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A.S. Overseas Private Limited v. Iswar Chinta Haran Shiv Thakur
Factual and Procedural Background
In May 1987 the plaintiff filed a suit against the defendant deity and nine others who were described as Shebaits/Trustees of the deity. The plaintiff's case was that the defendants approached it to develop about 70 cottahs of land (out of about 92 cottahs) at premises No. 8, Ekdalia Road, Calcutta for construction of a multi-storeyed building. An agreement dated 25th July 1986 was alleged to have been entered into between the plaintiff and the defendants with terms including: development of about 70 cottahs, demolition of existing buildings on that area, payment by the plaintiff of Rs. 1,00,00,000 in instalments, entitlement of defendants to 25,000 sq. ft. of super floor area, completion of the buildings within 48 months after obtaining vacant and peaceful possession, and that balance area would belong to the plaintiff.
The plaintiff alleged that it paid amounts (Rs. 20,000 and further sums totalling Rs. 45,000 between 4th and 29th July 1986), that defendants threatened breach, and that the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform. The plaint sought, with leave under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent, among other reliefs, a declaration that the agreement was valid and subsisting and permanent injunction restraining the defendants from entering into transactions derogating from the plaintiff's rights under that agreement. An ad-interim injunction in terms of the plaintiff's application was granted on 6th July 1987. Contempt proceedings for violation of that order and the interlocutory application were pending.
Defendants Nos. 1 and 8 filed an application seeking that the plaint be taken off the file. Their grounds were that the plaint disclosed no cause of action because there was no concluded/enforceable agreement, that the suit was in substance a "suit for land" falling outside the jurisdiction under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent, that the suit was barred under section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, and that it was barred under section 269UC of the Income Tax Act, 1961.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, on the pleadings and documents, there was a concluded and enforceable agreement between the plaintiff and the defendants or whether the agreement was merely an agreement to enter into an agreement/conditional and thus not enforceable (i.e., whether the plaint disclosed a cause of action).
- Whether the suit, as framed, was in substance a "suit for land" within the meaning of Clause 12 of the Letters Patent, thereby affecting the Court's jurisdiction to hear the matter.
- Whether the suit was barred under section 34 of the Specific Relief Act because the plaintiff had not claimed the reliefs then available to it when seeking declaratory relief.
- Whether the suit was barred under section 269UC of the Income Tax Act, 1961.
- Whether the plaint should be taken off the file under Order 7, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure on the grounds advanced by defendants Nos. 1 and 8.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioners / Defendants Nos. 1 and 8 (Application to take plaint off file)
- There was no cause of action disclosed in the plaint because, as shown by the documents, there was no concluded agreement; the document was an agreement to enter into an agreement and not enforceable in law.
- The agreement was conditional (pre-condition being permission of the High Court) and therefore not enforceable.
- The suit was effectively a "suit for land" within Clause 12 of the Letters Patent; when the primary object is declaration of title or determination of possession, the court should treat it as a suit for land (relying on T.B.K.S Maharaj v. Mayapore Sri Chaitanya Math and Bengal Glass & Silicate Works v. Lalit Mohan Bijlani).
- The suit was barred by section 34 of the Specific Relief Act because the plaintiff had not claimed the reliefs then available when seeking a declaratory decree (relying on M.K. Rappai v. John).
- The suit was barred under section 269UC of the Income Tax Act, 1961.
Respondents / Plaintiff (and other respondents opposing the application)
- The plaint only claimed a declaration that the agreement dated 25th July 1986 was valid and subsisting and under that agreement the plaintiff had merely a right to develop the property (no question of title or possession claimed).
- Authorities were cited (Debendra Nath Chowdhury v. Southern Bank Limited and United Commercial Bank v. Sonatan Bastu Shilpa Prathisthan Pvt. Ltd.) to argue that where reliefs are limited to specific performance or rights under agreement and do not directly operate on land, the suit cannot be treated as a suit for land.
- The application to take the plaint off file was grossly delayed (brought in 1993) and, given that the suit had been allowed to remain pending before the Court for a long time, jurisdiction should not be decided on such an application but the suit should be heard in the normal course; revocation of leave under Clause 12 had not been sought.
