institutions (Aided and Unaided), 1969 (Education Department's notification), and these orders superseded previous recruitment procedures. Two provisions of the Rules were central to the analysis:
- Rule 4(a): school authorities must approach the local Employment Exchange for sponsoring names of candidates up to Honours Graduate level and the National Employment Exchange for Post-Graduate candidates.
- Rule 6(k): candidates should be selected from the list sent by the Employment Exchange and no second list should be obtained.
The Court reasoned that Rule 4(a) plainly required local exchanges to sponsor only candidates up to Honours level and reserved postgraduate sponsorship to the National Employment Exchange. Therefore, the local Employment Exchange “could not have sponsored the name of the petitioner.” The Court treated the local sponsorship of the petitioner as a mistake capable of rectification by the competent authority of the Local Employment Exchange.
The Court also stressed settled principles of statutory construction and administrative law: statutes and statutory rules must be read as a whole, interpreted in light of their object and purpose, and statutory authorities must act within the four corners of their statutory powers. The Court relied on cited authorities to support the proposition that statutory bodies cannot exceed the powers conferred on them and that procedures laid down by statute must be followed.
Applying these principles to the recruitment rules, the Court concluded that the Managing Committee of the School could not lawfully require the Employment Exchange to sponsor candidates with higher qualifications than allowed under Rule 4(a), and that Rule 6(k) (selection only from the employment exchange list) could not operate to override the requirement in Rule 4(a). On that basis, the petitioner was held not to be entitled to appear at the interview.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The writ application is DISMISSED. The Court further held that, in view of its findings, it was unnecessary to proceed with the contempt matter; both applications were disposed of accordingly.
Implications:
- Direct effect: The petitioner is not entitled to appear at the interview because the local Employment Exchange should not have sponsored a post-graduate candidate for the post which, under the recruitment rules, required sponsorship of post-graduates only by the National Employment Exchange. The sponsorship was a mistake capable of correction by the Employment Exchange.
- No broader implication or new judicial precedent was articulated beyond the Court's application and affirmation of established principles of statutory interpretation and the limits of statutory authority. The decision applies these principles to the facts and results in dismissal of the petition and disposition of the related contempt matter.
JUDGMENT
The Court:— The writ application and the contempt matter are taken up together and are being disposed of by this common judgment.
2. The petitioner has filed the writ application, inter alia, praying for issuance of a writ of or in the nature of Mandamus directing the respondents to issue letter of interview as per list sent by the Employment Exchange in terms of memo dated 5.10.93 and for further direction upon the respondents not to change and/or cancel the list sent by the Employment Exchange.
3. The petitioner is said to be an MA. in English. Pursuant to an advertisement issued for filling up a vacancy for the post of Assistant Teacher in Dumurtore Bagbadini High School, Bankura (hereinafter referred to as School), the name of the petitioner who got his name registered in the Employment Exchange, was sponsored in terms of the aforementioned memo. According to the petitioner, the School Authorities despite the same have not called him for an interview. Affidavit-in-opposition has been filed on behalf of the Secretary of the said School, being respondent No. 4. In the said affidavit it has been stated that the prescribed qualification for appointment was B.A (Hons.)/M.A in English preferably B.T/B.Ed/P.G.B.T The Employment Officer-in-Charge, District Employment Exchange sent the names of several persons wherein the name of the petitioner appears at serial No. 18 with the qualification B.Sc, M.A in English and B.Ed The petitioner was the only candidate having a Post-Graduate degree. It has been contended that according to the new recruitment rules the name of a post graduate candidate can be sponsored only by the National Employment Exchange and in this view of the matter as the petitioner was not eligible for appointment no interview letter was sent to him.
4. Mr. Chakraborty, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, inter alia, submitted that keeping in view of the fact that the petitioner was eligible and his name has been sponsored by the local Employment Exchange, the same could not have been cancelled or withdrawn nor the School Authorities can refuse to allow the petitioner to appear at the interview. The learned Counsel further submitted that in any event the School Authorities were bound to comply with the interim order passed by this Court whereby and whereunder the petitioner was allowed to appear at the interview and non-compliance thereof amounts to gross contempt of this Court.