- The averments in the plaint must be taken as correct; even if statutory non-compliance might prevent a decree, that would not mean the suit was barred or not maintainable as framed.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| T.B.K.S Maharaj v. Mayapore Sri Chaitanya Math, AIR 1983 Cal 420 | Sets out the primary-object test to determine whether a suit is a "suit for land"—look to substance not form; whether relief can be granted without adjudicating title/possession. | The Court relied on this decision as the governing test when construing the plaint and determining whether the suit was in substance a suit for land. |
| Bengal Glass & Silicate Works v. Lalit Mohan Bijlani, AIR 1986 Cal 56 | Applied the same principle in cases with similar pleadings (prayers for declarations and injunctions relating to immovable property). | The Court noted that this decision followed the T.B.K.S. principle and treated it as analogous authority in assessing the present pleadings. |
| M.K. Rappai v. John, (1969) 2 SCC 590 | Authority cited in relation to the principle under section 34 of the Specific Relief Act that a declaratory suit may be barred if the plaintiff did not claim reliefs then available. | The petitioners relied on this Supreme Court decision to argue the suit was barred under section 34; the decision was referenced as supporting that submission (but the Court's ultimate order rested on the finding that the suit was a suit for land). |
| Debendra Nath Chowdhury v. Southern Bank Limited, AIR 1960 Cal 626 | Authority for the proposition that a suit for specific performance where the only relief claimed is execution/transfer (and nothing more) is not a suit for land. | The Court distinguished this case on the facts: in Debendra Nath Chowdhury the reliefs were narrowly limited, whereas in the present suit the reliefs were broader and involved rights that carried possession and ownership implications. |
| United Commercial Bank v. Sonatan Bastu Shilpa Prathisthan Pvt. Ltd., AIR 1981 Cal 146 | Example where plaintiff was in possession and the court observed that leave under Clause 12 could not be granted piecemeal; it addressed how an injunction claim might be treated at hearing. | The Court observed the distinguishing features: in that case the plaintiff was in possession and the court accepted the possibility of dealing with a contentious prayer at hearing; here, both prayers related to title and possession so the suit fell within Clause 12. |
| Brijmohanlal Rathi v. Gita Devi Rathi, AIR 1992 Cal 67 | Illustrated that an injunction framed to restrain defendants from acting in derogation of the plaintiff's title/interest amounts in substance to a claim for determination of the right to possession. | The Court relied on this Division Bench reasoning to show that the plaintiff's prayer for injunction would, in substance, require adjudication on possession and therefore indicated the suit was a suit for land. |
| Md. Hasson Hashmi v. Kaberi Roy, AIR 1993 Cal 70 (DB) | Principle that delay in moving to challenge jurisdiction is immaterial; either the court has jurisdiction or it does not, and consent cannot confer jurisdiction. | The Court invoked this authority to reject the respondents' submission that delay in bringing the application to take the plaint off file was fatal to the petitioners' claim; delay did not affect the jurisdictional question. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court applied the well-established principle governing applications under Order 7, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure: the court ordinarily must accept the averments of the plaint as correct but may construe the plaint and determine the nature of the suit by looking to the substance rather than the form of the pleadings. To decide whether the suit was a "suit for land" within Clause 12 of the Letters Patent, the Court applied the primary-object test as articulated in T.B.K.S Maharaj v. Mayapore Sri Chaitanya Math: one must see whether the relief claimed can be granted without adjudicating questions of title to or possession of immovable property.
The Court examined the terms of the agreement pleaded in the plaint. It found that the plaintiff's alleged rights included demolition and construction of buildings on the premises — rights which implicitly (and, in clause 'f', explicitly) contemplated the plaintiff obtaining possession of the premises ("after the plaintiff obtains possession of the premises"). The agreement also recognised the plaintiff's right to dispose of a portion of the construction, which the Court regarded as being based upon ownership.
On that basis the Court concluded that the agreement did not confer a mere right to develop (as the plaintiff argued at hearing) but involved a transfer of possession and ownership. The Court observed that the permanent injunction sought to restrain the defendants from doing any act in derogation of the plaintiff's rights under the agreement would, in substance, require adjudication as to the right to possession. The Court relied on Division Bench authority (Brijmohanlal Rathi) to demonstrate that an injunction in such terms would amount to a claim for determination of possession.
The Court considered the precedents relied on by the respondents and distinguished them: Debendra Nath Chowdhury was said to be authority for a limited situation where the only relief was a decree for execution/transfer and thus not a suit for land; the present case was not similarly limited. United Commercial Bank was considered distinguishable because in that case the plaintiff was in possession and the court could deal with a contested injunction at hearing; here both prayers related to title and possession bringing the matter within Clause 12.
Regarding the contention about the delay in bringing the application (it was filed in 1993), the Court held that delay was immaterial in determining jurisdiction, citing Md. Hasson Hashmi v. Kaberi Roy: either the Court has jurisdiction or it does not, and consent cannot cure want of jurisdiction.
For these reasons the Court concluded that, without addressing other grounds advanced, the petitioners were entitled to the relief sought because the suit was in substance a suit for land and therefore outside the Court's jurisdiction under Clause 12 as pleaded. The application under Order 7, Rule 11 was allowed on that ground.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Court allowed the application by defendants Nos. 1 and 8 to take the plaint off the file on the ground that the suit, in substance, was a "suit for land" within the meaning of Clause 12 of the Letters Patent and therefore not properly before the Court in the manner pleaded. The Court ordered relief in terms of prayer 'a' of the notice of motion and made no order as to costs.
Implications: The direct effect of the decision is that the plaint was taken off the file (i.e., the suit as framed could not proceed in this Court under the leave granted), because adjudication of the reliefs claimed would necessarily involve determination of title and/or possession. The opinion does not state that it establishes a new legal precedent; it applies and follows existing authorities and distinguishes others to reach the immediate result for the parties. No broader novel legal rule was pronounced beyond the application of the established primary-object test to the pleadings in this matter.
JUDGMENT
The Court:— In May 1987, the plaintiff filed a suit against the defendant deity and 9 others as Shebaits/Trustees of the deity. The case of the plaintiff is that the defendants Shebaits/Trustees approached the plaintiff for development of about 70 cottahs of land for construction of a multi-storeyed building and that after negotiations on 25th July, 1986 an agreement was entered into between the plaintiff and the defendants on the following terms:
(a) That the plaintiff would develop about 70 cottahs of land out of about 92 cottahs of land at premises No. 8, Ekdalia Road, Calcutta 700 019, belonging to the defendant No. 11 deity after excluding about 24 cottahs of land within the temple compound;
(b) That the plaintiff would construct multi-storeyed residential buildings on the said 70 cottahs of land and that the existing buildings on the said 70 cottahs of land would be demolished at an appropriate stage in course of development;
(c) That in consideration of the value of the property the plaintiff would pay to the defendants and the defendants would be entitled to receive from the plaintiff a sum of Rs. 1,00,00,000/- (Rupees One Crore only) to be paid in instalments as agreed by the parties;
(d) That the defendants will be further entitled to receive 25,000 square feet of super floor area in the buildings to be constructed by the plaintiff;
(c) That the balance area in the building to be constructed by the plaintiff as aforesaid shall belong to and remain with the plaintiff which shall be at liberty to dispose of the same according to its sole discretion;
(f) That the proposed buildings to be constructed shall be completed within the periods of 48 months from the date of obtaining vacant and peaceful possession of the said 70 Cottahs of land by the plaintiff from the defendants and/or the plans of the buildings being sanctioned.”
2. It is the plaintiff's case that pursuant to the agreement with the plaintiff, it paid a sum of Rs. 20,000/- to the defendant No. 3 and thereafter between 4th July, 1986 and 29th July, 1986 a further amount of Rs. 45,000/-. It is the plantiff's case that the defendants were threatening to act in breach of the agreement although the plaintiff has performed arid was ready and willing to perform its obligation under the agreement. It is further said that the plaintiff has the right to enjoy the benefit of the agreement between the parties to the exclusion of all others. In paragraph 13 of the plaint it has been stated that the defendants had agreed to sell the premises to the plaintiff under the agreement.
3. On the basis of these allegations the plaintiff filed this suit with leave under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent for the following reliefs:
“(c) A declaration that the said agreement dated 25th July, 1986 is valid and subsisting and the plaintiff's entitled to enjoy the rights under the said agreement to the exclusion of all others;
(d) A permanent injunction restraining the defendants, its servants, agents or assignees from entering into any agreement or any transaction affecting the right of the plaintiff under the said agreement dated 25th July 1986 or to do any act which is in derogation of the rights of the plaintiff under the said agreement dated 25th July 1986 or for commissioning any act which would be contrary to the rights of the plaintiff under the said agreement dated 25th July, 1986;
(e) Damages;
(f) Receiver;
(g) Injunction;
(h) Costs;
(i) Further and other reliefs.”