5. Mr. Banerjee appearing on behalf of the respondents, on the other hand, submitted that in terms of the Recruitment Rules framed by the Government of West Bengal which has come into force with effect from 20th May, 1993 as the petitioner was not qualified to appear at the interview, no prejudice has been caused to him.
6. The question which falls for consideration in the writ application, therefore, is as to whether the petitioner was entitled to appear at the interview.
7. It is not in dispute that the petitioner is a holder of post graduate degree whereas the qualification required for the purpose of appointment of Assistant Teacher was Graduate or Honours Graduate. The Director of School Education framed appointment rules in exercise of the power conferred upon him by clauses (i) and (ii) of Sub Rule (1) and by clause (1) of Sub Rule (4) of Rule 28 of the Rules for Management of Recognised non-Government Institutions (Aided and Unaided), 1969, Education Department's notification No. 1598-Edn(S) dt. 15.7.69 as amended from time to time. The said order cancels all other previous orders of the directorate in respect of procedures for recruitment of teaching and non-teaching staff of non-Government Secondary Schools.
Rule 4(a) and Rule 6(k) read as follows:
“Rule 4(a). On receipt of the prior permission, the school authorities shall approach the local Employment Exchange for sponsoring the names of the candidates up to Honours Graduate level and National Employment Exchange for Post-Graduates candidates, according to prior permission within 7 days.
Rule 6(k). The candidates should be selected from the list sent by the Employment Exchange and no second list should be obtained. If two or more candidates for the post of teacher secure equal marks, preference shall be given to the acadimically better one. For non-teaching posts seniority in age shall foe counted for giving preference.”
A bare perusal of Rule 4(a) aforementioned leaves no room for doubt that the School Authorities are to approach the Local Employment Exchange for sponsoring the names of candidates upto Honours Graduate level whereas National Employment Exchange is to be approached for Post-Graduate candidates. The Local Employment Exchange, therefore, could not have sponsored the name of the petitioner. Sponsoring of the petitioner's name was, therefore, by way of a mistake which could be rectified by the competent authority of the Local Employment Exchange.
8. In terms of Rule 6(k) candidates are to be selected only from the list sent by the Employment Exchange. The validity of the aforementioned Rules is not in question. The aforementioned Rules have presumably been framed by the Directorate keeping in view the fact that the post of Assistant Teacher should not normally be filled up by person having higher qualification. Had the Managing Committee of the School been of the of the opinion that for filling up some posts candidates having Post-Graduate qualification were required to be interviewed, they could have called for the names of the candidates only from the National Employment Exchange. They having not done so, Local Employment Exchange could have sent the names of only such candidates who are having degrees up to Honours level and not beyond the same.
9. It is now a well settled principle of law that Statute has to be read as a whole. It is further well know that a Statute has to be interpreted keeping in view its object and purpose. It is further well known that the Statutory Authorities must act within the four corners of the Statute. It is also well settled that when a procedure is laid down by Statutory Authority to do a thing in a particular manner, the same may be done in the manner prescribed or not at all. In the case of the S.R Tewari v. District Board, Agra, reported in AIR 1964 SC 1680 it has been held that the powers of a statutory body are always subject to the Statute which has constituted it and must be exercised consistently with the Statute and Courts in appropriate cases have power to declare an action of the body illegal or ultra vires, even if the action relates to determination of employment of a servant. Similar view has been taken by the Supreme Court in the case of M. Pentiah v. Muddala Veeramallappa reported in AIR 1961 SC 1107 in the following terms:
In M. Pentiah v. Veeramallappa, reported in AIR 1961 SC 1107, the Appeal Court wherein it has been held as follows:
“17. In this context learned counsel for the appellants invoked the doctrine of law that an action of a statutory corporation may be ultra vires its powers without being illegal and also the principle that when a statute confers an express power, a power inconsistent with that expressly given cannot be implied. It is not necessary to consider all the decisions cited, as learned counsel for the respondents does not canvass the correctness of the said principles. It would, therefore, be sufficient to notice two of the decisions cited at the Bar. The decision in Wenlock (Baroness) v. River Dee Co., (1885) 10 AC 354 is relied upon in support of the proposition that when a corporation is authorised to do an act subject to certain conditions, it must be deemed to have been prohibited to do the said act except in accordance with the provisions of that Act which confers the authority on it. Where by Act 14 and 15 Vict. a company was empowered to borrow at interest for the purposes of the concerned Acts, subject to certain conditions, it was held that the company was prohibited by the said Act from borrowing except in accordance with the provisions of that Act. Strong relience is placed on the decision in Attorney General v. Fulham Corporation, (1921) 1 Ch.d 440. There, in exercise of the powers conferred under the Baths and Washhouses Acts, the Metropolitan Borough of Fulham propounded a scheme in substitution of an earlier one whereunder it installed a wash-house to which persons resorted for washing their clothes bringing their own wash materials and utilised the facilities offered by the Municipality on payment of the prescribed charges. Sarjant, J., held that the object of the legislation was to provide for persons who became customers facilities for doing their own washing, but the scheme provided for washing by the municipality itself and that, therefore, it was ultra vires the statute. In coming to that conclusion the learned Judge, after considering in earlier decision on the subject, applied the following principle to the facts of the case before him:
“That recognises that in every case it is for a corporation of this kind to show that it has affirmatively an authority to do particular acts; but that in applying that principle, the rule is not to be applied too narrowly, and the corporation is entitled to do not only that which is expressly authorised but that which is reasonably incidental to or consequential upon that which is in terms authorized.’”
This Court also in the case of Scotts (P) Ltd. v. The Corporation of Calcutta, reported in 79 CWN 883 this court held:
12. In the case of Maniuddin Bepari v. The Chairman of the Municipal Commissioners, Dacca, 40 CWN 17, R.C Mitter, J. observed at p. 18–19 as follows:
“It is a fundamental principle of law that a natural person has the capacity to do all lawful things unless his capacity has been curtailed by some rule of law. It is equally a fundamental principle that in the case of a statutory corporation it is just the other way. The Corporation has no power to do anything unless those powers are conferred on it by the statute which creates it.”
10. A School recognised by the States discharges Public Function. So does the Employment Exchange. Both the authorities are bound by the statutory rules and they are statutorily obliged to act strictly in terms thereof.
11. In this view of the matter there cannot be any doubt that the Managing Committee of the School could not have asked the Employment Exchange to sponsor candidates having higher qualifications.
12. Rule 6(k) upon which strong reliance has been placed by Mr. Chakraborty cannot be read in isolation. It has to be read with the other provisions of the said Rules excluding Rule 4(a).
13. In the case of Indian Administrative Service (S.C.S) Association, U.P v. Union of India reported in 1993 Supp (1) SCC 730 the Supreme Court has held that in case of ambiguity Court can endeavour to iron out the creases and adopt, a just, reasonable and sensible construction in consonance with the legislative intention. It has further been held that in a given case if the provision is found to be defective, wrong, ultra vires or violative of fundamental rights, Court can strike it down but it cannot substitute its own words and phrases to supply casus omissus. In the case of State Of Punjab v. Balbir Singh., reported in (1994) 3 SCC 299 it has been held as follows:
“As discussed above, in considering whether a provision in a statute is mandatory and the effect of non-compliance of the same, the Courts should keep in mind the real intention of the legislature keeping in view the whole scope of the Act and the particular provisions to be construed in the context. Keeping these principles inview, we shall proceed to consider the nature of some of these relevant provisions.”
14. For the reasons aforementioned, it must be held that the petitioner is not entitled to appear at the interview as the Employment Exchange could not have sent his name. In view of my findings aforementioned, there is no merit in this application which is accordingly dismissed.
In this view of the matter, in my opinion it is not necessary to proceed with the contempt matter any further.
Both the applications are disposed of accordingly.
All parties are to act on a signed xerox copy of this judgment on the usual undertaking.
Applications disposed of accordingly.
K.P
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