4. An interlocutory application was moved in the suit. An ad-interim order was passed on 6th July, 1987 in terms of prayer ‘a’ of the petition reads as under:
“An order of injunction do issue restraining the defendants, their servants, agents or assigns from entering into any agreement or any transaction effecting the right of plaintiff under the agreement dated 25th July, 1986 or to do any act which is in derogation of the rights of the plaintiff or the obligations defendants under the said agreement dated 25th July, 1986 or from commissioning any act which would be contrary to the rights of the plaintiff under the said agreement dated 25th July, 1986.”
5. It appears that contempt proceedings were filed by the plaintiff against the defendants for the violation of the order dated 6th July, 1987. The contempt proceeding and the interlocutory application are still pending.
6. The defendants Nos. 1 and 8 then filed an application for taking the plaint of the file. The grounds for the relief claimed in this application are four. The first submission is that there was no cause of action disclosed in the plaint. It is submitted by the petitioners that the Suit had been filed for declaration that an agreement was valid and subsisting. It is said that there was in fact no concluded agreement between the parties as was apparent from the documents filed with the plaint. It is said that the agreement was to enter into an agreement and was not enforceable in law. It is also said that the agreement was a conditional one the pre-condition for the performances of which was permission of the High Court and as such could not be enforced.
7. Secondly it is submitted that the suit was a suit for land within the meaning of Clause 12 of the Letters Patent and as such the Court did not have the jurisdiction to try the suit. Reliance has been placed on T.B.K.S Maharaj v. Mayapore Sri Chaitanya Math, AIR 1983 Cal 420 and Bengal Glass & Silicate Works v. Lalit Mohan Bijlani, AIR 1986 Cal 56 to contend that where the primary object of the Suit was to obtain declaration of title or a determination on the question of possession, the Court would treat the suit as a suit for land despite the language which may have been used.
8. Thirdly it is submitted that the suit was barred under the provision of section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, in as much as the plaintiff had not claimed the relief which it could have at the time praying for declaratory relief. The decision of the Supreme Court in M.K Rappai v. John, (1969) 2 SCC 590 has been cited in this context.
9. Finally it is submitted that the suit was barred under section 269 UC of the Income Tax Act, 1961.
10. The respondents have contended that in the suit as framed the plaintiff had claimed only a declaration that the agreement dated 25th July, 1986 entered into between the parties was valid and subsisting. Under that agreement the plaintiff only had a right to develop the property. It is submitted that there was no question of title involved nor was any possession asked for. The respondents had relied upon Debendra Nath Chowdhury v. Southern Bank Limited, AIR 1960 Cal 626 and United Commercial Bank v. Sonatan Bastu Shilpa Prathisthan Pvt. Ltd., AIR 1981 Cal 146 to contend that in such circumstances a suit cannot be said to be a suit for land. It is urged that the plaintiff wanted to restrain the defendants from granting the rights under the agreement to any third party. The reliefs did not operate directly in respect of the land.
11. Secondly, it is submitted that the application was grossly delayed. It is submitted that since the parties had allowed the suit to remain pending before this Court for such a long time, The court should not determine the issue of jurisdiction on an application but allow the suit to be heard in the normal course. It is pointed out that revocation of leave under clause 12 of the Letters Patent had not been asked for.
12. Thirdly, it is submitted that the statements contained in the plaint will have to be taken as correct. It was the plaintiff's case in the plaint that there was a concluded agreement. It may be that the Court may not pass a decree in favour of the plaintiff by reason of non-compliance with a statutory provision such as the Income Tax Act but this would not mean that the suit was barred or not maintainable as framed.
13. Without going into any other question in my view, the petitioner is entitled to an order as prayed for on the ground that the suit is in fact a suit for land.
14. The principle for deciding an application under Order 7, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure is well-established. The principle is that the court must act on the basis that the averments in the plaint are correct. There is an exception to this principle. The exception is that the court will construe the plaint and will determine the nature of the suit on the substance rather than the form of the pleadings. As already held by the Division Bench in T.B.K.S Maharaj v. Mayapore Sri Chaitanya Math (supra), the primary object of the suit will have to be decided and the test to determine the primary object is to see whether the relief claimed can be granted to the plaintiff without necessity of any adjudication the question of title to land or building or other immovable properties or possession or control or management thereof. If the relief stands the test, the suit will not be a suit for land within the meaning of Clause 12 of the Letters Patent although the grant of such relief may indirectly affect the land. If, however, by applying the test it is found that such relief cannot be granted without deciding the question of title or possession control or management of land, the suit will be a suit for land within the meaning of Clause 12.
15. In the case of T.B.K.S Maharaj v. Mayapore Sri Chaitanya Math (supra), the reliefs were for declarations and injunctions relating to immovable property.
16. This decision has been followed in Bengal Glass & Silicate Works v. Lalit Mohan Bijlani (supra), in which the prayers are similarly couched as the prayers in the plaint in this case.
17. The prayers in the plaint clearly indicate that the plaintiff is seeking an adjudication upon it's rights under the agreement. The plaintiff's rights under the agreement, according to the plaintiff have been set out in paragraph 4 of the plaint as quoted earlier. This includes the right to demolish and to construct in the premises. Both these rights carry with them implicitly the right to possess the premises. This implicit right is made somewhat explicit in clause ‘f’ quoted above, which envisages the construction to be completed within a period of 48 months after the plaintiff obtains: possession of the premises.
18. Additionally the agreement recognises the right of the plaintiff to dispose of a portion of the construction. This right is based upon ownership.
19. The agreement does not confers a mere right to develop as contended by the plaintiff at the time of hearing but involves a transfer of possession and ownership.
20. The permanent injunction prayed for against the defendants to restrain them from doing any act in derogation of the rights of the plaintiff under the agreement connotes an adjudication on the right to possession.
21. In a similar case the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Brijmohanlal Rathi v. Gita Devi Rathi, AIR 1992 Cal 67 held:
“Prayer (d) the plaint is for an injunction restraining the defendants/respondents from in any manner acting in derogation of or in manner inconsistent with the right, title and interest of the appellant/plaintiff in respect of the premises. Admittedly, the respondents/defendants are in possession of the premises. An injunction in this form would mean that the defendants/respondents cannot any further remain in possession of the premises and would have to vacate. In substance, the plaintiff by prayer (d) is explicitly claiming the determination of the right to possession of the premises.”
22. The decision in Debendra Nath Chowdhury v. Southern Bank Limited (supra) is an authority for the proposition that a suit for specific performance where the only relief claimed is a decree for execution of document or transfer and nothing else, is not a suit for land. In this case the relief is not as limited as it was in the case before the Division Bench.
23. In the second decision cited by the respondents in United Commercial Bank v. Sonatan Bastu Shilpa Prathisthan Pvt. Ltd. (supra), the plaintiff was in possession of the premises. The title of the defendants to the flat was not disputed. Of all the prayers, prayer (d) related to an injunction restraining the defendants from acting in any manner contrary to or inconsistent with the agreement. The Court accepted the submission of the plaintiff that even if any difficulty was felt by the Court at the hearing of the suit in granting prayer (d) of the plaint the Court may deal with the same at the hearing and the plaintiff was entitled to give up such claim at the hearing but leave under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent could not be granted prayer-wise or piece meal.
24. In this case both the prayers (c) and (d) relate to title and possession bringing the case clearly within the definition “suit for” land and within the meaning of Clause 12 of the Letters Patent.
25. The fact that the application has been taken out in 1993 is immaterial. As held in Md. Hasson Hashmi v. Kaberi Roy, AIR 1993 Cal. 70(DB) either the Court has jurisdiction or it does not have the jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of the Court does not depend on the volition of the defendant (vide paragraph 21 of the report).
26. It is too well established to need the citing of any authority that consent cannot confer jurisdiction where on the basis of the allegations contained in the plaint the Court is of the view that the suit is a suit for land, no useful purpose would be served is prolonging the agony by having the issue decided at the hearing of the suit. For the reasons aforesaid the application is allowed. There will be an order in terms of prayer ‘a’ of the notice of motion. There will however, be no order as to costs.
Application allowed.
K.P
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